Instrumentalization of Brazilian foreign policy to hegemony building: from Cardoso’s Neoliberal Bloc to Lula and Rousseff’s Neodevelopmentalist’s

Instrumentalização da política externa brasileira para construção de hegemonia: do bloco neoliberal de Cardoso ao neodesenvolvimentista de Lula e Dilma

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Abstract: This article addresses the central aspects of the Brazilian Foreign Policy from 1995 to mid 2016, under the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Vana Rousseff, and the models used to seek Brazilian autonomy. Based on the appropriate theme bibliography and the following analysis and data interpretation, a triangularization between Foreign Policy Analysis and Gramsci’s theory and Poulantzas’ s was made to investigate whether there was an intersection between the projects of hegemony and the Foreign policies applied during that time or not. The investigation also looked into the role of such projects in relation to their particular autonomy seeking model. Thusly, there are elements that point to Foreign Policy as part of the public policies which, along the transition from neoliberalism to neodevelopmentalism, show a general move towards a dispute for hegemonic supremacy related to the configuration of power blocs and historic blocs, thus affecting the whole of the Brazilian Capitalist Organization.

Keywords: Brazilian Foreign Affairs; Hegemony; Neoliberalism; Neodevelopmentalism.

Resumo: O artigo aborda os aspectos centrais das relações exteriores do Brasil que permitam compreender os modelos de busca por autonomia adotados entre 1995 e meados

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de 2016, nas gestões de Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva e Dilma Vana Rousseff. Através do acesso à bibliografia pertinente à temática e da interpretação de seus dados, realiza-se uma triangulação entre a Análise de Política Externa e as teorias gramsciana e poulantziana para investigar as intersecções entre projetos de hegemonia e a política externa aplicada no período, assim como situar o papel desses projetos em meio aos respectivos modelos de busca por autonomia, identificando as particularidades de cada gestão. Assim, chega-se a elementos que apontam para a política externa como parte do conjunto de políticas públicas que, na transição do neoliberalismo para o neodesenvolvimentismo, incide sobre o movimento geral de disputa por hegemonia, relacionando-se com a configuração de blocos no poder e blocos históricos e, consequentemente, sobre a organização do capitalismo brasileiro.

Palavras-chave: Política Externa Brasileira; Hegemonia; Neoliberalismo; Neodesenvolvimentismo.

1. Introduction

The search for autonomy is constant in the Brazilian foreign policy tradition, and it moves through the many development models adopted by the Brazilian governments in a complex way, mainly due to the lethargic Brazilian democratic tradition, interrupted by authoritarian and dictatorial projects (SOARES DE LIMA, 1996). It is important to emphasize that such policies are not loose gears in the political environment, but are inserted in its structure and movement complex, whose modulation is determined by political and social hegemonies. The hegemonic dispute, therefore, is not alien to foreign policy. It is up to this article the understanding of these interactions from 1995 to mid 2016.

That moment had been marked by the presence of two structuring models for Brazilian capitalism, neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism, which, respectively, adopted the model of autonomy by integration (Fernando Henrique Cardoso) and autonomy by diversification (Luís Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Vana Rousseff). In autonomy by integration, the country's development objectives were achieved through adherence, albeit with some friction, to neoliberal hegemony, seeking space for the country's protagonism via active participation in the design of the framework of norms and laws that would regulate political and economic international activity (PINHEIRO,2000). This led to the belief of expanding the space for Brazil's articulation.

Changes in the electoral terrain of hegemony consecrate the Workers' Party (PT) as government leader, carrying with it a transition without irreconcilable ruptures to a new ideological matrix, which was responsible for leading Lula and Dilma's
governments. The public policy framework guided by this new ideology would also manifest itself in the foreign policy applied by the government, which presents a new formula for autonomy. Due to the need of reproducing the material concerns of social groups within the government's political base, these administrations' foreign policy was the basis for a national development project (RAMOS, 2012). This was so because the new power bloc included layers of the working class associated with fractions of the bourgeoisie (BERRINGER, 2015). Autonomy by diversification, then, prioritized South-South relations while maintaining relations with economic centers. It aimed to influence the international system's dynamics, building a broad spectrum of maneuvering and greater possibilities for the country's protagonism on the economic and social agenda (SOARES DE LIMA, 2005).

Interpreting the foreign policy employed in these periods can be useful for a theoretical objective that still holds potential for exploitation when it comes to the more general understanding of a government: the dispute for hegemony. To achieve this, the perspectives of Foreign Policy Analysis will be used to argumentatively determine the objectives and practices derived from these policies. This effort will sustain the use of Gramscian and Poulantzian theories to conceptually approach foreign policy as a tool in the construction of hegemony, associating these hegemonic projects with their respective autonomy understandings. Based on these intentions, the article is divided into four sections: the first analyzes FHC's foreign policy and seeks to find in it elements capable of pointing to the power bloc organization (Poulantzas, 1977) that supported him, as well as to understanding his objectives, in terms of tactics for hegemony through such a policy. The second focuses on the role of foreign policy in PT's hegemonic project and identifies some contradictions between the party program and the power bloc. To that end, it exposes the elements of the party's foreign policy and the changes between Lula and Dilma's governments. The third dedicates itself to systematizing these elements from the perspective of historic bloc construction. Finally, some final notes are sought on the analyses contained in the article.

2. Neoliberal Hegemony: Perspectives on Foreign Policy and its Relation with the Power Bloc
Due to opting for Foreign Policy Analysis as a method, the aspects of foreign policy will be approached through a perspective focused on state agents, not by disregarding the influences of supra, extra and parastatal entities, but by seeing foreign policy, in short, as a public policy, permeated by the dynamics of domestic conflicts (SALOMÓN; PINHEIRO, 2013). However, in accordance with the vision proposed here, this takes place in the midst of the dispute for hegemony field, so it is also necessary to understand how social classes, their fractions and, sometimes, their representative entities are interposed in these interactions.

Faced with the end of the Cold War, the FHC governments are characterized by adherence to the nascent neoliberal hegemony that from the western becomes worldwide. This is the origin of the concept that Chesnais (1996) would characterize as mondialisation. A change in the Brazilian foreign policy matrix, which had carried continuities since the 1970s, is then perceived. The new matrix assumed the process of mondialisation, adopting the paradigm of neoliberal policies that, according to the government's perspectives, aimed at overcoming the economic crisis and stagnation characteristic of the 1980s. It is necessary, however, to understand that the neoliberal precepts pervaded all the governments in the 1990s. Each of them would adapt the neoliberal assumptions according to their pretensions of autonomy and development. (SILVA, 2012).

It may be stated that the foreign policy in FHC's governments was resized, in comparison with that started by Itamar Franco, who assumed some national-developmentalist postures, absorbing from Fernando Collor the automatic alignment to the Washington Consensus and implementing an aggressive neoliberalism, which would end up generating reactions from the national business community and the Brazilian leftwing. However, there are some continuity traits regarding the policy implemented by Itamar Franco, mainly in the economic policy, marked by the Real, while in the internal and external policy it gradually adapted to the neoliberal matrix. A considerable part of the theorization that sustained this type of international insertion came from the president himself, with his concept of "associate-dependent", which no longer saw opposition between dependency and development (TEIXEIRA; PINTO, 2012). Thus, a space is opened to understand the conformation of the power bloc that would support the neoliberal project in Brazil and integrate the historic bloc led by the world financial bourgeoisie.
The rupture sense is more pronounced if we compare it to the protectionist policies in force until 1988, which would characterize what Vigevani, Oliveira and Cintra (2003) called autonomy by distance. The changes towards the neoliberal matrix did not take place unilaterally in Fernando Henrique Cardoso's governments, since they were gradually absorbed by the predecessor governments (the end of the Sarney and Collor governments and with some resistance in Itamar Franco's government), but were potentialized by the latter, when this transition would lead to the strategy of autonomy by integration. It sought to institutionalize the international scenario, considering this the path to Brazilian insertion as a global player.

In the context of this strategy and the paradigm used for its application, one must consider the local context of Brazil's insertion: Latin America. In the 1990s, neoliberalism was hegemonic throughout the region, although with different historical times. In the country, neoliberalism became a reality in the period of redemocratization, in which social movements gained significant political strength and the national bourgeoisie was shielded by the state, which made this project's hegemonic desires difficult. This analysis is also supported by the opponent Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party), which claims that the effects of neoliberalism upon Brazil have been softened (CONGRESSO NACIONAL DO PT, 2007). Nevertheless, the economic climate of hyperinflation and fiscal crisis of the state are sufficient to build consensus around the need for "structural reforms" (SILVA, 2012).

A new power bloc is then consolidated (POULANTZAS, 1977) led by the associated (or purchasing) bourgeoisie, in other words, one that due to its lack of its own basis of accumulation, has binding relations of dependence on international financial capital, controlled by the large centers (BERRINGER, 2014).

Cervo and Bueno (2008), on the other hand, proceeded to a state-centered analysis, characterizing the model adopted by FHC as "Normal State", or that which adheres to mondialisation (neoliberal hegemony). In this paper it is believed that despite being the main matrix adopted, there was mutual coexistence between the characterizations given by the authors of developmental (industrializing) state and logistic state (balance in international concert). These swings are also the outcome of the dispute for hegemony, since they are responses to the need of giving political cohesion to a heterogeneous power bloc in terms of bourgeoisie fractions, also including the industrial
bourgeoisie which, displeased with the 1980s economic performance, adhered to the neoliberal project (BIANCHI, 2010).

Furthermore, the inclusion of themes such as human rights, environment, minorities, indigenous populations and drug trafficking in the world debate leads the perspectives of a country's insertion to a rescaling, the relative importance being less measured by its military and strategic weight and more by its capacity to articulate an economic, commercial, scientific and cultural projection (VIGEVANI; OLIVEIRA; CINTRA, 2003).

The government's decision-making core was articulated in the consensus around the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) and the free trade area with the European Union, based on the perspective that "the global solution must be the objective" (BRAZIL apud VIGEVANI; OLIVEIRA; CINTRA, 2003 p.34), characterizing the desired tactic for transforming Brazil into a global trader. It also brings elements to consolidate the understanding of a buying bourgeoisie as the leader of the power bloc in that government.

So the government's options converged on three fronts: MERCOSUR, South America and the FTAA. Brazil's international projection was consolidated by its performance in MERCOSUR, passing through South America and flowing into the international scenario as a whole. This international projection, developed from the regional axis, would be one of the great continuities of his government, although it carried the novelty of closer alignment with US policy.

Back to the internal conditioning factors, it can be seen that the civil society organization, hegemonized by the opposition, boosted public debate on foreign policy, increasing the dispute over its formulation. In response, presidential diplomacy was adopted as a way to mobilize public opinion sectors and install a new diplomatic management model and decision-making process (AMORIM NETO, 2011). This characteristic also takes place in the Lula administration, although in a different direction (SILVA, 2012). However, it is not possible to affirm that Itamaraty, in its typical insulation (FARIA, 2012), had its role reduced in the decision-making process for policies applied at the external level. That is, presidential diplomacy rather represents the form than the content of foreign policy.

Regarding the construction of the FTAA, Brazilian strategy was based on obstruction, seeking to benefit from the alleged reduction of the US power. Silva (2012), however, highlights the risky nature of this movement, since it could lead to bilateral
accessions to trade agreements with the United States. This process linked to the FTAA would bring to light an important debate around the risks and opportunities of integration, pushing the country, through a movement that would manifest itself internally and externally, to the appreciation of MERCOSUR and the debate about its role and future. Here one perceives a movement of concessions, essential in maintaining hegemony, considering the internal fraction of the bourgeoisie led by the purchasing bourgeoisie and in political terms, by the PSDB. The aim was to maintain the unity of the dominant classes, against the dominated classes (BOITO JR, 1999).

According to the vision held by the foreign policy formulation body under the FHC government, this movement would not only give harmony to its power bloc, but would also allow greater synchrony between Brazilian foreign policy and world trends. This model of interaction with the world would finally seek to avoid the isolation of Brazil from the international mainstream. (BURGES; BASTOS, 2017).

This movement also sought to align the construction of national identity with the values imposed by neoliberalism, focusing on what Gramsci (1985) had postulated, on the importance of ideological activity in the battle for dominance over other social classes. The creation of a historic block, or the adhesion to it, would not happen without the convergence between the structural and supra structural aspects, between the economic-social and the ethical-political. According to Renault (2008), the Brazilian media played an important role in a positive imagetic construction of FHC, before and during its mandate, which may suggest that there could be media adhesion to the power block under the FHC government, contributing in this function of ideological dispute towards the consolidation of a historic block. This differentiation must be made between the power bloc and the historical bloc. The former is a transient and unstable arrangement that supports the project emanating from the latter, which consolidates its hegemony through the confluence of power blocs.

In sum, through the active participation in the mechanisms of world concert under the historic neoliberal bloc, the redefinition "autonomy" concept is demonstrated, which should not be sought by the country’s isolation, but through a complete integration with the dictates of world order.

Based theoretically greatly on the leader at the time and balancing itself between the Grotian (synthesis between realism and idealism) and Kantian (idealism) paradigms, it was through this undertaking that Brazil would seek the development goals aligned with
its power bloc, which, being led by the purchasing bourgeoisie, entangled them indistinctly to the general interests of the world order.

The ideological dispute within civil society came about in terms of attracting general perspectives for cosmopolitan and therefore neoliberal acceptance. Understanding the function of organic intellectuals, to a large extent, represented or diffused by the media, on disputing traditional intellectuals and formulating beyond economic, but philosophical and moral interests and thus exercising power of influence over the whole civil body (GRAMSCI, 1985), one can denote the function of FHC's foreign policy in this broader process of hegemonic building. It is necessary, however, to point out that his government aligned itself to a great extent with the hegemonic interests of the historic bloc with world pretensions born from the end of the Cold War and for this reason he did not see great needs for efforts in this bias, beyond those already exercised by the entities representing the bourgeoisie fractions coalized in his power bloc.

FHC's neoliberal structures would be bequeathed to his successor, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, although now with a new power bloc configuration, therefore differentiated development objectives (BERRINGER, 2014). This new configuration did not dispense an elevation in the hegemonic dispute, since it contested aspects of the project emanating from the historic neoliberal bloc. Foreign policy was a strong dispute front in this sense.

3. Foreign Policy as a Hegemonic Dispute Front: Lula, Dilma and Neodevelopmentalism

The foreign policy employed by both Lula and Rousseff holds many similarities with that formulated within the Workers' Party, which would be the result of a build-up of debates dating back to the late 1970s and passing through many evolutions until it led to government policy, which would represent a confluence between the party's perspectives, the professional trajectory outlined by Celso Amorim, his legacy left to Rousseff and the Itamaraty traditions themselves (RAMOS, 2012). The most symbolic address was that of change, in relation to the foreign policy applied by the predecessor governments, especially that of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The power bloc, then led by the purchasing bourgeoisie, was now hegemonized by a new fraction, the internal bourgeoisie (BOITO JR, 2012), but with a determining factor: the inclusion of the
dominated classes within this bloc, even if at a disadvantage in terms of power, but with the advantage of leading the bloc politically.

Armando Boito Jr (2012) would call the set of characteristics coming from this power block configuration "neodevelopmentalism", as it presents a process of development without ruptures with the neoliberal matrix and, emphasizing the characteristic considered here most relevant of its description, with fewer possibilities of developing anti-imperialist characteristics. The article will present some excerpts that may contradict this argument, however it uses the term "neodevelopmentalism" because it corroborates with its central idea: a development process that preserves neoliberal structures.

To begin with, one must understand that the expansion of relations with developing and emerging countries, especially South American countries and relations with Russia, China, India and South Africa (developing BRICS) in Lula and Dilma's governments was not the result of a foreign policy guided solely by ideological motivation, but rather a pragmatic one (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007). Thereby, it was essential in building a movement against hegemony in relation to the historic bloc led by the US financial bourgeoisie (RAMOS, 2012). However, it cannot be said that there have been basal breaks in the policy presented by Lula:

[…]while there was no significant break with historical paradigms of Brazilian foreign policy, with some of the guidelines being unfolded and reinforcements of actions already underway in the FHC administration, there was a significant change in the emphases given to certain options open earlier to Brazilian foreign policy. We consider both governments (FHC and Lula da Silva) as representatives of distinct Brazilian diplomatic traditions, presenting differences in actions, preferences, and beliefs, seeking specific results that are very different in terms of foreign policy, but trying not to move away from an objective always pursued: to develop the country economically, while preserving a certain political autonomy. (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007 p. 275)

Therefore, one can state that the main differences between FHC and Lula lie in these leaders' and their staff's different interpretations and ideologies about the constraints and possibilities of the international order. Hence, at the center of the debate comes the question of the principles that led Brazil's foreign policy in Lula and Dilma's administration.

2 Author's translation.
An important aspect of the change seen in the party's governments was activism for the inclusion of social issues in the main international debates, as in 2003 in the Doha round, when Lula advocated for economic center countries to unleash efforts for programs to fight hunger in developing countries, gaining the French and Chilean presidents' support. This would characterize the demanding profile, in relation to developed nations, that would be established in the given period.

An institutional framework (IBSA, BRICS, G-20) was also built to reconfigure the international correlation of forces, influencing the process of hegemonic dispute worldwide.

Based on this diversification, Lula's administration expanded the relevance of foreign relations in the execution of a national development project. A basis for comparison can then be established between the three autonomy search models propagated by Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007): The search for autonomy by distance, in which a certain distance from international centers of power is sought (characteristic of the Independent Foreign Policy period and of some periods of the civic-military dictatorship, under Ernesto Geisel's command); autonomy by participation, which was introduced in 1989 and strengthened with FHC, absorbing the idea that it was necessary to influence the international agenda by actively participating in building the international system's framework of norms and rules; and finally, autonomy by diversification, in which the settlement of relations with non-conventional partners is sought, especially in South-South relations. The foreign policy coordinated in Lula's governments bore occasional similarities to the first two traditions, but strongly incorporated the aspect of autonomy by diversification.

The transition from the autonomy by participation model to that of autonomy by diversification presents traces of change, such as the appointment of Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, a fierce critic of the FHC administration, to the general secretariat of Itamaraty, but also of continuity, with the maintenance of important ambassadors.

From the development of the country's foreign relations new model, it can be understood that the central elements of Brazilian foreign policy, as of 2003, were articulated around the need for a national development project, whose objectives would be mirrored in the following items: the resumption of economic growth, reversing the trend of recession; combining growth with a process of income distribution, based on the construction of a market for mass consumption goods, a factor linked to the expansion of...
employment and wages, credit supply and income transfer policies; the achievement of economic balance, aimed at reducing external vulnerability; the expansion of democracy and a sovereign international insertion of the country; priority to the integration of South America (GASPAR; SPINA, 2018).

From that the "South American option" was developed, since there was an untapped potential in the region, which has one of the largest and most diversified energy capacities on Earth, advanced agriculture in terms of size and technology, and enormous mineral deposits. This allied to a significant industrial park (although concentrated in some countries), high quality scientific and technological research centers and an exuberant culture, situates South America as a strategic region in the geopolitical dispute for hegemony. Thus, MERCOSUR is seen as an important initiative, which has reached higher levels of development in the periods of progressive governments in the region. With the approach of several countries to this endeavor, arises the need, led by the Brazilian State, to create UNASUL (Union of South American Nations), which brings together all the countries of South America. This process didn't occur without complexities for the Brazilian foreign policy implementation in the continent, since it found limits mainly in the conflicts developed in the Andean regions, which led to an intensification of social struggles. (GASPAR; SPINA, 2018).

The Brazilian government's stance facing situations such as the Iraq War (2003) and US espionage on the Brazilian government (2015) demonstrated an independent agenda towards the economic center. The attempt to adapt the international scenario to its political pretensions led the Brazilian government, under Lula, to actively participate in the construction of the commercial G20, which changed important parameters in global commercial characteristics. Emerging from this nascent position of Brazil in the world are the invitations to participate in the financial G20 and the formation of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), which is responsible for creating an important counter-hegemonic movement against the historic neoliberal bloc led by the United States.

The expression coined by Nelson Rodrigues (1993), "mutt complex," seemed to place itself further and further away in face of the new foreign policy implemented by Lula, in which autonomy by diversification proved to be an important instrument for the reallocation of Brazil in the international system. The announced ephemerality of this

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position would come true in face of the inability to implement state reforms that would allow a lasting and consolidated effect of these policies.

As a result, the prospect of a national development project, which would go through the model of import substitution, was gradually abandoned, mainly in the FHC governments, but was also present in the Lula governments, in which the advocates of a national development project gradually gave up a protectionist process (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007).

This movement, however, didn't prevent Brazil from seeking to implement a national development project, using the foreign policy as one of the instruments for this, which would manifest itself through the deepening of relations in South America (with the development of UNASUL), with the intensification of emerging countries relations, through a prominent action in the Doha round of the WTO and in other economic negotiations, the maintenance of friendly relations with economic center countries, including the United States, a deepening and greater attention in the relationship with African countries, an important campaign for the reform of the UN Security Council and the defense of social objectives that would guarantee the balance between States and populations (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007).

According to Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2004) foreign policy was the area of government that bore the greatest similarities to the internal formulations of PT, therefore the emphasis on relations with the global South and a broader process of integration with South America and the defense of this path for a potentialized intervention by Brazil in the world are not surprising.

Lula's governments' international prospects were strongly influenced by the international policy formulated within the PT. This fact can be proved by the innovation in appointing a Party member, Marco Aurélio Garcia, and not a career diplomat, as chief advisor of the President's Special Advice, as it has been usual, and even the dispute for the conduct of foreign policy between him and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, is noticeable sometimes. (GARCIA, 2004). This aspect demonstrates the party's desire to carry out, from within the government, the dispute for its forms of integration and internationalism, which had been built since its foundation in 1980.

Brazil's diplomatic action stood critically in face of trade opening guidelines that could make it impossible to implement national policies for development and technological autonomy (ALMEIDA, 2004), what didn't put the need to maintain the

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cohesion of the power bloc that gave support to the government in suspension, leading, for example, to strong Brazilian activism towards the opening of agricultural markets, contrary to the party's historical demands, because in the long run it could harm industrial and technological development (ROUQUIÉ, 2006).

Defending multilateralism and national sovereignty more vehemently than the previous government, Lula, with his autonomy by diversification tactics, led Brazil to a more relevant and even leading position, if one considers the country's insertion in the region. According to Almeida (2003), the ideas of both the Workers' Party and the decision-makers within his government were not fully employed in foreign policy practice, and over time they suffered considerable softening, nevertheless resulting in immediate effects on relations between Brazil and the other countries. This effect would be achieved through more active and dynamic diplomatic action and the defense of so-called "universal" issues.

It is claimed that the leadership issue did not occur as a specific plan formulated aiming to achieve a certain degree of hegemony, but as a result of the defenses and practices elaborated by Brazilian foreign policy during Lula's administration. In the perspective presented here, however, there was a general objective of consolidating a hegemony that would allow both internal and external results through leadership in South America and to some extent in the global South. Brazil's performance in Haiti can be seen as an attempt to prove this leadership capacity, seeking at last to plead for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and thus reconfigure the international system structure, obtaining recognition as a middle power (LAFER, 2001).

Hence, as Ramos (2012) stated, a pragmatic and realistic policy that sought, through the diversification of relations and agendas, an insertion of the country in the world concert that would focus more directly on its reorganization could be observed.

However, a position of relative autonomy was maintained vis-à-vis the world powers, and at times there have been frontal disagreements with the interests of the United States and the European Union. What can be seen is that relations with these countries were maintained, but the priority and dynamic center revolved around relations with the South. This would demonstrate even more clearly the aspects of the autonomy by diversification quest, reflecting a new configuration of the geography of power and the world economy.
An important foreign policy variable in Lula and Dilma Rousseff's administration was the issue's accessibility to the public debate, since the export agenda, in growing in significance, began to mobilize the elites, businessmen, unions, parties and parliament's intentions. At the same time, it enhanced the importance of foreign policy in the midst of the policies adopted by the government. This accessibility allowed a greater opposition power, breaking down the perception that separates foreign policy from other public policies (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007).

It's possible to borrow the concepts of movement war and position war from the Gramscian perspective to understand the tactics undertaken through foreign policy by the Workers' Party once in government. According to Gramsci, the movement war should be the tactic adopted by organizations representing subaltern sectors in States that he would characterize as "oriental", that is, with more gelatinous civil societies and less formally democratic structures, while the position war should be adopted by these organizations if located in a typically "western" State, with structured civil society and greater balance in relations with political society (SCHELESENER, 2007).

Lincoln Secco (2011) would indicate that the analysis shared by the Workers' Party was that, with the constitution of 1988, Brazil was typically a "western" State and, therefore, the tactic should be essentially that of position war. Thus, foreign policy would be a way to "accumulate positions" within the Brazilian state, that is, gradually exercise the hegemonic dispute through the cumulative results of the policy applied at the external level towards the internal environment.

This analysis, however, could be the result of a disregard for the character of the 1979 Amnesty Law (No. 6,683) applied by the civic-military dictatorship and affirmed by Constitutional Amendment No. 26/1985, which prevented its revision by the Constituent Assembly. This law, in addition to granting amnesty to political prisoners and exiles, prevented the punishment of the regime's excesses perpetrators. Thus, as Silva Filho (2018) states, the Brazilian State was in fact unable to overcome the structures of the authoritarian regime, among other reasons because members of the political, legal, legislative and military structure kept their posts in Brazilian institutions. This leads to the perception that Brazil would preserve, under Gramscian conceptualization, ambiguous aspects between "orientalism" and "westernism". The tactic resulting from this reality should also be one that considers the position war and the movement war.
When the succession between Lula and Dilma Rousseff is analyzed, important traits of continuity can be found, although less emphasis on the use of presidential diplomacy is noticeable. As an example, one can take the presidential trips: Lula in his second government made 160 trips, while Dilma in her first one made 63. Still in this sense, the visibility given to the office was significantly reduced, when compared to Lula (BASTOS; HIRATUKA, 2017). This movement may indicate a reduction in the drive to use foreign policy as a form of hegemonic dispute. In the effort to harmonize her power bloc and in the dispute for its leadership, Dilma would be more emphatic in the economic agenda, through the "new economic matrix," which sought to satisfy, at least materially, the desires of the Brazilian internal bourgeoisie, through a credit subsidy package, tax, interest and energy tariff reduction, exchange devaluation and industrial protectionism. It sought, essentially, to eliminate the public debt rentism, aiming at expanding productive investment (BASTOS, 2017).

In order to understand this change in the profile of presidential activity in foreign policy matters, it's necessary to consider the radical change that was taking place in the international context, with the rise of the 2008 crisis, leading Dilma to adapt to the new reality. The most hostile environment would then give the tone to the adjustments made and not in fact a change in foreign policy objectives (CORNETET, 2014).

Rousseff, following a tradition of insertion into the international scene through relations in South America leveraged by Lula, sought to deepen this activity, expanding MERCOSUR to the region's center and north through efforts to include Bolivia and Venezuela in the economic bloc (SCHREIBER, 2015). Therefore, despite the low profile employed to the external activity and the decrease of its importance as a mechanism of hegemonic dispute, the president showed interest in adding partners close ideologically, as a way to increase its influence over the bloc and, consequently, over the region.

These multilateral-based actions were also intended to increase the political potential to question developed countries’ control over the multilateral financial institutions created at Bretton Woods, presenting a Brazilian contribution to the counter-hegemonic movement that was growing internationally, largely supported by the deepening of BRICS relations (SARAIVA, 2014).

The world's geopolitics also undergoes substantial changes from the Arab Spring movements, the wars in Libya and Syria, the war in Ukraine, and the quarrels involving islands in the Pacific. This scenario diminishes the importance of multilateral economic
issues in which Brazil was a protagonist, giving greater centrality to the military powers' politics and making the hegemonic dispute at world level more complex, which in conflictive periods becomes focused on the military powers and their industrial complexes (MIYAMOTO, 1995).

Despite the low profile adopted in international travel, Dilma followed Lula's foreign policy model, or the model of autonomy by diversification, not adhering to the model of autonomy by integration or participation as desired by neoliberals. She was even more vehement in her choice of independence from the United States, even canceling an earlier scheduled trip to the country when Edward Snowden leaked the scandal of U.S. espionage onto Brazil. The president would also take the case to the UN, so that the issue of digital privacy could be discussed. An unfolding of this episode was the option to buy the Swedish Gripen as a fighter of the Brazilian Air Force, which could be understood as retaliation to the United States in face of the trust breakdown (BASTOS; HIRATUKA, 2017).

Under Rousseff's whole administration, the utmost of autonomy and independence from the U.S. through the consolidation and expansion of South American integration was present. This is demonstrated by the incorporation of Venezuela into MERCOSUR in 2012. Intensive negotiations were also established to incorporate Bolivia in 2015 and Suriname and Guyana joined as associate members in 2013 and 2015. This effort would indicate the continuity of the "South American option" as a guiding formula for Rousseff's government, demonstrating that despite the lower intensity, foreign policy would still be used as a form of dispute for hegemony, especially in the regional level.

The BRICS group's consolidation that took place during her government created expectations on the creation of "legal models compatible with the plural reality of societies that make up the world order" (MONTEIRO; LINS E SILVA, 2013, p 115), by reducing the Washington Consensus's multilateral institutions importance and increasing the countries' possibilities of insertion with real impact on the international political agenda.

The president was active in consolidating the BRICS, which reduced exchange rate vulnerability and helped finance infrastructure projects, expanding trade agreements

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3 Author's translation.
4 As popularly known, the meeting held in the US capital which established institutional, political and economic parameters based on the neoliberal primer as a requirement for access to loans from the Bretton Woods multilateral institutions and to economic cooperation.

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and investment projects (BASTOS; HIRATUKA, 2017). From a strictly material perspective, this movement took into account the desires of the bourgeoisie fractions that made up her power bloc, as well as of relevant urban worker and peasant sectors. This confluence actually took place throughout the entire period of the Workers’ Party’s governments, which succeeded in bringing the interests of the internal bourgeoisie closer to those of the popular movements. With this "it is the changes in Brazilian domestic politics that have themselves emerged, linked to changes in the international scenario, that explain the new foreign policy of the Lula and Dilma governments." (BOITO JR; BERRINGER, 2013, p.34) The hegemonic dispute, however, had important points of contradiction with the Workers’ Party’s program itself in the popular narrative realm.

This contradiction occurred in the attempt itself to maintain unity within the power bloc that supported her, since internally the Workers’ Party program affirms anti-capitalist convictions. It also formulates on the intrinsically anti-democratic character of neoliberalism, exposing the incongruity of not breaking with its macroeconomic model. (CONGRESSO NACIONAL DO PT, 2007). This sometimes contradictory construction of syntheses expresses the tactic of position war, in which one advances over elements of the state through, but not only, the dispute through the devices of liberal democracy. The next session of this article deals with the intersection between this process and the construction of historic blocs.

4. Foreign Policy, Hegemony and Historic Bloc Building

With the above presented, it became apparent that, to a greater or lesser extent, foreign policy was instrumentalised as a form of hegemonic construction in the three administrations under discussion. It's valid for the analysis this article proposes articulating the items exposed to a broader process of integration and consolidation, or construction of a historic bloc. The aim here is to do so briefly, as a means of clearing up, but also to raise questions about the subject. Gramsci and Poulantzas, not without proper consideration to international contexts, focus their issues at the national level, while watching the dynamics of class struggle within the State. This work sought to extend these concepts to the international arena.

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5 Author’s translation.

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Gramsci (1985) defines the state as the conjunction between civil society and political society, in which hegemony is contained by coercion. It's clear then that for the author hegemony is found exactly in the State' nature. Here the notion that hegemony permeates the State is promoted, but it is also shaped through the relationship between them and the construction of the international institutional framework (MOUFFE, 2003). From this comes the idea that foreign policy would be a relevant item in the dispute for hegemony (inserted in the tactic of position war), both in this broader scenario and, as proposed here, in the internal context, since the dialectical movement makes these two scenes, the internal and the external, intertwine.

Given that the process of struggle for hegemony takes place in the midst of the capitalist social formation molds and that a new type of hegemony, or the construction of a new historic bloc, demands the intellectual reform of the subordinate classes and also of sectors of the dominant classes (GALASTRI, 2013; LÉNIN, 2015), it's understandable that power blocs and their respective领导s inserted in peripheral contexts, in consonance or dissonance with the world historic bloc, have different commitments in the use of foreign policy as a mechanism of dispute for this same hegemony.

As already exposed here, FHC and his power bloc hegemonized by the buying bourgeoisie were in deep consonance with the historic neoliberal bloc that became mondialisé with the Soviet Union's collapse. Lula and Dilma and their power bloc hegemonized by the Brazilian internal bourgeoisie, in alliance with the urban workers and peasants, had sometimes more, sometimes less profound points of dissonance with this historic world bloc.

It can be seen, then, that the use of foreign policy is directed towards the consolidation of the power bloc conformed internally, so as to influence this dispute, whether pro or counter-hegemonic at a global level, as a way of joining a historic bloc already constituted or enabling the construction of a new type of historic bloc. But its use as a form of ideological dispute is also observed, an item that, as noted, has not been seconded by the administrations under consideration, although addressed less vehemently by Dilma.

5. Conclusions

The analyses carried out in this work allow the placement of Brazilian foreign policy in the midst of the realignment movement of the class fractions of the bourgeoisie.
within the power bloc, throughout the transition from FHC to Lula and its continuity to Dilma. Despite the visible continuity traits, the main differences result from the conquest of hegemony in the bloc by the internal bourgeoisie in alliance with expressive segments of the working class, in detriment of the purchasing bourgeoisie.

This hegemonic rearrangement impacts in a dialectic way on the execution of foreign policy: it causes changes, resizing the relations Brazil/economic center and Brazil/South (especially vis-à-vis the respective formulas for autonomy) and its role in the economic and social development of the country, while at the same time being permeable to the different directions given to such a policy, given the greater or lesser degree of alignment of each bloc with the mondialisé historic neoliberal bloc and the hegemonic construction needs resulting from this relationship.

The hegemony arrangements reconfigure the search for autonomy patterns, which alters the insertion of Brazil in the world concert, but also leads to interpretations about the internal dynamics of the hegemonic dispute. FHC’s autonomy by integration model, in incorporating Brazil into the world order led by financial capital, is one of the variables that indicate the purchasing bourgeoisie’s hegemony over the power bloc formed for his government. It is understood, then, that such a policy acts with the intention to, by demobilizing the resources for the protection of internal capital, consolidate the hegemony of this class fraction, as well as sustaining the historic neoliberal world bloc.

Due to the conflicting interests within Lula and Dilma's power bloc, the foreign policy resulting from their autonomy by diversification model has at times had ambiguous characteristics, in the search to keep their support bloc cohesive. This ambiguity would express, in some cases, a contradiction between measures taken, such as the active claim for the opening of the agricultural market and historical positions of the Workers' Party. However, this reality contrasted with the centrality given to foreign policy for the country's economic and social development, as well as with Brazil's positioning as an emerging power in the period, increasing the country's influence on building an international scenario open to multilateralism (through undertakings such as BRICS and action within G20). This movement unfolded in two ways: it aimed to strengthen the working class and the internal bourgeoisie, in detriment of the purchasing bourgeoisie, and held a contestatory content towards the historic neoliberal world bloc, which can be understood as a tactic of 'position war', in which attempts were made, through foreign policy, to accumulate capacities for reconfiguring the internal hegemonic arrangement.
Although there were differences between Lula's and Dilma's foreign policies, mainly related to presidential profiles and the general conditions for Brazil's performance in the international system, the characteristics described above went through the entire Workers' Party government.

Finally, and based on the study related here, it's noticeable that the national movement of dispute for hegemony pervades the development objectives that drive the external actions of the governments at stake. As it relates directly to the hegemonic arrangement in the world context, foreign policy is instrumentalized in order to either consolidate a hegemony aligned with the historic neoliberal bloc or to guarantee means of hegemonic rearrangement in opposition to this bloc.

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