ASPECTS OF THE COORDINATION BETWEEN SEMANTICS AND PHILOSOPHY IN GILBERT RYLE:

AN ARGUMENT ABOUT THE PHILOSOPHICAL NATURE OF SEMANTIC KNOWLEDGE

Abstract

This paper explores the theses of two 1930s articles by Gilbert Ryle (Systematically Misleading Expressions and Categories), occasionally commenting two others papers (Meaning Theory and Ordinary Language) to discuss an alternative to the Quine-Davidsonian thesis that semantic knowledge about simpliciter truth and analytical truth is purely extensional, and do not involve any normative, conceptual or intensional knowledge about the identity of the studied semantic objects. Ryle's thesis is not an obvious opposition, as he agrees with Quine-Davidson on at least one key point: the thesis that semantic knowledge does not involve intensional objects. However, in addition to maintaining a normative view on the practice of signification, Ryle's thesis also contains an opposition to Quine-Davidson that is not obviously perceptible, although fundamental: he argues that structural knowledge about semantic connections involves an understanding of categories, that teaches language speakers to predict systematic antinomies or deceptions. Ryle believes that this knowledge is philosophical, as well as semantic. His thesis shows an aspect in which semantics and philosophy are not completely divorced. This article intends to remind this interpretative option to the universe of the current semantic discussion.