PRESIDENTIAL POWERS IN THE SYSTEM OF STATE SUPERVISION IN THE MANAGEMENT SPHERE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Resumo

1. Rationale is determined by increase of convergence processes in constitutional and administrative and legal regulation of public administration sphere in democratic states, which is one of legal indications of trends to “rationalized parliamentarism” practice development. The practice of perception and reorganization of classic “triad” principle of branches of government and “checks and balances” system in state administration is featured with significant country-specific peculiarities and, at times, high dynamism in states with with a mixed government, and is observed, firstly, via studies of modifications of arrangement and status of individual responsibility, politico-legal institution of the chief executive.
2. Aim of the article is to reveal, based on the study of development of president status regulation by constitution and administrative and legal mechanisms, modifications of “separation of powers” system under conditions of mixed government, i.e. semi-presidential republic in the Russian Federation, related to confirmation of constitutional and legal fundamentals of presidential power as an independent branch, its identification with executive (partially) and control (mainly) branches.
3. The leading approach to the study of this issue is as follows. Mechanism of interaction, competition (but not confrontation) and “mutual circumscription” of authorities is ensured by corresponding organizational and legal forms of their activities. In order to ensure the effective functioning of the “separation of powers” system, it is necessary to consider that each of the branch of government are realized through the same organizational and legal forms, that is, also, by means of rule-making and on the basis of positive law enforcement, and both law enforcement and control activities. At that, functions conforming with lawmaking, law enforcement and administration, or control forms of each branch activities are implemented only within the ranges and framework of the corresponding branch purposive appointment. [3. p. 24].
4. Results.

A). Due to convergence of constitutional and administrative and legal regulation, in the scientific community, there sometimes sound diametrically opposed judgments on future of structure of state based on division of powers: from complete negation of “separation of powers” principle to overuse of powers “division” into branches, significant extension of classic “triad” is proposed. It seems, that overuse of the power division, acceptance of multiple centers of power in state practice may inspire trends towards weakening of state, which is unwelcome for enforcement of rights and freedoms. However, some extension of classic system is feasible. Thus, regarding mixed forms of government, it is worthwhile to agree with necessity for reinterpretation of classic “separation of powers” concept, in particular, of extraction of control branch of government.

 B). State control as an organizational and legal form of activity is inherent to  each branch of power. Among the variety of constitutional control, there should be distinguished: Presidential control, parliamentary control, judicial control and control in the system of executive branch. However, as the branch of government in a presidential-parliamentary Republic, the constitutional control is identical to presidential status.  In control powers, there is the great (exceeding) force of presidential powers concealed in semi-presidential republic as compared to presidential powers in classic presidential republic.

C). In the course of operational (practical) activities, heads of states (chief executives), in most countries, exercise their constitutional powers, relying on apparatuses, not constitutionally established structures which status is rather based on administrative regulations, or administrative discretion rights. In Russia, the Executive Office of the President (similar to the corresponding organization in some other countries) relies on constitutional provisions, which is more corresponding to the requirements of constitutional system with regard to remarkable factual significance of the specified institutions for mechanism of individual responsibility powers exercising.

D). Presidential control in the Russian Federation, by its nature, is a form of constitutional control. The peculiarity of presidential branch of power in Russia (as a semi-presidential one) is that it is a synthesis of three foreparts: The status of head of state (highest representative of the Russian state and arbitrator of constitutionally established authorities); status of president as the chief executive; constitutional control powers of the President.

E). In composite (federate) states, the powers of the president in area of constitutional control of federate relations “vertical structure” are highly important to ensure unity and territorial integrity of state, prevent and preclude conflicts in legal system. In Russia, in this framework, the activity of the RF President is rather important, including the one based on interaction with courts and Russian procuratorial bodies. The Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993) envisages a wide range of restrictions of presidential control regarding the subjects of the Russian Federation, which are ensuring effect of constitutional state and federalism principles announced in the Constitution.

F). Maintenance of balance between constitutional and administrative regulation of public administration sphere in a democratic state is the condition of moderate balance of powers in constitutional “separation of powers” system.

5. Materials of the article may be useful when improving legislation and practice of states with a mixed form of government (semi-presidential republic) for development of constitutional control academical doctrine, for improvement of heads of states statuses under conditions of mixed forms of government.