Archangel Operation: an evaluation of the Law and Order Guarantee Operation in the Alemão and Penha communities in Rio de Janeiro

Operação Arcanjo: uma avaliação da Operação de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem nas comunidades do Alemão e da Penha no Rio de Janeiro

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Abstract: Guarantee of Law and Order Operations are legal instruments that enable the National Armed Forces to act in Public Security. One of the most prominent and nationally known of these operations was Archangel Operation, which began with a decree aimed at preserving public order in Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha (Alemão’s and Penha’s communities), in Rio de Janeiro; also, one of its major objectives was to assist Public Security Forces in a pacification process for the implementation of Peacekeeping police unite known as ‘UPP’, which would improve Rio de Janeiro’s image during mega-events that would take place in the city at the time. Thus, this article has as its main objective to analyze and evaluate the implementation of Archangel Operation, identify its stakeholders, understand if its real goals were achieved and the gaps that prevented this achievement. As methodologies, the literature review and the analysis and evaluation of public policies were applied, more specifically the evaluation of public policies by Evert Vedung, which resulted in the use of intervention theory, an illustration of stakeholders, and the model of achieving objectives and goals, in addition to other qualitative analyses. Finally, it was found that, in long terms, the operation was more in people's imagination than in real life’s concrete facts.

Keywords: Archangel Operation. Armed Forces. Public Policy. Guarantee of Law and Order Operations.

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**Resumo:** As Operações de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem são instrumentos jurídicos que possibilitam a atuação das Forças Armadas Nacionais na Segurança Pública. Uma das Operações de maior proeminência e conhecimento nacional foi a Operação Arcanjo, que se iniciou por um decreto que teve como objetivo a preservação da ordem pública nas comunidades do Complexo do Alemão e do Complexo da Penha, no Rio de Janeiro; além disso, tinha como um de seus grandes objetivos prestar auxílio às Forças de Segurança Pública em um processo de pacificação para implementação das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs), o que melhoraria a imagem do Rio de Janeiro durante os megaeventos que ocorreriam na cidade. Assim, este artigo, tem como objetivo principal analisar e avaliar a implementação da Operação Arcanjo, identificando os grupos de interesse em sua realização, se os reais objetivos dessa operação foram alcançados, e as lacunas que impediram esse atingimento. Como metodologias, foram aplicadas a revisão bibliográfica e a análise e avaliação de políticas públicas, mais especificamente a avaliação de políticas públicas de Evert Vedung, que resultou na utilização da teoria da intervenção, ilustração de stakeholders e no modelo de consecução de objetivos e metas, além de outras análises qualitativas. Por fim, constatou-se que, em longo prazo, a operação ficou mais no imaginário popular do que em fatos concretos na vida real.

**Palavras-chave:** Operação Arcanjo; Forças Armadas; Políticas Públicas; Garantia da Lei e da Ordem.

1. **Introduction**

   The States’ Armed Forces are traditionally used to contain external threats, either through actual violence or through deterrence. The Cold War (1945 - 1991) raised the level of distrust in the international system by indicating the exponential and possible use of nuclear weapons, which would put an end to humanity itself. Although this war was contextualized as a major bipolar conflict without confrontations between the two prominent powers - the United States of America and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -, the Armed Forces of the other many countries did not cease to exist.

   With the Cold War’s ending, the characteristics involved in bipolarity, the use of nuclear weapons, and their arms race, no longer play an extremely important role in the definition of security. The emphasis on the State, on the study of the threat, use, and control of military force for the resolution of controversies, is no longer predominant (Waltz, 2002), but no less important. Thus, the theoretical field of security studies has suffered considerable disruptions. New theories and new analyzes appeared in international relations.

   Under these circumstances, the expansion of the International Security Studies agenda has been studied by authors such as Buzan and Hansen (2012), who expand the...
concept of security, reflecting growing concerns about new themes, in addition to those present in the “political-military agenda and the traditional positivist epistemology”.

In this sense, the concept of sovereignty has never enjoyed unanimity in terms of its significance, its practical validity, or political viability. With that, it has always been up to deconstructions. Altruistic interests and those most linked to hegemonic States are part of this process. One effort relates to the human security approach that:

It represents the effort to establish new international norms, based on humanitarianism, that transfer to the so-called international community the responsibility to safeguard the rights of the populations of those states that have failed in their task as a security provider. Thus, it is essential to protect individuals, the freedom they have to make choices, the access they have to social and market opportunities, as well as concern for the environment in which they live, that is, whether it is marked by conflict or by peace (United Nations Development Program, 1994, p.23).

These new approaches to security, which put the individual at the center of the debate by providing a certain deconstruction of State sovereignty with the securitization of the most varied themes related to individuals and world security, coincided with geopolitical ideas (mostly foreign) that sought to affect Defense Policy of peripheral States, under the auspices of an alleged American Pax. Thus, these States were more concerned with internal security and would exercise an almost exclusive police role in internal security, based on the Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO) (Violante, 2017).

However, a human security strategy would only make sense if all individuals, regardless of their location and State, were served with the same concern and urgency with which the most fragile states on the global power scale or those considered to failed are treated, what does not occur in practice (Marroni, De Castro & Violante, 2018).

Mignon (2011) adds that terrorism, emigration, social and political issues, and other transnational illicit problems are examples of current or potential military problems that end up putting the classic sovereignty model into perspective and the state response to be considered, and may also be prone, including external interventions.

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3 The securitization of a given theme takes place according to each states’ reality. In high politics, it is where the themes that should be securitized are defined, in line with the perceptions of threats or vulnerabilities. Thus, each government explains what will be addressed, but which will not necessarily be resolved by the use of military means (Buzan et al, 1998).

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Therefore, in the face of internal and external circumstances, from the 1990s onwards, the Brazilian State became concerned, in addition to its tasks of security and external defense, with the legal provision of the Guarantee of Law and Order, which indicates the national armed forces’ mobilization within its borders.

Law and Order Guarantee Operations are part of the constitutional tasks of the Brazilian Armed Forces and can be seen occurring since the constitution of 1824. In fact, according to Mendes (2012), all Brazilian constitutions - except the one from 1937 -, legitimized the performance of the Armed Forces in exceptional situations and, by direct order of the President of the Republic, for the restoration of public order. Furthermore, from the last two decades of the twentieth century to the present day, urban violence in large Brazilian cities has become more sophisticated, with the appearance of more organized groups linked to drug trafficking.

However, the recurrent use of the Armed Forces in internal issues generates the phenomenon known as trivialization, that is, the Armed Forces are used in absentia by political agents, through military responses to problems of a general nature, such as confronting organized crime (police problem), involving large logistics (operations at major events) and in Voting and Counting Guarantee (GVA) operations.

The national Armed Forces have devoted themselves more to subsidiary actions than to the constitutional mission of State Defense, as defined in article 142 of the Federal Constitution. In this line of thought, Oliveira (2009), states that the National Defense Strategic (END) plan envisages the use of the Armed Forces in GLO operations as a strategic action, prioritizing the forces "inward", resulting in a lack of structure to combat external threats.

This article will analyze, therefore, a specific operation that became known as Archangel Operation and established, utilizing a Ministerial Decree, a Pacification Force (FPaz) that had the objective of preserving public order in the communities of Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha, in Rio de Janeiro, in addition to assisting the Public Security Forces in a pacification process for the implementation of a Pacifying Police Unit (UPP), which would improve the image of Rio de Janeiro during the mega-events that would take place in the City.

As a methodology, exploratory and descriptive analyzes were used to understand the phenomenon of the use of the National Armed Forces in public security operations, such as Archangel Operation. The approach taken here was qualitative, as indicated by
Goldenberg (1997), seeking to understand the operation itself and not just its numerical expressions.

To support the knowledge, a documental analysis was made of academic authors who dealt with the topic, understanding the legal framework that regulates both Law and Order Guarantee Operations and the Ministerial Guideline that originated Archangel Operation more specifically, analysis of collected data through the system of the Public Security Institute (ISP), an autarchy linked to the State Government of Rio de Janeiro and the Institute of Economic and Applied Research (IPEA).

For a better understanding of the actors and interest groups involved in the elaboration of the operation that is the central object of this study, a survey was made of those responsible for the development of operation to guarantee the law and the order of any foundation, that is, those who can request of these operations according to the constitution, and the actors who would directly benefit from it when analyzing and evaluating the implementation of the Operation Archangel program.

It can be said that the results of action can be seen immediately, in the medium or long term. These analyzes will also be based on the models of the public policy evaluation method of Evert Vedung (1997, 2017), in which it will be observed if their real objectives have been achieved, their stakeholders, and the gaps in achieving the objectives of this project.

2. Guarantee of Law and Order Operations

To better understand the legal framework that delimits the Armed Forces, it is necessary to understand what they are, who they are, and how the Brazilian Armed Forces (FA) operate. The FA is the military instrument responsible for the defense of Brazil and consists of the Brazilian Navy (MB), the Brazilian Army (EB), and the Brazilian Air Force (FAB), as constitutionally expressed.

The FAs are under the superior direction of the Ministry of Defense and their constitutional provisions are supported, especially, in the 1988 Federal Constitution (CF) art. 142, which states the following:

The Armed Forces, constituted by the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force, are permanent and regular national institutions, organized based on hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of the Republic’s President, and are intended for the Fatherland’s defense, to guarantee of constitutional powers and, on the initiative of any of
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these, of law and order (Federal Constitution, 1988, art. 142, emphasis added, our translation).

The Guarantee of Law and Order Operations (Op. GLO) are part of the Brazilian Armed Forces’ constitutional destinations, as demonstrated in Art. 142 of the Federal Constitution of 1988 (expressed above) and had their regulation under infra constitutional scope with the Complementary Law n° 97, of June 9, 1999, being part of the modern legal justifications for the Armed Forces' performance.

However, the 1988 CF is not the first one to address the issue. All previous constitutions, except the 1937s, refer to this subject, more specifically in the following articles: art. 148 of the 1824 constitution, art. 14 of 1891, art. 162 of 1934, art. 177 of 1946, art. 92 of 1967 and, finally, art. 142 of the current constitution.

Further, in history, the 1824 Constitution indicates, in its art. 148, that “The Executive Power is exclusively responsible for employing the Armed Forces of the Sea and Land, as it sees fit with Security, and defense of the Empire” (Constitution of Brazil, 1824, our translation); art. 14 of the 1891 Constitution: "The forces of land and sea are permanent national institutions, destined to the defense of the Fatherland abroad and the maintenance of laws in the interior" (Constitution of Brazil, 1891, our translation).

From the 1934 Constitution, it is possible to see the guarantee of law and order explicitly mentioned. Art. 162 of the 1934 Constitution states:

The armed forces are permanent national institutions, and, within the law, essentially obedient to their superiors. They are intended to defend the country and guarantee constitutional powers, and law and order (Constitution of Brazil, 1934, emphasis added, our translation).

The Constitution of the United States of Brazil, of September 18, 1946, indicates, in its art. 177 the performance of the Armed Forces, which “The armed forces are destined to defend the Fatherland and to guarantee the constitutional powers, the law and the order” (Constitution of Brazil, 1946, our translation). The same text is repeated in art. 92 of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 1967.

Therefore, since the foundation of the first national constitution, the FA has played a relevant role in the country, with so-called subsidiary obligations, although not so clearly to guarantee the Law and the Order.

Parallel to art. 142 of the Federal Legislation of 1988, some complementary laws and normative decrees were elaborated to give the proper guidelines for the FA’s
activities. Complementary Law no. 97 of 1999 (LC 97/99) is part of the arsenal that regulates the FA’s performance within the constitutional scope and seeks to define the rules for the organization, preparation, and use of the Armed Forces (Succi Junior, 2018). The Law will deal with Republic’s President powers in decisions over the FA’s employment; the operating conditions, that is, the need to exhaust the instruments shown in art. 144 of the 1988 CF; and the recognition, by the Heads of Executive and State Power, as "unavailable, nonexistent or insufficient to the regular performance of their constitutional mission" (Complementary Law nº 97 of 1999, our translation).

Op. GLO’s regulation effectively came with the approval of Decree No. 3,897 of August 24, 2001, which sets the guidelines for the employment of the Armed Forces in the Guarantee of Law and Order and brings, in its art. 5, a little talked about the fact: operations involving official and public events with the participation of State authorities. Art. 5 is also relevant in indicating a supposed determination of time, although not very explicit, of "the shortest possible time". This type of approach leaves room for long operations not to take place.

Sérgio Arruda (2007) is quite categorical in saying that Decree no. 3,897/01 and previous legislation goes by the obvious, by basically indicating what is already expressed in the Constitution, without further explanation:

[...] Furthermore, the decree goes through the obvious, repeating the terms of the Constitution and the Complementary Law. Sow more doubt than certainty. It even makes the employment of the Military Police dependent on the consent of the State Governor, under the operational control of the federal military command (Arruda, 2007, p. 98).

The 2001 decree sets the guidelines for the Armed Forces’ use, but as inferred by Arruda (2007), it brings more doubts than answers, while it gives the Army, and the other forces, police power in order to inhibit or curb individual actions, in the name of an alleged common good, whereas the decree itself does not clearly explain which order is intended for GLO Operations, being the responsibility of each operation separately. Another uncertainty is the possibility, then, that the FA may develop actions of ostensive police, which is constitutionally the competence of the Military Police. In

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4 According to the FA glossary, operational (or operative) control means: “power assigned to a commander to employ and control forces, in specific and limited missions or tasks, in order to enable him to carry out his mission. It excludes the authority to separately employ the components of these forces as well as to carry out their logistical or administrative control and assigns authority to control other forces that, although they are not subordinate to them, operate or transit within their area of responsibility.
other words, the operational control of operations is in the hands of a superior authority that is not competent and does not act in such functions in a daily basis.

It is also worth noting that the 2001 decree facilitated the use of Law and Order Guarantee Operations, so that there would no longer be a need for a declaration of insufficiency by the governors, since only the operational control of the troops would be assigned to the command of the Armed Forces, reducing the imaginary-political damage of local governors.

However, it is important to realize that Decree nº 3.897/01 calls attention to the need for information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) on operations, to avoid possible negative impacts internationally, in a possible international distrust. Further on, there is complementary Law no. 117 of 2004 (LC 117/04) and Complementary Law no. 136 of 2010 (LC 136/2010) that amend LC No. 97/99 and deepen the debate on what is defined as the exhaustion of public security mechanisms, deals with the operational control of public security bodies.

Also, Complementary Law no. 117 sets three precedents for Op. GLO’s run, which directly implies how operations should be thought and enacted:

- employment hypothesis under the conditions provided for in §3 of this article, after a message from the Republic’s President, the Armed Forces’ operation organs will be activated, which will carry out, in an episodic manner, in a previously established area and for a limited time, preventive and repressive measures necessary to ensure the result of operations in guaranteeing law and order (Federal Constitution, 1988, emphasis added, our translation).

It is necessary to understand that Op. GLO must happen in an episodic way; in a previously defined area, and cannot extend over a long territory; and lastly, with a determined period of activity, which makes the situation a little complex, as there is no limitation in this determination, which can reach a month or even 100 years.

In this understanding, De Almeida, Franchi & França (2019) understand that Armed Forces work in Op. GLO is not limited to related cases, only to acts of a strike by public security institutions, but also involves the holding of States’ events, collaborating for the maintenance of a safe and stable environment, collaborating for the achievement of States’ political-strategic objectives.

Another important part of this analysis is to identify the historical milestones in the regulation of Law and Order Guarantee Operations. Legislative Decree no. 373 of 2013 approved the update of the National Defense Strategy and the creation of the
National Defense Policy and the White Paper on National Defense, which deals with the activities of the FA.

Besides, two other documents are of paramount importance for understanding the theme: Ordinance nº 62 of 2005 from the army, which creates the Law and Order Guarantee Instructions Center, which was subordinate to the 11th Light Infantry Brigade, in Campinas in the state of São Paulo; and the Ministry of Defense Ordinance no. 3,461 of 2013 that creates the document ‘Law and Order Guarantee’ (MD 33-M-10), which establishes guidelines for planning and executing Law and Order Guarantee Operations. In this sense, it is of relevance for the understanding of FA’s activities they are entitled to do, especially in the case of GLO Operations that have been occurring more frequently, as will be seen below.

According to the Ministry of Defense (2014), the FA’s role for the Guarantee of Law and Order is considered a specific “non-war” action because it does not have the purpose of combat itself, even though it allows the use of force when necessary. Thus, Op. GLO are a type of military operation carried out by the FA on a non-recurring basis and with specific limitations.

**Figure 01:** Summary table - GLO’s legislation in Brazil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marcos legais das Operações de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem no Brasil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ {CF} Art 148 1824;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ {CF} Art 14 1891;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ {CF} Art 162 1934;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ {CF} Art 177 1946;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ {CF} Art 92 1967;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ {CF} Art 142 1988;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ {LC} 9.299/1996;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ {LC} 97/1999;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ {DE} 3.897/2001;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ {LC} 117/2004;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Portaria 062/2005;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ {DE} 6.703/2008;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ {LC} 136/2010;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ {DE} 7.496/2011;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ {DL} 373/2013;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Portaria 3.461/2013;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Prepared by the Authors.

Before going on to historical performances, it is important to understand the basic principles for the FA’s performance (the so-called Rules of Engagement), which according to MD 33-M-10 (2014) are these: Proportionality, Reasonability, and Legality. Thereafter, the FA’s actions must follow guidelines that move in this
direction. A normative summary table of the GLO’s legislation in Brazil is presented in figure 01:

3. The archangel operation - implementation analysis

The Archangel Operation is the most common name for the Law and Order Guarantee Operation that took place in the Alemão and Penha complexes, in the north of Rio de Janeiro, between 2010 and 2012.

The aforementioned Complexes were known for the high degree of violence and the constant confrontations between rival factions (Mendonça, 2017), which in itself already indicates the need for a public policy aimed at the region, which has very specific characteristics and somewhat different from the rest of the city of Rio de Janeiro.

In an unprecedented request, in November 2010, the Governor of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral, asked for support from national forces to restore order in communities in the city, a request promptly answered and accepted by the then Minister of Defense, Nelson Jobim. An operation was initiated that, together with public security agencies, such as the Battalion of Special Police Operations (BOPE) managed to occupy the Vila Cruzeiro region. The momentary success of the operation has made it possible to extend the operation viable and precise, which will extend and, to a certain extent, allow the occupation of a Pacifying Police Unit (UPP). Thus, the relationship of the Armed Forces in GLO operations with the so-called “war on trafficking”, headed by the UPPs' logistics, is evident.

As indicated by Cabeleira (2013), the first Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) was installed in Morro Santa Bárbara in Botafogo, and the project aimed to expand this policy to other locations sensitive to the organization of mega-events, such as the Soccer World Cup 2014, the 2016 Olympics, as well as increasing the attractiveness of tourism and civil construction to the area.

This objective is quite evident when analyzing the locations where the UPPs were installed. Most of them were implemented in the South, Center, and North Zone of the city of Rio de Janeiro places very visited by tourists and with a large flow of people who wish to take cultural tours. In this sense, Mendonça (2017) draws attention to the sites of Complexes do Alemão and Penha, very close to the Red Line and the international airport of Galeão, a welcome place for tourists.
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It is quite evident that the interests in a Law and Order Guarantee Operation, with the name of pacification, have objectives beyond the merely “pacification” of the local and eventual, since it corresponds to tourist and companies interested in this specialty, that benefit from the image of a pacified and safe Rio de Janeiro.

With these points covered, it is possible to proceed with the explanation of the so-called Pacification Force (FPaz)’s consolidation, which was officially determined by the Ministerial Guideline No. 15/2010 of the Defense’s Ministry, based on the specific legislation of Law and Order Guarantee Operations, such as Complementary Law (LC) No. 97/1999 and Decree 3,897/2001.

Thus, there was a request from the State of Rio de Janeiro’s governor to “continue the integrated process of pacification of the State of Rio de Janeiro, between the Union and the State”, authorizing the “temporary employment of military personnel from the Armed Forces... for the preservation of public order in the communities of Alemão and Penha Complexes”(Ministerial Guideline No. 14 of 2010, our translation).

Also, the Ministerial Guideline indicates some functions that would be performed by FPaz, namely: patrolling, searching and forecasting, and flagrant. It is also explained that the FPaz organization would be under the Army Commander’s responsibility, in the presence of Commander Enzo Peri, who would continue the work carried out under Ministerial Directive N° 14/2010.

Archangel Operation took place, therefore, between November 2010 and July 2012, having as main players the Brazilian Navy and the Brazilian Army. The Operation had an average of 1,500.00 military personnel circulating quarterly and an approximate cost of R $ 135,458,800.00, and just for comparing complexity, it was a less costly operation, when compared to the military contingent and the expenses of the Operation of the Military Games that also took place in Rio de Janeiro (Defense Ministry, 2020). Looking at Figure 02 it’s possible to understand the relation between costs and military personnel from some GLO operations.

Although, at first glance, it seems an unfounded comparison, as it deals with different contexts, it is worth mentioning the understanding of the comparative use of funds in Law and Order Guarantee operations, calling attention to the non-predominance of operations against combating drug trafficking.

The figure 02, bellow, shows, when making a small cut from 2010 to 2012, that both the question of human resources and the budget allocation of GLO Operations...
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were not entirely aimed at fighting crime, as opened with the Archangel operation. The comparison with the most expensive operation so far, which of the V Military World Games, explains this breakthrough, especially when taking into account the duration vs the cost.

**Figure 02: GLO costs and personnel** Source: Brazilian Defense Ministry, 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>EFFECTIVE</th>
<th>COSTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>IV Câmpus dos Chefs do Estado e de Governadores (CBG)</td>
<td>13 to 18 days of May 2016</td>
<td>Protect the archangel event carried out in Brasilia-DF</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>R$ 634,639.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>III Câmpus dos Chefs do Estado e de Governadores (CBG)</td>
<td>15 to 20 days of May 2016</td>
<td>Protect the archangel event carried out in Brasilia-DF</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>R$ 625,164.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>IV Câmpus dos Chefs do Estado e de Governadores (CBG)</td>
<td>24 to 29 days of May 2016</td>
<td>Protect the archangel event carried out in Brasilia-DF</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>R$ 1,698,316.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Operation Eleições – 2010</td>
<td>01 to 4 days or 10 to 15 days of May 2010</td>
<td>公安机关的4号和5号GLO/parliament elections and operations in all of Brazil</td>
<td>11 to 135</td>
<td>R$ 40,111,774.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Operation Aracaju</td>
<td>29 days of May 2010</td>
<td>Protect the archangel event carried out in Brasilia-DF</td>
<td>1,500 units paid per contingent</td>
<td>R$ 135,838,800.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>XL Reunião de Chefs de Estados de NARCOSUL e Associados</td>
<td>13 to 18 days of May 2010</td>
<td>Efectuar as obras de construção relacionadas com o Reunião, realizada em Brasilia DF</td>
<td>1,494</td>
<td>R$ 1,056,237.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Visit to the President of the United Nations</td>
<td>22 to 26 days of May 2010</td>
<td>Impede as ações de segurança relacionadas com o Reunião, realizada em Brasilia DF</td>
<td>2,412</td>
<td>R$ 2,416,305.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Operation São Paulo</td>
<td>21 to 24 days of May 2010</td>
<td>Impede as ações de segurança relacionadas com o Reunião, realizada em Brasilia DF</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>R$ 11,655,097.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>V Juegos Mundiales Militares</td>
<td>01 to 4 days of June 2010</td>
<td>Impede as ações de segurança relacionadas com o Reunião, realizada em Brasilia DF</td>
<td>6,405</td>
<td>R$ 386,672,018.00</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Encontro Brasileiro de Alto Nível (EBAFN)</td>
<td>21 to 25 days of June 2010</td>
<td>Coordenar as ações de segurança para o evento, realizado em Brasilia DF</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>R$ 1,150,085.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Operation Macau</td>
<td>24 days of May 2010</td>
<td>Impede as ações de segurança para o evento, realizado em Brasilia DF</td>
<td>1,777</td>
<td>R$ 2,022,965.51</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Visit to the President of the United Nations</td>
<td>01 to 2 days of June 2010</td>
<td>Impede as ações de segurança para o evento, realizado em Brasilia DF</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>R$ 3,842,150.64</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Operation Rio Capital</td>
<td>06 to 15 days of June 2010</td>
<td>Impede as ações de segurança para o evento, realizado em Brasilia DF</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>R$ 1,035,724.46</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Operation Curitiba</td>
<td>07 to 15 days of June 2010</td>
<td>Impede as ações de segurança para o evento, realizado em Brasilia DF</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>R$ 7,328,152.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Operation Brazil</td>
<td>01 to 15 days of June 2010</td>
<td>Impede as ações de segurança para o evento, réalisé in Brasilia DF</td>
<td>4,482</td>
<td>R$ 14,365,904.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Operation Rio De Janeiro</td>
<td>06 to 15 days of June 2010</td>
<td>Impede as ações de segurança para o evento, realizado em Brasilia DF</td>
<td>24,813</td>
<td>R$ 2,077,990,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fonte:** Brazilian Defense Ministry (2020).

4. Intervention Theory

For Vedung (1997, 2017), the intervention theory is an analysis of the decision-making problems that investigates the determinants of a problematic condition (the implementation gaps of Archangel Operation in Rio de Janeiro) that the program action undertaken by political and decided by the actors and policymakers can modify as state policy. The objective is to extract an action logic, a structure of assumptions about activities performed by the actors that cause effects, measuring the effectiveness of a decision, based on the intervention results.

It is a fact that, in the evaluation of Public Policies, what matters are causes, consequences, and their mediation connections. Pittol Trevisan and Van Bellen (2008) add that the design of a public program can be synthesized in a sequence of definitions corresponding to successive degrees of objective aggregation. Therefore, figure 03 exemplifies the synthesis of the objective sequences of Operation Archangel, based on the analysis of the previous sections.
In reality, the Inputs that stimulate the creation of the policy are a) exogenous - the political-strategic scenario of Brazil and, more particularly, the regional and local reality of the State and the city of Rio de Janeiro; and b) endogenous - the national strategic awareness and a favorable political interest for the maintenance of a power project and greater regional and international insertion, given the international events that Brazil would hold, highlighting Brazilian soft power to the world.

The conversion takes place within the government, absorbing externalities in the search for a viable solution capable of responding to the wishes of political power, the perception of a large part of the Brazilian population, and the needs imposed on the country to fulfill the commitments assumed with the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA), the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and other national and international actors. Here, the President of the Republic, the Governor of RJ, the Mayor of the city of Rio de Janeiro, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), the Ministry of Defense (MD), the Brazilian Army (EB), the Brazilian Navy (MB) elaborate the program per se, aiming at political objectives.

The main intervention was Archangel Operation, which made other adjustments and operations possible in other areas, years later.

The outputs, such as the political decision to prioritize internal security, with the use of the FFAA in public security in focal and important areas for tourism and its...
transit corridors in the city of Rio de Janeiro, to answer the factors that led to its creation (the inputs).

The outcomes derived from the outputs, portraying those immediately desired, such as more actions, activities, projects, resources for the FA, cooperation between the FA and the Auxiliary Forces. As the desired intermediate or medium-term outcomes, the promotion of cooperation in all areas of public security stands out, with greater investment in resources and personnel in public security.

The final desired outcomes were aimed at establishing programs and projects to meet the needs of the intervention, which was partially accomplished. The results were partial, temporary, and limited in specific predetermined areas. The prevalence of more immediate results, which were not based on the resolution of long-term insurance problems, contributed to the failure to achieve these outcomes.

4.1. Stakeholders

Any action, state-owned or not, has a group with its interests to make this activity happen. Often these groups are not reported explicitly and that is why the analysis narrative becomes more difficult. In this part of the article, we will try to explain in a didactic way which interest groups (stakeholders) that permeate Archangel Operation.

Within the public sphere, it is possible to indicate the groups most interested in the occurrence of the aforementioned Operation, namely the Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro, at the time, Sérgio Cabral (PMDB) and the Mayor of the City of Rio de Janeiro, at Eduardo Paes (PMDB). Also, even within the sphere of the State, with the consent of the President of the Republic, it is possible to affirm that then-President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) is also an interested party, as well as President Dilma Rousseff (PT) who determined the extension of the actions.

Still, concerning public stakeholders, the range of interested ministries can be quite wide, since even the budget allocation changes. That is, it is very evident that the Ministry of Defense when representing the Armed Forces, is the most interested in Law and Order Guarantee Operations to take place, and more specifically Archangel Operation had the media explicitly agreed by the two ministers who were in charge of the portfolio at the time, Jobim (2003-10) and Amorim (2011-14).
Melo, Violante. *Archangel Operation*

Besides, it is possible to indicate that the auxiliary forces, when responding to the State Governor and being an active part of the conflicts involving public security, are key players as interest groups for the actions of the Armed Forces in Alemão and Penha’s Complexes.

The legislation referring to Law and Order Guarantee Operations indicates that these may be required by the governments of the States, by the President of the Republic and by the President of any of the powers, therefore both the National Congress and the Supreme Federal Court can also be counted as interest group participants for Law and Order Guarantee Operations.

When considering the initial idea that Archangel Operation happened not only to help state forces in the implementation of the UPPs but also to improve the image of Rio de Janeiro given the large number of tourists who frequent the city, a possible interest group with quite prominent are tourism-related companies in the region, since crime and high levels of violence directly affect the city’s image and economy.

A study carried out in 2011 by the research group of the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF) entitled “Tourism, Urban Environment, and Social Inclusion” demonstrated that one of the main factors in destinations choice elimination is the fear of violence (Olerj, 2019). Still, in 2011, Duék revealed to BBC Brasil that the concern for violence affects national tourists more tangentially, but even so, foreign tourists place the violence rates of the city of Rio de Janeiro as the main problem of the city.

Later, in 2017, an estimate from the National Confederation of Trade in Goods, Services and Tourism (CNC) indicated that within the eight months of the same year, tourism in the city had already lost R$657 million due to urban violence, demonstrating, once again, that tourism-related companies are concerned with the violence in the city of Rio de Janeiro and take a position on the dealings with this problem.

Just as tourism-related companies were interested in crime-fighting operations in Rio de Janeiro, so are armaments companies, whether private or not, that directly relate to the Brazilian Armed Forces.

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A very evident example that demonstrates this argument is the participation of companies such as the Brazilian Military Material Industry (IMBEL), which is publicly linked to the Ministry of Defense and which is responsible for the production of various weapons, from pistols and rifles to communication equipment, as described on the website of the company in question.

IMBEL is supplying the Brazilian Army, as a result of the Brazilian Combatant Project (COBRA), IA2 assault rifles (lighter and used both in peace operations and in Law and Order Guarantee Operations), pistols, and knives to operationally train Brazilian combatants for future activities.

**Table 01:** Participation of arms and ammunition among selected companies (2003-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsegment</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total of enterprises</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabricação de explosivos</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabricação de equipamento belico pesado, armas de fogo e munições</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentual do total</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** IPEA, 2016, adapted from de Rais/MTE.

**Table 02:** Frequency of respondent companies’ production according to sub-segments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsegment</th>
<th>Frequência</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosivos industrial e militar</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misseis</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munições pesadas</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munições leves</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foguetes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carabinas</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuzis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morteiros</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistolas</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canhões e obuseiros</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revólveres</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metralhadoras</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** IPEA, 2016.

In addition to IMBEL, many other defense companies are present when analyzing the procurement of arms purchases for the Armed Forces present on the Federal Government's Transparency Portal, such as Helibras (belonging to the European
group EADS and manufacturer of helicopters), Forjas Taurus (armaments manufacturer), IVECO (tanks manufacturer), construction company Andrade Gutierrez, which created a joint venture with the French company Thales (camera manufacturers) and Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (manufacturer of military ammunition and public security). Another company worth mentioning is Condor Technologies, which, on its website, shows its participation in the sale of equipment exclusively for Law and Order Guarantee Operations for the Brazilian Armed Forces.

**Figure 04: Stakeholder Evaluation Model**

In a study by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) from 2016, about the Brazilian Defense Industrial Base, within a sample of 19 companies, only 14% of them offered light weapons such as carbines, rifles and pistols and the vast majority, about 63%, provided heavy military equipment, as we will see in the tables below. In this way, it is possible to understand the role played by national war material companies in the recurring or not use of GLO Operations, since this indicates the extent

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7 The study presented by IPEA does not specify which are the 19 companies selected
to which the company benefits from the possibility of a larger market and in the sale of necessary products for light combat.

Vedung (1997, 2017) comments that there are different assessment models, such as comprehensive, economic, customer-oriented, and stakeholder assessment. Therefore, the stakeholder assessment model, presented below, maps the above analyzes, for the groups of actors involved or who have some interest in the execution and results of the program to be evaluated, considering all those interested in government intervention, as shown in figure 04.

5. Objectives and Results

Any public action must have very clear objectives so that its event is not disputed or even invalidated and, more latently, so that it is possible to measure whether such an attitude was successful or not and how to improve it for the future or, if necessary, for extinguish it.

The actions related to defense and security, public or national, are also no different. While the Ministry of Defense, the body responsible for the top management of the Armed Forces, had a budget forecast of R$ 74.6 billion in 2019, accountability must be shown effectively.

The decree that embodied Operation Arcanjo aims to preserve public order in the communities of Alemão and Penha Complexes, in Rio de Janeiro and, also, to assist the Public Security Forces in a process of pacification for the UPP’s implementation, which would improve the image of Rio de Janeiro during the mega-events that would take place in the city.

It can be said that the results of action can be seen immediately, in the medium or long term. Thus, it will be analyzed whether the objectives established for the pacification Force, and mentioned above, developed within this scope and the reasons for this.

One of the functions of the Armed Forces, although not so explicitly, was to ensure the social services\(^8\) function provided to those communities and, immediately, it

is very evident that this happens since the garbage collection system and even public transport were resumed. While the Pacification Force stayed in place for almost 18 full months, it can be said that in the medium term the service was also guaranteed.

The same situation is repeated in the aid to the Public Security forces, in the short and medium terms the aid happens and the operations are carried out in a more or less integrated manner, but, like any Law and Order Guarantee Operation, there are no objectives in the long run and therefore, it can be said that the maintenance of social services and assistance to auxiliary forces was not effective in the long run.

**Figure 05: Objectives Achievement Model**

As previously explained, the improvement of Rio de Janeiro’ image because of the mega-events that would happen soon in the city and the pacification process of the communities of the city with the implementation of the Pacifying Police Units were factors that proved to be very important objectives for the operation, but, in the end, they also did not have such effective results.

Did the implementation move towards the desired results? It is subject to external control, as shown in the Model for achieving objectives, in Figure 05.

As a result, national media reports were hopeful and treated the operation as a historic day in the fight against violence in Rio de Janeiro, as can be seen by doing a thorough analysis of the news and coverage given by the press during that day, but when analyzing the international media a few years later, during major events, it is evident that criticisms of mega-operation and its effects are present.
The presenter of the Globo TV Jornal Nacional, William Bonner, told Folha de São Paulo⁹ that Rio de Janeiro would be “united in a historic moment” and that was also the speech present during the broadcast of the RJTV newscast from the same broadcaster and the Jornal Nacional on 11/28/2010, the start of operations at Alemão’s complex.

The media euphoria did indeed result in television, but it fell short of the crime rates. This can be inferred by considering that both Jornal Nacional and RJTV that covered the operation from start to finish on 11/25/2010 when the operation started in Vila Cruzeiro, broke audience records for that year. The same happened with Rede Record, which transmitted information about the operation the following day, 26, with the program Fala Brasil

However, despite the presenter Ana Paula Araújo, during the RJTV program on the same day, saying that they are “decisive days for security in Rio de Janeiro”, this has not been shown in the coming years in the communities, especially when considering the violence rates from such locations. In an interview with the Los Angeles Times, journalist Rene Silva pointed out that "Violence today is worse than before pacification because we do not know when there will be shooting".

Figure 06: Absolute Number of Robberies, Alemão’s Complex (2002-2016)

Source: Adapted from G1 News Portal, 2017.

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The Fogo Cruzado application, an initiative by International Amnesty that registers the locations where there is shooting in the city of Rio de Janeiro and the metropolitan region, showed that, between July 2016 and July 2017 (4 years after the departure of FPaz), the Alemão’s Complex was the neighborhood with the highest number of occurrences, registering 225 foci of shots and 38 dead. The second neighborhood with the highest incidence of shots was Penha, also a target of FPaz, with 200 notifications and 25 dead.

The G1 news portal condensed data taken from the Public Security Institute and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) into a very didactic infographic and from these data it is possible to perceive more clearly the momentality of the drop in crime in Alemão’s Complex, which will be analyzed through figure 06:

The data above have as reference the month of October (immediately before the start of FPaz's activities) and analyzing the historical series it is evident that the theft rates in the region were in constant decline, but from 2012, right after the end of the Operation, it increases again, indicating, once again, the momentary characteristic of the Armed Forces' performance in the Operation in question and reinforcing the argument that, in the long run, there were no improvements.

In addition, these data presented serve as a panorama for understanding that the UPPs' policies did not succeed in that region and, therefore, Archangel Operation itself did not represent real gains for the city, only the immediate results that have already been addressed that made possible the implementation of the Pacifying Police Unit in that region. However, it should be noted that the article proposed here is not prepared to explain the characteristics and objectives of the UPPs, but rather, their relationship with the Archangel operation and the use of the Armed Forces.

6. Side Effects

Allied to the results, it is necessary to understand the phenomenon of the side effects of adopting public policies, which often may not be directly associated with the idealized scenario itself, but with the adversities of the reality that is taking shape.

The operation that took place in Alemão and Penha Complexes, as well as any other operation, had positive and negative side effects, which will be more precisely identified from this point on. Firstly, all the positive points are analyzed, then the negative ones, and finally, a general assessment of the presented analyzes is made.
The first point that can be highlighted is the budgetary relief that the operation generates for the forces since a large amount of values is abruptly invested, with Archangel Operation receiving approximately R$135,458,800.00, which was used in the most diverse ways. forms, from the purchase of equipment to the expenses with ranch and personnel.

A second aspect that must be considered is the momentary drop-in crime rates in the region, where forces were employed, which enabled the implementation of the Pacifying Police Unit in the respective neighborhoods. However, as previously explored, this is a momentary decline, while long-term State actions are not included in military actions.

Considering the negative side effects, the first point of extreme relevance to be considered is the exposure of the military that are in action to the most diverse environments and niches. The military is exposed to the crime environment, to the rigor of the media, and even to society in general, both the military individual and the acting force.

The adequacy of the Armed Forces doctrine is a crucial element of analysis, as it overflows the operation itself and affects all GLO operations and, ultimately, the National Defense and constitutional powers. The institutionalization of the Manual of Guarantee of Law and Order (MD33-M-10), for example, only happened in 2014, in view of the need to characterize the GLO operations that were increasingly occurring.

As part of the armed forces’ doctrine adequacy, they are subject to the Rules of Engagement, or employment rules, of each operation, which are characterized as a document that delimits the proportional use of force (Nexo, 219). This document is very volatile and changes constantly, not only between different operations but also between interoperational phases.

The volatility of the rules of engagement requires that the Brazilian military is always in constant updating of their training methods since they must be ready to act at any time. In this scope, the question of military armaments that need to correspond to the current reality of the troops on the ground is also involved, that is, if the terrain is urban, it is logical that the armament used is suitable for that purpose.

It is emphasized that the side effects of a military operation can be several and, as initially indicated, are not necessarily directly linked to the operation, but often with the individual capacities of individuals or even with the environment. The success of an
operation, however, should not be measured solely through its side effects, but they must be taken into account when operations are designed at a higher political-strategic level. Figure 07 summaries the side effects of the Transaction.

**Figure 07:** Side Effects: Archangel Operation

![Diagram showing side effects of Archangel Operation](Source: Authors’ Elaboration)

7. Final Remarks

The work that was done here aimed to analyze Archangel Operation in an exploratory way to understand what phenomena occurred during the participation of the Brazilian Armed Forces in such a particular context of public security in Rio de Janeiro, as was the implementation of the Pacifying Police Unit in the Alemão’s Compex, in 2010, what became known as the Pacification Force.

Right away, it is necessary to understand that the creation of a Pacification force to retake public order, although that order is not very well placed in the Ministerial Decree that creates it, at the request of the then-governor of State, Sérgio Cabral, responded to exposed truths at that time and fulfilled the role of the federal entity in helping to design and implement the Pacifying Police Unit for the region of Alemão and Penha’s Complexes.

It is quite evident throughout the work that there are groups that are very interested in the occurrence or not of Law and Order Guarantee operations, especially...
those that take place in an area as mediatic as Rio de Janeiro. While these interest
groups are projected socially not only as groups but through individuals, public or not, it
is increasingly difficult to establish which ties permeate these relationships.

Allied to the interest groups that are projected before the implementation of
Archangel Operation and the establishment of the Pacification Force, we have to
analyze its effectiveness during and after its end. During the analysis, the argument that
FPaz did not reach its previously determined objectives in the fight against crime in the
medium and long term was always present. This argument was confirmed by the models
of analysis and evaluation of public policies used.

However, it should be noted that this was not the objective of the Pacification
Force and, therefore, it is reasonable that it has not been achieved. The criticism that is
constructed here, when identifying the decrease in crime as a parallel objective, is the
political use of this demand, since it is a socially and politically placed demand for the
military engaged in Law and Order Guarantee operations, but not necessarily the reality
pointed out in the different legislations on the subject.

Besides, the side effects that such an implementation obtained were also
analyzed, identifying more negative than positive results. Because more than seven
years have passed since Archangel Operation, it can be said that its effects are no longer
as sparse, and it is possible to indicate, with a certain level of clarity, what its
consequences are in Rio de Janeiro and, more specifically, in Alemão and Penha’s
Complexes.

The work does not intend to analyze the budgetary theme and therefore it is
limited to presenting companies that act as influencers and participants in decision-
making, requiring a more in-depth analysis in this area to understand in more detail the
relationship of forces established consonance and achievement of a Law and Order
Guarantee operation.

Thus, the work complies with its proposal to analyze Archangel Operation in its
objectives, allied to the interest groups that permeate these goals, the achievement of its
objectives in a staggered way, and what are its side effects to the troops and society in
general. It is evident that other operations took place in that region after the dismantling
of FPaz, but this was not the subject of this work.

As soon as it is necessary to understand that the mission of pacification of a
certain area, whether inside or outside national borders, should not be directed solely
and exclusively to military forces, as was the case with Archangel Operation. Public authorities and the society that resides in that region, need to act together through the elaboration of decent public policies aimed at ensuring that military power is not an end in itself and, thus, fleeing the vicious cycle of Armed Forces’ use in demand of a so called not-present public order that is not taught, passed on or at least presented.

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*Revista Brasileira de Políticas Públicas e Internacionais*, v. 5, n. 3, dez./2020, pp. 01-27.