@article{Jalali_Vahid Lajevardi_Ali Heydari_2020, title={THE POSITION OF JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL SYSTEMS}, volume={9}, url={https://periodicos.ufpb.br/index.php/ged/article/view/50827}, DOI={10.22478/ufpb.2179-7137.2020v9n2.50827}, abstractNote={<p>In the political systems of nations, independence from the political pressure exerted by government officials and legislators guarantees the impartiality of judges. Thus, the power of judges to review public law and to violate the constitution by them acts as a fundamental obstacle to the possible abuse of power by the state. This power requires the courts to be independent and able to make their decisions based on the law. Administrative and institutional independence of the judiciary has never been a matter of purpose and has not been an inherent matter, but has been a means of securing the independence of the judge. Because the mere organizational and organizational independence of the judiciary is as valid as the independence of the legislature and the executive. The emphasis, therefore, on judicial independence in this sense must, to some extent, be that the balance of power is maintained. Just as judges in the United States and England are elected by political bodies such as the President and the Senate, there must be a way for the judiciary to maintain the balance of power, which is nothing but judicial oversight</p>}, number={2}, journal={GĂȘnero & Direito}, author={Jalali, Gholamreza and Vahid Lajevardi, Seyyed and Ali Heydari, Abbas}, year={2020}, month={fev.} }