ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF DISEMBODIED COGNITION: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF THE LIMITS OF THE ARTIFICIAL MIND

Abstract

The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) as a technical and epistemic phenomenon reconfigures philosophical debates on the nature of mind, cognition, and subjectivity. This article examines the ontological assumptions underlying the equation between human and artificial cognition, questioning the possibility of a disembodied mind. Through a phenomenological and critical approach, we articulate the contributions of Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus, Searle, Chalmers, and others to demonstrate that cognition cannot be reduced to computational processes but emerges from lived and situated corporeality. We argue that AI, by abstracting the embodied dimension of experience, operates as a simulacrum, incapable of reproducing the intentionality and qualia of human consciousness. The study reveals that the attempt to replicate the mind in machinic substrates exposes not only the limits of technology but also the aporias of traditional philosophical models of cognition. We conclude that AI, more than a technical challenge, is a critical mirror that compels philosophy to rethink the relationship between body, mind, and technology.