

Global Climate Governance: Subnational Contributions from Mato Grosso to Brazilian Participation in the Paris Agreement¹

Governança Climática Global: Contribuições Subnacionais do Mato Grosso à Participação Brasileira no Acordo de Paris

Elze Rodrigues² 
Miriam Garcia³ 

DOI: 10.22478/ufpb.2525-5584.2020v5n3.54627

Received: 18/08/2020
Approved: 21/09/2020

Abstract: How is it possible for subnational actors to participate in complying with Brazil's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)? The purpose of this article is to discuss such possibilities based on the concept of multilevel governance on the climate change agenda. The example of the state of Mato Grosso – which, at COP-21, presented an innovative proposal bringing together civil society actors with a focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions in a strategy called “Produce, conserve and include” (PCI) – is the starting point for exploring the role of the units of the Brazilian federation in the national articulation for the management of policies for compliance with the NDC. In addition to the PCI strategy, the state draws attention to its geography, composed of three different biomes (Amazon, Cerrado and Pantanal), and its economic character as a significant exporter of commodities. Based on the theoretical frameworks of orchestration in the climate change regime and the interaction between public and private actors, the expected result is to determinate aspects that characterize the performance of subnational actors in climate change policy in light of international commitments.

Keywords: Paris Agreement; Multilevel Governance; Subnational Actors; Brazilian Foreign Policy; Mato Grosso.

¹ The author Miriam Lia Cangussu Tomaz Garcia would like to thank the São Paulo Research Foundation (Fapesp) for financing the research project (Grant number 2017/23153-8). The opinions, hypotheses, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are the author's responsibility and do not necessarily reflect the Fapesp vision.

² University of Sao Paulo (USP) – E-mail: elzerodrigues@gmail.com.

³ University of Sao Paulo (USP) – E-mail: miliagarcia@gmail.com.

Resumo: Como é possível a participação de atores subnacionais no cumprimento da Contribuição Nacionalmente Determinada (NDC) do Brasil? O objetivo desse artigo é discutir tais possibilidades usando como base o conceito da governança multinível na agenda da mudança do clima. O exemplo do estado do Mato Grosso - que, na COP-21, apresentou uma proposta inovadora agregando atores da sociedade civil como foco na de diminuição das emissões de gases de efeito estufa em um uma estratégia denominada “Produzir, conservar e incluir” (PCI) – é o ponto de partida da exploração do papel das unidades da federação brasileira na articulação nacional para a gestão de políticas para o cumprimento da NDC. Para além da estratégia do PCI, o estado chama a atenção por sua geografia, composta por três biomas diferentes (Amazônia, Cerrado e Pantanal), e seu caráter econômico de expressivo exportador de *commodities*. A partir dos referenciais teóricos da orquestração no regime de mudança do clima e a interação entre atores públicos e privados, espera-se como o resultado determinar aspectos que caracterizem a atuação de atores subnacionais na política de mudança do clima à luz dos compromissos internacionais.

Palavras-chave: Acordo de Paris; Governança Multinível; Atores Subnacionais; Política Externa Brasileira; Mato Grosso.

1. Introduction

De acordo com Viola e Basso (2016), os desafios impostos pelas instabilidades ambientais foram minimamente incorporados pela disciplina de Relações internacionais. According to Viola and Basso (2016), the challenges imposed by environmental instabilities were minimally incorporated by the International Relations discipline. The authors use two references from the natural sciences to demonstrate the importance of integrating these challenges into the cognitive matrix of internationalists. The Anthropocene is the first reference illustrating a new geological era that started in the period of the Industrial Revolution, in which human actions have become the greatest vectors of global environmental changes, with consequences that can be harmful and even catastrophic for the planet (Rockström et al., 2009). The planetary boundaries constitute the second reference presented by Viola and Basso (2016). According to the authors of the concept of planetary boundaries, the Earth's subsystems can react in a non-linear, abrupt, and particularly sensitive way when they are placed close to their threshold levels.

Among the nine limits identified by the authors, climate change, biodiversity loss and the interferences in the nitrogen cycle have already had their barriers overcome. However, there is a significant uncertainty of how long it will take for disastrous environmental changes to happen or to the triggering of other processes that would drastically reduce the ability of the Earth's system to return to safe levels. In addition, Nash, Cvitanovic, Fulton and Halpern (2017) demonstrate that the concept of planetary

boundaries has the potential to shape future environmental policies and technological innovations due to the significant increase in research on the topic and its integration in multilateral debates, such as the Sustainable Development Goals. Viola and Basso (2016) argue that it is necessary to place the mitigation of environmental instability, including the struggle against climate change, in the category of the global common good, which would require greater international consultation in favor of more effective global governance.

With regard to global climate governance, there is a change in the actors comprising its landscape, which are no longer exclusively States acting in an intergovernmental sphere. As pointed out by Widerberg and Pattberg (2016), there is a strong tendency of increasing and consolidation of transnational climate initiatives that can support mitigation and adaptation actions to climate change. Therefore, the mention of the role of non-state and subnational actions, or even those actors gathered in arrangements such as transnational climate initiatives, as non-Party Stakeholders in the decision of the Conference of the Parties (COP) 21 in Paris is presented by the literature as the institutionalization of a new governance model (Chan; Brandi & Bauer, 2016; Falkner, 2016; Hale, 2016). The institutionalization of the role of non-Party stakeholders in the intergovernmental sphere could be seen as the recognition of the support offered by these actors to States in fulfilling their targets established through their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) (Chan et al. in press).

Considering this, this article's main question is: how can subnational actors contribute to the fulfillment of NDCs? This article's goal is to introduce the debate on the contribution of non-Party stakeholders to the achievement of goals established by states in the intergovernmental sphere. For this purpose, we use the example of the Mato Grosso state in COP-21, when it presented a strategy called "Produce, Conserve and Include". The case of the state of Mato Grosso is relevant because of its place as a strategic subnational unit in Brazilian environmental policies due to its geographical condition comprising three biomes, Amazon, Cerrado, and Pantanal, and the economic characteristics of a significant exporter of commodities. In addition, it is a member of different transnational climate initiatives.

This article is divided into three parts. First, we conduct a literature review on global climate governance and multilevel governance. Subsequently, we present an empirical analysis of the case of Mato Grosso, and its voluntary contribution to

greenhouse gas reduction (GHG) targets through subnational transnational initiatives will be presented. Finally, we discuss how federative entities can contribute to the fulfillment of the Brazilian NDC.

2. Multilevel Governance and Climate Change

2.1. The international climate change regime: hybrid multilateralism

As a landmark for the inclusion of environmental issues on the international agenda, it is possible to point out to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, which took place in 1972 in Stockholm. Twenty years later, after a gradual increase in debates on the topic, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), known as Earth Summit, took place in Rio de Janeiro. So far, this is the most important intergovernmental environmental meeting, in view of its results and repercussions, such as the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, the Convention to Combat Desertification, the Declaration of Principles on Forests, the Agenda 21 and, the treaty more pertinent to our article, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Widerberg and Pattberg (2017) highlight that, since the adoption of the UNFCCC at Earth Summit, we can observe three paradigm shifts in global climate governance. The first is described as a “Cambrian explosion” of institutions around the UNFCCC such as bilateral initiatives and other international regimes. The second change is the proliferation of transnational climate actions by non-state actors and subnational authorities. Finally, the third shift corresponds to the alignment of this transnational regime with the UNFCCC as a way of addressing climate change.

International Relations literature has developed a vast theoretical framework to explain this evolution of global climate governance. It is noteworthy to highlight the most famous concept of a regime complex for climate change defined by Keohane and Victor (2011) in which the UNFCCC exercises the role of an umbrella organization for the different actors of the regime. Abbott (2012) proposes a new term called the transnational regime complex for climate change emphasizing the emergence and consolidation of non-state actors. There is also a concept advanced by Betsill, Dubash, Paterson and Van Asselt (2015) called the global climate governance landscape in which the UNFCCC would act as a point of coordination in a landscape composed of different intergovernmental and transnational initiatives. Finally, there is the concept of hybrid multilateralism proposed

by Bäckstrand, Kuyper, Linner, and Lövbrand (2017) also in order to explain how intergovernmental and transnational spheres interact in global climate governance.

For Bäckstrand et al. (2017), the involvement of non-state actors is a particular feature of global climate governance developed in recent decades, given that UNFCCC climate diplomacy has been a pioneer in continuously facilitating access and inclusion of non-state actors in negotiation processes. A complementary analysis to this is presented by Hale (2016), when stating that both the increase in the climate actions of non-state and subnational actors and the failure of Copenhagen to negotiate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol allowed a greater prominence of these transnational initiatives and its potential to contribute to fight against climate change. The author points out that this dynamic of transnational initiatives was perceived by United Nations officials not as being a competition, or even an alternative to the UNFCCC; but as a way of encouraging member states in their efforts to achieve their goals.

In this sense, Bäckstrand et al. (2017) advances the concept of hybrid multilateralism to describe the growing trend in global climate governance of approximation between the domains of multilateral diplomacy and transnational climate actions. For the authors, hybrid multilateralism is defined as follows:

[...] hybrid multilateralism denotes a bottom-up climate policy architecture that combines voluntary pledging by states with an international transparency framework for periodic review and ratcheting-up of ambition, in which non-state actors play important roles as implementers, experts and watchdogs. Second, hybrid multilateralism refers to an increasingly dynamic interplay between multilateral and transnational climate action, where the UNFCCC Secretariat has taken a role as facilitator, or orchestrator, of a multitude of non-state climate initiatives and actions. (Bäckstrand et al., 2017, p. 573).

According to Bäckstrand et al. (2017), the Paris Agreement institutionalizes the concept of hybrid multilateralism. Regarding the participation of non-state and subnational actors in the climate regime after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, it is worth mentioning the use of the term non-Party Stakeholders in the COP-21 Decision.

Agreeing to uphold and promote regional and international cooperation in order to mobilize stronger and more ambitious climate action by all Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities, and other subnational authorities, local communities, and indigenous peoples. (United Nations, 2015, p. 2).

The term non-Party Stakeholders is used eleven times throughout the text of the COP-21 Decision to notably refer to the efforts of actors in this category that are scaled-up in climate action and to support UNFCCC Parties in strengthening their actions mitigation and adaptation. The participation of non-Party Stakeholders is subsequently integrated into the functions of the UNFCCC Secretariat with the decision of COP-22 establishing the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action with a mandate until 2020.

2.2. Orchestration as a mode of governance

Bearing in mind the concept of hybrid multilateralism, this paper seeks to understand how international organizations act, or even react, to this scenario with a stronger presence of non-state actors. This article converges with the assumption that the UNFCCC plays the role of orchestrating climate actions implemented by non-state actors (Abbott, 2017; Bäckstrand et Al., 2017; Dryzcek, 2017; Falkner, 2016). For Falkner (2016), the Paris Agreement can become an “orchestrator” of climate action beyond the domain of traditional international governance. Such a theoretical approach is also shared by Bäckstrand and Kuyper (2017) when they stated that international organizations have increasingly used orchestration as a way of governance to solve problems of collective action and to manage global governance.

It is understood that international organizations employ orchestration when they engage intermediate actors on a voluntary basis, providing them with ideational and/or material support, to address target actors in the search to achieve the objectives of international organizations in order to guarantee certain effectiveness (Abbott; Green & Keohane 2015).

Orchestration is a governance mode that relies on soft inducements rather than mandatory controls. It is widely used in transnational settings where ‘governors’ possess limited authority. An orchestrator with sufficient legitimacy, focality, and resources can enlist likeminded actors and organizations, deploying material support, reputational incentives, information and guidance, and mobilizing pressure and assistance from third parties, to catalyze, support, and steer the behavior of enlisted actors, enhancing their impact on their ultimate targets or beneficiaries. Orchestration is non-hierarchical: organizations respond because they share the orchestrator’s general policy goals, because the orchestrator deploys valuable material and ideational inducements, and

because other incentives – such as a desire for policy relevance – prompt cooperation. (Abbott, 2017, p. 739).

In this way, it is possible to differentiate the act of orchestrating from the traditional hierarchy of governance, or even from the practices of delegation, by two fundamental characteristics: being indirect and soft. In orchestration, organizations act through intermediaries, who can be civil society actors or even other international organizations, and without any control over them to reach targets, which can be the States or the private sector (Abbott et al., 2015). Despite still being little identified and studied, orchestration is a mode of governance widely used by international organizations in parallel to the traditional attributions conferred on them by international law (Abbott et al., 2015; Widerberg, 2017; Dryzek, 2017).

Bäckstrand and Kuyper (2017) list four arguments to affirm that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change can be analyzed according to the theory of orchestration. The first comes from the UNFCCC's limited governance capacity in terms of budget and staff, especially when compared to other international organizations. The authors also pointed out that there is a great diversity of potential intermediary actors in climate governance: transnational initiatives, civil society actors, subnational entities, the academic community, and investors. Third, the authors point to the reaffirmation of the Convention's role as an organization that leads to global climate governance, and this role was reinforced after the adoption of the Paris Agreement. And, finally, there is a divergence of objectives between the parties when considering the asymmetric distribution of the negative impacts of climate change.

Throughout the Paris Agreement negotiation process, as Dryzek (2017) points out, the UNFCCC Secretariat used orchestration as a way of governance by establishing two platforms included in the Global Agenda for Climate Action: (i) the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) and (ii) the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA). At the twentieth meeting of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP-20), the Lima-Paris Action Agenda initiative was launched with the aim of increasing and giving greater visibility to the climate actions of non-state actors and to encourage member states to adopt an Agreement at the Conference from Paris. At the same time, NAZCA was also launched, which aims to record the mobilization and actions that are supporting the countries to reach and exceed their national climate commitments.

2.3. The limits of the Paris Agreement and the decision of COP-21 as an instrument for multilevel climate governance

In retracing a history about the mention of the term non-Party Stakeholders, the article by Hale (2016) reports that the inclusion of these actors in the official texts was not an approach easily accepted by all UNFCCC member states. Hale (2016) states that the term non-Party Stakeholders was adopted after claims by subnational governments that the term non-state actors were not the most appropriate to represent them. Even though the mention of non-state actors and subnational authorities is not present in the Paris Agreement, but in the COP-21 Decision, Hale (2016) argues that these actors have become part of the center of the climate change regime. However, it is necessary to extrapolate this argument in order to analyze to what extent the Paris Agreement can be considered as a representative instrument of multilevel climate governance since for the author, not only the member states are at the center of the climate change regime.

According to Zürn (2013), multilevel governance has become the *conditio politica* of the 21st century. Although it is not delimited by a rigid institutional design, it is understood that multilevel governance connects domestic levels of governance with those beyond the nation-state; and, this configuration has a better capacity to provide more effective and legitimate policies in an era of globalization. The author presents two necessary conditions to affirm that global governance can be characterized as a multilevel governance system: the autonomy of the global level and the interaction between levels that have functional differentiations. In developing the hypothesis, the author contrasts two approaches to governance in the international system: the intergovernmental and the multilevel.

The intergovernmental approach is built on the concept of Westphalian sovereignty, which would imply defining the international system as anarchic. That is, States are not subject to compliance with laws without their prior consent. It appears that the international institutions established in the post-World War II period respond to the logic of this intergovernmental approach since they are institutions of authority delegated by the States. Ultimately, states would control both the administrative apparatus and the budget of these institutions.

However, the author argues that the growing increase in the number of international institutions, as well as the recognition of increasingly complex problems – such as environmental risks –, has made borders less significant for national transactions.

This, in turn, led to an increase in the political scope of the activities of these international institutions. There is a disaggregation of the governmental functions of the State and attribution of these functions to different levels of governance, including the global level. The author sheds light on the phenomenon of greater intrusion of these new international institutions in domestic policies, such as, for example, the increasing degree of interaction of these institutions with transnational actors on topics previously considered exclusive to the domestic plan. Nation-states, by consenting to the establishment of international institutions with a more sophisticated architecture in which the logic of delegated and controlled authority can no longer be applied, become subjects of a new dynamic.

Thus, the author argues that in some areas, as in the case of the environmental regime, the global level has reached a certain degree of autonomy. It is necessary to consider the fundamental caveat made by Zürn (2013) that the recent changes in the global order should not be understood as an indication of the death of the nation-state. For the author, overcoming problems, such as those related to global financial markets, are hardly conceivable without the participation of nation-states. Nation-states exercise governmental functions with a legitimate monopoly on the use of force and the ability to collect taxes that are crucial in seeking to resolve a range of problems of public interest.

These ideas can be applied in the Brazilian literature that discusses the relative autonomy of the international action of the federated subnational entities. Rodrigues (2008) and Vigevani (2006) point out that there is room for action by Brazilian subnational governments, as long as the limits of their constitutional powers are respected, which applies to the case of Mato Grosso. Prado (2018) adds to this view the problem of differentiating between high and low politics, arguing that the international insertion of federative units can be more fruitful in a theme that appears with less priority on the federal foreign policy agenda, which can also be the case of environmental issues in the Brazilian government's approach.

Considering the above mentioned elements, a scenario of multilevel governance corresponds to one that the nation-state will no longer be the indispensable political institution and also the only one with the capacity to perform all governance functions; legitimacy will not only be attributed to nation-states at the international level and national societies at the domestic level. Zürn (2013) considers that it is already possible to use the concept of multilevel global governance. When analyzing the argument advanced by Hale (2016) in the light of the theoretical framework of multilevel

governance proposed by Zürn (2013), it is clear that, despite the strong change in the composition of international institutions, it is still not possible to say that the global level holds a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the nation-state. What we intend to defend when using the concept of hybrid multilateralism in this literature review is the capacity to reinvent the international Westphalian system in the face of growing challenges, including the aggregation of new actors.

New institutional arrangements were established with the participation of non-state actors as well as the increase in the complexity of the themes in the international arena. This undeniably generated a new dynamic of interaction between levels of governance beyond the nation-state. However, these changes were not enough to cancel the logic that international institutions operating with an authority delegated and controlled by States as in the intergovernmental model.

3. Transnational Climate Initiatives: Mato Grosso State engagement and climate actions

3.1. Non-party stakeholders and transnational climate initiatives

Regarding the need to achieve the Paris Agreement provisions of keeping a global temperature rise well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels or to pursue efforts to 1.5 degrees Celsius, the level of ambition advanced by the Parties through their NDCs is not enough to tackle climate change. Even considering that all contributions submitted by Parties are achieved, the temperature would still increase between 2.9 degrees Celsius and 3.4 degrees Celsius by the end of the century (UNEP, 2016). This represents temperatures much higher than that recommended by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, in its acronym in English) a special report published in 2018 states that climate-related risks to human health, livelihoods, and security increase even further with global warming of 2°C in the comparison between the 2°C scenario. This difference between the trajectory of global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) that considers the actions and commitments assumed by countries and the trajectory necessary to achieve what is recommended by the IPCC is called an “emission gap”.

Since 2010, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) publishes annual reports regarding the emissions gap. The 2019 report points out that even with the full implementation of unconditional NDCs, in 2030 the emissions gap for a 2 ° C temperature rise scenario would be 15 gigatonnes of CO₂ higher than necessary. For the 1.5 ° C

trajectory, the emission gap is equivalent to approximately 32 gigatonnes. The challenge of reducing GHG emissions is quite considerable. One of the examples UNEP uses to illustrate is the fact that 1 gigaton of CO₂ corresponds approximately to all emissions generated by the transport sector, including aviation, throughout the European Union for one year.

The 217 UNEP report on the emission gap indicates that non-state actors, including the private sector and civil society organizations, can contribute to closing the gap, especially in sectors such as agriculture and transport. In other words, it is not only possible to observe the increased engagement of non-Party stakeholders on the international scene, but also a broader recognition of the role of these actors in solving collective problems such as the mitigation of GHG emissions. This interpretation is also advanced by Chan et al. (2015) when stating that by connecting the multilateral climate regime to the diversified field of non-state and subnational actors climate actions can maximize benefits. This can be further illustrated thanks to the findings of Hsu, Brandt, Widerberg, and Chan (2020) pointing out transnational initiatives with the greatest contribution potential to reduce the emission gap in thematics such as forest (Bonn Challenge, Governor's Climate and Forest Task Force, New York Declaration on Forests), local authorities (Under 2 Coalition) and companies (RE100 Initiative).

The elements of the COP-21 Decision constitute one of the most comprehensive frameworks on the engagement of non-state actors formulated in international regimes (Chan et al. 2016). However, the relationship between non-Party stakeholders and States regarding the implementation of NDCs remains briefly addressed in the literature. By proposing a debate on how to ensure that the promises of climate action by non-state actors, local governments, and transnational initiatives can be fulfilled, and thus complement the actions of the States, Chan et al. (2019) identify risks such as a geographic imbalance in the implementation of actions, lack of alignment with the priorities of the climate and sustainability agenda, potential political disputes, among others. The authors conclude by highlighting the need to offer incentives, to ensure that actions are based on the national and regional context, and the need to engage not only actors and initiatives categorized as the front-runners. Hsu et al. (2020) offer a complimentary analysis on the interaction between non-state and subnational actors and States by stressing the role of these actors in the implementation of NDCs, supporting the revision of national targets ambitions, promoting technical capacity, demonstrating the

feasibility of projects and building political support. However, the authors emphasize that this impact depends on how national strategies recognize these contributions.

3.2. The example of the Mato Grosso state in global climate governance

The Mato Grosso state is the third-largest in Brazil in terms of land area, and historically one of its main economic activities rely on agriculture and livestock. One critical feature of this state is the fact that it is the only Brazilian state with three biomes in its territory (Mato Grosso, 2020). Despite occupying only 7.2% of the state, the Pantanal biome portion in Mato Grosso gathers an elevated number of endemic fauna; the Cerrado occupies 32.29% of the territory, and the Amazon is present in approximately 50% of the state's territory. Also, Mato Grosso is one of the major exporters of commodities, such as soybeans, beef, and corn, among others. For instance, the state leads in the Brazilian scenario of beef exportations (IBGE, 2018) and it is also the largest producer of soybeans (Silva Júnior; Lima, 2018). In addition, Bustamante et al (2012) point out that the potential for reducing emissions offered by the beef industry is very high and may constitute one of the most important options for mitigating Brazilian emissions.

According to the National Institute for Space Research (INPE by its acronym in Portuguese), in 2019, the deforestation rate for the Brazilian Legal Amazon, which comprises nine states, places Mato Grosso in second place contributing to deforestation with 16.80%, behind Pará (INPE, 2020). However, historically, the state has already shown strong trends in reducing it. The good results obtained in the struggle against deforestation were presented by the state government in a document submitted to Under2 Coalition. It mentions that, in the past years, it was the Brazilian Amazonian state that has most contributed to reducing deforestation preventing the emission of 1.9 Gt CO₂.

On the one hand, Mato Grosso represents the Brazilian agricultural productive power. On the other hand, the state has increasingly sought to become one reference among local authorities regarding climate actions. In the run-up to COP-21, the state's engagement was demonstrated on two approaches.

The first approach refers to the adoption of local strategies and policies. For instance, the state adopted the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation and Fires comprising targets until 2020. Between 2016 and 2020, the state aims to reduce deforestation by 80% (in average for the period) in relation to the baseline period (from

2001 to 2010). Furthermore, the Action Plan aims to eliminate illegal deforestation by 2020. At COP-21, the state also presented a strategy called “Produce, Conserve and Include” (Mato Grosso, 2016). With targets for 2030, the strategy presents goals such as: (1) replacing 6 million hectares of low-yielding pasture with high-yield crops, (2) conserving 60% of native vegetation cover, (3) reducing deforestation by 90% for the Amazon biome and 95% for the Cerrado, (4) recover 2.9 million hectares of riparian forest, (5) offer technical assistance for 100% of small products, among others. Stickler, Duchelle, Nepstad and Ardila (2018) highlight that the “Produce, Conserve and Include” (PCI) strategy is internationally recognized as one of the jurisdictional approach references. This because the Mato Grosso approach encompasses a local authority leading a multi-stakeholder platform gathering producers, civil society organizations, among others with quantitative targets. In addition, the implementation of the strategy has transparency criteria with the availability of public data for monitoring (PCI, 2020). Finally, in 2019, the state Decree 46 defines that the PCI strategy will be implemented by a private non-profit entity called “PCI Institute” allowing, among other functions, to coordinate and articulate the actions between multiple actors and to identify national and international fundraising opportunities for the implementation of the strategy (PCI MT, 2020).

The second approach, complementary to the first one, relates to the engagement of Mato Grosso on transnational climate initiatives that were part of LPAA and registered on NAZCA platforms. For example, during COP-21, the state of Mato Grosso signed the document to be part of the transnational climate initiative Under2 Coalition. The initiative gathers a group of ambitious state and regional governments committed to containing the global warming increase below 2°C. Currently, the coalition has more than 220 local authorities and represents 43% of the global economy.

The Mato Grosso state is also engaged in other initiatives, as mentioned below:

- R20: aims to accelerate investments in infrastructure for a green economy at the sub-national level.
- Governors' Climate and Forests Task Force (GCF): an initiative with 35 states and provinces in Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Ivory Coast, United States, and Spain. The initiative seeks to promote REDD + programs and other financing opportunities for performance projects. For example, in 2018, Mato Grosso was granted by the initiative financial resources to promote the training of professionals

regarding climate change debates, transparency, availability of environmental information to civil society, and support for local communities (Carvalho, 2018).

- 20X20 Initiative (part of the Bonn Challenge): the State of Mato Grosso is committed to restoring 2.9 million hectares.
- Tropical Forest Alliance 2020: The Tropical Forest Alliance 2020 (TFA 2020) is a global public-private partnership in which partners take voluntary actions, individually and jointly, to reduce tropical deforestation associated with the supply of commodities such as palm oil, soy, meat, pulp, and paper. At the present moment, the state of Mato Grosso is one of the sub-national authorities in this initiative that brings together the private sector, civil society, international organizations, and states.

Despite a proactive engagement, especially considering the adoption of local plans and strategies such as the PCI, it should be noted that all commitments taken by the Mato Grosso state as a member of transnational climate initiatives are volunteers. As previously mentioned, the greater approximation of the intergovernmental and transnational spheres does not invalidate the predominant rationale of the international system based on the nation-state. Having said this, it is essential to debate how local authorities can contribute to the elaboration, review, and achievement of the climate goals established by Brazil.

4. The contribution of federated entities to the achievement of the goals established in the Brazilian NDC

Previous International Relations literature showed the multilateral environment of international organizations (OI) as a legitimizer of the decisions taken within its scope. Such a legitimate feature is due to the wide participation that is allowed by multilateralism. This means that, at least theoretically, the various members of the organization have their participation guaranteed, despite their individual characteristics that may differentiate them, for example, in terms of power (Bouchard & Perterson, 2014; Hurrell, 2010; Morse & Keohane, 2014).

The United Nations is one of the most emblematic examples of a multilateral organization. Currently, it is the international organization (IO) that most aggregates state representations. In its General Assembly (UNGA), which takes place annually, 193 countries participate, in addition to observers such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

Due to the characteristics of the IOs, States that would have a difficult individual representation in the mainstream of international decision-making have strong participation in this type of multilateral environment. For instance, both at AGNU and the UNFCCC votes have the same weight.

Since the League of Nations, Brazil has a historic engagement with multilateral organizations. In accordance with this trend, Brazil joined the UN in the organization's establishment. In addition to being responsible for the opening speech, and in compliance with the UN rules, Brazil also participates in debates and votes (Mello, 2014; Sardenberg, 2013). In this article, we argue that the international performance of a country constitutes one of its public policies; meaning that its engagement on the intergovernmental sphere is one of the actions carried out by the government when seeking its nation common good (Salomon & Pinheiro, 2013).

However, this view regarding the Brazilian foreign policy is relatively recent. Due to the specificities of the Brazilian diplomatic structure, for a long time, the predominant view regarding its foreign policy was one of isolation in relation to other governmental aspects. Thus, it was perceived as state policy rather than government policy. More recent studies and debates have shown that this idea of Brazilian foreign policy as a billiard ball, in other words, a massive, impenetrable, and isolated, is mistaken (Milani & Pinheiro, 2013; Milani, 2015).

Focusing on state political processes, as advanced by the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) field, it does not imply that only these processes are relevant to understanding the international scene. The FPA field is quite attentive to the interaction of governmental decision-making units as the field also captures the various actors inside and outside of a given State's borders that influence the conception and implementation of this public policy (Salomon & Pinheiro, 2013).

According to Putnam (1988), several international negotiations can be conceived at two different levels. At the domestic level, there are groups that pressure governments defending their interests which can be diverse and divergent. Political leaders seek to create coalitions among these groups. At the international level, governments aim to maximize their ability to meet domestic concerns while minimizing the consequences of external developments. On this account, the decision-maker is an articulator who circulates between these two levels and who cannot ignore any of them, creating his scope of satisfactory actions and seeking a balance.

As stated previously, this paper is aligned to the strands of the literature arguing that domestic and international interaction allows investigating foreign policy as a public policy. This has been discussed by a great number of authors in the literature (Milner, 1997; Lentner, 2006) stating that foreign policy is not insulated. This is due to the growing international regulation and the consolidation of democracy that engenders new domestic decision-making dynamics that are responsive to the international sphere.

Brazilian foreign policy, like most of the country's public policies, has the main objective of guaranteeing the maintenance of the potential of national economic development. In this sense, the country's participation in multilateral environments is part of its strategy to promote these interests (Mello, 2014).

As has been previously reported in the literature, there are three models for formulating public policies. The multiple-streams framework, developed by Kingdon (1984), states that when the government spots an opportunity for change, there are three main streams that lead to the government's agenda-setting: problems, policy, and politics. In contrast, the punctuated equilibrium theory, described by Baumgartner and Jones (1993), observes interruptions of long periods of stability in the elaboration of public policies (slow and linear pace) due to rapid and punctual changes. In other words, the theory seeks to explain how there is an alternation between moments of rapid change and stability and it builds on two analytical approaches: institutional structures and the agenda-setting process. Finally, there is also the model of advocacy coalition framework. This model, developed by Sabatier (1987), takes into account values, beliefs, and the role of political learning in the elaboration of public policies. Thus, an advocacy coalition would be composed of individuals of different positions who share certain beliefs that have a minimally relevant degree on actions over time.

Throughout the UNFCCC COPs, Brazilian diplomacy played a leading role in the discussions. The protagonism took place, above all, through a conciliatory behavior between groups of countries from the North and the South. In the conception of the Kyoto Protocol, Brazil defended two priorities in the negotiations: sovereignty over forests and the financial incentives for a sustainable development path for non-Annex I countries. In other words, the Brazilian position can be analyzed as one based on the defense of national development and the promotion of the sustainable development concept. Thus, it was aligned with a large group of other developing countries (Viola, 2002; Vieira, 2013). Since then, Brazilian diplomacy has been very focused on the Clean Development

Mechanism approach, a way of establishing a cooperation channel - the great Brazilian flagship in the treaty.

In 2009, Brazilian diplomacy announced the establishment of voluntary targets for reducing GHG emissions, becoming the first non-Annex I country to take this kind of action. This is part of a strategy adopted by Brazil as a response to a reformist proposal by a group of countries to preserve the status quo within the UNFCCC. The rationale guiding this shift was to find a middle ground, using a reformist position by the adoption of voluntary targets as well as a conservative one regarding the terms of the negotiation still built on a North-South division (Bailey, 2010; Viola, 2010).

The BASIC group, at that time comprising Brazil, South Africa, India, and China, specially established for the climate negotiations, is a strong indication of the new Brazilian position. In a way, the union of these countries shows a certain distance from other developing countries. Besides, the group's refusal to be identified with the developed countries and the emphasis on the emergence of the economy also distance them from Annex I countries (Vieira, 2013; Viola, 2013). Thus, in the first years of the 21st century, Brazil is at a crossroads in the international system, between the G77 and the emerging economies of the BASIC group (Gamba & Ribeiro, 2013). Although the diversity in its members, in the climate agenda, the G77 has a tendency to a defensive position in relation to the mandatory commitments for GHG reductions for its members arguing for the protection of their industrial developments. In this way, it is possible to understand this dilemma of Brazilian climate diplomacy as a search for participation in the process of changing norms, but without harming its interests - especially the economic ones.

In the preparation for the COP-21, the Brazilian government conducted an unprecedented survey in terms of foreign policy. To agree on the targets presented in the NDC, the Brazilian government led a public consultation with civil society, epistemic communities, and governmental agencies that would potentially be involved in the implementation of public policies to achieve the targets. The Brazilian NDC established that in relation to the 2005 level, the country would reduce its emissions by 37% by 2025 and 42% by 2030 (Brazil, 2015). In coordinating efforts to achieve the Brazilian NDC targets, the participation of non-Party stakeholders, including the federated entities - such as Mato Grosso - is extremely relevant as regional and local actions are added up to the national efforts of GHG emissions reduction.

The NDC model differs from the Kyoto Protocol mainly regarding the GHG reduction targets. On the one hand, the Kyoto Protocol model had emissions reduction targets established at the UN level on top-down models. On the other hand, the NDCs present voluntary targets representing each State contribution respecting their capacities and in a universal model which includes Annex I and non-Annex I countries (United Nations, 2015).

The Paris Agreement was ratified by the Brazilian Congress in 2016. At the moment, it was determined that the implementation of the NDC targets would be associated with the regulatory framework called the National Policy on Climate Change (PNMC by its acronym in Portuguese) dating back from 2009 (Brazil, 2016). This reveals that the proximity of climate actions established internationally is linked with public policies that are intrinsically determined at the domestic level. Therefore, it is possible to state that the foreign policy is a dependent variable of public policies which makes it possible to be investigated against its results, gaps, opportunities, and outputs.

5. Conclusion

The theoretical framework proposed by Zürn on multilevel governance contributes to shedding light on the debate about the changing composition of institutions in global climate governance. Regarding a more consistent engagement of sub-national actors with transnational initiatives and the consolidation of these initiatives with governance functions, this article argues that new theoretical approaches are necessary to understand this emerging social phenomenon. In this sense, the example of the Mato Grosso state can be considered as relevant. Mato Grosso sought to position itself by joining transnational climate initiatives and defining the PCI strategy for its participation in COP-21. Having said this, the concept of multilevel governance supports investigating the process of new actors implementing functions previously exercised exclusively by States and the process of reorganizing actors defending the maintenance and provision of global public goods. However, it is argued that the intergovernmental approach to global governance prevails over the approach to the global governance of a multilevel model. In sum, despite recent challenges to the domain of multilateral diplomacy, global governance cannot be understood as autonomous nor can international organizations be understood without the logic of delegated and controlled authority.

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