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EMBODIED COGNITION AND PLEASURE IN ANCIENT COMIC ANGER[1]

[COGNICIÓN ENCARNADA Y PLACER EN LA ANTIGUA IRA CÓMICA]

Manuela Irarrazabal
Universidad de Chile, Chile

ABSTRACT: This paper explores the application of a model of embodied cognition as a lens to understand anger in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata.* It argues that the representation of anger in the comedy follows a pattern found across genres in Greek literature in which the emotion is associated with pleasure. This sensory element is found ranging from a more articulated fashion in Aristotle to a variety of metaphors that link anger to erotism in other authors. The theory of conceptual metaphors, whose main claim is that our conceptual apparatus brings forth its own world of significance which depends upon having a body embedded in a biological, psychological and cultural context, provides an important tool to understand emotions in a text. The idea that our language carries information about the way in which we conceptualise things sheds light on the relationship between eros and anger in *Lysistrata*.
KEYWORDS: Embodied cognition; Emotion science; Cognitive metaphors; Ancient emotions; Greek comedy.

RESUMEN: Este artículo explora la aplicación de un modelo de cognición encarnada como lente para entender la ira en *Lisístrata* de Aristófanes. Se argumenta que la representación de la ira en esta comedia sigue un patrón encontrado en diferentes géneros de la literatura griega en que la emoción es asociada a un elemento de placer. Este elemento sensorial es encontrado desde una manera más articulada en Aristóteles hasta una variedad de metáforas que conectan la ira y el erotismo en otros autores. La teoría de metáforas conceptuales, cuya principal aserción es que nuestro aparato cognitivo produce su propio mundo de significado que depende del hecho de tener un cuerpo biológico y un contexto psicológico y cultural, provee una herramienta importante para entender las emociones en un texto. La idea de que nuestro lenguaje acarrea información acerca de la forma en que conceptualizamos las cosas arroja luz sobre la relación entre eros e ira en *Lysistrata.*
PALABRAS CLAVE: Cognición encarnada; Ciencia de las emociones; Metáforas cognitivas; Emociones antiguas; Comedia griega.

** Manuela Irarrazabal Elliott is a Postdoctoral fellow (research) in ancient literature and philosophy at Universidad de Chile. Her current research project deals with comic anger in Aristophanes from the perspective of embodied cognitive science. E-mail: manuela.irarrazabal@uchile.cl*

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1 Introduction

This article discusses an application of embodied cognition as a model for reading and understanding emotions in ancient Greek literature. I have chosen Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* as a test case for the value of this model for the study of ancient emotions. The passages selected support a pattern in Greek literature where anger is associated with pleasure. This pattern, it is argued here, responds to the way in which language in general, and abstract concepts in particular, carries information about our bodily-lived experience and our folk theories about things. Comedy, like any genre, responded to specific conventions on language usage. By tradition, the use of vulgarities, obscene jokes and refined risible language twists is pervasive. With a few exceptions, comedy has been somehow neglected as a place for the study of anger, probably because the emotion does not have the same catastrophic consequences as in epic and tragedy. However, precisely because of the idiomatic conventions of the genre, comic anger is an interesting place to assess the conceptualisation of the emotion.

There is nothing new in applying cognitive science to the study of ancient emotions. Yet, although this approach became a trend in research in the 1970's and has intensified over the last decades, the discussion has been largely dominated by readings of Aristotle from an understanding of cognition as *appraisal,* which places the focus on how the individual appraises a social situation(Fortenbaugh, 1975, 1979; Konstan, 2003; Nussbaum, 2001). These readings have been further extended to other ancient Greek authors (Konstan, 2006; Nussbaum, 2013). This lens has been fruitful in bridging ancient perspectives on emotions to modern ones while at the same time breaking up with a previous tradition that regarded emotion as "bodily stirrings" (Cairns, 2003, p. 16), that is, to autonomic responses. However, it has also been restrictive in several respects. Although Aristoteles' theory of emotions has been praised for being cognitive and for bringing into question the traditional opposition between emotion and reason, it can sometimes be too schematic to capture all the vicissitudes of emotions in Greek texts.

Here I outline two broad reasons for shifting the way we approach emotions in ancient texts from appraisal to embodied cognition theory. The first one has to do with the paradigms themselves and the challenges they have faced from within emotion and affective science. The second has to do with overlooking some aspects of the representation of emotions in ancient literature by applying a model that, despite fitting Aristotle's theory to a large degree, is over-intellectual when applied to other sources where the role of the body is more prominent. I begin with a brief review of these two reasons in the next section and then I turn to one model to make a case for using it in ancient drama.

This paper represents an effort to redress these two problems by testing a model of embodied cognition organised around the question of language and, most importantly, the information it can carry about emotions in a distant culture. The fact that our main source of information about emotions in ancient Greece is textual (material culture is of course important, but limited) makes the model of embodied cognition a very compelling one as it brings into question the significance of lived experience when discussing the way emotions are portrayed. This is particularly the case when we want to understand emotions in texts where the interest does not necessarily lie in developing a theory of emotions, but where one can assume that the audience needs relevant information to make the dramatic representation of an emotion intelligible (Budelmann; Easterling, 2010).

Lakoff and Johnson ([1980] 2003; 1999)[2] developed a theory of

conceptualisation according to which abstract concepts are reliant upon metaphors that are grounded in the body. One important consequence of their claim is that the way in which we give account of our emotions depends both on our shared cultural understanding of them and on our experience of them, two strongly interrelated factors (Lakoff, [1987] 1990, p. 406-8). This is in line with some recent developments in embodied cognitive science and 4E cognition (embodied, embedded, enactive and extended) more broadly, that have been incorporated by emotion science (Colombetti, 2014). According to embodied cognition, an emotion cannot be reduced to the result of an evaluation of the environment; rather, it is a way of making sense of the world by a situated and embodied organism, which includes bodily experience and folk knowledge. Despite this model not being new, Cairns (2003, 2016a, 2016b) and Forte (2019) have done important work on emotions using cognitive linguistics,[3] it has not been used in ancient literature in a systematic way to test patterns in the language of emotions across genres, including comedy.

Bringing ancient conceptualisations on emotions, and by "conceptualisations" I refer to presuppositions rather than explicitly articulated theories of emotions, is key both for enhancing our understanding of ancient literature and for building a history of emotions. This paper develops the application of a model and explores its implications for our efforts to understand ancient emotions, one of them being the strong presence of erotic vocabulary in relation to anger in Greek drama.

2 Background: towards a model shift

2.1 Embodied theories of cognition as a lens for emotions

Some cognitive theories of emotions have developed apart from a narrow understanding of cognition as mental processing of information from the outside world or as the product of an abstract mental-evaluative faculty (Solomon, 1973, 1977, 2002; Neu, 1987; de Sousa, 1987; Stocker, 1980; Lazarus, 1991), where the body plays mostly a role as an interface for the acquisition of knowledge, to conceptions of cognition that give the non-neural body an important meaning-generating role (Varela et al., 1991; Rosch, 1999; Colombetti, 2014; Colombetti & Thomson, 2008; Gallagher, 2008). According to the first group, appraisals depend uniquely on the brain and are sufficient conditions for emotion; a bodily change might come as a result of that appraisal, but they are distinct events. Even if bodily arousal is considered as necessary for emotion, it is normally as some excitation of the sympathetic nervous system and as in need of interpretation by some separate cognitive-evaluative faculty in order to be experienced by the subject as a specific emotion (Schachter; Singer, 1962, p. 379; Colombetti, 2014, p. 153). According to the second group, bodily arousal is "constitutive of the process of interpreting a situation" and of the emotion (Colombetti, 2014, p. 157). This perspective is based both on the phenomenology of the emotion – experientially, appraisal is integrated with arousal –and on the implications of the rich interconnectivity of the brain, the body and the environment –the amygdala is involved in appraisal and arousal; similarly, the cortex is involved in planning and emotion experience (Lewis, 2005, p. 182; Meteyard & Vigliocco, 2008, p. 305; Colombetti, 2014, p. 157). This view of cognition represents a step forward in bridging the disconnect between philosophy of emotions and neuroscience that often embroils

appraisal theory.

The idea that cognitive systems bring forth their own worlds of significance, as has been suggested by Varela et al. (1991), Weber & Varela (2002), Di Paolo (2005) and Colombetti (2014), among others, implies a radical shift in the conceptualisation of emotions. An appraisal might well be "an evaluation of a situation in terms of its relevance for oneself" (Lewis, 2005, p. 170), but little is elucidated by this if we cannot account for the relevance-generating process involved. Emotions are not a reaction to an assessment of the world out there; emotions are not intellectual judgments in which a bodily event may follow; emotions are strategies for self-regulation and adaptivity that provide action-guiding values, drives, preferences (Colombetti, 2014, p. 150) and belong to the social situatedness of the organism (Gallagher, 2008, p. 441; Griffiths; Scarantino, 2008, p. 438). Colombetti (2014) has argued extensively for a notion of emotion which assumes that the whole organism is a vehicle of meaning. The main claim is that living organisms, by continuously regenerating the conditions of their own survival and by establishing the boundaries between themselves and the environment, necessarily establish a point of view, which generates meaning. In her account (Colombetti, 2014, p. 148), "the environment is never, for the living system, a neutral world awaiting to be internally represented and evaluated in order to become meaningful." Meaning is thus generated within the system in its relationship with its environment and emotions are importantly involved in this process.

I will leave this aspect of the discussion on emotion aside for a moment and move to the question of how we conceptualise them through language. Embodied cognitive science has strong implications for the way we understand language and the information it can carry about a speaking community, and this is key to understand emotions in the past. As has been discussed, embodiment means that cognition depends upon the experience of having a body with its sensorimotor capacities, which is embedded in a biological, psychological and cultural context. Perception is not constrained by the surrounding world; it contributes to the enactment of that world, and this means that one appraises through being embodied and situated. As Rosch (1999, p. 73) points out, concepts "only occur as part of a web of meaning provided both by other concepts and by interrelated life activities." It is important to bear in mind that experience happens in "interdependent meaningful wholes" and that "meaningful wholes include: world knowledge, beliefs, expectations, values, desires, habits, skills, intuitions, the body, everything that is un- or non-conscious, and so on" (Rosch, 1999, p. 70).

Embodied theories of cognition propose that semantics are grounded in our basic sensorimotor, social, and other experience. Lakoff and Johnson ([1980] 2003) advanced this idea and suggested that the structured nature of bodily experience and the capacity to imaginatively project from certain well-structured aspects of that experience to abstract conceptual structures lays at the basis of conceptualising. The debate on whether simulation is at the foundation of this process is outside the scope of this article; however, there is evidence from neuroscience suggesting that sensory and motor information is implicated in conceptual representation (Meteyard & Vigliocco, 2008, p. 304; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005).

Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 16-17) went on to spell out a model to explain how our concepts are shaped by the perceptual and motor systems of our body. Furthermore, categorisation is understood as a result of our biological makeup and as something that happens mostly automatically and unconsciously (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 18). Concepts, according to this model, are prototype-like structures that enable the organisation and usage of information, while at the same time affect what we take as

reality –in this respect, this model matches the one proposed by Rosch (1999). Lakoff and Johnson ([1980] 2003, p. 56-68) propose that most of our conceptual system is metaphorically structured, meaning that most concepts are partially understood in terms of other concepts. Abstract conceptualisations, such as anger, are never independent from metaphoric models (also called schemas or prototypes) informed by bodily experience and folk knowledge, among other things. The understanding of metaphors as operations embedded in a speaking community is central to this claim (Johnson, 1987, p. 190-193),[4] an aspect that makes it particularly significant for the purpose of understanding emotions in a given culture.

Lakoff and Kövecses (1987)[5] delved specifically into the question of the conceptualisation of anger and elaborated on what language can reveal about it. For example, when we want to talk about our anger in English, we appeal to concepts such as "intensity," "limit," "boiling," "insanity," "burden," "struggle," "channelling," among others. These metaphors provide non-arbitrary patterns, ingrained in the language shared by a speaking community, which are informed both by experience, such as physiological agitation, and by folk knowledge, such as anger being an entity that can be *channelled* into something constructive in life. The way in which metaphors for anger are integrated into language is not necessarily conscious and it is inherited with the language in which they are found (Lakoff;Johnson, [1980] 2003, p. 3). This view does not deny the possibility that metaphors can be conscious acts of creativity. Rather, the emphasis here is placed on those metaphors that are inherited with the language. The question then is what insight this model can provide about those culturally shared elements in the conceptualisation of anger in antiquity. Before entering that question, I will give a quick overview of the debate on understanding emotions in ancient texts.

2.2 Reading emotions in ancient texts

The scholarship on ancient emotions over the last decades has experienced a major shift from understanding them as *passions* –the connotation being that the subject is passively affected by something opposed to rationality and similar to a bodily urge – to understanding them as evaluative functions or appraisals (Konstan, 2003, p. 104-7). The way in which emotions were understood in ancient texts responded both to the general frameworks used to conceptualise emotions by academics at the time and to the fact that the Greek word that we translate into "emotion" is "*páthos,*" which depending on the context can be what one "suffers," "endures" or "experiences." Together with the connotation of "being affected," it was often highlighted how emotions in Greek literature were portrayed as exaggerated, overwhelming and sometimes explained as externally induced by deities, without paying much attention to other aspects of their representation in the texts. This indebtedness has been somehow redressed by Fortenbaugh (1975) and subsequently by Nussbaum (2001; 2013) and Konstan (2003; 2006) who, having reviewed extensively the theories of emotions of Aristotle, Seneca and others, have shown how *cognitive* they are. Aristotle and other ancient philosophers developed theories of emotions as changes in the way we perceive and assess the world along with strategies for influencing and controlling them. This has placed the Greeks as early precursors of cognitive theories of emotions (Price, 2009; Gill, 2009) and given way to a whole new perspective on ancient literature. This approach has also been part of a larger trend in literary criticism that in the last decades has sparked new interest in the history of emotions as cognitive events.

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Aristotle's discussion on anger is a unique surviving attempt to systematise the understanding of the emotion within the classical Greek setting. He defines anger and places it within a theory of emotions. In *Rhetoric 2* (1378a20-3), Aristotle defines emotions in terms of their intentional object:[6] emotions are *about* something, and this differentiates them from bodily urges. Anger's intentional object, according to Aristotle, is the perception of being the victim of an *insult* (ὀλιγωρία 1378a32) by someone from whom such a treatment is not justified. One reason why this definition has been considered as cognitive is that it establishes anger as a function of the individual's mind. As has been often remarked (Konstan, 2003, p. 100-101; 2006, p. 42-45), Aristotle specifies that it is the *perceived insult* (φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν 1378a32), that is to say, a mental representation of what is happening, what constitutes the emotion. If there is an insult and the subject fails to perceive it, there will be no anger; the belief that one is being insulted is enough to arise the emotion, whether the insult took place or not.

This understanding of emotions was also developed by other schools of philosophy in the Hellenistic period, sparking increasing interest in the study of ancient perspectives on emotions. Yet, despite initial enthusiasm, this cognitivist perspective has posed some challenges when attempts have been made to read other ancient texts, like oratory or drama, under this light. One of them is the role granted to the body in the understanding of emotions, which is present in many ancient Greek accounts, either by mentioning bodily reactions or sensations anchored in the body, such as pleasure and pain. The overlooking of these aspects, which makes the cognitivist view more intellectualistic than Aristotle himself, ignores the importance of how the lived experience of emotions is incorporated into their conceptualisation.

If we pay attention to *Rhetoric II*, the very source of the enthusiasm for appraisal theory as a lens for reading ancient texts, we learn that "emotions are all those affections which make people modify with regard to their judgements and that carry *pain* (λύπη) and *pleasure* (ἡδονή) with them"[7] (1378a21-2). While the definition of emotion is prominently centred around changes in opinion, it includes a sensory input and therefore, appraisal cannot be abstracted from the body (Campeggiani, 2020, p. 247). When considering anger, Aristotle spells out that it "always carries a certain *pleasure* (ἡδονή), caused by the expectation of revenge to come" (1378b2). Furthermore, when discussing the nature of desire in *Rhetoric I*, he states that "those who are resentful are extremely *pained* (λυποῦνται) when they fail to exact revenge, whereas the prospect of it makes them take *pleasure* (χαίρουσιν) in it" (1370b31-2). These examples show that when considering emotions, Aristotle connects the sensory input with a type of judgement in a precise way.[8] What we see here is an attempt at establishing in a systematic way, within a theory of emotions, what accounts for pleasure and what for pain by connecting sensory information with a certain mental representation. One consequence of this is that sensory information is not considered just a random event following an emotion.

The presence of the body in the account of emotions in *De Anima* is even more conspicuous, as Aristotle states that "it looks like all the *affections* (πάθη) of the soul involve the *body* (σώματος) –anger, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving and hating; in all these, the *body* is altered as well" (403a17). Moreover, when arguing that the "affections of the soul are *enmattered expressions* (λόγοι ἔνυλοί)" (403a25), he provides examples of emotional arousal without judgmental stimulus (403a21-2) and adds that definitions of emotions should reflect their embodied nature (403a26). Aristotle clearly distinguishes between soul and body, but as these passages show, the affections of the soul become apparent to us through the body.[9]

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Discussing Aristotle's theory in detail is outside the scope of this article, but it is a relevant starting point to illustrate the importance of using models that acknowledge the body in their accounts of emotions. Aristotle himself warns us against an over-intellectual approach to emotions and about being aware of how the models we impose into our objects of study can shape them. The definition of emotion by a natural philosopher will differ from the one by a dialectician, "the latter would define anger as the desire for *inflicting pain in return* (ἀντιλυπήσεως) or so, while the former as an effervescence of the blood or heat around the heart" (*DA* 403a30-1). This discussion does not touch upon whether appraisals are sufficient or even necessary for an emotion to take place, although it questions the very way cognitivism understands them; rather, my interest here is to show that by sticking to a model that ignores the importance and pervasiveness of embodiment in emotion science we are overlooking some important aspects of their portrayal in ancient Greek texts.

3 Discussion

3.1 The Opponent metaphor in ancient texts

As outlined in the introductory section, this article sets out to test the value of the embodied theory of cognition as a model for the study of ancient emotions. For this, I will focus on Aristophanes and use the analysis provided by Lakoff ([1987] 1990, p. 380-415) on conceptual metaphors used in English for anger. His analysis is particularly helpful in that it groups the expressions for anger under different metaphors, as for example, under the *hot fluid in a container* metaphor, we find expressions like "inflammatory remarks," "he exploded" that are probably linked to a raise in our blood pressure or to the perception that a threshold has been exceeded (Novaco, 2011, p. 651).

Here, I will focus on one of the metaphors for anger identified by Lakoff and Kövecses: the *opponent* metaphor. It groups expressions involving anger being a "struggle," one "battling*"* or "appeasing" one's own anger (Lakoff, [1987] 1990, p. 391). Under this metaphor, we find images representing anger as bestial and fierce, as insatiable and having demands of itself to be appeased. This metaphor reflects a folk understanding of anger as a negative emotion that can take you "out of your mind," as a type of insanity, if you do not control it. In this sense, anger is understood as a threat and as an opponent. My interest in the *opponent* metaphor lies in the overlap found between metaphors for anger and for lust (Lakoff, [1987] 1990, p. 411) as it supports a pattern in Greek literature where anger is associated with pleasure and food.

Appetite and *voraciousness* metaphors are metonymically linked to the *opponent* one as they stand for the "demands" of anger and sex (implicitly characterised as entities). In both cases, the metaphor connects with "food" through a sensory input – taste buds. Lakoff ([1987] 1990, p. 409) provides several examples of *food* metaphors for sex: "meat," "sexual appetite," "honey," "sugar," "she's a dish," "he's sex-starved," which have similar counterparts in Portuguese ("gostoso/a") and Spanish ("rico/a," "me lo/a comí"). Some examples of *food* metaphors for anger (albeit not identified by Lakoff) in English are: "your anger is *eating* you," "he's *consumed* by his anger," "your anger is *poisoning* you," "you are becoming *bitter*;" and *anger* metaphors for sex: "battle of sex," "battlefield," "he's devastating," "dressed to kill," "bombshell,"

"conquest," "surrender," "lust for revenge," "to be mad about"/"she's driving me mad" (to be angry or in love), "fire," "hot" (to be angry or sexually aroused "light my fire") Lakoff ([1987] 1990, p. 411).

When Aristotle discusses the pleasurable aspect of anger in *Rhetoric* (1370b12; 1378b6), he quotes Homer twice (*Il.* 18.108-9): "and anger, that sets a man on to rage, even him being very wise, *sweeter* (γλυκίων) than dripping *honey* (μέλιτος) spreads down his throat like smoke in the chest." In going back to Homer, Aristotle's conceptualisation suggests dependence on a shared cultural understanding of anger as well as a linguistic use of "food," standing for a sensory input. As in Aristotle, in Homer, anger can also be conceived as unpleasant, an aspect that is rendered by a metaphor involving taste: "an anger exceedingly *bitter/pungent* (δριμύς) gets hold of him" (*Il.* 18.322).[10] When discussing the modes of anger according to its intensity and duration, Aristotle says that we call *sour*(πικρός) the tendency to cherish anger within ourselves (*EE* 1221b15).[11] In a completely different context, Demosthenes speaks of the "discharge the sourness (πικρίαν) and malice" that Midias has kept in his mind against the masses (Dem. 21. 204).

Clements (2013) has compellingly argued that the use of adjectives such as δριμύς often regarded as metaphorical when used outside the domain of taste/smell, responses to our sensory structure being less compartmentalised than what we tend to think. Based on that, he rejects the distinction between "primary" and "secondary" meaning in this type of adjectives, where he sees a continuity between Aristotle's model of metaphor and Lakoff and Johnson's one (Clements, 2013, p. 80, fn. 34). However, what the conceptual metaphors model proposes, largely following Rosch's developments as explained above, is that concepts exist only in a network of meaningful wholes and that includes bodily experience as well as beliefs and folk theories. Lakoff and Johnson's claim is that abstract concepts are built upon other more concrete concepts. The fact that an adjective like δριμύςcan be applied to characterise the taste of a dish, the look that someone gives us, and a type of angry reaction might well be an indication of these three cases being semantically related either by bodily experience, by folk theory or by both of them. Let us not forget that this model is based on the view that any cognitive system brings forth their own worlds of significance which depend upon having a body embedded in a biological, psychological and cultural context.[12]

Furthermore, metaphors for anger are not only about "taste" but also more straightforwardly about "eating." Aristotle (*Rh.* 1369b12-3) claims that anger causes revenge, and that revenge is inflicted for the sake of the one who inflicts it (hence the difference from punishment) in order to *satiate* (πληρόω, a word that is used for being full of food) him. Homer makes Achilles say to Hector "I wish that somehow anger and fury might drive me to carve your flesh and *eat* (ἔδμεναι) it raw because of what you have done" (*Il.* 22.345-7) and in a similar fashion, makes Hecuba say "in the power of a violent man, in whose inmost liver I wish I could fix my teeth and feed on it (ἐσθέμεναι)" (*Il.* 24.213). Likewise, Aeschylus presents the angry deities Erinyes speaking of Orestes as "food" (*Eu.* 302) and as a "feast" (*Eu*. 305), while also saying that his "undrinkable" blood "nourishes" them (*Eu.* 266), conflating anger and desire for food. In the same trilogy, Clytemnestra appears referring to Agamemnon as a "fish" (*Ag*.1382) while trapping him with a net to kill him and to Cassandra as a "side-dish" to her "luxurious bed" (*Ag*. 1447), making a connection between food, sex, and anger. Although Lakoff does not trace metaphors linking anger and eating, they exist, as I showed above. I would suggest that the overlap responds to an element of pleasure experienced in anger that, except for Aristotle, is not normally acknowledged in folk

theories of anger. Aristotle attributes the pleasurable experience to the actual or imagined satisfaction of a desire for punishment. Another explanation, not necessarily contradicting it, is possible when taking what Lakoff ([1987] 1990. p. 392) identifies as the conceptualisation of anger as being a "beast inside a person" that falls under the *opponent* metaphor. According to it, the *voraciousness* metaphor stands for the "demands" of anger which are perceived as overtaking the individual.

3.2 Lysistrata

Lysistrata is an Athenian woman who is determined to end the Peloponnesian war. She is not the only one. Desperate for sex, since young men are fighting and dying, Athenian women decide to stop the war. Lysistrata manages to bring the Spartan women over on that mission. Part of their strategy is to cut men completely from sex: they swear an oath to deny sex to their husbands and lovers until they stop fighting. Women decide to seize the Acropolis, where the state treasury is, so men cannot continue fighting without their financial resources. The chorus of old men (the only men around) menace with setting fire to the building, but the women bring buckets of water to put out the fires. A dispute between the women in the Acropolis and the old men in which women show the bad decisions men take during war continues until Kinesias, Myrrhine's husband, appears with a huge erection. She, above all loyal to the oath, prepares him without delivering, increasing the tension. Eventually, a beautiful woman called Reconciliation arrives and men are finally persuaded of the advantages of stopping the war. The reasons for the women's discontent go beyond sexual neglect: men have wasted taxes and offspring and have allowed war to turn upside down both the public and the private space. Lysistrata reasserts that women, unlike slaves, have *anger* (χολὴν, 464): there is no doubt that the striking women are angry. By plot, sex is quite literally understood as a weapon. Not only established by women's sex-strike but also by men's attempts at penetrating – with spears first, then with phalluses (Henderson, 1975, p. 96). As it has been highlighted (Zeitlin, 1981, p. 305; Worman, 2008, p. 67-72), women are portrayed as lascivious, emotionally incontinent, and untrustworthy, delineating by contrast what a male character should be (whether men in the play live up to this is a different story though). This female emotional incontinence, which in comedy is aimed at prompting laughter, whereas in tragedy, horror, relies on a portrayal of women who are overly concerned about both anger and sex. Hence, the connection between anger and erotic desire is not only integral to the plot, but also responds to tradition and ideology. Yet, my concern here is with how those presuppositions are articulated into the representation of anger and how language can provide information about that.

Probably the biggest effort to describe and explain the connection between anger and sex in Aristophanes and other Greek sources has been made by Allen (2000, p. 54; 2003, p. 82-89), who argues that the word *orgé* denoted both anger and, less commonly, eros. She provides plenty of examples showing the connection between the two emotions, advocating for an etymological link between *orgé* and the cognate *orgaō*, genitals, and ripening figs, an innuendo for testicles. This claim has been met with scepticism by Harris (2003, p. 122), who instead suggests that "occasionally of course there is a connection [of anger] with eros" explained by the fact that both led to action, both had to be resisted by women, and by eros leading "not infrequently to a whole variety of angry emotions." Like Harris (2003, p. 122), I am not fully convinced by Allen's etymological argument; however, the pattern connecting anger and sex points to

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a link beyond the "occasional" one. The examples provided in the previous section show that the link between the two emotions goes beyond Allen's etymological claim, which in any case my argument does not affect. As I have been arguing, sensory input is key in the understanding of ancient emotions, and there is a pattern in the conceptualisation of anger that points to recognising a pleasurable element in it. I suggest that by reading *Lysistrata* through the lens of the *opponent* metaphor one can shed some light on this pattern.

At the very beginning of the play, Lysistrata claims "my heart is in heat (κάομαι τὴν καρδίαν), I am terribly vexed about us women" (9-10), playing with the double meaning of "heat" as she is angry at the situation in which she is in precisely because she is "in heat," that is, desperate for sex. Calonice's remark on Lysistrata's curved eyebrows in the previous line makes it explicit that she is angry. This exploitation of the ambiguity of "heat" appears again in the play, when Lysistrata and Calonice repeat "so that my husband will be inflamed (ἐπιτυφῇ) by me" (*Lys* 221-2), since the word *epitúphomai* can also mean "furious" as in Plato (*Ph* 230a). Heat and anger are connected in several passages in Aristophanes. In *Frogs*, Dionysus warns Aeschylus about overheating his innards with his anger (844); in *Knights*, the sausage seller says that someone is boiling (919) and over-boiling (920) implying that is angry; in *Thesmophoriazusae*, bile boils because of ill speak (468) and the chorus speaks of boiling fury (680). The critical importance of the overlap between anger and sexual desire is central to the theme of *Lysistrata*, not only as a prevalent metaphor. The action of the play hinges on it, especially the scene of the dispute at the Acropolis described above.

Yet, anger is also connected to cooking and eating. In *Wasps*, Lovecleon compares the pleasure at a small lawsuit cooked in a casserole to eating eel (510-511), adding that he is addicted to that pleasure. In *Lysistrata*, the leader of the chorus of women cries that if a man attacks her, "he'll eat no more garlic and chew no more beans. If you so much as curse me, with over-pouring rage I'll be the beetle-midwife to your eagle's eggs" (692-5, Loeb's translation with adjustment). The innuendo here is pervasive, as everything points to both food and sexual parts. The richness of Greek comedy's food words that stand for male genitalia has been reviewed by Henderson (1975, p. 45) – "sausage," "fig," "acorn" "egg" being some of the most common ones; as to female genitalia, they are "dishes" or "ovens;" but also "beans," "fruits," "berries," and many others; "sauces" and "soups" stand for female secretions. These metaphors worked for Aristophanes because they were well understood by his audience. When Myrrhine's husband appears with an erection, Lysistrata's advises to "roast and turn him around", with the connotation of "give him a hard time" and adds "cheat on him, love him and not love him" (839-40). Eating, sex and anger, also appear in *Knights*, as when Paphlagon and the sausage seller have an abusive encounter where "I'll devour you," "I'll drink your blood," and "I know how to enlarge your arse" (698-720); similarly, sending him to "bite off his cock" (1010).

Henderson (1975, p. 32) points out the striking difference between the language of comedy, full of sexual and eschatological words, and the language of any other Attic text. He attributes this to comedy being a very particular public occasion that allowed a relaxation of the rules of decorum that ruled society with very few other exceptions. Many of the ingenious twists used by Aristophanes might have been his own creation. Some were probably jokes, that even though are not captured in the extant Attic texts, run among the audience orally and privately. In either case these metaphors work because of a collaboration between the audience and the playwright at the moment of the performance. *Lysistrata* can make the idea of using sex as a weapon risible *because*

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the connection between sexual desire and anger is already established, and not only in comedy. One might question Allen's etymological link, but she is not the first one to point out the connection between the two emotions. Padel (1992, p.116), for example, has highlighted the use of "boiling" as an epitaph for both anger and desire in tragedy; Thumiger (2013, p. 35-6) has argued that eros is used as a metaphor for an undetermined destructive passion in tragedy. Even if one were to agree with Konstan (1985, p. 28) that eros is the "strongest term" for an "unruly passion," one would also have to agree to a certain shared phenomenology between anger and sexual desire –and that in both cases there is a desire for pleasure.

4 Conclusion

The model just tested claims that the way we conceptualise, anger in this case, arises from the embodied condition of cognition and that the metaphors used in understanding abstract concepts respond to our physiology and our cultural environment. By the conventions of the genre, in comedy, we expect things to be sexualised, including anger, and part of the comic effect is obtained by the ambiguity of the language. Ambiguity, such as with "heat," works precisely because of the metaphorical overlap between anger and sexual desire. I have shown that this metaphorical overlap is part of a pattern in Greek literature where anger is conceptualised as having a pleasurable element. This pattern can be found explicitly articulated in Aristotle and through metaphors bearing sensory input, such as desire for food or sex, in other settings. Expressions of anger in terms of bodily desires like drinking suggest the pleasurable experience of the satisfaction of an urge. This might be related to a bodily experience, such as the secretion of epinephrine (associated to pleasure) during anger, and to folk theories that conceive anger as an immediate reaction to wrongdoing. The secretion of dopamine and serotonin fundamental for movement and sexual activity (Gerrans, 2003, p. 512) is also central in aggression, which is a characteristic normally attributed to anger by folk theories. Greek literature is an extremely rich and nonhomogeneous body of views on emotions, where anger takes a central role either as a resource for explaining a sequence of events, as a force that overtakes the individual, as a tool for persuasion and as a topic for philosophical debate. Yet, there is an underlying sense that anger can get out of control and lead to disaster. This conceptualisation is unveiled by the analysed metaphors that Lakoff groups under the *opponent* metaphor. However, the metaphors discussed do not necessarily provide information about issues such as the range of offences that triggered anger in ancient times or what were the ideologies associated with the appropriate response –here we have a number of parameters such as gender and class on which the analysis of metaphors might be limited. They also shed little light on how individual traits, or character, play into ancient understandings of anger. Yet, this does not mean that we have to go back to appraisal theory as embodied cognitive theory is consistent with the understanding that emotions require a narrative which feedbacks to emotions. What these metaphors show is an understanding of emotions that being cognitive is embodied, where the language reflects the sensorial and cultural environment in which the subject is situated.

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Notas

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2 See also Johnson (1987) and Lakoff ([1987] 1990).

3 Cairns (2003, p. 13-14), uses this model to describe "prototypical scenarios" and to discusswhether emotions are universal or culture-specific; he (2016a, b) has also traced the use of metaphors and metonymies for the symptomatology of emotions such as fear and shame showing how they are culturally embedded. Forte (2019), using cognitive linguistics, has shown how the conceptualisation of surprise in Homer is grounded in the body and interacts with those of other emotions.

4 Searle (1979, p. 78) also maintained that for a metaphor to work in a speaking community, the relationship between the sentence's literal meaning and the metaphorical meaning has to be "systematic rather than *ad hoc.*" Performative theories of language see metaphors as acts of collaboration between the speaker and the audience; however, they tend to study metaphors considered as a characteristic of language rather than as a characteristic of thinking, which is the stance of cognitive linguistics that I am outlining here.

5 See also Lakoff [1987] 1990, p. 380-415.

6 As *intentio,* e.g.Aquinas' *De Veritate* 21, 3 *ad* 5; see also Kenny, [1963] 2003; Solomon, 1973.

7 Translations are mine unless otherwise stated, my emphasis.

8 See also *EN* 1105b21-3, *EE* 1220b12-4.

9 Contrast Plato's *Phaedo* (83c-84b) on emotion, pleasure and pain.

10 Similarly, see *Il.* 15.696; *Od.* 24.319.

11 Similarly, see Soph. *Ant.* 423.

12 See Lakoff & Johnson's (2002) reply to Marina Rakova, on whose criticism Clements' one is largely based upon.