Foreign Aid and Security Sector Reform in Latin America: mapping donors and recipient countries

Ajuda Externa e Reforma do Setor de Segurança na América Latina: Mapeando Países Doadores e Receptores

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Resumo: Este artigo é parte de uma pesquisa em curso cujo objetivo é confrontar as demandas das instituições policiais latino-americanas com os programas no âmbito da reforma do setor de segurança financiados com recursos internacionais no continente. A hipótese orientadora deste estudo é que os programas de ajuda externa focados na reforma do setor de segurança na América Latina são genéricos e ignoram demandas locais provenientes das organizações policiais. Sugere-se que a oferta internacional nesta área segue uma agenda regional, que é basicamente preventiva e muito resistente a trabalhar com as polícias. Parte do trabalho é mapear países doadores e receptores destes recursos para analisar programas executados nos países latino-americanos. Este artigo apresenta uma revisão da literatura sobre o assunto e os primeiros resultados de nossa pesquisa empírica.

Palavras-chave: ajuda externa, reforma do setor de segurança, reforma da polícia, América Latina, cooperação internacional.

Abstract: This article is part of an ongoing investigation interested in confronting the demands of Latin American law enforcement institutions in light of security sector reform programs fostered by foreign agencies for international assistance on the continent. The guiding hypothesis of this study is that programs of international aid focused on security sector reform in Latin America are generic and overlook law enforcement demands for institutional strengthening. It will be suggested that the international offering in this area follows a regional agenda, which is basically preventive and is very resistant to work with law enforcement organizations. Part of the work also maps donor and recipient countries for analyzing programs implemented in Latin American countries. This article presents a literature review for the investigation and the first results of our empirical research.

Keywords: foreign aid; security sector reform; police reform; Latin America; international cooperation.

1. Introduction

In recent years, the issue of Latin American violence has attracted the attention of many transnational agencies. Most countries in the region are in the critical categories of 10 to 80 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (UNODC, 2013) - the World Health Organization (WHO) considers 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants as the epidemic threshold level of violence - which means that most of the continent is plunged into a homicide epidemic[1]. On the other hand, international organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have dedicated several documents adverting to police abuses in the continent in the last ten years. Thus, the scenario pictured is one with high levels of violence where the law enforcement organizations are not only unprepared and underequipped, but are also perpetrators of this violence.

Governments have enormous difficulty in dealing with this issue (Dammert & Bailey, 2005; Dammert, 2007; Adorno, 1999). The implementation of democratizing reforms in police institutions at a time of rising crime is not necessarily able to count on popular support, which then contributes to their delay. The situation is thus one of a vicious circle: police are unable to provide a satisfactory service to the population under democratic standards, a condition that favors their cooptation by organized criminal groups. In short, although there is an agenda of change recommended by recent democratization processes across the continent, it has not been fully implemented by Latin American law enforcement institutions thanks to a scenario that prevents new changes, and a structure that favors the permanence of the *status quo*.

Aid agencies have developed specific programs and funded several projects in Latin America. Despite the fact that there are very few studies examining the role and performance of these agencies in the specific field of security sector reform, the few existing ones point to a tendency of importing generalized solutions to the recipient countries, of imposing an agenda that is disconnected with local organizational, institutional and cultural arrangements (Tuchin & Golding, 2003; Ziegler & Nield, 2002, Bayley, 2005; Peake & Marenin, 2008). Some of them also

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[1] The Global Study Report on Homicides (UNODC, 2013) states that Honduras has the highest rate of homicides in the world (90.4 per 100 000 inhabitants). The WHO report on violence prevention in the World (2014) sets Brazil in the top of the ranking of absolute number of homicides – 64,000 murders in 2012).

point to the existence of a certain resistance on the part of these agencies to deal with issues related directly to law enforcement organizations (Hammergren, 2003; Leeds, 2007; Bayley, 2006), which are the institutions legally responsible for the prevention and suppression of crime.

It is normally assumed that foreign aid agencies are vehicles for the practice of soft power (Kroening et al, 2010; Nye, 2010). In this perspective, these agencies' programs reflect the crystallization of domestic concerns and conceal perhaps an agenda that may not necessarily be committed to the development of recipient countries. Therefore, understanding why an agency concentrates donations in one area over another can reveal interests (and disinterests) that constrain or limit the development of less privileged sectors for these resources. Moreover, it is appropriate that the recipient countries know the determinants of the decision-making process that define the agenda of these organizations. This would make them less vulnerable to decisions that seem random as well as more able to create international pressure mechanisms on the topics that interest them.

From the scientific point of view, this research project is justified by the lack of academic papers that map out the longitudinal profile and comparative performance of these agencies and analyze them in light of appropriate literature. There are several case studies (Brown et alli, 2008), emphasizing trends in this or that direction - what we do not know, however, is what guides those trends. What is being proposed here is an analysis of the performance of these agencies based on the literature of Security Sector Reform and Foreign Aid. We hope this work will contribute to understanding the factors that explain aid - or lack thereof - and determine the design of programs promoted by these agencies, the interests involved, and the guidelines that are hidden in the construction of these agendas process.

Data concerning financial flows and details of programs have been collected with the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Information on the demands of Latin American law enforcement institutions have been collected with documents from the MISPAs - Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Public Security in the Americas, which are funded and organized by the Organization of American States (OAS) . Once the data is systematized, we will confront the nature

of programs offered by international organizations to Latin American countries in the field of security sector reform using MISPAs' documents, in which countries list their fragilities, establish collective goals, and sign commitments to cooperate amongst themselves. Interviews with top donors will also be scheduled to try to understand what determines the direction and the amounts of flows. Also, we program interviews with Latin American chiefs of police in order to verify to what extent their voices are considered in the process of these agencies' agenda setting.

It is expected that by the end of this research we will have been able to 1) trace the performance pattern of aid agencies in Latin America with regards to the Security Sector Reform and, if the data collected permits, differentiate them concerning bilateral and multilateral donors; 2) understand if we are dealing with a united Latin American agenda of police reform or a series of isolated and inarticulate demands; and, 3) deepen and connect the literature on Foreign Aid and Security Sector Reform (SSR), as it is currently a very restricted one.

In this paper, we make public the literature revised for the purpose of this investigation and the first data produced by our research, based on the systematization of SSR Programs available in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the DAC/OECD Database (2004-2014): the mapping of donor and recipient countries, flows and partial conclusions.

2. The international community of donors and the Security Sector Reform in Latin America

The beginning of the new century was the moment bilateral and multilateral agencies officially recognized that domestic security was an important item for development. Until then, interventions in the security field concerned only military assistance in conflict areas and the protection of the state. The provision of a safe domestic environment was considered by development actors as "a primary responsibility of their defense, intelligence and police counterparts". An important publication from the World Bank in 2000, however, recognized the

link between security and development[2] and, since then, many supporting articles and reports have been produced[3].

Private foundations were the first to promote projects in this area in the early 1990s, as a development of programs in the area of human rights (Leeds, 2007). At the World Bank the subject has been increasingly popular since 2004, when it appeared in the Urban Development Sector of the Bank, passing in 2010 to the Social Development Sector and even earning its own Citizen Security Team to consider these issues[4]. The Inter-American Development Bank established a Unit of Public Safety and has been investing in the sector since 1998 - the current public safety platform of the IADB has a portfolio of projects, either completed or in execution, of more than $450 million[5]. The theme also grew between the bodies of the United Nations, particularly the United Nations Development Program – UNDP.

In the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a review on approaches to deal with military issues has been in course since 1997. The Committee developed a conceptual framework for security assistance, the "*Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence[6].*" The discussions around the elaboration of this framework led to the incorporation of key security concepts into some important DAC documents: *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (2001)* and *The DAC Guidelines: Poverty Reduction (2001).* But

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[2] Voices of the Poor, World Bank, Oxford University Press, 2000.

[3] The Geneva Declaration (2007, 2008 and 2010) also published reports showing that insecurity negatively affects development indicators. More recently, the Inter-American Development Bank launched a study (IABD, 2013) that evaluated the negative impact that violence has on the cost of housing in metropolitan areas and found that people in Brazil pay 13 billion dollars in order to enjoy the feeling of security. In Uruguay, the negative impact of the problem reaches 3% of the GDP.

[4] Information provided by Flávia Carbonari, who worked for the bank and was part of the its Citizen Security Team, June 2012.

[5] Information provided by the IDB website: http://www.iadb.org/pt/noticias/comunicados-de-imprensa/2013-02-21/seguranca-cidada-no-brasil,10338.html#.UjxmQIafg-I, visited in 09/20/2014.

[6] OECD/DAC, 2001, 'Security issues and development co-operation: a conceptual framework for enhancing policy coherence', The DAC Journal, vol.2, no.3, pp. 33-68. Visited on 5th september, 2016.

until that moment, domestic security was not yet considered a component item of the ODA (Official Development Assistance)[7].

In the 2002 – 2003 annual survey conducted by the DAC on its members, donors showed dissatisfaction with programs in the security field, demonstrating that "less progress has been made in translating the new security concepts into policies and programs"[8]. The DAC then elaborated and released a reference publication in 2005 entitled "DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance". The publication is part of the DAC Guidelines and Reference Series collection. This guide aimed at helping donors to: i) improve their understanding of the security challenges facing developing and transition countries today; ii) link security and development; iii) mainstream Security Sector Reform in development work; and iv) establish improved policy frameworks and more effective programming. The work was framed as a component of the UN "human security" agenda and a complement to the DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict. The document provided information on key actors in the field, the multisectoral character of security in development countries, and ways to enhance domestic ownership[9].

In 2005, the definition of official development assistance (ODA) was re-elaborated to include several elements of Security Sector Reform[10]. In 2007, the OECD released the DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. The handbook provided instructions for the operationalization of the 2005 guidelines, offering a step-by-step on the assessment, design and implementation of programs in this field. The handbook also provided

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[7] According to the OECD, "Official development assistance (ODA) is defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Aid may be provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient, or channelled through a multilateral development agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank". Available at: https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm, visited on 7th march, 2016.

[8] DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance, OECD, 2005, pag. 16. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/docs/31785288.pdf, visited on 29th February, 2016.

[9] DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance, OECD, 2005, pag. 3. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/docs/31785288.pdf, visited in 29th February, 2016

[10] "Security System Report: What Have We Learned?", OECD, 2009, pag. 2. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/governance/governance-peace/conflictfragilityandresilience/docs/44391867.pdf, visited on 29th February, 2016.

guidance on monitoring, reviewing and evaluating Security Sector Reform. Finally, it exposed some case studies as examples of best practice to encourage donors to get to know real experiences. A two-year dissemination campaign accompanied the publication of this handbook.

Between 2007 and early 2009 the DAC collected and systematized donor views on the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform. In late 2009, the DAC released the report "Security System Report: What Have We Learned?", including donors' experiences and an analysis of successes and failures, based on the programs implementation and following the guidelines provided by the DAC publications. Interestingly, according to the document, one of the most current complaints among donors in the process of SSR program implementation were the "lack of ownership" on the part of recipient countries and the several time-consuming steps it involved[11]. The document stressed the need for participation by domestic stakeholders, but it did not explore the nature of this participation, such as whether local actors might take part in the decision-making process of programs developed or who would coordinate it. It also explained that programs must be context-specific, adequate to the capacities and budget limitations of national authorities; that agencies should communicate and share competencies and responsibilities to avoid overlapping resources and programs; and, that when SSR programs are not harmonized with other development programs, they fail to meet narrow timeframes and function effectively, highlighting the holistic and multisectoral character of the field.

It is interesting to note that these documents were elaborated based on consultations with donor countries (DAC members) and not the receiving (developing) countries. The publications provide basic information on the security systems of target continents, but the guidelines are based on the experience of donors' countries in dealing with security programs in developing countries. Even if they orient donors to consider local contexts and to involve local actors, guidelines are elaborated and disseminated in a top-down model.

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[11] "Security System Report: What Have We Learned?", OECD, 2009, pag. 15/16. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/governance/governance-peace/conflictfragilityandresilience/docs/44391867.pdf, visited on 7th march, 2016.

3. Literature on Foreign Assistance for Security Sector Reform

Part of the literature on these programs insinuates a resistance to deal with issues related to law enforcement organizations from these agencies. Some authors suggest that programs aimed at institutional reforms, despite not being very costly, are effective only in the long term and require constant monitoring (Leeds, 2007). Hammergren (2003), a former executive agent from USAID and the World Bank, explains that in the early 1980s USAID initiated a justice systems reform program in Latin America, but that results were lagging behind. The program officers responsible for the program ended up concluding that structural and organizational changes in these countries' justice systems were slow and needed to be monitored for too long, exceeding the time period of a political mandate or an administrative management term. For this reason, the program was abandoned by the agency in the late 1990s.

Leeds (2007), who works specifically with police reform, seems to support the idea that donors avoid programs in this area because they require too long a commitment in order to generate tangible results. The most part of support for this type of program takes place between governments, is based on technical assistance, and agreements usually last no more than two years. Such a timeframe may be enough to trigger changes, but is insufficient in achieving the expected results of restructuring police institutions' organizational culture. This issue is recognized by the DAC-OECD in its 2009 publication, "Security System Report: What Have We Learned?"[12].

Hammergren (2003) also criticizes the formulation of programs by donors, which occurs without appropriate knowledge on the recipients and is based on subsides that come from external consultants contracted in the donor country. In Foreign Aid literature, criticism of project officers' distance and lack of knowledge in relation to the target countries' institutions is not new. Easterly (2002), a scholar who is also a former executive of the World Bank, states that foreign aid agencies place enormous demands on scarce administrative skills and weak institutions in poor countries, which may be considered a proxy of failure. This view is shared with Berg (2003), for whom the

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[12] "Security System Report: What Have We Learned?", OECD, 2009, pag. 7. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/governance/governance-peace/conflictfragilityandresilience/docs/44391867.pdf, visited on 7th march, 2016.

reformational failure of political institutions in recipient countries may reflect the inability of donors to adapt programmes and practices to the circumstances of low-income countries with weak administrative institutions. Easterly (2003) also points out that aid is not able to promote large-scale growth and agencies should set more modest goals, rather than trying to be the catalyst for society-wide transformation. Although his focus was not the SSR, the statement seems to fit aid programs in this field well.

Peake & Marenin (2008) explain that despite the amount of police reform studies in developing countries, undertaken by what they call "the GPPC" (Global Police Policy Community) and funded by the international donor community, these studies show no positive impact. The authors demonstrate that these studies / reports are not considered by the police "beneficiaries" which they try to explain. In their essay, the authors try to prove the existence of an "informational bleeding", the product of the huge amount of information by the GPPC that is not read. Throughout the text, the authors list why these works are not read by the beneficiary community: studies take time to be read; authors are more focused on their academic recognition in the area of police reform; language is directed at a general audience and lacks objectivity; articles are published in journals and conferences that are not accessible; and, academics lack the knowledge on contextual micro nuances of policies.

The authors conclude that the work produced by the GPPC ignores an older literature that addresses the challenges of implementing structural changes in very traditional institutions (Peake & Marenin, 2008). In addition, their recommendations are biased by the context of the policy of their original countries ("if it works here, it can work anywhere"). It is necessary to better understand the context of recipient policing system and offer simpler and long-term reforms, which does not please donors. The authors suggest that the recruitment of specialists in the same country as the donor agencies to process and provide recommendations on topics elsewhere does not lead to good results, since the researcher is always biased by his/her local context. They recommend that the local community is well understood in detail before the advisor is able to propose reforms and make recommendations. This study reinforces some conclusions that Marenin (1999) had already outlined some years before, in which he stated that assistance to SSR programs, like all

sorts of foreign assistance, reflects donor/advisor orientations: "*aid and advice – even when desired by the recipient country, as is generally the case – does not come for free, nor is it silent*" (pag. 108).

Bayley (2005) shares the same view as the authors cited above. In an article on police reform as foreign aid, he evaluates the successes and failures of programs implemented and funded mostly by the US. He lists what works, what does not work, and what must be taken into consideration for a successful program on democratizing police worldwide. The author stated that the guidelines of projects in this field still reflected the experience of the donor rather than the specific context of recipients. The author also addressed the absence of evaluations on these programs. There are numerous case studies, but not enough generic and broader works in the field to permit comparative studies and the production of a balance sheet on the sector as a whole. This prevents program officers and advisors - who have a tendency of oversimplifying complex problems and imposing agendas - to learn from past errors, as there is no systematized and comparable information on these programs, which further jeopardizes the opportunity to plan strategically in the sector. It is not known what is imperative to be done because it is not known what has already been done. The author also criticizes the fact that agencies do not share experiences with each other, which leaves the scenario more opaque still. As part of Human Rights agenda, Bayley defends that police reform abroad must be evidence-based and rely on information systems.

This idea would appear again a year later in another article by the same author (Bayley, 2006a), where he analyzes US efforts to reform or rebuild law enforcement organizations and justice systems. The author focuses on the US' failure to restructure police and justice institutions in Iraq and reinforces the difficulty in formulating good strategies for intervention on foreign ground without information on previous trials, successes and failures, drawing attention to the need to collect information, map these experiences and highlight best practices.

It is important to mention that Bayley (2005, 2006a) wrote the above articles when the OECD was starting to collect and systematize data in the security sector reform. This does not

mean that programs for reforming and democratizing policing worldwide did not exist until then – the articles by Leeds (2007) and Hammergren (2003) provide brief descriptions of former justice and security programs implemented in developing countries and funded by developed donors years earlier. Also, Marenin (1999) describes several actions developed by the ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance), an agency under the US Department of Justice, in Latin American countries in the 1990's. However, systematized information on these programs has only been available since 2004 and the OECD is the only organization compiling it.

In a later work, Bayley (2006b) states that legal and political constraints may restrict donations to police reform programs. According to the author, all kinds of investment to fund US policing programs were banned in 1974 as a US Congressional reaction to how resources for training and equipment were used between 1962 and 1974. In this period, repressive and cruel policing strategies were used by authoritarian governments in Latin America and Vietnam on the account of the fight against communism. Once the "ghost" of communism was gone, the 1974 ban was amended with a series of exceptions to allow this type of assistance, with the main argument of neutralizing threats to American sovereignty (organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, etc.).

With this, police assistance provided by the United States to various countries is diluted across many different government agencies, with names that are not always directly related to the funded programs. This hides a great deal about resources, which, if transparent, could be questioned not only by the US Congress, but also by the many human rights organizations concerned with the destination and end use of these resources. It seems that both the United States (represented by Congress, in this case) and several other donors fear the way their resources may be implied in security sector reform. A passage in Leeds' (2007) article makes this clear:

> "*All categories of funders are understandably cautious about involvement in public safety reform. Those promoting strengthened capacity for criminal justice institutions and personnel are concerned about the unintended adverse consequences of, for example, training programs for more effective crime-reduction techniques that could be used for*

> *undemocratic intelligence –gathering rather than improving public safety"*
> (apud Neild & Ziegler, 2002: 15-16).

Funding security apparatus, according to this view, may be trapping, and this may be a reason for donors to avoid the involvement of law enforcement organizations when formulating SSR projects, prioritizing work by the prevention of risk factors and leaving policing aside. However, as Leeds states, "*it is with the police that most citizens have their first encounter with the state, and more often than not those encounters are tainted by corrupt or repressive behavior*" (p. 26). In other words, safety is more than policing. But law enforcement organizations are not only a detail in the provision of a safe environment.

Marenin (1999), who endorsed the above statement, also explains that there was a change of view amongst US human rights groups in the second half of the last century. He states that in the 1960's, these groups focused on military and political leaders as solutions for human rights violations. Police were hardly mentioned and, when they were, were strongly condemned. Nowadays, human rights groups support police reform as they understand that violations of human and civil rights are frequently perpetrated by the police and there is no way to revert this picture without reforming law enforcement organizations: "*Gradually there has come the realization that the police are more important and more autonomous – as violators of rights, but also as potential protectors*" (pg 102).

It is interesting to note that multilateral bodies such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank seem a little more permeable to issues that relate more directly to law enforcement organizations. These organisms have a history of actions in Latin America and are more open to this type of financing (Hammergren, 2007). Indeed, some interesting articles point to differences in the development of activities by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies that may explain this. Maizels & Nissanke (1984) test if aid-giving is guided more by the donor's interests or the recipient's needs. They find evidence that bilateral aid is mostly guided by donor's interests and multilateral aid is mostly guided by recipient's needs. Dollar & Levin (2006) examine the extent to which foreign aid, bilateral and multilateral, is "selective" in terms of democracy and

property rights/rule of law. They find that multilateral assistance is more selective than bilateral aid in targeting countries with good rule of law. Neumayer (2003) endorses this finding. He states that a country's record on human rights is often statistically insignificant as a determinant of aid allocation, but there are differences between aid allocations from bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. Only for the latter is respect for human rights relevant[13].

For multilateral aid agencies, the thesis of "resistance" to police reform may not apply - and it is worth investigating the reasons for this greater openness to the theme. Still, there is a lot of criticism for their operations on the Latin American continent because resources are provided based on an agenda that generalizes security problems in the region. Tulchin & Golding (2003) attribute this to the widespread adoption of community policing on the continent, saying that this would have been a condition imposed by these bodies to receive loans for the democratization of the police. The same criticism is reinforced in the work of Ziegler & Nield (2002), which brought together the findings of a conference entitled "Police Reform and the International Community: From Peace Processes to Democratic Governance", promoted by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). According to the authors, discussions that took place showed that there is no universal model of police democratization to be applied uniformly in Latin American countries, and that donors' (funding organizations) lack of knowledge of the countries in which they operate leads to great amount of resources invested in projects that are disconnected from local demands. The conference also stressed the importance of the beneficiary country's own wishes as a contribution to policing models, as when actions are imposed by a foreign agenda local empowerment is very weak.

4. **Programs developed in the continent: mapping organizations and countries involved**

*4.1. "Security System Management and Reform"*

As already explained, information on SSR programs are only available from 2004 on the OECD Database. We therefore selected the total ODA from all donor countries addressed to Latin

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[13] The same author will endorse similar findings in two other articles (Neumayer, 2003b; Neumayer, 2003c).

America since 2004, and compared them to ODA from all donor countries addressed specifically to SSR programs in Latin America. This gave us an idea of the magnitude of the difference in amounts (n.b: the OECD does not have complete information on resources implied in each program executed, but they do include the aggregated level by country donor). We have also ranked recipient countries and donors for SSR programs in Latin America.

Between 2004 and 2014 donors appointed $96.7 billion to Latin America regarding all ODA items. Of this amount, only $673 million were addressed to "Security System Management and Reform", or 0.7% of the amount. Although OECD documents cited in Chapter One affirm that SSR programs have become a priority for the DAC, the numbers do not seem to agree. The graphs below show, respectively, the Total ODA fluxes to Latin American countries, donors and amounts; the "Security System Management and Reform" ODA fluxes to Latin American countries, donors and amounts; and, finally, a superposition of Total ODA fluxes with SSR ODA fluxes:

Graph 5.1: *Total ODA from all donors to Latin American countries, 2004 – 2014, in USD Millions.*


Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Database[14] – DAC/OECD.

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[14] Available at: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1. Visited on 4th november, 2016.

The graph shows that disbursements to the continent are not uniform and stable, the reasons for which are unknown. One might suggest this is affected by the world economy, yet the disbursements to Latin America increased after the 2008 crisis and dropped later, exactly when top donors were recovering from the crisis. Further investigation (such as planned interviews with donors) may help us understand these floatations. The graph below shows the amount per donor country for the same period.

Graph 5.2: *Total ODA from all donors to Latin American countries, 2004 – 2014, in USD Millions, <u>by donor country</u>.*

Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Database – DAC/OECD.

The United States is by far the greatest donor, standing almost $10 billion ahead of the second greatest donor to Latin American countries in the period, Germany. The graph below shows ODA fluxes specifically to SSR programs in Latin American countries:

Graph 5.3: *Total ODA from all donors to <u>SSR programs</u> Latin American countries, 2004 – 2014, in USD Millions.*


Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Database – DAC/OECD.

It is interesting to note that although the magnitude of unspecific resources to Latin America (graphs 5.1. and 5.2.) and resources addressed to SSR programs (graph 5.3.) is completely different, the amounts of ODA in the second case seem a little more stable than the total ODA. It performs an upward trend from 2004 to 2012 and then sees an abrupt drop in 2013 that continues until 2014. This drop is also evident in graph 3.1, showing that it follows the general tendency of

ODA fluxes to the continent. The graph below ranks donors according to the amount of resources they addressed to SSR programs in Latin America.

Graph 5.4: *Total ODA from all donors to SSR programs Latin American countries, 2004 – 2014, in USD Millions, <u>by donors</u>.*

Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Database – DAC/OECD.

When we analyze general donors and SSR program donors to Latin America side by side, some donors remain (Canada, United States and Spain) and sometimes change their position in the list (Canada, United States). Others were relatively insignificant as generic donors, but play an important role as SSR donors, such as Korea, for example. If we consider only the six top donors in both cases, we have:

Table 5.1: *Top donor countries to Latin America (1st to 6th) vs. Top donor countries to SSR Programs in Latin America (1st to 6th).*

| TOP DONOR COUNTRIES TO LATIN AMERICA	TOP DONOR COUNTRIES TO SSR PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA
1ST United States	1st Canada
2nd Germany	2nd United States
3rd Spain	3rd Spain
4th Japan	4th United Kingdom
5th France	5th Korea
6th Canada	6th Netherlands

Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Database – DAC/OECD.

Canada is the country that has addressed the greatest amount of resources to SSR programs in Latin America, although it is just in 6th position in the top donors concerning total ODA. United States is the second and Spain is the 3rd, remaining in position as a top donor only for total ODA. United Kingdom and Netherlands are already great donors of total ODA, yet they are not on the top list. Korea is a surprise – despite the fact that it is not close geographically, has never had colonies in Latin America or even immigrant descendants in a significant portion and is not a great donor of total ODA to the continent, the country funds SSR programs in the Latin American continent and is a top donor in this ODA category.

It is important to remark that the amount of resources implied in SSR programs in Latin American countries may vary a lot even among top donors. Canada, the greatest donor, spends 50% more than the United States, which is the second top donor, and the United States spends more than five times what Spain, the third top SSR donor, does. Further investigations may analyze and compare what portion of these countries' regular budget is addressed to Latin American SSR

programs. It would give us an idea on how and to what extent they prioritize this subject in their foreign aid decisions.

Graph 5.5. *Total ODA from all donor countries to Latin America X SSR Programs ODA addressed to the continent, 2004 – 2014, in USD Million.*

Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Database – DAC/OECD.

The graph shows the insignificance of SSR ODA in comparison to total ODA addressed to the Latin American continent in the period – The line representing "Security System, Management and Reform" ODA is stuck to the X axis of the graph.

5.2. SSR Programs Recipients and Donors

Our Excel database on SSR programs implemented by DAC donor countries in Latin America in the period 2004 - 2014 has information on 685 programs, fomented by 24 donors in 36 recipient countries. Unfortunately, the database only has information on the title and scope of the programs (and sometimes resources), and does not provide details on their target public or expected

results. This means it will be necessary to obtain program descriptions either from the OECD or directly from the aid agencies responsible for the projects.

We ranked recipient and donor countries based on the amount of SSR programs "donated" and "received". Resources are not always disaggregated at the program level, so the ranking could not be based on the magnitude of resources mobilized by these programs. The 36 recipient countries and the number of SSR programs they received between 2004 and 2014 can be seen in the graph below:

Graph 5.6: *Number of SSR Programs implemented in the Latin American continent, by recipient country, 2004 - 2014*


Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Database – DAC/OECD.

The top five countries that received SSR programs in the continent are, respectively, Haiti, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico and El Salvador. Some funders do not specify recipient countries and prefer to identify their "receivers" by group. That is the reason for the existence of categories such as "America (generic)", "South America" and "North and Central America" without the specification of the country. We have kept these categories in our tables and graphs, but we will need to contact the agencies responsible for these programs to disaggregate them by country.

We have also ranked DAC donor countries based on the number of SSR programs implemented in Latin America. The 24 donor countries and the number of SSR programs they funded in the 2004 – 2014 period can be viewed below:

Graph 5.7: *Number of SSR Programs implemented in Latin American Countries by Donors, 2004 - 2014*

Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Database – DAC/OECD.

It is interesting to note that when we compare general donors and SSR programs donors to Latin America, the top donors do not change much, but their position in the list does. It may be a little confusing though, as earlier we spoke of resource amounts and here we have only the quantity of programs. In any case graph 5.4 shows that multilateral aid agencies do not even appear among donors. Yet here in graph 5.7 they appear and as a top donor: UNDP is the 5th greatest funder for SSR programs in Latin America and the IADB is 6th. This means that they are responsible for a great number of SSR interventions in the continent, despite not being the greatest funders financially speaking. This finding may corroborate the statement that multilateral aid agencies are mostly guided by countries' needs while bilateral agencies are mostly guided by donor's interests (Maizels & Nissanke, 1984). However, it may be too early for such conclusions.

6. Partial Conclusions and Further Investigations

What the above data shows is, firstly, that SSR programs constitute a very reduced portion of total ODA from all OECD donors to Latin America, despite the violence rates found on the continent. The amounts analyzed allow us to state that SSR programs are still far from becoming a priority among donors. This said, our focus is concentrated precisely in this very small portion of ODA – the aid agencies that decide to address resources to this field.

Our research may be unfolded in two stages. The first one must answer questions such as: do these agencies search for law enforcement vindication agendas? Do they invite law enforcement members to participate in the construction of the programs? To what extent and why? We are raising the law enforcement reform agenda vocalized by the organizations themselves to compare with the programs in the field of security sector reform financed by bilateral and multilateral agencies. Also, further interviews with Latin-American law enforcement chiefs will verify if and to what extent these organizations participated in the process of development of these programs. We must check for the existence of listening mechanisms of police demands in the construction of this agenda. If this is not the case, we are faced with an agenda that excludes law enforcement organizations from program formatting process that affect them directly, discrediting them as key players and contributing to postponing necessary reforms.

The second stage of this research must answer to the questions: What makes a country eligible for SSR programs allocations? Is it violence history? Commercial interests? Political interests and affinities?[15] In brief, what justifies/legitimates, in the foreign policy agenda of donor countries, providing assistance to police reform and what makes a country eligible? These questions must be asked of donor countries. It may help us understand what the incentives and criteria in selecting recipients for SSR aid are.

In these first systematizations of SSR aid programs we have suggested that the USA demonstrate great concern in training the border police of Latin American recipient countries, which may reflect preoccupations with narcotrafficking and smuggling, that might indirectly affect their economy and crime rates. Canada's preferential recipient country is by far Haiti and their programs focus on the reconstruction of security services in general. Haitians compose a significant immigrant population in Canada – mainly in Québec. Canada's programs in Haiti may demonstrate cultural purposes but also a preoccupation to avoid illegal immigration from Haiti to Canada. Once more, these are only speculations for the moment, some proto—hypotheses that may guide our questions along the systematization of interventions data.

It is important to clarify that this investigation is limited to check if the formulation of SSR programs by aid agencies is, at any level, affected by local demands and, if not, what composes and constrains their agenda in this field. It does not analyze if the existence of these programs is positive or negative for the recipient countries, as for that we would need to develop metrics of negative and positive impact. While this is currently beyond our scope, we strongly encourage further investigations in this direction.

Finally, a panel with SSR aid donors' intervention profiles in Latin America, as well as a map of law enforcement institutions' vindications, will permit us not only to analyze convergences and divergences between donors and recipients' agendas on the topic of SSR programs in Latin America, but also to understand the nature of these interventions (if they are focused on repression

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[15] Both Bayley (2006ª) and Marenin (1999) believe SSR programes are part of a strategy of expanding democracy globally (some studies demonstrate that democratic countries are less pugnacious and their commerce is more open) and the reform of law enforcement organizations are on the core of democratization plans.

training only, if they facilitate or hinder the acquisition of weapons, if they contemplate cultural changes in police institutions, or if they are concerned with domestic performance of the police or their actuation in the border areas), generate patters of intervention by donor and recipient countries, and subsidize further investigations in the field.

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