STRAUSS AND THE MORAL ANTITHESIS ARGUMENT AGAINST SCIENTISM IN HOBBES' PHILOSOPHY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7443/problemata.v12i1.56665Keywords:
Hobbes, Vanity, Civil philosophy, Mechanism, FearAbstract
The aim of this article is to provide a critique of Strauss' claims to determine a moral foundation for Hobbes' civil philosophy. It is therefore a question of discussing the determinations of man's behavior derived from a natural tendency imposed upon him. In this way, the viability of the link between natural philosophy and civil philosophy is exposed in order to determine Hobbes' commitment to the terms of the mechanism of his time. Strauss' argument that the principle of self-preservation is based on a moral antithesis between vanity and the fundamentally just fear of violent death is thus made impossible.
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