

RPPI

Revista Brasileira de
Políticas Públicas e Internacionais

ISSN 2525 - 5584
VOL. 6 / N° 3 / 2021

U Editora
UFPB





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The Brazilian Journal of Public and International Policies would like to express their appreciation and deep gratitude to colleagues who served as peer reviewers in the third issue of 2020, as listed below.

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EDITORIAL

Estimados miembros del Consejo Editorial, asistentes de edición, lectores, autores, revisores y otros usuarios, tenemos el agrado de presentar el tercer número de 2021 (vol.6, n.3, 2021) de la Revista Brasileña de Políticas Públicas e Internacionales (RPPI). Complacido de poder publicar otro volumen a pesar de los desafíos impuestos por la pandemia en 2020 y 2021 y las inestabilidades institucionales. A pesar de los problemas operativos que afectaron nuestro sistema para recibir artículos y encontrar revisores calificados y dispuestos a la actividad (no remunerados y en tiempos de sobrecarga de trabajo) completamos los volúmenes de 2021. Victoria ante tantos desafíos.


La propuesta de la RPPI es convertirse en un medio de divulgación académico-científica con un perfil interdisciplinario, que lleve a la comunidad académica, investigadores, estudiantes y demás interesados a un debate contemporáneo sobre temas asociados e integrados a las políticas públicas y la cooperación internacional.

Desde 2020, RPPI publica artículos en dos idiomas, portugués, además de español o inglés, a criterio de los autores. Así, comenzamos a cumplir con los criterios de internacionalización, accesibilidad y mayor difusión de los trabajos científicos publicados en la RPPI. En el mismo sentido, el nuevo sistema de la revista permite el acceso en tres idiomas (portugués, inglés y español), cumpliendo los mismos criterios de acceso a autores, lectores y difusión internacional tanto de la revista como de los artículos publicados. Esperamos con estas mejoras aumentar el alcance de nuestras publicaciones y cumplir con los criterios de registros y bases de indexación de producciones académicas y científicas nacionales e internacionales (Web of Science, Scopus, Scimago, h-index, entre otros).

Este es el último número de 2021 y el último bajo mi responsabilidad como Editor en jefe de RPPI. Luego de un período de 4 años al frente de la revista, me despidió de este cargo, pasando el relevo al Prof. Anderson Rafael Nascimento. Debo agradecer a los editores asociados a las líneas de cooperación y gestión y políticas públicas que acompañaron el trabajo durante este período. Mención especial a los asistentes

editoriales: Samuel Spellmann, Luan Nascimento, Polianna Almeida Portela y Aline Cristina Resende Mota, porque sin asistentes editoriales sería imposible gestionar una revista. Es el final de un ciclo de mucho trabajo y aprendizaje, pero también de buenos logros.

Dicho esto, presento, junto con los demás editores y asistentes editoriales, el volumen 03 de 2021 de la Revista Brasileña de Políticas Públicas e Internacionales, deseándoles a todos una buena lectura.

Alexandre César Cunha Leite 
Editor-Chefe da Revista Brasileira de Políticas Públicas e Internacionais

Poder local y gestión pública: dimensiones para el análisis de la gobernanza municipal

Poder local e gestão pública: dimensões para análises da governança municipal

Anderson Rafael Nascimento¹ 
Eduardo Grin² 

DOI: [10.22478/ufpb.2525-5584.2021v6n3.62726]

1. Introducción

Este dossier propone el análisis de la relación entre el poder local y la gestión pública. Los estudios sobre el poder local tienen una larga tradición en el pensamiento político, remontándose a autores como Maquiavel, Tocqueville y Stuart Mill, destacando en ocasiones su papel como escuela de democracia, o bien como medio más eficiente de prestación de servicios públicos. La proximidad entre gobernantes y ciudadanos fue vista como fundamental para la constitución de lazos políticos, sentido de colectividad y eficiencia distributiva.

El caso brasileño es emblemático para comprender estas relaciones, ya que los municipios fueron elevados al nivel de una entidad federativa, por lo tanto, con sus autonomías preservadas. El discurso municipalista estaba en sintonía con la descentralización y la democratización, que se convirtieron en palabras clave de la nueva Constitución.

El poder local siempre se refiere al ámbito municipal. Sin embargo, esto no se presenta como un límite. La ubicación no está restringida a los municipios. Ya sea porque el poder local puede estar asociado a dimensiones intraterritoriales que pueden ser subdivisiones políticas del espacio municipal. O porque, el poder local puede abarcar más de un municipio, por lo tanto, el local asociado al regional.

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El municipio, la comprensión de su gestión y sus políticas públicas son escenarios desafiantes que permiten verificar las formas en que se produce el poder local y, principalmente, qué impactos generan en las capacidades estatales locales y en la gobernabilidad municipal. La pregunta que surge es si esos dos efectos virtuosos, a juicio de los teóricos políticos modernos, generados por el poder local, no pueden ocurrir de manera sinérgica y simultánea, y la gestión pública es parte de este contexto. En otras palabras, una mayor democratización puede no tener un efecto sobre la calidad de la prestación de los servicios públicos y viceversa.

En el caso brasileño, los estudios clásicos entendían el poder local como esfuerzos realizados por actores políticos para la preservación y predominio de sus intereses, que en general pueden clasificarse como privados. En este contexto, el poder local puede ser visto como antagónico a la noción de Estado republicano si aún persisten lógicas patrimonialistas en el funcionamiento de los gobiernos locales. Son cuestiones que aún impactan a los municipios brasileños, especialmente a los micro y pequeños, en los que todavía existen fenómenos de oligarquía del poder, como es el caso de las familias que se suceden en el mando de la política local. Este tipo de realidad, si no lo impide, dificulta su análisis a partir de los referentes de políticas urbanas que presuponen el debate público y la participación de actores y procesos que inciden en la producción de políticas en las ciudades (Marques, 2018) .

La gestión pública presupone métodos impersonales y racionalidades específicas para la conducta del Estado en busca de la eficiencia. En el contexto de relaciones patrimoniales cuyo poder local emergía, la gestión pública no pudo seguir sus caminos burocráticos, conviviendo con la precariedad y la discontinuidad. Así, se establecieron relaciones de conflictos y disputas entre el poder local y la gestión pública.

El gobierno local gana evidencia en estas relaciones, ya que tiene el doble desafío: (1) crear interfaces y conexiones entre la porosidad del poder local, ser una representación ejecutiva de las fuerzas políticas locales y (2) promover la constancia que la gestión pública presupondría, ya que el gobierno local actúa con fines definidos en una jurisdicción delimitada territorialmente.

Este texto, al igual que los presentados en el Dossier, busca avanzar en el desafío de delimitar las relaciones entre los conceptos de poder local y gestión pública. Así, el

tema del gobierno local se convierte en un tema transversal que busca hilvanar los análisis y conceptos.

Este texto está organizado en cuatro secciones, además de esta introducción. La primera parte discute el concepto de autonomía local para comprender aspectos centrales relacionados con la política. El segundo analiza brevemente el poder local en Brasil para comprender los aspectos históricos y contemporáneos del concepto. La tercera parte presenta un debate sobre los impactos que las relaciones entre el poder local y la gestión pública generan en la gobernanza urbana contemporánea. Finalmente, la última parte presenta los textos que componen el Dossier.

2. Delimitaciones del gobierno local y la autonomía: bases para el concepto de poder local

Una primera cuestión es distinguir la autonomía del gobierno local y la autonomía local (Souza & Blumm, 1999). El primer concepto sirve para analizar el comportamiento de una institución política y organizativa y las acciones que realiza en cuanto al alcance de las atribuciones que se enmarcan en el marco del orden jurídico y constitucional en el que se inserta. El segundo término es más utilizado para analizar cómo una comunidad o localidad es dominada y/o gobernada por líderes que ocupan posiciones destacadas en la sociedad.

En general, dos son las funciones más relevantes destacadas en la literatura sobre los roles de los gobiernos locales: a) administrativa (proveer bienes y servicios a las poblaciones locales); y b) la política (representar y crear mecanismos para involucrar a los ciudadanos en los asuntos públicos). Actuar para cualificar la democracia y la gestión y prestación de los servicios públicos son dos pilares básicos para caracterizar los roles esenciales de los gobiernos locales. En resumen, es una organización que controla un área delimitada territorialmente, en la cual los líderes políticos, generalmente electos, junto con un cuerpo técnico permanente, son responsables para proporcionar servicios a la población residente.

Los gobiernos locales tienen personalidad jurídica garantizada para actuar, administrar y regular una colectividad definida geográficamente. Es un ámbito que, con sus niveles de autonomía política, administrativa y financiera, representa el interés público en su jurisdicción. En este sentido, recibe delegación de responsabilidades constitucionales, pero también es una institución de autogobierno (Sachdeva, 2011). En

este contexto, se destaca el tema de la subsidiariedad, ya que la autonomía para el desempeño de las tareas no prescinde de identificar las competencias existentes para ello, así como de comprender cuáles son los roles complementarios de los entes superiores.

Normativamente, el gobierno local se diferencia de la administración local, entendida como un órgano territorial que ejecuta las decisiones en los niveles superiores. Los gobiernos locales tienen poder político, autoridad y derecho a decidir sobre los asuntos que les afectan. Esta garantía constitucional es una condición necesaria para preservar los espacios de autonomía local sin necesidad de autorización previa de los entes centrales, lo que les garantiza la condición jurídica y política de ente integrador del Estado nacional en su esfuerzo por ordenar el territorio del país (Sachdeva, 2011).

La perspectiva local exige autonomía, pues implica la libertad de injerencia de los niveles superiores en la realización de acciones y la preservación de su identidad, respetando los mínimos nacionales en materia de políticas públicas. En términos normativos, el tema de la autonomía se inscribe en el marco de una visión ética sustentada en la teoría liberal. El concepto de autonomía surge de la noción de separación política, dado que los gobiernos locales se adaptan mejor a las demandas de los ciudadanos, por su proximidad (Grin & Abrucio, 2019). La democracia local y el autogobierno son, en esta medida, conceptos asociados desde la perspectiva de la autonomía y la libertad de acción frente a los niveles superiores.

En este sentido, la autonomía impacta en la estructura y funcionamiento de los gobiernos locales, ya que estos deben definir e implementar políticas de interés para su comunidad (Chandler, 2010). Similar es el enfoque del “neolocalismo” (Pratchett, 2004), que enfatiza los derechos inherentes de las localidades frente a la desconcentración de acciones desde los niveles centrales de gobierno.

El discurso neolocalista, inspirándose en las fuentes de la teoría política moderna, tiene dos vertientes argumentativas que revalorizan el ámbito local. Inicialmente, el énfasis en el control público, la rendición de cuentas y la democratización de la gestión pública local en lo que respecta a la relación entre el gobierno y la sociedad civil. Luego, el foco en la eficiencia asignativa y la respuesta a las necesidades y demandas locales (Carneiro & Brasil, 2007). La perspectiva neolocalista parte de estos principios, ya que enfatiza los derechos inherentes a las localidades frente a la desconcentración de acciones de los niveles centrales de gobierno.

La autonomía local impacta la estructura y el funcionamiento de los gobiernos locales, ya que deben definir e implementar políticas de interés para su comunidad (Chandler, 2010). Esta forma de entender presenta una conexión con la idea de autogobierno. Por lo tanto, la perspectiva local requiere este tipo de autonomía, ya que implica cierto grado de flexibilidad en el ejercicio de sus acciones y la preservación de su identidad y en relación con la injerencia de entidades superiores, respetando los mínimos nacionales en materia de políticas públicas.

Esta perspectiva de análisis permite la posibilidad de considerar, por ejemplo, demandas que surgen de grupos sociales y representaciones territoriales específicas en el contexto municipal. Si bien el nivel municipal se considera el ámbito local y establece una dimensión de ciudadanía, las representaciones locales pueden establecerse por proximidad y relaciones territoriales. Esta perspectiva geográfica comienza a impactar, por ejemplo, dimensiones como el voto en la legislatura, ya que los concejales, representantes de los gobiernos locales y componentes del gobierno local ahora son votados de acuerdo con sus territorios (Terron et. al.; 2012; Faganelo, 2017).

Otro punto que asocia esta dimensión de la autonomía con la política y el gobierno local está relacionado con los arreglos de gobierno. Este montaje puede ser el resultado de fuerzas políticas locales. El ejecutivo municipal tiene como función de proponer leyes para la creación de cargos públicos, organización administrativa, plan de cargos, carrera y salarios de los servidores públicos, materia presupuestaria, adquisición y concesión de inmuebles municipales, entre otras materias. Por tanto, la asamblea de secretarías es un momento para tejer coaliciones gubernamentales con partidos políticos, grupos sociales de la ciudad y líderes territoriales y, en consecuencia, puede ser una forma de capilarizar la relación entre el Poder Ejecutivo y los segmentos sociales (García; Praça, 2011; García, 2013). Por tanto, este margen para cambiar la estructura organizativa de la alcaldía, creando o fusionando secretarías, por ejemplo, permite un margen de adecuación y priorización de la agenda política del alcalde y sus instrumentos de gestión.

Este enfoque de amplia autonomía local no es consensuado en la literatura. Para Erlingsson y Odalen (2013), por ejemplo, esto puede ser peligroso si desencadena una “tiranía de la mayoría” contra otras minorías. Por lo tanto, el alcance de la discrecionalidad es un asunto de delegación de las autoridades centrales al gobierno local, protegido por límites jurisdiccionales, negociados y definidos de acuerdo con la

constitución. En otras palabras, la autonomía se basa en los temas que están definidos en la Constitución Federal, especialmente en los sistemas federativos. De esta forma, los gobiernos locales, en sus jurisdicciones, son responsables de los impactos en los asuntos públicos y de trascendencia. La autonomía está relacionada con la legitimidad que tienen los gobiernos locales y puede medirse de varias formas, especialmente en los ámbitos constitucional, político, administrativo y financiero, en una escala de más localismo a más centralismo (Lidstrom, 1998).

Relacionado con este aspecto, la perspectiva neolocalista entiende, por ejemplo, que el pacto negociado -la constitución- presupone una integración, sustentada en la descentralización de las políticas, la aceptación de normas generales definidas nacionalmente (Berrt & Yuval, 2013) y las políticas que afectan a todos los ciudadanos del país (Chandler, 2010).

La autonomía de los gobiernos locales se materializa, para Wolman, McManmon y Brunori (2008), cuando son importantes en la economía, en el sistema intergubernamental tienen discrecionalidad para definir sus acciones sin coacción de esferas superiores y capacidades de actuación.

La sectorialización del gasto en políticas públicas promovida por los cambios institucionales desarrollados e implementados en Brasil, especialmente a nivel federal, restringió el poder de decisión local sobre la asignación de recursos presupuestarios. Esto apunta a dos desafíos relacionados con la autonomía local y el gobierno local. Primero, el diseño organizacional de las políticas públicas limita la forma en que se utilizan los recursos, lo que dificulta la implementación de políticas integradas. En segundo lugar, esta sectorialización también trae restricciones al debate sobre el presupuesto a negociar con espacios políticos más amplios, como los consejos y la participación social (Peres & Mattos, 2017; Peres, 2020).

Los entendimientos sobre autonomía y gobierno local que se presentaron aquí muestran elementos desafiantes para comprender el concepto de poder local, ya que se ubica en una intersección entre el autogobierno y la gobernanza multinivel regulada por sistemas de políticas públicas, ya sea en federaciones o estados unitarios.

3. Una mirada al concepto de poder local en Brasil

Los significados de autonomía tratados hasta entonces también repercutieron en los teóricos del inicio de la formación del Estado en Brasil. Pero aquí el debate clásico

sobre el tema del poder local, basado en la autonomía, abordó cuestiones relacionadas con el patrimonialismo y los riesgos que ello implicaba en la política representativa.

Autores como Bastos (1870) y Faoro (1975), por ejemplo, entendieron que el poder local era débil para contener el desdoblamiento del Estado centralizado y patrimonial. Duarte (1939) y Vianna (2005), en cambio, entendieron que el poder privado tenía autonomía y predominaba frente al poder local y el Estado.

Leal (1976) incluyó un elemento más en el análisis del poder local cuando planteó sus relaciones y conexiones con el poder central. La perspectiva central en el análisis del autor fue la relación simbiótica entre el poder público recién fortalecido y el poder privado tradicional, pero con ropajes decadentes. En esta relación, el poder local pasó a someterse al poder central, mediado por las figuras de los gobernantes, y así se estableció un sistema coronelista, o un “compromiso coronelista” (Kerbaudy, 2000).

El coronelismo no se refiere, por tanto, a una sola persona, un jefe. Carvalho (1997) señala que la literatura brasileña identifica erróneamente coronelismo y mandonismo. Sin embargo, incluso sin esta centralidad de señor absoluto en el poder local que podría ejercer el coronel, se pueden observar algunos efectos mandones. El principal está relacionado con la dificultad de consolidar un sistema representativo, base de una concepción democrática (Cintra, 1971). El mandonismo impidió la construcción de la identidad de clase al crear barreras para la comprensión de un espíritu de cuerpo y colectividad. El intercambio de favores y la mejora privada fueron los principales impulsores de este fracaso del ideal representativo.

En esta concepción, las promesas de los autores de la teoría política moderna sobre el poder local estaban rotas, ya sea como escuela de democracia, ya como la mejor forma de prestación de servicios. Por lo tanto, durante algún tiempo en Brasil (y con cierta permanencia en la actualidad), el poder local fue (y sigue siendo) sinónimo de atraso.

Durante mucho tiempo, lo “local” en la política brasileña fue visto como el lugar de los excesos autoritarios de los representantes de las élites locales o regionales. La idea detrás de este adagio es que, haciendo uso de los recursos económicos, la élite local domina y somete el aparato del Estado a sus designios particulares, alienando a todos los demás segmentos, en particular a los sectores populares. Por eso el gobierno local es derrochador, mal gastador del dinero público, casi siempre corrupto y cuyo rasgo característico es la ineficiencia. Por la misma razón, el poder local también fue, durante

mucho tiempo, considerado un instrumento de “atraso”. En otras palabras, es una instancia de gobierno que, en lugar de promover el progreso y el desarrollo, trabaja para contenerlo, para evitar que suceda. (Dombowski, 2008, pág. 271)

Otro punto que merece ser mirado con detenimiento y en conexión con los temas planteados está relacionado con la desorganización intencional de la prestación de los servicios públicos. La gestión pública apareció como un vínculo de mantenimiento entre los intereses privados, generalmente de la clase dominante, y la acción estatal a nivel local. En estas lecturas se dejaron de lado los principios elementales de la gestión pública, como la impersonalidad y la desconexión entre el cargo y la persona, para favorecer los lazos de proximidad y familiaridad.

Estas perspectivas se vieron enfrentadas por el intento de valorización del ámbito local durante el período de redemocratización. Como resultado, el municipio fue promovido a la posición de entidad federativa, responsable de profundizar la democracia y ejecutar las políticas públicas y sociales (Grin & Abrucio, 2018). En Brasil, el municipio es una unidad integral del sistema federativo y no está subordinado a ningún nivel superior de gobierno. Esta suele ser la regla en la mayoría de las federaciones, donde los municipios son creados por estados o provincias, como en Estados Unidos, México, Argentina y Canadá.

De acuerdo con el artículo 18 de la Constitución Federal, la organización político-administrativa de la Federación comprende la Unión, los Estados, el Distrito Federal y los Municipios, todos ellos autónomos entre sí. La autonomía municipal es la piedra angular de varias disposiciones constitucionales que facultan a los municipios para formar su propio gobierno, organizar los servicios, redactar sus propias leyes y autogestionarse, de acuerdo con el ordenamiento jurídico del país (Pires, 2017). Autonomía significa la capacidad de autogobierno, autoorganización, autolegislación y autogestión (Resende, 2008; Pires, 1999). En otras palabras: la autonomía política, administrativa y financiera son las dimensiones clave.

En las últimas tres décadas, los municipios se han convertido en la unidad federativa central para la implementación y provisión de políticas públicas, especialmente de bienestar social. Los gobiernos locales se hicieron responsables de la provisión de atención médica básica, educación preescolar y primaria, asistencia social, así como funciones como el desarrollo urbano y el transporte público local, por ejemplo. Estas

nuevas responsabilidades fueron acompañadas por la garantía constitucional de autonomía política, administrativa y financiera. En este contexto, también crecieron las demandas para calificar su gestión para responder a sus nuevos roles y responsabilidades a nivel local y en las relaciones intergubernamentales (Souza & Grin, 2021).

Por tanto, los conceptos de democratización y descentralización, tan destacados en el texto constitucional, encontraron su lugar de realización en el municipio. Las políticas sectoriales permitieron así que el poder local encontrara un terreno más pluralizado (Nascimento, Peres, 2020). Además, podemos entender que un municipio puede estar cortado por numerosos territorios con características e identidades propias. Estas perspectivas pluralizan aún más el poder local y amplían sus particularidades, ya que demuestran que la forma en que los territorios interactúan con el gobierno local, incluida la relación entre los poderes Ejecutivo y Legislativo locales, requiere de mecanismos políticos diferentes. En otras palabras, en esta realidad, las dimensiones de la gobernanza municipal se ven impactadas por estas relaciones entre el poder local y la gestión pública.

Estas interacciones entre territorios y grupos sociales con el gobierno local no pueden explicarse únicamente a través de una lente clientelista. En el clientelismo, los actores de la clase política local se relacionan con parte de la población controlando su acceso a servicios públicos y mejoras. Como resultado, los actores políticos ganan los votos de los beneficiarios y siguen ocupando el espacio representativo (Burgos, 2005). En este contexto, son comunes las relaciones entre actores que asumen roles de liderazgo en determinados territorios y políticos, principalmente del poder legislativo, que pueden actuar como puente hacia el poder ejecutivo.

En el caso brasileño, muchas prácticas enmarcadas como clientelistas podrían conceptualizarse mejor a partir del concepto, nacido en la ciencia política estadounidense, del pork barrel. Básicamente, la idea de este concepto es que el presupuesto público se dirija a beneficiar a una parte específica de la sociedad, incluido un territorio. Esta idea puede traducir el uso que los políticos locales hacen de la estructura de las administraciones locales (recursos presupuestarios, equipamientos públicos y servidores, por ejemplo) a la hora de llevar políticas y acciones al electorado de un determinado territorio (Silva, 2009; Grin, 2015).

4. Innovaciones en el gobierno local y cambios en la gobernanza municipal: usando la lente del poder local

El tema de la autonomía de los gobiernos locales, ya sea en términos normativos o empíricos, necesita ajustarse a las nuevas demandas de política, especialmente con la autonomía local, y los instrumentos de gestión urbana, en un contexto federativo y sistemas de políticas públicas.

Cada vez más, las autoridades locales están más obligadas a rendir cuentas de su desempeño, decisiones y acciones en las diversas redes de múltiples partes interesadas en las que participan. Los roles más tradicionales de los gobiernos locales han ido cambiando, especialmente con respecto a la prestación de servicios por parte de los actores de la sociedad. Estos procesos fortalecen el camino del gobierno hacia la gobernabilidad municipal y sus premisas de participación, representación, eficacia y legitimidad como recurso para la práctica democrática y la prestación de servicios. Este tipo de relación entre el gobierno local y la sociedad está guiada por una mayor horizontalidad, lo que cambia la visión clásica de un gobierno que se dirige a la sociedad y busca conducir y regular la vida de los ciudadanos sin mediación.

Cinco son los temas que pueden actualizar la agenda de preguntas sobre el papel de los gobiernos locales (Banco Mundial, 1997). La primera innovación se refiere al desempeño administrativo (aumento de la capacidad profesional y reorganización administrativa). La segunda exige calificar la gestión fiscal para que sea más eficiente y transparente para la sociedad, especialmente en lo que se refiere a la forma en que se generan los recursos financieros, tributarios y de transferencia intergubernamental. El tercero se relaciona con la provisión de servicios y mayor eficiencia en la entrega, coordinación intra e intergubernamental, especialmente donde existen procesos de descentralización, como es el caso de Brasil. El cuarto, destinado a ampliar la capacidad de inversión local, para nuevos arreglos que involucren a actores privados. Finalmente, ampliar las opciones de participación de la sociedad en la planificación y definición de políticas públicas.

Por eso, en diálogo con las autoridades locales y con la autonomía local, se destaca la discusión sobre la naturaleza de la democracia en el ámbito local, con experiencias en la participación de la sociedad y los territorios. A nivel local, la existencia de grupos de vecinos organizados, asociaciones o formas similares son necesarias para implementar

ciertas políticas públicas. Reconocer a estos colectivos y convocarlos a la órbita del gobierno no reemplaza y refuerza la democracia representativa con foros donde la ciudadanía y la sociedad puedan participar directamente, sin perjuicio del rol de los concejales (Councillors) (Jones & Stewart, 2012).

En Brasil, esa es una práctica existente, por lo menos, desde fines de la década de 1980, con el Presupuesto Participativo y los consejos municipales de política pública. Si bien pueden ser objeto de críticas en cuanto a su eficacia y la relación de estas instancias con los intereses territoriales en el municipio, son canales fundamentales para la conexión entre el gobierno local y el poder local. El “buen gobierno” depende de la participación de la sociedad, que a su vez depende de ciudadanos organizados y políticamente activos (Wilson, 2000).

Por lo tanto, a pesar de las dificultades, los procesos de gobernanza municipal en sus diversas modalidades y formas de implementación incentivan el desarrollo de políticas públicas para expandirse más allá de las fronteras gubernamentales, visando aumentar la capacidad de respuesta de su acción. En este sentido, la difusión de prácticas innovadoras puede contribuir al desempeño del gobierno local. Pero esta es una calle de doble sentido, porque si bien existen canales abiertos y accesibles para la participación de la sociedad, la información y el análisis necesarios para la formación de políticas públicas, provenientes de la gestión pública, son determinantes. Por tanto, aquí se establece otro vínculo entre el poder local y la gestión pública.

Dicho en otros términos, el desafío de la innovación para los gobiernos locales y la gobernanza urbana radica en: a) articular un proceso marcado por el fortalecimiento de las capacidades de gobierno y gobernanza para cambiar la relación con la sociedad; b) reunir la capacidad de modificar la gestión urbana en un mundo en el que la globalización y los cambios tecnológicos estandarizan cada vez más los estilos de vida y las demandas de la población. Estos objetivos buscan ampliar las condiciones de regulación de la vida colectiva en las ciudades para lograr fines considerados relevantes. Estos dos ejes pretenden sintetizar el papel de los gobiernos locales como proveedor de servicios y como unidad política (Les Galès, 2010).

La interdependencia e interrelación entre actores gubernamentales y sociales amplía la posibilidad de un nuevo modelo de gestión municipal que pueda reforzar las características de autonomía de los gobiernos locales. Es por ello que, dadas las

limitaciones de los gobiernos para enfrentar el surgimiento de nuevos temas (tema climático, derechos de las minorías, inmigración, derechos de los consumidores, entre otros), se fortalece la gobernanza municipal como alternativa. Por lo tanto, la pregunta ya no es la clásica pregunta del pluralismo de "¿Quién gobierna?", sino "¿El gobierno puede gobernar o dirigir?" Y de ser así, ¿qué actividades conforman la lista de responsabilidades y posibilidades, con qué actores políticos y sociales y de qué manera? (Les Gales, 2010).

A partir de este entendimiento, los gobiernos fuertes no son aquellos que se imponen a la colectividad, sino aquellos que estimulan mecanismos de participación de la sociedad en los asuntos públicos. Un papel crucial no es tanto la provisión de servicios y políticas públicas, sino la forma en que se organizan los espacios públicos institucionalizados con la presencia de funcionarios electos y actores sociales. Este es un aspecto fundamental para la promoción de la democracia y el respeto a las diferentes corrientes de opinión existentes en la ciudad. En lugar de centralizar la toma de decisiones, el esfuerzo consiste en descentralizar políticamente la gestión local, buscando calificar los modelos de gobernanza municipal y acercarlos a los territorios y las diferentes manifestaciones del poder local.

Por otro lado, el desarrollo de políticas públicas a través de arreglos innovadores de gobernanza puede contener fallas: ¿cómo incluir contingentes de la sociedad para planificar la provisión de servicios públicos y cómo insertarlos en el debate democrático? A estas preguntas hay que añadir dos más: "¿Quién está gobernado?" y "¿Qué se gobierna?", por lo que todas las preguntas remiten a una necesaria actualización sobre los límites de la gobernanza municipal (Les Galès, 2010). Estas son preguntas esenciales, pues atañen a las dimensiones constitutivas de la autonomía de los gobiernos locales en un mundo en el que la interdependencia económica, social y fiscal, por sólo tomar algunos de los factores, son realidades que se imponen.

En esta dirección, el campo de las innovaciones en las capacidades de gobierno/gobernanza a nivel local se abre a nuevas posibilidades. Si la Nueva Gestión Pública buscó discutir su relación con la sociedad, dado que los ciudadanos pasaron a ser vistos como clientes, en los modelos de gobernanza, los ciudadanos asumen cada vez más el papel de "coproductores".

La coproducción se define como la provisión de servicios a través de relaciones entre el gobierno y los usuarios, de modo que todos los participantes contribuyan

sustancialmente. Este tipo de relación combina la participación de actores sociales y gubernamentales para diseñar un servicio o política pública, en línea con experiencias en gobiernos locales de Noruega y Nueva Zelanda, por ejemplo. Las viejas instituciones necesitan cambiar para convertirse en “formas democráticas deliberativas y permanentemente movilizadas” para que los participantes no necesiten “luchar por el poder”, sino que puedan ejercer algún poder que se les otorga para priorizar su esfuerzo colaborativo (Bovaird & Downe, 2008) .

Por lo tanto, se coloca en la agenda de los gobiernos locales la reivindicación de una nueva síntesis entre autonomía local, participación y actuación desde la autonomía del gobierno local. Si bien los componentes de esta ecuación no son nuevos, sus términos requieren una nueva comprensión. Los gobiernos locales, ante sus límites sobre lo que se rige en el territorio de las ciudades, requieren implementar nuevos formatos de relación más horizontales con los diversos actores sociales. Estas son otras dimensiones para el análisis de la gobernanza municipal.

La implementación de arreglos de gobernabilidad y otros modelos de participación de la sociedad en los asuntos públicos amplía la presencia de la ciudadanía en términos de formulación, implementación y evaluación de políticas y servicios públicos a nivel local. No se trata sólo de analizar la autonomía administrativa y política desde la perspectiva de la libertad desde los niveles superiores, sino también de adoptar modelos de compromiso cívico por parte de los ciudadanos. Más aún, las nuevas modalidades de gobernanza también han enfatizado la necesidad de que el gobierno local cree mecanismos para la producción conjunta de servicios públicos con los actores de la sociedad. En efecto, además del voto ciudadano, se destaca la participación y el diseño integrado de iniciativas de gobierno de interés público.

5. Poder local y gestión pública: dimensiones para el análisis de la gobernanza municipal

La diversidad de temas abordados en los artículos del Dossier permite una muestra de cómo los estudios sobre poder local y políticas públicas encuentran un amplio campo. El lector encontrará estudios sobre diferentes sectores de las políticas públicas: salud, cultura, vivienda, turismo y asistencia social. Además, también encontrará artículos de invitados sobre experiencias internacionales (Uruguay y Ecuador) que, incluso en el caso

de países con Estados unitarios, arrojan luz sobre la importancia del lugar como campo de estudio.

El concepto de poder local puede ser tomado como las acciones que realiza la administración pública y la política a nivel municipal. Desde esta perspectiva, las capacidades administrativas estatales pueden evidenciarse, ya que se valora la comprensión de los procesos y proyectos públicos. Los estudios cuantitativos hacen una contribución importante para este tipo de análisis, como se puede ver en el artículo “Partidos, elecciones y desigualdades en salud en los municipios brasileños: un análisis relacional a partir de la política, la gestión y la dependencia del sistema público”, escrito por Gabriel Santana Machado. Utilizando un indicador sintético de capacidades estatales en salud, el autor busca entender cómo los factores políticos se relacionan con las desigualdades en salud.

El poder local también encuentra interfaces con el aparato regulador y las relaciones entre las esferas de gobierno se convierten en variables a considerar. Los actores locales tienen un cierto nivel de discrecionalidad para utilizar reglas y normas de acuerdo con sus intereses, así como de acuerdo con sus propias configuraciones políticas. Por lo tanto, la ubicación importa (SELLERS, LIDSTROM, 2007; LADNER et. al., 2016) como variable para comprender las configuraciones de los sistemas de políticas públicas. Análisis que dialogan con esta perspectiva pueden encontrarse en los artículos invitados a este Dossier. Por ejemplo, en el texto de “El efecto de la carga regulatoria en la efectividad de las colaboraciones intergubernamentales: el caso de las alianzas subnacionales para gestionar la cooperación internacional”, escrito por Julio C. Zambrano y Claudia N. Avellaneda. En el texto, los autores demuestran que el Estado ecuatoriano buscó crear normas para las relaciones de cooperación entre los gobiernos subnacionales y los organismos internacionales, pero aún en el contexto de un Estado unitario, los locales logran actuar de acuerdo a sus intereses y vocaciones.

El texto “Actitudes políticas hacia la descentralización: El papel de las ideas y los incentivos en el caso uruguayo”, de Matias Ruiz Dias Rodriguez, Martín Freigedo y Lucia Selios, presenta un retrato de los impactos del proceso de descentralización política en Uruguay y el uso de este nuevo escenario por élites políticas ya localmente consolidadas. Por tanto, en los dos artículos invitados, el poder local incide en la forma en que las regulaciones y normas provenientes del Estado unitario inciden en cada realidad.

Los demás artículos del Dossier tratan de casos brasileños y de diferentes políticas sectoriales. En estos análisis es importante observar la coyuntura de cada sistema de política pública analizado, así como el papel de los municipios en estos contextos.

En el artículo “Capacidad estatal y gestión municipal: un análisis de la dimensión financiera de la política de vivienda en João Pessoa (2003 - 2020)”, de Glenda Dantas, Fernanda Lima-Silva y Felipe Ramelli, los resultados apuntan para una dependencia de la gestión municipal. administración en relación con las fuentes externas de fondos para el financiamiento de la política. Como resultado, la capacidad municipal para implementar la política de vivienda se ve afectada. En otras palabras, el artículo demuestra que la gestión pública, su autonomía y capacidad están limitadas para llevar a cabo esta política.

Como es bien sabido, el municipio es responsable de gestionar la implementación de las políticas sociales. Por lo tanto, conocer cómo se realiza el servicio en la burocracia de borde o de calle es un campo de estudio que arroja luz sobre el papel del municipio y sus dilemas. El artículo “La crisis de la pandemia y la institucionalización del Sistema Único de Asistencia Social en la Región Metropolitana de Porto Alegre”, de Luciana Papi, Gianna Reis Vargas, Gislaine Thompson dos Santos y Taciana Barcellos Rosa, muestra que la situación de crisis generada por la Pandemia no cambió de inmediato las estructuras de la Asistencia Social en los municipios estudiados, por el contrario, hizo más evidente la precariedad ya enfrentada.

Una última forma de abordar el concepto de poder local puede poner en valor el espacio para el ejercicio del autogobierno. Esta forma de análisis permite destacar las denominadas capacidades político-relacionales del Estado (Pires & Gomide, 2016). Para que esto ocurra, es importante la existencia de canales institucionales de relación entre el gobierno y la sociedad civil, como los consejos de políticas públicas. Además, también es necesario comprender las comunidades de políticas públicas que influyen en el proceso de toma de decisiones en cada lugar.

El artículo “Gobierno Local, Autonomía Municipal y Producción de Políticas Públicas de Cultura: El caso de la Gran Región ABC” de Lúcio Nagib Bittencourt, Ana Clécia Mesquista de Lima, Clarissa Bonvent, Mayra Carolina Ataide de Oliveira y Renan Gustavo Magalhães, señala que hay espacio para la autonomía municipal en este sector de la política pública. Los autores señalan que a pesar de la dinámica que puede ser

considerada de “recentralización” en el federalismo brasileño, los municipios siguen teniendo las condiciones y los recursos para innovar y desarrollar políticas públicas en este campo, adaptadas a las demandas locales. Más que eso, en casos como el del Programa Cultura Viva, vimos que, además de una historia local en ese sentido, queda la percepción, junto a los gestores públicos y agentes culturales, de que este diálogo entre el Estado y la Sociedad Civil es fundamental. por ajustes en la producción de estas políticas públicas.

El artículo “La agenda del gobierno local: el caso de la política turística en Ouro Preto” de Fernanda Cristina Silva, Catarina Ianni Segatto y Marco Antônio Carvalho Teixeira, menciona que el caso analizado encuentra la inexistencia de una comunidad epistémica y baja institucionalidad. Con esto, los autores señalan que la influencia se da más en torno a actores políticos y privados, que en espacios más colectivos.

Finalmente, el Dossier presenta la entrevista con la exalcaldesa Márcia Lucena. Márcia fue alcaldesa de Conde/PB, un pequeño municipio de la Región Metropolitana de João Pessoa. Un municipio con hermosas playas, territorios con poblaciones nativas, un centro urbano pequeño y con mucha pobreza y desigualdad. Conde es un retrato de Brasil en el que el pasado y el futuro, lo arcaico y lo moderno conviven, a veces como disputa, a veces como mutualismo. El pasado quedó en las estructuras de poder local que, de forma violenta y clientelar, mantenían sometida a sus intereses a parte de la población de Conde. La gestión pública fue otro espacio en el que esto ocurrió, sobre todo cuando el cambio de gestión era común por la desaparición de bienes del municipio y la quema de documentos. La gestión pública de Conde estuvo siempre en un nuevo comienzo. En la entrevista, el Exalcalde cuenta cómo es hacer la gestión pública en este contexto en el que el poder local sigue siendo el motivo del atraso en el municipio.

Le deseamos una gran lectura.

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The Effect of Regulatory Burden on the Effectiveness of Intergovernmental Collaborations: The Case of Subnational Partnerships for Managing International Cooperation

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DOI: [10.22478/ufpb.2525-5584.2021v6n3.61124]

Recebido em: 11/10/2021
Aprovado em: 22/11/2021

Abstract: With the goal of improving effectiveness and efficiency, worldwide cross-sector collaboration has become a central governance arrangement. Given this trend, research has focused on illustrating examples of collaborations over time and/or identifying collaboration's drivers and effects. Yet, as cross-sector collaborations are more prevalent, governments have changed the rules for civil society organizations to become part of cross-sector collaboration across policy domains. While some regulations can be seen as a precondition to start a collaboration, over-regulated contexts can become a burden for participating organizations, thus hindering collaboration sustainability. However, little knowledge exists as to how regulatory changes influence performance effects of cross-sector collaboration. To fill this gap, this research focuses on all the 2007-2018 Ecuadorian subnational partnerships that manage international cooperation to test whether adoption of further regulations or regulatory burden targeting civil society organizations compromises the amount of international aid subnational governments secure. We also expect that the economic diversity in a jurisdiction amplifies the performance effects of regulatory burden. Findings suggest that regulatory burden negatively influenced governance capacity to obtain international aid, particularly in jurisdictions with high economic diversity.

Keywords: Regulatory burden; intergovernmental collaboration; international aid, governmental performance.

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1. Introduction

With the goal of improving effectiveness and efficiency, worldwide cross-sector collaboration has become a central governance arrangement. Subnational governments now partner among themselves and/or with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to boost governmental performance. That is the case of provinces, municipalities, and rural parishes that partner with the goal of applying for and securing international aid from international cooperation. In response, some governmental regulation has sought to stimulate cross-sector collaborations to address complex issues in the public sector (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Bull, 2015; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015a; Freeman, 1997). As cross-sector collaboration continues gaining supporters and followers, governments have enacted additional rules to regulate civil society organizations (e.g., international and national NGOs) that partner with subnational governments. Indeed, as experience with cross-sectoral collaboration mounts, and the number of NGOs increases, some governments have adopted further regulations targeting civil society organizations (CSO) during the life cycle of a cross-sector collaboration. With these additional regulations, governments may want to either control, facilitate, structure, or obstruct CSO's entrance, operations, and activities (Becker, 2013, Appe 2015). In fact, while some regulations can be seen as a precondition for a CSO to start operating, over-regulated contexts can become a burden for participating organizations, thus hindering collaboration sustainability. Surprisingly, little knowledge exists as to how regulatory changes during CSO's life cycle affect collaborations that pursue international aid. This gap leads us to explore whether overregulating CSOs that donate foreign aid influences the sum of international aid a jurisdiction secures.

This study defines regulation as “the intentional intervention in the activities of a target population” (Koop & Lodge, 2017, p.104). Regulatory burden happens when the cost for complying with a regulation to perform an activity is higher than benefits the activity brings to the target population (Helm, 2006; Keyworth, 2006). While government regulation could require international donors to formally initiate a collaborative agreement to participate in the implementation of a public program, the success of governmental regulation depends on preventing regulatory burden. For example, international donors are called (a) to collaborate only in projects that respond to the

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priorities established by aid-recipient countries and (b) to follow aid-recipient countries' regulatory framework (OECD, 2005).

We argue that regulatory burden influences the administrative costs of organizations participating in a collaborative agreement, thus compromising the expected results. The following rationale justifies our main proposition. Collaboration implies costs in time, resources, learning, coordination, communication, and commitment. Therefore, complying with additional regulations entails more administrative costs, in which the costs may exceed the benefits of collaborating. To test the effects of regulatory burden on the dynamics of collaborative governance over time, this study relies on Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012)'s framework to test the effectiveness of subnational government partnerships to acquire international aid. In sum, we employ a comprehensive conceptualization of collaboration to test whether the effectiveness of subnational partnerships for securing international aid varies as a result of intensifying government regulations against CSOs.

Because collaboration happens in the context of diverse partners (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015a), over-regulated policy domains may have distinct effects on collaborating partners. For instance, a province's degree of economic diversity in terms of the number of industrial sectors over time (see Siegel, Johnson, & Alwang, 1995) may moderate the effects that regulatory burden may have on the international aid a subnational government partnership may secure. When a jurisdiction's gross domestic product depends on several economic activities, chances are that this jurisdiction's population possesses diverse interests in comparison to jurisdictions with economies that depend only on a couple of industries. Economic diversity may increase the cost of coordination, cooperation, and collaboration (Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 2012; White, 2005; White & Siu-Yun Lui, 2005). Consequently, we also suggest that a jurisdiction's economic diversity (e.g., mining, agriculture, tourism) amplifies the performance effects of regulatory burden because regulations targeting CSOs will impact a broader set of international-aid donors.

We test the two propositions in the context of Ecuadorian subnational governments between 2007-2018. Ecuador offers an excellent context to test our propositions because in 2011, the national government handed over to subnational governments the responsibility to manage international cooperation. Before 2011, the central government acquired and managed international cooperation. Moreover, in June

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2013, but implemented in January 2015, the Presidential Decree No.16 imposed new requirements on CSOs operating in Ecuador. These new requirements increased minimum assets to operate, demanded both a new application process to obtain legal status, and reporting information to the national government. Using data from all Ecuadorian provinces, this study tested: 1) whether the effectiveness of subnational government partnerships for obtaining international aid changed after adopting further regulations targeting CSOs (e.g., international and national NGOs), and 2) whether a jurisdiction's economic diversity moderates the effect that regulatory burden has on subnational government partnerships' effectiveness in securing international aid.

Results confirm that collaboration between subnational governments has been an effective strategy to apply for and secure international aid after 2011 when subnational governments became accountable for managing international cooperation. However, findings also suggest that regulatory burden negatively influenced subnational governmental capacity to obtain international aid, particularly in provinces with high economic diversity. That is, economic diversity amplified the negative effect that regulatory burden had on subnational partnerships' effectiveness to secure international aid.

This study aims to make three contributions to research on subnational governance by focusing on intergovernmental relations. First, previous studies of intergovernmental relations have mainly focused on frameworks that highlight politicians' motivations (Alesina et al., 1992; Rogoff & Sibert, 1988), ideological inclinations (Buchanan & Wagner, 1977; Hibbs Jr, 1977), parties' bargaining power (Roubini & Sachs, 1989a, b) and/or intergovernmental transfers (Buchanan 1950, Oates 1972, Musgrave and Musgrave 1984, Bahl 2012). While these explanations focus on politicians' and parties' motives, less attention has been given to how central government regulations affect subnational governments' abilities to secure international aid. We apply insights from compliance theory (Etienne 2011 and Lindenberg & Steg, 2007) to examine how regulations influence subnational governments' collaboration that targets obtaining international aid. It advances that (1) regulations increase the costs of collaboration, negatively affecting the expected outcomes, and that (2) the performance effects of regulations are conditioned by a jurisdiction's degree of economic diversity.

Second, empirical studies of subnational governance are often conducted either at the municipal (e.g., Suzuki and Avellaneda 2018, Avellaneda and Gomes 2017) or

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provincial/state level (Avellaneda et al. 2019). But this study focuses on the collaborative behavior between provinces, municipalities, and rural parishes; and tests the effects of three layers of collaboration (province with province, province with municipalities, and province with municipalities and rural parishes) on their governance capacity to secure international aid. Understanding the performance effects of intergovernmental collaboration has practical and theoretical implications. So, to explain subnational government performance in terms of securing international aid, in addition to the effect of central regulations, the influence of provincial, municipal and rural parish collaboration should be accounted for.

Third, while abundant literature exists addressing intergovernmental collaboration (Agranoff and McGuire 2003, Feiock et al 2012, Gulati and Gargiulo 1999, Gulati et al 2012, O’Leary and Vij 2012, Lee and Lee 2020), understanding intergovernmental collaboration in developing and non-consolidated democracies needs further empirical studies. Using all Ecuadorian subnational collaborative arrangements involving provinces, municipalities, and rural parishes, we examine the international aid securing effects of regulations, subnational collaboration, and economic diversity, in the context of a developing economy with a non-consolidated democracy. Therefore, our longitudinal analyses help advance the explanation of governance capacity of subnational governments via intergovernmental collaboration, regulations, and economic diversity.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the research area of government regulation and collaborative governance. Next, we provide a short review of literature on international aid policy and regulatory burden. Then, compliance theory is discussed to derive the two hypotheses tested in this study. This is followed by the study’s case selection, methodology and statistical results. Then, we discuss the implications of our study for research on governance choices, list the study’s limitations, and conclude.

2. Government Regulation on Collaborative Governance

Collaboration implies a governance process to coordinate interactions between partners. Collaborative governance consists of “processes and structures of public policy decision-making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies (...) in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished.” (Emerson et al., 2012, p.2).

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Major components that can influence the performance of collaborative governance have been described in the literature (see Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015 for a revision). Specifically, Emerson et al. (2012) include regulations as part of the context of a collaboration. Regulations are part of policies or legal frameworks that can drive organizations to collaborate or hinder opportunities for collaborating (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015a). For example, regulations determine whether a collaboration is mandated or non-mandated for implementing a public program.

Collaborative governance is conditional on the antecedents of the collaboration (Bryson et al 2006). Mandated collaborations have to comply with formal planning structures to meet government regulations, while in non-mandated collaborations planning is emergent. For instance, a case for mandated collaboration is the Drug-Free Communities Support Program. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in the White House provides grants to community coalitions to prevent and reduce youth substance use that is based on the Drug-Free Communities Act of 1997. To become a grant recipient, community coalitions are composed of 12 local organizations that coordinate actions to comply with particular conditions, such as deliver a plan with measurable objectives and incorporate information systems to report back to the government agency (ONDCP, 2019).

Some favor or oppose legislation for formalizing collaborative structures to implement public policy (see Bingham, 2010; Coggins, 1999). However, discussions about whether organizations comply with regulations preconditioning their participation in collaborative governance are less frequent in the literature. In fact, the literature about regulatory compliance presents evidence about firms' reactions with respect to government regulations to improve food safety, workplace safety, and to reduce air pollution, financial risk, among others (Henson & Heasman, 1998; Heyes, 2000; Leverty, 2012; Vickers, James, Smallbone, & Baldock, 2005). But studies analyzing regulatory compliance to join a collaboration in the public sector are uncommon.

Since government regulation without compliance is an oxymoron, scholars have proposed several theories to explain regulatory compliance (see Appari, Johnson, & Anthony, 2009; Etienne, 2010, 2011 for a review). These theories rely on different factors, such as institutional components (e.g., coercive power and isomorphic behavior) and rearrangement of preferences (e.g., normative, gain, and hedonic goals) to explain regulatory compliance (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). Moreover,

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research in economic performance refocuses the discussion of regulatory compliance to regulatory burden to highlight that a regulation is only justified when the compliance costs are lower than costs of market failure the regulation is trying to get around (Helm, 2006; Keyworth, 2006).

Meanwhile, to understand the dynamics of collaborative governance over time, researchers compiled several international cases of collaborative governance. The main contribution was to show how outputs and outcomes evolved as the components of collaboration changed over time. However, regulatory changes in the legal and policy frameworks of a collaboration were overlooked in previous studies (see Ulibarri et al., 2019). Thus, the need exists to understand whether regulatory compliance/burden influences the dynamics of a collaboration over time. This is important because the sustainability of collaborative processes is key to achieve long-term policy goals (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015b).

Building on previous findings, this paper investigates whether regulations against CSOs operating in the international-aid policy domain influences collaborative capacity in securing foreign aid. Specifically, using Etienne (2011)'s goal framework approach to regulatory compliance, this study contributes to the literature in public administration and regulation by testing effects of regulations targeting CSOs and their willingness to establish cross-sector collaborations with subnational government partnerships to donate foreign aid.

3. International aid policy and regulatory burden

The policy and legal framework of international aid becomes ideal for studying whether government regulations alter the effectiveness of collaborative governance over time. The international-aid system has changed over the last decades due to criticisms about its effectiveness in contributing to the development of aid-recipient countries. The international community agreed to coordinate and align international-aid resources based on aid-recipient countries' national priorities (OECD, 2005). The new vision about the role of international aid is reflected in the change of scope of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), in comparison to Millennium Development Goals (MDG). SDGs envision global partnerships for sustainable development as collaborations, making use of international aid resources following aid-recipient countries' planning strategies to achieve priorities in line with SDGs. This differs from MDG in which global partnerships

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ignored the leadership role of aid-recipient countries to manage international aid resources (MDG, 2000; SDG, 2016).

CSOs have been key partners for economic development in the international aid system (Frantz, 1987; Ghaus-Pasha, 2004). NGOs are part of the overall body of CSOs (see Mercer, 2002) and NGOs' lack of effectiveness to tackle long-term structural change to increase development and reduce poverty has been widely recognized (Banks & Hulme, 2012; Banks, Hulme, & Edwards, 2015; Murray & Overton, 2011). In fact, literature calls for stopping to assume the global international-aid system never interferes with the sovereignty of aid-recipient countries (Tvedt, 1998, 2002). To avoid intrusion in domestic matters, governments started placing significant regulations on CSOs (e.g., NGOs) (Bloodgood, Tremblay-Boire, & Prakash, 2014; Dupuy, Ron, & Prakash, 2016).

Across countries, different sets of regulations target NGOs. The degree and nature of regulations may be determined by political leaders' perceptions of whether NGOs players represent a threat to their political survival by changing the political order. This view falls in line with empirical findings associating government overregulation with low-level trust contexts (see Charron, Haring, & Lapuente, 2021 for a reference). In this sense, regulatory burden against NGOs involves: 1) requirements to obtain legal status for operating in a country, 2) government discretion to approve their legal status, and 3) complexity of the overall regulation (Bloodgood, Tremblay-Boire, & Prakash, 2014; Dupuy, Ron, & Prakash, 2016).

In regards to regulations, Mitchell and Schmitz (2014) coined the term "principled instrumentalism" (p.489) to describe how foreign NGOs pursue their missions subject to regulatory constraints and looking for political opportunities in aid-recipient countries. Likewise, Heiss and Kelley (2017) describe how regulatory pressures against foreign NGOs have increased over time, and Bratton (1989) shows how authoritarian governments in aid-recipient countries reduce the opportunities of NGOs to carry their missions through cooptation. In sum, the degree and scope of regulations targeting NGOs vary considerably across countries. Nevertheless, understanding the drivers of this variation is outside of this study's scope.

4. Compliance theory and the expected effects of regulatory burden

In a critique of compliance theories, Etienne (2011) proposed to borrow from Lindenberg's Goal Framing Theory (see Lindenberg & Steg, 2007 for more details) to integrate previous insights of compliance theory into a consistent framework. Etienne's

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main contribution is to highlight the distinct motivations to comply with a regulation. In doing so, to explain the odds of complying with a regulation, Etienne applies a three-goal framework: hedonic, normative, and gain. Relying on Etienne's compliance framework, this study assumes that CSOs (i.e., foreign NGOs) decide 1) to comply with regulations of international aid-recipient countries, or 2) to refocus their efforts toward countries with less regulations.

CSOs' motivations to comply with regulations and be allowed to be part of cross-sector collaborations may be financial incentives, intrinsic satisfaction, and/or normative concerns. In fact, literature presents examples of (a) non-profit organizations prioritizing a revenue-seeking behavior to diversify revenue strategies (Froelich, 1999), (b) non-profit organizational personnel mainly motivated by mission accomplishment (De Cooman, De Gieter, Pepermans, & Jegers, 2011), and (c) CSOs as advocates and promoters of societal norms and values (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).

Nonetheless, chances exist that certain regulations in aid-recipient countries discourage CSOs to operate in a country. Specifically, one way to understand regulatory compliance is to focus on how regulations influence organizations' goal prioritization (Etienne 2011). In this sense, regulatory burden may increase compliance costs (Leverty, 2012). As a result, organizations motivated by financial incentives (e.g., Froelich, 1999) may see their administrative costs increase, thus reducing their need or willingness to comply.

Moreover, evidence also shows that organizations comply with regulations due to fear of retaliation from regulatory agencies (Birnbaum, 1985). If so, organizations motivated by hedonic incentives (e.g., De Cooman et al., 2011) may see that regulations diminished their satisfaction, thus decreasing their odds of compliance. Nonetheless, organizations also comply when they believe in the normative importance of regulation (Burby, May, & Paterson, 1998; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). However, uncertainty about the merits of the regulation may discourage compliance. Consequently, this study's first hypothesis states the following:

Hypothesis 1: Aid-recipient countries' regulations targeting civil society organizations within the international aid policy domain should decrease the level of international aid secured through collaborative arrangements.

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The diversity in the context of a collaboration also can add extra pressure to CSOs that are already subject to regulatory burden. Greater complexity in the context of the participating organizations is expected to (a) affect organizational motivations to comply with regulations (Etienne, 2010, 2011), (b) require more outward management to coordinate with more heterogeneous actors (O'Toole, Meier, & Nicholson-Crotty, 2005; O'Toole & Meier, 2014), and (c) have broader effect as more policy areas may be impacted.

For instance, managing collaborations in contexts with high economic diversity may be costly because this economic diversity may increase the costs of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration to accomplish collaborative arrangements' goals (Gulati et al., 2012; White, 2005; White & Siu-Yun Lui, 2005). Consequently, context complexity is expected to discourage CSOs' regulation compliance because operating in complex environments becomes more costly.

Hypothesis 2: Jurisdictional economic diversity negatively moderates the effect of regulations on securing international aid through cross-sector collaboration.

5. Regulatory policy targeting civil society organizations such NGOs in Ecuador

Ecuador is a particular well-suited case for studying how changes in the policy and legal frameworks affect outcomes of a collaborative arrangement over time. Ecuador is a democratic, decentralized, and unitary government. Its political administration includes 24 provinces (states), 221 cantons (counties), 412 urban parishes and 816 rural parishes (INEC, 2012). The decentralization process formally began with the implementation of the 19th Ecuadorian Constitution in 1998. In doing so, every subnational government was eligible to start its decentralization process by presenting a "decentralization plan" to the National Council of State Modernization (CRE, 1998).

However, some argue the 1997–1998 decentralization process was a failure because the central government submitted transfers to subnational governments without specifying their responsibilities (Paladines, 2005). As a result, local politicians promoted only the responsibilities that benefited their political careers. For this reason, this practice was called "a la carta" (Falconí & Bedón, 2012, p. 7). To fix that, the 2008 Constitution mandated standard responsibilities to all subnational governments (CRE, 2008; Falconí & Bedón, 2012).

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Under the new system, the national government must transfer to subnational governments 21% of its permanent revenues and 10% of its non-permanent revenues. Sixty-seven percent of those resources are directly transferred to the municipalities, 27% to provinces, and 6% to rural parishes (COOTAD, 2010). Due to large dependencies on national transfers, subnational governments are encouraged to secure extra revenues through their own means. Obtaining foreign aid through international cooperation and NGOs becomes a potential funding source.

Ecuador has increased government regulation against CSOs in the last decade. The regulations increased for two reasons: 1) a vision toward aligning international aid with national priorities (OECD, 2005), as well as 2) a way to monitor and control CSOs' influence on Ecuadorian society. The second reason became determinant because CSOs had a key role during social mobilizations that overthrew three Ecuadorian presidents between 1997 and 2005 (see Appe, 2013; Bräutigam & Segarra, 2007 for details).

Table 01: International aid policy regulations between 2007 and 2017

Action	Details	Source
The Ecuadorian national government implemented international aid policy according to the guidelines of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness	The Ecuadorian government creates a national system for international cooperation aligned with the development priorities of the country. Representatives from subnational governments became part of the board of directors to administer international aid funds.	Presidential Decree No.699 (October 2007)
Ecuador enacted a new constitution	Subnational governments included the management of international cooperation among their constitutional responsibilities. Future legislation will define the mechanism for subnational governments to fulfill with this new responsibility.	Ecuadorian Constitution, articles 263, 264, and 267 (October 2008)
The Ecuadorian national government established regulations to foreign NGOs	Foreign NGOs must sign an agreement with the national government to operate in Ecuador. Foreign NGOs cannot engage in activities that are not approved by the national government.	Presidential Decree No.812 (July 2011)
The Ecuadorian national government devolved the responsibility to manage international cooperation to subnational governments	The Ecuadorian national government determined that subnational governments have the responsibility to bring non-reimbursable international cooperation to their communities without receiving new	Resolution 009-CNC (September 2011)

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	resources from the national budget for the fulfillment of this responsibility.	
The Ecuadorian national government established regulations to civil society organizations	Civil society organizations need to comply with new requirements to receive its legal status. Foreign NGOs have among the requirements to receive legal status the fulfillment of Executive decree 812. The deadline to update the legal status is December 2014.	Presidential Decree No. 16 (June 2013)
The Ecuadorian national government abolished Presidential Decree No. 16	The Ecuadorian national government simplified the regulatory burden against civil society organizations.	Presidential Decree No. 193 (October 2017)

Table 1 summarizes the main laws and presidential decrees that regulate CSOs between 2007-2017. The Ecuadorian national government sought to sign agreements with foreign NGOs to increase accountability, transparency, and planning by fostering collaboration between governmental entities and CSOs (Appe, 2013). However, particularly the Presidential Decree No.16 imposed new requirements on civil society operating in Ecuador. These new requirements include minimum assets, apply or reapply to obtain legal status, and reporting information to the national government. The main regulatory burden registered in the literature is the perception of CSOs about the wide range of discretion the Ecuadorian national government had to renew the legal status of an organization. As a result, many CSOs ceased to operate in Ecuador or refocused their priorities to address unforeseen barriers the Presidential Decree No.16 imposed (Appe, 2018).

The academic debate about the effects of regulation against CSOs is not new in Ecuador. For instance, Appe (2015) described the protests that rural Ecuadorian women indigenous movements carried to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the new regulations imposed on CSOs. The protests centered on the Ecuadorian government mandate for CSOs to have a minimum of \$400 in assets to legally operate. The women indigenous movements considered this measure discriminatory and infeasible for the organizations with scarce resources with which they typically associate. Additionally,

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Dupuy et al. (2016) included Ecuador in the list of countries in which the president has the power to cease CSOs for political reasons. This arbitrary factor generated uncertainty in the context in which CSOs operate in Ecuador.

It is important to highlight the Ecuadorian national government had a conflictive relationship with some CSOs during the presidential regime between 2007-2017 (see Becker, 2013). In fact, the regime 1) threatened or shut down ecological CSOs (e.g., Acción Ecológica, Fundación Pachamama) if they continued protesting against the presence of extractive industries in protected areas, such as national parks (see Lalander & Merimaa, 2018 for details), and 2) registered actions against free expression organizations (e.g., Fundamedios) due to their critical reports of freedom of the press in Ecuador (see House, 2017 for details). However, it is less evident whether the new set of regulations targeting CSOs had an effect on subnational partnerships' effectiveness to secure international aid. For this reason, this study undertakes this analysis.

6. Data

The unit of analysis of this study is the province-year. The analysis examined the level of international aid funds in the Ecuadorian provinces between 2007 and 2018 because of (a) data availability starts in this timeframe, (b) the devolution of the responsibility to manage international aid funds from the national to the subnational governments started at the end of 2011, and (c) the effect of the regulatory burden against CSOs can be assessed after 2014.

Data for this study come from several Ecuadorian public organizations at the national level. The Ministry of Foreign Relationships and Human Mobility (MREMH for its acronym in Spanish) maintained a database that includes the amount of foreign aid reported by donors since 2007. The data is publicly available, but province level data between 2007 and 2018 was made available after an official request.

Moreover, this study includes information of all subnational government partnerships created to manage international cooperation between 2011 and 2018 at the province level. The Territorial Organization section in the Ecuadorian Constitution allows subnational governments to form “mancomunidades” (e.g., inter-governmental cooperation) for managing their responsibilities (CRE, 2008, Art. 243). For example, a province can join another province and/or other municipalities to apply and secure foreign aid. Ecuadorian legislation requires subnational governments to officially register a partnership specifying the purpose of the collaborative endeavor (COOTAD, Art. 286-

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287). The National Council of Competencies (CNC for its acronym in Spanish) established an administrative register for every subnational government partnership created to fulfill their competencies (responsibilities) since 2011. The CNC is responsible for evaluating the fulfillment of the inter-governmental partnerships, and it keeps administrative records including membership and purpose(s) of each partnership (COOTAD, Art. 287). The CNC provided a list of all the subnational government agreements, along with their memberships and purposes, registered between 2011 and 2018 after an official request (CNC, 2019).

Information to capture subnational economic diversity comes from the National Accounts (BCE, 2019). Other provincial characteristics come from the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF for its acronym in Spanish) and the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC for its acronym in Spanish). The resulting database is a balanced panel covering 262 province-year observations. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in this research are detailed in Table 2.

Table 02: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent variable				
International aid (US\$ thousand)	4.76	23.08	0	203.11
Independent variables				
Regulation to civil society organizations (yes=1)	0.33	0.47	0	1
One-level partnership (yes=1)	0.25	0.43	0	1
Two-level partnership (yes=1)	0.08	0.28	0	1
Three-level partnership (yes=1)	0.09	0.29	0	1
Economic diversity	0.84	0.19	0.08	0.94
Control variables				
International cooperation devolution policy (yes=1)	0.58	0.49	0	1
Central government international aid (U.S. \$ thousand)	1746.48	2192.04	0.00	16915.36
Donor suppliers index	0.00	1.00	-1.79	3.05

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Fiscal dependence (%)	69.31	13.95	19.34	99.36
Poverty (%)	41.51	13.99	10.50	76.10
Gross domestic product (U.S. \$ million)	3343.0 5	5612.33	141.67	26406.8 7
Population (thousand)	650.02	894.00	23.46	4267.89

7. Dependent Variable

The MREMH database provides international aid funds that donors declared having transferred to subnational government partnerships at the province level. This is the measure of organizational performance (e.g., provincial performance) in this study, and it refers to non-reimbursable international cooperation in U.S. dollars that a provincial government obtained through subnational government partnerships.

8. Independent Variables

The set of regulations targeting CSOs was implemented after the introduction of the Presidential Decree No.16 in June 2013. This study includes a dichotomous variable, regulatory burden, to capture overregulation. The overregulation variable is equal to one (1) between 2015 and 2018 and zero (0) otherwise. This is because the deadline to comply with the requirements to renew or obtain legal status for CSOs (e.g., foreign NGOs) ended in December 2014. As a result, CSOs that failed to comply with Presidential Decree No.16 were no longer allowed to operate in Ecuador starting in January 2015.

The CNC database identifies which provinces have a partnership with other subnational governments (e.g., provinces and/or municipalities and/or rural parishes) to manage international cooperation. Since the Ecuadorian subnational governments officially became responsible for managing international cooperation in October 2011, partnerships with the mission to obtain international cooperation appear registered since 2011. This study disaggregates the subnational partnerships into three types: 1) one-level partnerships represent collaborations between provinces, 2) two-level partnerships represent collaborations between provinces and municipalities, and 3) three-level partnerships represent collaborations between provinces, municipalities, and rural parishes.

Using data for the Ecuadorian national accounts at the province level, a Blau index represents the level of economic diversity for each province. Following the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC), the BCE represents

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
47 industries to calculate the gross domestic product at the province level. This study operationalizes economic diversity with the following formula:

$$\text{EconomicDiversity} = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{47} \rho_i^2$$

Where ρ_i is the proportion of each industry in the gross domestic product of each province. A high value of economic diversity means the economy of a given province depends on a higher number of industries. As a result, the level of economic diversity is higher in comparison to the scenario in which the economy of a province depends only on a few industries.


Figure 1 shows the level of economic diversity across all 24 Ecuadorian provinces. Interestingly, it appears to be a relationship between the level of economic diversity and the international aid growth rate at the province level in Figure 2. Those provinces with a high level of economic diversity showed no increase in international aid after CSOs had to comply with new regulations to maintain legal status.

Figure 01: Average economic diversity across the 24 Ecuadorian provinces between 2007 and 2018. Control Variables



Note: This figure was created using STATA-16 *spmap* function.

Figure 02: Growth rate between average international aid for the period 2007-2014 and the period 2015-2018.



Note: This figure was created using STATA-16 *smap* function.

The Resolution 009-CNC in September 2011 officially devolved from national to subnational governments the responsibility to manage (e.g., applying, securing, administrating, and implementing) international cooperation. For that reason, this study included a dichotomous variable equal to one (1) from 2012 until 2018; and zero (0) prior to 2012 to control for the implementation of the devolution policy.

Other controls included provincial characteristics expected to affect the provincial capacity to secure international aid funds. First, some provinces may have more supply of donors interested in supplying international aid in their jurisdictions. For that reason, this study added an index score generated from a factor analysis of 1) the number of countries, and 2) the number of organizations channeling international aid funds to a given province. Third, the level of financial support from the central government varies across time and between provinces. For that reason, the analysis included national transferences as a proportion of total revenues (i.e., fiscal dependence) for each province, as well as the amount of international aid the central government redirected to the provinces. Although subnational governments are in charge of managing international aid, the central government still may share with the provinces additional international aid channeled through central agencies. Finally, the analysis included the poverty level, the size of the economy, and the population at the province level.

9. Methods

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All models used two-way fixed effects regression to analyze within-province changes and include over-time trends that can affect cross-sectional time-series. The equation below derived the main findings for this study:

$$Y_{pt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Decree16}_{pt} + \beta_2 \text{Collaboration}_{pt} + \beta_3 \text{Diversity}_{pt} + \beta_4 (\text{Collaboration}_{mt} \times \text{Diversity}_{pt}) + X'_{pt} + u_p + v_t + \varepsilon_{pt}$$

where, Y_{pt} represents the international aid funds in province p at time t , Decree16_{pt} represents the overregulation to CSOs, $\text{Collaboration}_{pt}$ represents the partnerships adopted in province p at time t , Diversity_{pt} represents economic diversity in province p at time t , and its interaction with $\text{Collaboration}_{pt}$ examines the moderator effect on organizational performance, X'_{mt} is a vector of time variant control variables, u_p are province fixed-effects, and v_t are year fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the province level and all control variables are lagged one period, except devolution policy.

10. Findings

The results of model 1 for the period between 2007 and 2014 are presented in column 1 of Table 3. Results in column 1 of Table 3 show the effect of both subnational partnerships and economic diversity on organizational performance before CSOs had to comply with the regulations established by the Presidential Decree No.16 of 2013. Only one-level subnational partnerships (i.e., collaborations between provinces) are statistically significant and positively associated with the level of international aid, even in provincial contexts with high economic diversity. Additionally, while three-level subnational partnerships (collaboration between provinces, municipalities, and rural parishes) are associated with an increment of international aid, the interaction with economic diversity is not statistically significant.

The results of model 2 in column 2 of Table 3 capture the effect of regulatory burden (Decree No.16 of June 2013) on organizational performance. The results in column 2 of Table 3 suggest regulations targeting CSOs had a negative effect on both 1) the level of international aid, and 2) the effectiveness of subnational partnerships to obtain international aid. That is, between 2012-2014 subnational partnerships were more

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effective in obtaining international aid. This means that provinces secured more international aid prior (a) they were handed over the responsibility to manage international aid and (b) before the regulations of Decree No.16 of June 2013 were implemented.

Before analyzing the results for the moderator effect of economic diversity on the relationship between collaboration and performance, it is worth noting that fiscal dependency was the only control variable that was statistically significant in Table 3. Provinces with higher dependence on central government transfers to generate revenues received less international aid funds. In fact, one percentage point increase in fiscal dependency was associated with a 1% reduction of international aid funds.

The results of column 2 in Table 3 include the interaction effect between different types of subnational partnerships and the centered value of economic diversification to reduce the multicollinearity level in this model specification. In fact, the variance inflation factor (VIF) after including the interaction terms does not signal multicollinearity. The highest VIF score among the interacted variables is 6.43. Given only three-level partnerships had a statistically significant relation with the level of international aid funds, the interaction term between three-level partnerships and the centered value of economic diversification provides the result to analyze the second hypothesis of this study. Findings suggest the effectiveness of collaboration on securing international aid decreases as the level of provincial economic diversity increases.

Table 03: The effects of regulatory policy, collaboration, and economic diversity on international aid between 2007-2014 (M1) and 2007-2018 (M2).

	M1: International aid 2007-2014 (lg)	M2: International aid 2007-2018 (lg)
Regulatory policy (since 2014)		-1.1026* (0.3970)
One-level partnership (yes=1)	0.5999* (0.2514)	0.5166+ (0.2571)
Two-level partnership (yes=1)	0.4494 (0.3166)	0.3052 (0.3610)
Three-level partnership (yes=1)	2.1167***	0.6595+

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	(0.1625)	(0.3291)
Economic diversity (ED)	2.6396*	-0.3020
	(1.2245)	(1.5906)
One-level X ED	8.5005**	-0.0820
	(2.8233)	(1.3431)
Two-level X ED	-4.3253	5.3029**
	(4.1186)	(1.6040)
Three-level X ED	-41.7021	-134.2536*
	(69.0976)	(52.7621)
International cooperation devolution policy	1.1600+	0.7572
	(0.5944)	(0.4861)
Central government international aid (logged)	-0.0166	-0.0321
	(0.0913)	(0.0581)
Donor suppliers index	-0.1622	0.4923
	(0.3133)	(0.3333)
Fiscal dependency (%)	-0.0125*	-0.0102+
	(0.0052)	(0.0057)
Poverty (%)	-0.0094	-0.0105
	(0.0093)	(0.0073)
Gross domestic product (logged)	-1.0576	-0.3408
	(0.6625)	(0.4285)
Population (thousand)	0.0001	-0.0013
	(0.0018)	(0.0010)
Constant	8.8350+	4.8557
	(4.5621)	(3.2981)
<hr/>		
Province fixed-effects	Yes	Yes

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
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	166	262
Province	24	24
R ² : within	0.3213	0.2544

Cluster standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: All control variables are lagged one period.

The moderating effect of economic diversity varies and this relationship is easier to interpret graphically. Figure 3 shows the marginal effect of partnerships between the three-level of subnational governments on the amount of international aid, as the level of economic diversity changes. The vertical line in Figure 3 represents the mean value of the cantered variable of economic diversity. While the direct effect of collaboration between subnational governments has a positive effect on the level of international aid, provinces with economic diversity above the average neutralize the positive effect of collaboration, venturing into a negative marginal effect.

Figure 03: Marginal effect of collaboration on international aid as economic diversity changes between 2007 and 2018. Conclusions



The results of the present study suggest changes in the policy and legal frameworks during the life cycle of partnerships influences the expected outcomes of collaboration. Regulatory burden discouraged CSOs from complying with further regulations. As a result, the effectiveness of subnational partnerships to capture international aid resources for their communities was limited.

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Additionally, this study shows how the negative effects of regulatory burden amplified in provinces with high economic diversity. This is because diversity increases the complexity in the context of an organization, and organizations need to spend more resources to coordinate with their external environment. Also, economic diversity involves more areas potentially qualifiable to apply for international cooperation, increasing the chances of a larger number of CSOs to become overregulated.

Our results imply that regulatory burden can hinder the outcomes expected from collaborative governance. Moreover, the economic context of a jurisdiction seems to exacerbate the negative effects of regulations. This study presents evidence that government regulations condition how an organization can exploit diversity in its external environment to their benefit. Diversity has the potential for innovation; however, regulations jeopardized the potential benefits of diversity.

This study does not go without limitations. First, the analysis relies on international aid funds as a performance measure. Future studies should evaluate the regulatory effects on other dimensions of collaborative governance such as aid-recipient jurisdictions' economic development, etc. Moreover, when possible, future studies should capture the sectoral diversity of all the partners of a collaborative arrangement. While this study used economic diversity to indirectly represent the level of sectoral diversity in a collaboration, it encourages further analysis and concept operationalizations to better understand the effects of diversity on collaborative governance.

The main findings are a starting point and contribution toward understanding the effect of regulations on the performance of collaborative governance. This is important since collaboration can lead to benefits when it takes place in contexts with legal frameworks that encourage rather than discourage collaborators. Our findings call for effective policy interventions that permit the attainment of collaborative goals.

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Actitudes políticas hacia la descentralización: el rol de las ideas y los incentivos en el caso uruguayo

Political attitudes towards decentralization: the role of ideas and incentives in the uruguayan case

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DOI: [10.22478/ufpb.2525-5584.2021v6n3.61122]

Recebido em: 11/10/2021
Aprovado em: 22/11/2021

Resumen: Una de las preocupaciones principales de la literatura sobre la descentralización pasa por comprender cuáles son las causas que llevan a los actores políticos a profundizar procesos descentralizadores. Este artículo está orientado a aportar en esta línea a partir del análisis del caso uruguayo, buscando responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿qué características de las elites políticas permiten comprender sus preferencias por profundizar la descentralización? El argumento es que estas preferencias no dependen del partido político al que pertenecen los actores, sino que están asociadas al nivel de gobierno en el que se desempeñan. El estudio utiliza una metodología novedosa para los estudios sobre descentralización, basado en una encuesta a 110 elites políticas de diferentes partidos y diferentes niveles de gobierno.

Palabras claves: Descentralización; Uruguay; Actitudes políticas.

Abstract: One of the main concerns in the literature about decentralization is to understand the causes that lead political actors to deepen decentralization processes. This

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article is oriented to contribute in this line from the analysis of the uruguayan case, seeking to answer the following question: what characteristics of the political elites allows to understand their preferences for deepening decentralization? The argument is that these preferences do not depend on the political party to which the actors belong but are associated with the level of government in which they operate. The study uses a novel methodology for decentralization studies, based on a survey of 110 political elites from different parties and different levels of government.

Keywords: Decentralization; Uruguay; Political preferences.

1. Introducción

En el año 2009, Uruguay dio un paso fundamental en el proceso de descentralización política y territorial. Con la aprobación de la Ley de Descentralización Política y Participación Ciudadana N° 18.567 (LDPyPC), quedó instalado un tercer nivel de gobierno en el país. Los Gobiernos Municipales, tal como se denominó a la nueva institucionalidad, son gobiernos locales electos directamente por la ciudadanía. Ha pasado casi una década desde que los Municipios comenzaron a funcionar y a cambiar la política a nivel sub nacional. El proceso ha sido dinámico y se han ido realizando modificaciones sobre la marcha. Como todo nuevo proceso fue generando aprendizajes y desafíos. La descentralización en Uruguay debe entenderse como un proceso que se encuentra en constante reformulación.

Una de las preocupaciones principales de la literatura pasa por entender las causas que llevan al desarrollo de procesos descentralizadores (Montecinos, 2006; Falleti, 2006; Montero y Samuels, 2004). Parte de las explicaciones se centran en el contexto político, en las estructuras institucionales preexistentes y en los incentivos que los actores tienen para promoverlos (Montero y Samuels, 2004; O'Neill, 2003). El caso uruguayo, en tanto transformación en marcha, se vuelve una oportunidad para evaluar las motivaciones de los actores por continuar profundizando el proceso –o no–, y así aportar a la teoría que intenta avanzar en la comprensión de las reformas descentralizadoras. El presente trabajo pretende aportar elementos en esta línea, utilizando una metodología novedosa para los estudios sobre la descentralización, basada en una encuesta a elites políticas de todos los partidos y niveles de gobierno.

Como se justificará más adelante, las motivaciones que tienen los políticos para profundizar los procesos de descentralización tienen diferente naturaleza. Pueden estar dadas por la existencia de incentivos electorales o por ideas, reflejados en el partido político al que pertenecen los actores, pero también por el impacto en la distribución de

poder que los procesos descentralizadores tengan como consecuencia, según el nivel de gobierno de los actores. Tomando en cuenta estas motivaciones, se busca responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿Qué características de las elites políticas permiten comprender sus preferencias por profundizar la descentralización? El argumento de este trabajo es que las preferencias por avanzar en el proceso de descentralización no dependen del partido político al que pertenecen los actores. Las preferencias por profundizar el proceso están asociadas al nivel de gobierno en el que se desempeñan.

Los actores del nivel local son los que presentan mayor propensión a la profundización al proceso de descentralización en el país, mientras que los actores del segundo nivel son los que presentan las mayores resistencias al avance descentralizador, dado que son los actores que perciben mayores impactos negativos en la distribución de poder ante el avance del proceso descentralizador. Siguiendo con la secuencia de la teoría de Falleti (2006), la descentralización política es aquella que recoge menos apoyo entre los actores de niveles superiores dado que impone una mayor pérdida de poder, le sigue la dimensión fiscal y la que menos resistencia encuentra es la administrativa.

El artículo se estructura de la siguiente forma. En el próximo apartado se presenta la discusión teórica en base a la experiencia del caso uruguayo. En la segunda sección se describe el diseño metodológico. El tercer apartado está dedicado al análisis tanto cuantitativo como cualitativo. Por último, se presenta una sección de discusión sobre los hallazgos del artículo.

2. Argumentos sobre las preferencias por la descentralización en el caso Uruguayo

En este apartado se presentan los argumentos que la literatura toma en cuenta para explicar las preferencias en torno a la descentralización. El caso uruguayo es interesante para contrastar qué rol cumplen las expectativas electorales y las ideas en las actitudes hacia la descentralización, así como los intereses de los actores según su nivel de gobierno. El esquema institucional existente es producto de negociaciones que reflejan cálculos racionales e ideas de los distintos actores que han participado de su diseño. En las páginas que siguen se brindan algunas características del sistema político uruguayo a nivel nacional y sub nacional, se pone en contexto el proceso de descentralización y se analizan los antecedentes y argumentos respecto al rol que juegan los incentivos –tanto electorales como funcionales– y las ideas en las actitudes que los diferentes actores tienen sobre el mismo.

2.1. El sistema político uruguayo y la Ley de Descentralización y Participación Ciudadana

Uruguay es un país unitario, caracterizado por un sistema político altamente institucionalizado y con partidos políticos fuertes. A lo largo de la historia los partidos han estructurado la dinámica política del país, al punto tal que la democracia en Uruguay se ha caracterizado como una partidocracia (Caetano, Rilla y Pérez, 1987). En esta partidocracia, la elaboración de las políticas ha estado signada por la construcción de consensos entre los actores, basados en esquemas institucionales coparticipativos (Buquet y Chasquetti, 2004).

A nivel sub nacional, Uruguay cuenta con 19 departamentos que se caracterizan por tener un órgano ejecutivo –Intendencia Departamental– y un órgano legislativo –Junta Departamental–. Históricamente ha predominado el Partido Nacional (PN) al frente de las Intendencias Departamentales. En el período 2015–2020, el PN está al frente de 12 Intendencias, el Frente Amplio (FA) tiene a su cargo seis, mientras que el Partido Colorado (PC) gobierna en tan solo una. De las 12 Intendencias nacionalistas, en seis de ellas el PN es un partido predominante (Cardarello y Freigedo, 2016). Desde el año 2010 y con la aprobación de la LDPyPC, Uruguay cuenta con un nivel municipal de gobierno. En este nivel, el PN también ha sido mayoritario.

En el año 2005 llegó el FA al Gobierno Nacional con una propuesta de mayor intervención estatal en la promoción del crecimiento y la disminución de las inequidades sociales. La descentralización fue planteada como uno de los ejes centrales de lo que sería “la madre de todas las reformas”: la reforma del Estado. El hito más relevante fue la creación de los Municipios, a través de la LDPyPC aprobada en 2009.

La norma estableció la creación de un nuevo nivel de gobierno, los Municipios, que están a cargo de un Concejo Municipal –órgano integrado por cinco concejales, uno de ellos el alcalde–. Estas autoridades son de carácter electivo por medio del voto directo de los ciudadanos y son asignadas de acuerdo al principio de representación proporcional. A nivel administrativo, la norma asignó a los Municipios atribuciones de mantenimiento de alumbrado, calles y limpieza, tomar medidas en salud, higiene y protección de medio ambiente, promover anteproyectos de decretos para presentar al Gobierno Departamental, rendir cuentas a la ciudadanía e incentivar la participación. De todas formas, estas atribuciones quedan supeditadas a la voluntad de los Gobiernos Departamentales de hacerlas efectivas. En materia fiscal no se estableció autonomía para el tercer nivel de

gobierno. Se determinaron tres fuentes de financiamiento para los gobiernos locales: fondos del Gobierno Departamental, fondos del Gobierno Nacional y donaciones.

El segundo período de gobierno frenteamplista a nivel nacional (2010-2015) fue el período de puesta en marcha del proceso de descentralización municipal. En el año 2010 fueron electas las primeras autoridades locales y comenzó la era de los Gobiernos Municipales en el país. Si bien los Municipios han ido adquiriendo legitimidad política y se han ido convirtiendo en actores relevantes en territorio, algunos problemas de funcionamiento y en las relaciones intergubernamentales derivados de la falta de autonomía llevaron a que en 2014 se aprobara una nueva ley –N° 19.272– que introdujo cambios a la norma original (Freigedo, Abrahan y Milanesi, 2016). El proceso continúa en marcha y está abierto a nuevos cambios.

Un aspecto importante para el avance de la descentralización tiene que ver con la creación de nuevos gobiernos locales. En Uruguay no se encuentra municipalizada la totalidad del territorio. Mientras que en el primer período –89 Municipios– se encontraba municipalizado el 20% del territorio y el 71% de la población, en el segundo período – 112 Municipios– el territorio municipalizado representa el 31% y la población municipalizada el 73% (OPP, 2017). La norma establece tres formas de creación de nuevos gobiernos locales: por población –localidades de 5000 habitantes para 2010 y de 2000 habitantes a partir de 2015–, por iniciativa del intendente departamental y respaldo de la Junta Departamental, o por iniciativa ciudadana.

Como se observa, los líderes políticos –especialmente los intendentes– son actores centrales para profundizar o bloquear el desarrollo del proceso. El avance de la descentralización municipal dependerá del grado en que los actores tengan actitudes favorables hacia la misma. Los incentivos y las ideas de los actores juegan un papel fundamental al momento de explicar estas actitudes. A continuación, se presentan los antecedentes que permiten dar cuenta de cómo los incentivos y las ideas podrían estar incidiendo en las actitudes de los líderes políticos uruguayos hacia la descentralización municipal.

2.2 Los incentivos electorales

Los beneficios estratégicos contribuyen a comprender las actitudes hacia la descentralización en el caso uruguayo. Como se mencionó, uno de los argumentos más utilizados para explicar los procesos de descentralización se basa en los incentivos que tienen los políticos para promoverlos. Estos incentivos se fundan en la estructura de

beneficios que podrían obtener favoreciendo la descentralización del poder. Si las elites del nivel superior perciben que a nivel local existen posibilidades de victorias electorales, tendrán mayor propensión a descentralizar (Montero y Samuels, 2004).

Habiendo transcurrido dos elecciones municipales los datos muestran qué partidos se han beneficiado con la creación de Municipios. Mientras que la elección de 2010 fue una elección de aprendizajes para los partidos y los ciudadanos (Magri, 2010; Cardarello y Magri, 2011), para la del año 2015 los gobiernos locales habían adquirido mayor relevancia en el plano político a nivel local. En este contexto, la segunda elección presentó algunas novedades respecto a la primera (Cardarello y Freigedo, 2016 y 2017).

El PN ha sido el gran beneficiado desde el punto de vista electoral. En 2015 obtuvo 66 Municipios –59% del total–, 24 más que los 42 que había obtenido en 2010. El principal motivo de este incremento es que el partido triunfó en 21 de los 23 nuevos Municipios que se crearon para la segunda elección. Por su parte, el FA fue el único partido que presentó un descenso en la cantidad de Municipios en su poder. De los 41 que ganó en 2010, cinco años después pasó a liderar en 37. Parte de la explicación a esta performance electoral se atribuye a que logró retener tan solo el 80% de los gobiernos locales que tenía y a que ganó en tan solo uno de los 23 nuevos Municipios. Los gobiernos locales frenteamplistas en 2015 representan el 33% del total. Sin embargo, estos comprenden el 69% de la población municipalizada.

La perspectiva racional es útil para comprender el apoyo de los actores del PN hacia el proceso descentralizador. Desde esta perspectiva, los líderes del FA no tienen incentivos para avanzar en el proceso. Hasta el momento el FA no ganó poder a nivel sub nacional con la ley de descentralización sino que, por el contrario, las nuevas reglas con–solidaron el fuerte liderazgo local de su principal competidor (Freigedo, Milanesi y Fuentes, 2017).

2.3 Los incentivos desde la perspectiva de las relaciones intergubernamentales

Los incentivos no solo se vinculan al partido político de pertenencia de la elite, sino también al nivel de gobierno en que se desempeñan los líderes. No solamente están marcados por los intereses electorales, sino que en ellos también juegan las percepciones acerca del aumento o la pérdida de poder del rol institucional que se ocupe. Falleti (2006) ha planteado que los intereses por profundizar la descentralización están marcados por el tipo de poder que se transfiere a los actores sub nacionales –político, fiscal o administrativo–. La descentralización administrativa refiere a la transferencia de

potestades para la prestación de servicios a niveles inferiores de gobierno, lo que no necesariamente implica la delegación de capacidades decisorias. La descentralización fiscal implica el aumento de los ingresos o autonomía fiscal de los niveles sub nacionales. Finalmente, la descentralización política abarca la ampliación de los espacios de representación a nivel sub nacional.

Las preferencias de los actores están marcadas por el tipo de secuencia que siga el proceso descentralizador, ya que no todas las medidas descentralizadoras tienen el mismo efecto en la distribución de poder. “Las medidas de descentralización política y fiscal que ocurren al principio de la secuencia tienden a aumentar el poder de los gobernadores e intendentes, en tanto que las secuencias caracterizadas por medidas de descentralización administrativa tempranas tienden a afectar el poder de gobernadores e intendentes de manera negativa.” (Falleti, 2006, p. 322). Dadas las características del caso uruguayo es esperable que los actores de nivel municipal tengan actitudes más favorables hacia la apertura de nuevos espacios de representación y el aumento de sus competencias a nivel fiscal; mientras que los intendentes tengan actitudes más pesimistas hacia el proceso, tanto a nivel político como fiscal.

La descentralización municipal en Uruguay implica delegación de poder desde el nivel departamental hacia el nivel municipal. El poder de los intendentes en su territorio es muy fuerte. A pesar de contar con escasas atribuciones en materia de políticas fiscales, distributivas y regulatorias, su capital político les permite generar lazos extra-institucionales para resolver temas que quedan fuera de sus competencias (Magri, 2010). La ley de descentralización genera competidores inconvenientes a estos intereses, ya que podría estar favoreciendo la emergencia de nuevas figuras políticas. El proceso podría llevar a cierta pérdida de margen de decisión y de recursos (Ferla, González, Silva y Zuasnabar, 2016).

2.4 Las ideas sobre la descentralización

Las actitudes hacia la descentralización no solo pueden ser explicadas por cálculos estratégicos que se configuran conforme a los beneficios que los actores perciben que obtendrían implementando este tipo de procesos (Grindle 2007). Hay evidencia para sostener que los líderes políticos buscan ceder poder porque están convencidos de que descentralizar asegurará mayor estabilidad y legitimidad de las instituciones. En Uruguay, este enfoque centrado en las ideas de los actores resulta fundamental para comprender el proceso (Freigedo et al., 2017).

Si bien la perspectiva racional es útil para entender la predisposición de los actores del PN a profundizar la descentralización, no lo es para contemplar la posición de los actores del FA. Justamente, la descentralización municipal en Uruguay ha sido un buque insignia de este partido. Los gobiernos locales fueron creados cuando este partido asume por primera vez en la historia el Gobierno Nacional.

Ruiz Díaz (2018) realiza un repaso por los discursos que los partidos políticos en Uruguay han tenido sobre la descentralización y sostiene que sus ideas sobre la misma se han ido construyendo a lo largo de la historia. Como partido cuya identidad se ha construido desde el interior, el PN ha tenido un discurso histórico afín y promotor de la descentralización. En el FA la descentralización formó parte de la génesis partidaria y a través de su relato ha vinculado el fenómeno a la participación como principio (Golfrank, 2007; De Sierra y Charbonnier, 2009; Veneziano, 2009).

En síntesis, las ideas de los actores políticos juegan su rol al momento de comprender sus actitudes hacia la descentralización. Ambos partidos se presentan como los partidos promotores de la descentralización en Uruguay. El PN lo ha hecho con una mirada que pone el énfasis en la autonomía de los gobiernos locales. Desde la década del 80, ha manifestado un discurso que asocia la descentralización con desarrollo territorial y otro discurso que la vincula a la eficiencia (Rivas 2005). En el FA, la orientación discursiva ha sido predominantemente participativa, asociando descentralización con profundización de la democracia.

3. Diseño Metodológico

El objetivo de este trabajo es aportar al debate sobre las actitudes que tienen los actores políticos en Uruguay hacia el proceso de descentralización municipal iniciado en el año 2010. Partiendo de la base de que la descentralización es un fenómeno multidimensional, se pretende identificar las diferencias que existen entre actores que pertenecen al PN y al FA, ambos identificados como promotores de la descentralización en Uruguay. También se busca encontrar diferencias o matices en las preferencias de los actores que se desempeñan en distintos niveles de gobierno, respecto a cada una de las dimensiones de la descentralización. El presente estudio propone un enfoque mixto. El trabajo combina una descripción cuantitativa con un análisis cualitativo realizado a partir de la acumulación teórica sobre fenómeno en Uruguay.

En primer lugar, se propone una descripción de corte cuantitativa. Los datos utilizados tienen como fuente la Encuesta Permanente de Élités y Líderes de Opinión

2017. Se trata de una encuesta realizada por el Instituto de Ciencia Política de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales –Universidad de la República–, aplicada a líderes de opinión. En la edición 2017, dicho estudio incluyó un módulo de preguntas sobre el proceso de descentralización municipal que se desarrolla en el país. La encuesta recoge aspectos cognitivos, evaluativos y propositivos acerca del proceso. El tamaño muestral es de 110 líderes políticos pertenecientes al PN y el FA. La siguiente tabla da cuenta de su composición⁴.

Tabla 01: Tipo de elites

Nivel de gobierno	Tipo de élite	Casos
Nacional	Legisladores	49
	Gobernantes y referentes de la oposición	24
Departamental	Intendentes	18 ⁵
Municipal	Alcaldes	19 ⁶
Total		110

Fuente de datos: Elaboración propia en base a Encuesta de Elites 2017 (ICP–UDELAR).

En este trabajo se considera la descentralización desde una perspectiva multidimensional, por lo que resultó necesario acudir a diferentes indicadores que dieran cuenta de diferentes dimensiones del fenómeno –aspectos administrativos, políticos y fiscales–. En la siguiente tabla se presentan las variables utilizadas para cada una de las dimensiones.

Tabla 02: Dimensiones, indicadores y categorías

Dimensión	Indicador	Categorías
Descentralización política	Considerando que actualmente en Uruguay se encuentra municipalizada el 72% de la población y 31% del territorio. Según su opinión, ¿cómo debería avanzar el proceso de municipalización?	1- Se debería disminuir el grado de municipalización. 2- Se debería mantener como está. 3- Se debería aumentar el grado de municipalización.
Descentralización administrativa	Señale su grado de acuerdo con la siguiente frase: las Intendencias Departamentales deberían transferir mayores responsabilidades a los Municipios	1- En desacuerdo. 2- Ni de acuerdo, ni en desacuerdo. 3- De acuerdo ⁷ .
Descentralización fiscal. Recaudación	En términos presupuestales, a nivel municipal, ¿cuál de las siguientes frases refleja mejor su manera de pensar?	1- Los Municipios no deberían tener autonomía para recaudar

⁴ Para la élite política, la muestra respetó la distribución de cuotas por partido político. Al FA le correspondió el 48.5% de los encuestados, mientras que al PN el 36.2%. El resto corresponde a otros partidos que no forman parte de este estudio.

⁵ Para este segmento de élite se encuestó la totalidad de la población.

⁶ Su selección combinó criterios aleatorios con estratificación, considerando las zonas y partidos a los que pertenecían.

⁷ Estas no son las categorías presentadas durante la encuesta. Las mismas representan una recodificación de las categorías originales.

		2- Los Municipios deberían tener autonomía para recaudar ⁸ .
Descentralización fiscal. Gasto	En términos presupuestales, a nivel municipal, ¿cuál de las siguientes frases refleja mejor su manera de pensar?	1- Los Municipios no deberían tener autonomía para gastar. 2- Los Municipios deberían tener autonomía para gastar ⁹ .

Fuente de datos: Elaboración propia en base a Encuesta de Elites 2017 (ICP-UDELAR).

En segundo lugar, más allá del carácter cuantitativo del trabajo, serán utilizados datos secundarios de corte cualitativo recolectados en estudios anteriores sobre el tema de investigación, basados en entrevistas semiestructuradas a los actores del segundo nivel de gobierno¹⁰. Los datos cualitativos permiten complementar los resultados cuantitativos y habilitan a la discusión y comprensión de los mismos. Esta triangulación entre lo cuantitativo y cualitativo le brinda a este trabajo una pretensión que va más allá de la mera tarea de describir, sino que permite tratar de interpretar los resultados a partir de la acumulación empírica existente.

El uso de diversos enfoques produce una riqueza al conocimiento obtenido por dos motivos. En primer lugar, permite integrar los resultados obtenidos utilizando técnicas de distinta naturaleza. En segunda instancia, permite superar las limitaciones y el reduccionismo que un solo método tiene para abordar el fenómeno. Los datos cualitativos permiten reforzar datos de la encuesta –cuando son coincidentes entre sí– o habilitar la reflexión sobre los datos cuantitativos en caso de que existan disonancias entre los resultados de ambos enfoques. De esta manera, se dota de mayor confiabilidad y validez a los resultados obtenidos.

4. Análisis

Este trabajo se propone indagar acerca de las actitudes de los actores políticos sobre el proceso de descentralización municipal. Cada uno de los aspectos del fenómeno será analizado por separado, aceptando que los actores pueden tener preferencias más descentralizadoras hacia algunas dimensiones y más centralistas respecto a otras.

4.1 Descentralización política: la creación de más autoridades con poder local

⁸ Ídem nota al pie 7.

⁹ Ídem notas al pie 7 y 8.

¹⁰ Las entrevistas corresponden a dos investigaciones que tuvieron como objetivo explorar los discursos que los actores del sistema político tienen sobre la descentralización e identificar posibles ideas que estén contenidas en esos discursos. Estas investigaciones son Ruiz Díaz (2014) y Ruiz Díaz (2018).

La dimensión política de la descentralización está vinculada a la distribución del poder de decisión hacia los gobiernos locales. Descentralizar implica crear nuevos espacios de representación a nivel territorial y ampliar la existencia de vínculos entre la esfera estatal y la sociedad. La descentralización municipal implicó el desarrollo de una reforma institucional que promovió la elección popular de las autoridades locales, reforzando el carácter representativo de la democracia local. Crear más Municipios implica abrir el espacio para que emerjan liderazgos locales y, por lo tanto, actores que disputen la distribución del poder establecido. De esta forma, es necesario observar cuáles son las preferencias de las élites respecto al avance territorial de la descentralización.


Como se mencionó, el caso uruguayo es atípico dado que el territorio no está municipalizado en su totalidad, pero la normativa brinda oportunidades institucionales para avanzar en la creación de nuevos gobiernos locales. En Uruguay, tan solo el 31% del territorio se encuentra municipalizado. Allí vive el 73% de la población (OPP, 2017). Avanzar en el proceso de municipalización, es decir, en la creación de más Municipios, es uno de los componentes centrales de la agenda de descentralización en el país.

Sobre este punto, se consultó a los líderes políticos cuáles son sus preferencias respecto al desarrollo del proceso de municipalización, es decir, si se debe continuar avanzando en la creación de Municipios o si, por el contrario, debería detenerse o dar marcha atrás. Si se analiza por partido político, se destaca que, tanto en el FA como en el PN, las preferencias por aumentar el grado de municipalización son mayoritarias. Por el contrario, las preferencias por retroceder, es decir, por eliminar Municipios son notoriamente minoritarias –gráfico 1–. Este es un punto importante porque da cuenta de que para las élites la descentralización territorial es un proceso que llegó para quedarse. Las preferencias por seguir municipalizando territorio no deberían extrañar si se toma en cuenta que el FA y el PN –sobre todo este último– son los partidos que más incentivos tendrían desde el punto de vista electoral.

Diferente es el caso al utilizar el nivel de gobierno como variable de segmentación para observar cómo se distribuyen las actitudes. Mientras que entre los alcaldes y los actores de nivel nacional las preferencias por seguir creando Municipios son mayoritarias, entre los intendentes la preferencia mayoritaria está en dejar el proceso tal cual está. Esto tiene que ver con las percepciones sobre la pérdida o ganancia de poder. Antes de que se inicie el proceso de descentralización, los intendentes eran los actores con más poder en el territorio. La creación de Municipios con autoridades electas por la ciudadanía generó

nuevos espacios de representación, permitiendo el surgimiento de nuevos actores que distribuyen recursos y que coexisten con el intendente.

Gráfico 01: ¿Cómo debería avanzar el proceso de municipalización? (%)



Fuente: elaboración propia en base a Encuesta de Elites 2017 (ICP-UDELAR).

En investigaciones cualitativas, las explicaciones que han dado los intendentes y otros actores vinculados a los Gobiernos Departamentales que se han expresado en contra de continuar municipalizando refieren a eventuales ineficiencias que pueden generarse con la descentralización de todo el territorio. Más que hacer referencias a pérdidas de poder —es lógico que los intendentes no reconozcan esta cuestión—, los actores hacen referencia a los costos de burocratización, especialmente en territorios con pocos habitantes. “Hacer lo mismo con más gente y con más costo es burocracia. El peso del Estado uruguayo es muy grande. Cuesta aceptar que se agrande más” (entrevista a ex intendente departamental [1], 2016)¹¹.

Es interesante destacar que hay actores que sostienen que, en esos casos, la mejor opción es desconcentrar servicios. “Llevar la descentralización a poblados de 300 personas es ineficiente. Burocratizar es malo por una cuestión de costos y porque se demora en ejecutar. No permite ser eficiente [...] Con tener una buena desconcentración ya sería suficiente” (entrevista a ex secretario general de Gobierno Departamental, 2014)¹².

¹¹ Al momento de ser entrevistado el actor se desempeñaba como Representante Nacional.

¹² Ídem nota al pie número 11.

Este punto es interesante si se toma en cuenta que el problema no es la creación de nuevas estructuras, sino la creación de estructuras con actores que gocen de cierto margen de autonomía. Una “buena desconcentración” implicaría que el Gobierno Departamental tenga un mayor despliegue territorial y eso no es visto por estos actores como burocratización. Sí lo es la creación de Municipios. Este tipo de incoherencias lleva a reflexionar hasta qué punto la burocratización es una razón real por parte de quienes se oponen a la municipalización.

Más allá de estos argumentos, es necesario considerar que la municipalización del territorio puede dar lugar a escenarios de cohabitación política, es decir, convivencia territorial de Gobiernos Departamentales y Gobiernos Municipales a cargo de diferentes partidos. Si bien en las investigaciones cualitativas que sirven de apoyo a la comprensión de estos resultados no se encuentran referencias específicas a la cohabitación, existen actores departamentales que ponen sobre la mesa la relevancia del relacionamiento entre alcaldes e intendentes. “En esta primera etapa los únicos Municipios que funcionaron bien fueron aquellos en los que había una buena relación entre el intendente y el alcalde. Quedó muy supeditado a la actitud del intendente” (entrevista a ex intendente departamental [1], 2016). Lógicamente, cuando ambos niveles de gobierno están bajo el mandato de un mismo partido, la cooperación entre actores se da con mayor fluidez. Los ruidos pueden darse con mayor probabilidad cuando existe cohabitación. No obstante, no todo pasa por la pertenencia a partidos, las relaciones personales también importan.

4.2 Descentralización administrativa: responsabilidades a los Municipios

Otro de los componentes principales del proceso de descentralización en Uruguay está vinculado a la distribución de funciones y competencias entre las Intendencias Departamentales y los Municipios. La LDPyPC establece que la materia departamental está a cargo de la Intendencia y de la Junta Departamental, mientras que la materia municipal está a cargo de los Municipios. Cabe destacar que la delimitación normativa presenta algunas insuficiencias, ya que el Gobierno Departamental puede asignar discrecionalmente cometidos a los Municipios.

En este marco, es relevante evaluar las opiniones sobre cómo se debería avanzar en materia de distribución de responsabilidades, más allá de que la mayoría considere que se debe ir hacia más municipalización. Si se analiza cómo se distribuyen las preferencias por partido político, se destaca que en los dos partidos existe una preferencia mayoritaria por que las Intendencias Departamentales continúen transfiriendo responsabilidades de


gestión a los gobiernos locales. En otras palabras, la mayoría de los actores frenteamplistas y nacionalistas no solo está de acuerdo con crear más Municipios, sino también con que deben tener más competencias –gráfico 2.

De todas formas, si se pone el foco en las proporciones de actores que están en desacuerdo con avanzar en la dimensión administrativa, se destaca que en el PN existe una mayor proporción de líderes que no ven con buenos ojos que los Gobiernos Departamentales transfieran más responsabilidades hacia los gobiernos locales. Si se interpreta desde la mirada local, este dato resulta llamativo en virtud de que es el partido que gobierna la mayor cantidad de Municipios. Que las instituciones locales tengan más responsabilidades implicaría incrementar su poder en territorio. Si se lo interpreta desde una visión departamental, la situación es inversa. Desde esta perspectiva parecería ser lógica la proporción de quienes están en desacuerdo, en virtud de que el PN es el partido con mayor cantidad de Intendencias gobernadas.

Cuando se analizan las preferencias por nivel de gobierno se encuentran diferencias más nítidas. Si bien quienes están de acuerdo con que las Intendencias transfieran más responsabilidades de gestión a los Municipios son mayoría en cada segmento de elite, las proporciones varían significativamente dentro de cada uno. Mientras que entre líderes nacionales y alcaldes estas proporciones giran en torno al 90%, entre los intendentes es de tan solo 61%. De la misma forma, la proporción de líderes que está en desacuerdo con que las Intendencias transfieran más responsabilidades hacia los Municipios es significativamente mayor entre los intendentes –superior a un cuarto– que entre actores nacionales o los alcaldes.

El hecho de que los intendentes departamentales sean aquellos que manifiestan mayores reparos al avance de la dimensión administrativa es un elemento a no pasar por alto. Tener un abanico más amplio de funciones implica tener control de un número mayor de políticas y de distribución de recursos en territorio. Si los intendentes transfieren competencias hacia los alcaldes, estarían perdiendo el control en la gestión de los recursos. Ello significaría una pérdida de poder. Hasta la reforma del año 2010 los intendentes fueron protagonistas importantes de la distribución de recursos en territorio. Su protagonismo se vio amenazado con la creación de autoridades locales, que ahora disputan parte del territorio. De esta forma, no resulta llamativa esta mayor resistencia por parte de los intendentes hacia el avance en esta dimensión.

Gráfico 02: Grado de acuerdo con la siguiente frase: las Intendencias Departamentales deberían transferir mayores responsabilidades a los Municipios (%)



Fuente: elaboración propia en base a Encuesta de Elites 2017 (ICP–UDELAR).

Las investigaciones cualitativas revelan que entre los intendentes departamentales se expresa la necesidad de que el proceso de descentralización departamental–municipal, se vea acompañado o precedido de una descentralización nacional–departamental. “Yo pienso en la descentralización al revés. Qué vamos a descentralizar desde el Gobierno Nacional hacia los Gobiernos Departamentales y cuáles son los recursos con que van a contar. Luego, considerar qué funciones y qué recursos van a pasar del Gobierno Departamental al Gobierno Municipal” (entrevista a ex intendente departamental [2], 2016)¹³. En otras palabras, los intendentes reclaman que para poder transferir responsabilidades a los Municipios es necesario asumir responsabilidades del Gobierno Nacional.

La capacidad de transferir poder entre los intendentes está supeditada a la posibilidad de recibir poder. El objetivo de los actores departamentales es asumir funciones más relevantes desde el punto de vista político o desde el impacto en el desarrollo territorial. A los Municipios, según su visión, le corresponderían responsabilidades más triviales.

Los Municipios deben tener las funciones básicas: limpieza, alumbrado, mantenimiento de calles. La gente visualiza al intendente en políticas de desarrollo, de cultura, de deporte, políticas a largo plazo con visión departamental. El Municipio no puede salir a buscar inversiones [...] Es la política del Gobierno Departamental la que fija el rumbo del departamento (entrevista a ex intendente departamental [1], 2016).

¹³ Ídem nota al pie número 11

También hay actores departamentales que expresan que los gobiernos locales tienen que asumir un rol de portavoces locales. “Los gobiernos locales deben proveer el acercamiento de la ciudadanía. Ese es el rol de los Municipios” (entrevista a ex intendente departamental [2], 2016).

4.3 Descentralización fiscal: la posibilidad de recaudar recursos propios y decidir cómo gastar

Por último, las diferencias más relevantes entre los actores se presentan en la dimensión fiscal del proceso de descentralización. Este aspecto está asociado a la distribución de competencias en materia de ingresos y gastos entre diferentes niveles de gobierno, que determina cuánto corresponde recaudar a cada nivel gubernamental y cómo debe de gastarlo. En la medida que exista una dependencia de los recursos del centro para cumplir con las responsabilidades delegadas, lejos está un gobierno local de ser autónomo. La LDPyPC establece que a nivel fiscal los Municipios sean totalmente dependientes de los recursos transferidos por los gobiernos de otros niveles. Una reforma que tienda a profundizar el proceso implicaría evaluar la posibilidad de que los gobiernos locales tengan autonomía para poder recaudar, pero también decidir cómo gastar tales recursos.

Respecto al primer punto, las preferencias a favor de la recaudación son menores en el FA que en el PN (gráfico 3). El FA ha impulsado la descentralización con el objetivo de generar desarrollo en todo el territorio y promover la convergencia. Desde el punto de vista discursivo la capacidad de recaudación está asociada a la generación de inequidades territoriales y eso se puede observar en los argumentos de los actores, extraídos de las investigaciones cualitativas. “Uno no puede dejar que hayan Municipios ricos y Municipios pobres. Punta del Este no puede quedarse con lo que recauda y que Aiguá se arregle con lo que se pueda. No se cambia con la autonomía económica de cada Municipio” (entrevista a director de Gobierno Departamental, Frente Amplio, 2014)¹⁴. Este tipo de argumentos podría ayudar a entender las posturas contrarias hacia la recaudación por parte de los gobiernos locales en el FA.


Del otro lado, desde el PN se ha promovido la descentralización destacando la capacidad que deben tener las instituciones locales para dar respuestas eficaces ante las demandas de la ciudadanía. “¿Por qué no dar [a los Municipios] participación en lo que se recauda? [...] Eso promueve ejercicio de responsabilidades más equilibradas y

¹⁴ Ídem nota al pie número 11

contrapesos entre el gobernante local y el departamental. Yo también me voy a preocupar en cuidar la renta local” (entrevista a edil departamental, Partido Nacional, 2014), expresaba un actor nacionalista cuando se le consultaba sobre el diseño institucional de la descentralización. En la medida que puedan recaudar recursos propios, los Municipios estarían en mejores condiciones para proveer los servicios cuya responsabilidad les fue transferida. Ello podría explicar la mayor predisposición a avanzar en la dimensión fiscal en este partido.

Las diferencias también se observan si se considera el nivel de gobierno de los líderes políticos. Entre los líderes nacionales y los intendentes, la proporción de quienes están a favor de que los Municipios tengan competencias para recaudar recursos propios son minoritarias. En cambio, la proporción de quienes están a favor supera el 50% entre los líderes locales. Parece lógico que los alcaldes sean quienes están a favor de poder obtener sus propios recursos y no depender de recursos que provienen de otros niveles de gobierno. En otras palabras, para los alcaldes avanzar en la dimensión fiscal implica autonomía. Por el contrario, para los líderes nacionales y los intendentes implica debilitar la influencia que tienen sobre los gobiernos locales.

Gráfico 03: Preferencias sobre competencias recaudatorias de los Municipios (%)




Fuente: elaboración propia en base a Encuesta de Elites 2017 (ICP-UDELAR).

Las diferencias a nivel de partido político son menos notorias respecto a la capacidad de decisión de las autoridades locales sobre el gasto. En ambos partidos las posiciones favorables a que los gobiernos locales tengan la capacidad de decidir cómo y en qué gastar son mayoritarias –gráfico 4–. Las diferencias se observan en la distribución de respuestas en cada partido. En el PN la proporción de opiniones negativas es

notoriamente mayor que en el FA. Si se toma en cuenta el nivel de gobierno de los actores sí se pueden observar diferencias. Mientras que la mayoría de los líderes nacionales y los alcaldes se manifiestan a favor de que las autoridades locales tengan capacidad de decisión sobre el gasto, entre los intendentes esta proporción es notoriamente menor. En la medida que los Municipios tengan competencias sobre el gasto, se da una mayor autonomía respecto a los Gobiernos Departamentales.

Gráfico 04: Preferencias sobre competencias decisorias de los Municipios (%)



Fuente: elaboración propia en base a Encuesta de Elites 2017 (ICP–UDELAR).

Sobre este punto, es necesario considerar que la toma de decisiones por parte de los gobiernos locales está asociada a la capacidad de articulación entre el Gobierno Departamental y el gobierno local, cuando no está claro hasta dónde llegan las competencias de cada nivel de gobierno en una misma área de política. En los argumentos extraídos de investigaciones cualitativas se puede observar la relevancia que los actores departamentales brindan a la coordinación. “Lo paradójico es que hay gestiones departamentales muy buenas y gestiones municipales malas. Difícilmente suceda lo inverso, una excelente gestión municipal y una mala gestión departamental. Lo ideal es generar sinergias, no duplicar esfuerzos. Por eso es que no estoy convencido de que se necesite un nivel más de gobierno” (entrevista a ex intendente departamental [2], 2016), expresaba un ex jerarca refiriéndose a las dificultades de gestión en los gobiernos locales.

Además de la preocupación por eludir problemas de coordinación, los argumentos para cuestionar la capacidad de decisión de los gobiernos locales tienen que ver con el rol que se les asigna a los Municipios por parte de los actores departamentales. Varios de

ellos han expresado que el gobierno local debe funcionar como articulador entre el Gobierno Departamental y la ciudadanía. “Si particularizamos la discusión sobre descentralización en darle plata a un alcalde, desvirtuamos todo. La pelea no es por plata sino de cabeza. Veo discusiones que defienden la descentralización para llevarle plata al alcalde para que la maneje él [...] Descentralizar es dar participación en las decisiones sin perder el contexto” (entrevista a intendente departamental, 2016). Si el Municipio es articulador, su función es abrir espacios de participación y trasladar las demandas hacia el Gobierno Departamental, más que decidir sobre el gasto.

5. Discusión

El caso uruguayo se vuelve una oportunidad para evaluar las motivaciones de los actores políticos por continuar profundizando el proceso de descentralización y así aportar a la teoría que intenta avanzar en la comprensión de las reformas descentralizadoras. El caso es atractivo dado lo reciente del proceso y su constante reformulación en un período reducido de tiempo, lo que permite evaluar el posicionamiento de los actores en las diferentes dimensiones del fenómeno. La reforma, lejos de estar acabada, todavía tiene abiertas diversas aristas que hace que los actores se enfrenten a un contexto de incertidumbre sobre los caminos a seguir.

Este trabajo buscó aportar desde el punto de vista metodológico, ya que está basado en una encuesta a elites políticas que logró relevar las percepciones de actores de diversos partidos políticos y de todos los niveles de gobierno, tomando como base una misma batería de preguntas que permiten comparar sus preferencias. Generalmente, los estudios sobre descentralización se acercan al fenómeno desde una perspectiva más cualitativa. Los estudios de opinión cuantitativos orientados a las elites políticas no son frecuentes en la literatura. La fortaleza del instrumento radica en que quienes contestan son aquellos actores que inciden en el proceso, ya sea por tener participación en el diseño, en la implementación o en la evaluación de la política en marcha.

Más allá de los resultados del abordaje cuantitativo, la incorporación de elementos surgidos de estudios secundarios de carácter cualitativo fue fundamental para formular posibles hipótesis que permitan comprender la dinámica de las actitudes de los actores hacia la descentralización. La evidencia encontrada en los discursos de los actores ha ayudado a interpretar los resultados.

En relación a los hallazgos, este repaso por las preferencias respecto a las diferentes dimensiones del fenómeno ha permitido comprender que en el PN y en el FA

se comparten visiones en cuanto a avanzar en el proceso de municipalización y dotar de mayores competencias a los gobiernos locales. Algunos matices entre actores de ambos partidos se presentan respecto a la dimensión fiscal del fenómeno, pero no son más que diferencias en la proporción en que se distribuyen las preferencias en cada uno. La variable partido político parecería ser más útil para explicar qué tipo de descentralización se promueve, más que para dar cuenta de las actitudes hacia la profundización del proceso.

La variable que más ayuda a comprender las diferencias en las actitudes hacia la descentralización es el nivel de gobierno en el que se desempeñan los actores. Por un lado, los alcaldes son los que tienen actitudes más favorables hacia el fenómeno. Se manifiestan a favor de avanzar en la descentralización política, generando más Municipios en el territorio y ampliando los canales de representación. Por otro lado, también creen que es necesario transferir más responsabilidades a los gobiernos locales, brindarles competencias recaudatorias y dotarlos de capacidad de decisión sobre el destino de lo recaudado. Los líderes de nivel nacional tienen actitudes similares a las de los alcaldes, excepto en lo que respecta a los aspectos fiscales. Por su parte, los intendentes –representantes del segundo nivel de gobierno– son los que tienen una actitud menos favorable. Se oponen a continuar municipalizando el territorio, dado que esto implica una mayor distribución de poder político. También en su mayoría se oponen a que los gobiernos locales tengan competencias recaudatorias.

El principal aporte de este trabajo es que las preferencias para descentralizar están asociadas a las percepciones que los actores tienen sobre la pérdida o ganancia de poder y esta percepción se vincula al rol institucional que los actores ocupan. Los intendentes serían los actores que perderían más relevancia política con el avance de la descentralización en sus distintas dimensiones, dado que se trata de un proceso de distribución de poder que va desde lo departamental hacia lo local.

La descentralización municipal uruguaya es esencialmente política. El proceso está marcado por una apertura de canales de representación local (Freigedo et al., 2017). Estos resultados pueden habilitar algunas reflexiones sobre cómo continuará la secuencia descentralizadora en Uruguay o, dicho con otras palabras, pensar en hipótesis acerca de cuáles serán las dimensiones por las que continuará avanzando el proceso. A pesar de que haber comenzado la secuencia por la dimensión política favoreció el incremento de poder de los alcaldes –siguiendo la línea teórica planteada por Falleti (2006) –, el centralismo

existente desde el punto de vista fiscal actuó como contrapeso, mitigando la pérdida de poder de los intendentes. Si el proceso continuase reforzando la autonomía política y financiera, la pérdida será de mayor magnitud para los actores departamentales. Este elemento puede ser útil para comprender por qué los intendentes tienen actitudes más favorables hacia la dimensión administrativa que hacia el resto de las dimensiones.

La separación analítica del fenómeno en dimensiones fue un recurso para encontrar las diferencias y ver el importante papel que juega el rol institucional de los actores como elemento mediador de las actitudes hacia la descentralización. El hecho de que las actitudes menos favorables de quienes deben ceder poder se orienten hacia los aspectos políticos y fiscales, conlleva a pensar que el proceso continuará profundizándose por los carriles administrativos en el caso de que los intendentes consigan hacer prevalecer sus intereses en el desarrollo futuro de la política. La vía administrativa es la alternativa políticamente más viable si también se consideran las preferencias que han expresado los actores del nivel nacional. Estas reflexiones llevan a pensar que en los próximos años habrá un aumento moderado en la creación de nuevos Municipios, se mantendrán las restricciones existentes respecto a la autonomía fiscal y se avanzará en los aspectos administrativos.

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Parties, elections and health inequalities in Brazilian municipalities: a relational analysis based on political and management factors and dependence on the public system¹

Partidos, eleições e desigualdades em saúde nos municípios brasileiros: uma análise relacional a partir dos fatores políticos, de gestão e da dependência do sistema público

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DOI: 10.22478/ufpb.2525-5584.2021v6n3.60028

Recebido em: 30/06/2021
Aprovado em: 18/11/2021

Abstract: This work aims to identify how political factors are related to health inequalities from the approach of state capacities, considering that these indicate a necessary condition for a potential reduction of health inequalities. For this, a synthetic indicator of state capacities in health was formulated for the 5,570 Brazilian municipalities from 2013 to 2015, and through descriptive analyzes and econometric regression models of panel data and logistic regression, we sought to answer the following questions: (I) is the dependence of voters on the public health system correlated with the levels of state capacity in health and, consequently, with the levels of inequality?; (II) do left parties reduce health inequalities more in relation to other parties?; and (III) are municipal governments that reduce health inequalities politically rewarded through re-election? The results indicate that (I) higher levels of dependence are correlated with higher levels of state capacity; (II) leftist parties no longer reduce health inequalities; (III) voters reward municipal governments for reducing health inequalities, although there is no unanimous standard in this regard.

Keywords: inequalities; health; state capacity; left; elections.

¹ Este artigo é resultado de uma iniciação científica (Processo Fapesp: 2019/09164-2) desenvolvida no Centro de Estudos da Metrópole (CEM/Cepid – Processo Fapesp: 2013/07616-7) sob orientação do Professor Marcos Paulo de Lucca-Silveira (EESP/FGV), a quem agradeço pelos comentários e sugestões, assim como à Professora Marta Arretche (FFLCH/USP/CEM). Agradeço também aos pareceristas anônimos da Revista Brasileira de Políticas Públicas e Internacionais pela avaliação e sugestões.

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Resumo: Este trabalho objetiva identificar de que forma os fatores políticos se relacionam com as desigualdades em saúde a partir da abordagem das capacidades estatais, considerando que estas indicam uma condição necessária para uma redução potencial das desigualdades em saúde. Para isso foi formulado um indicador sintético de capacidades estatais em saúde para os 5.570 municípios brasileiros de 2013 a 2015, e por meio de análises descritivas e modelos econométricos de regressão de dados em painel e regressão logística se buscou responder às seguintes perguntas: (I) a dependência dos eleitores sobre o sistema público de saúde se correlaciona com os níveis de capacidade estatal em saúde e conseqüentemente nos níveis de desigualdade?; (II) os partidos de esquerda reduzem mais as desigualdades em saúde em relação aos outros partidos?; e (III) os governos municipais que reduzem as desigualdades em saúde são recompensados politicamente por meio da reeleição? Os resultados indicam que (I) maiores níveis de dependência se correlacionam com maiores níveis de capacidade estatal; (II) os partidos de esquerda não reduzem mais as desigualdades em saúde; (III) os eleitores recompensam os governos municipais pela redução das desigualdades em saúde, embora não haja um padrão unânime em relação a este aspecto.

Palavras-chave: desigualdades; saúde; capacidade estatal; esquerda; eleições

1. Introduction

The constitution of public policies that make Brazilian social welfare state in the recent period refers to the Federal Constitution of 1988, which in its chapter on social rights guaranteed Brazilian society the rights to health, education, housing, study, assistance and others. Although many of these policies already existed up to then, Magna Carta leveraged them, expanding the service list that would come to be guaranteed to society. The landmark held in 1988 denotes a substantial paradigm shift for public policies in the subsequent period, being responsible, for example, for dynamics that result in an increase in individuals' well-being and a reduction in inequalities in many of its dimensions (Arretche, 2015).

Health policy, in particular, is undergoing a deep transformation as it is structured on the principles of universality, gratuity and integrality. Compared to the previous period, the last Federal Constitution now includes in the health system a significant portion of the population that previously did not have access to the system that was restricted and conditioned to an employment relationship, this transition exemplifies the "inclusion of outsiders" process (Arretche, 2018). As health services began to be expanded and individuals began to have greater access to them - so that the availability of income or employment was no longer a determining factor in access to health services - health inequality decreased, reflected in epidemiological and infant mortality scenarios, for example (Arretche, 2018; Coelho & Dias, 2015).

Still within the scope of health policy, another significant change marked in the Federal Constitution was the decentralization process. The federative model established in Brazil in 1988 gave municipalities a central role in the management and implementation of health policy, which are essential for its success. At the same time, health financing was the responsibility of the three federative entities. In summary, all entities finance and municipalities provide (Arretche, 2002). However, for Grin and Abrucio (2018), the transfer of responsibility to the municipalities was not accompanied by a proportional transfer of state capacities, so that this process could compromise the expected results.

So, the understanding of health policy in Brazil, its management and results, as well as the factors linked to its inequalities, requires an understanding of what happens in Brazilian municipalities. In this study, the approach centered on health inequalities takes place from the perspective of state capacities, understood as the state's capacity to implement public policies (Gomide, Pereira & Machado, 2017). It is true that this perspective is not directly and linearly reflected in the results (impacts and effects) of the health policy, since despite the availability of resources being a necessary condition for the success of the policy, it is not necessarily sufficient, given that there is a complexity of other factors that are also determinants of health policy outcomes. A given health program, for example, as Victora et al (2000) demonstrate, may, at a first stage of its implementation, widen inequalities between the most needy and least needy individuals in favor of them, and only in a later period will it reduce inequalities in favor of the poorest. Despite these dynamics, I argue that the increase in state capacities in health creates a potential reduction in health inequalities, in view of the increase in conditions for the policy to be implemented, contemplating in a more equitable manner the target population. Therefore, the reduction of health inequalities will be treated in this study as a potential effect of increasing state capacities in health.

Considering the complexity of political and management factors that involve the consummation of health policy within municipalities, as well as the dynamics of actors, elections, institutions and political parties, which, depending on their ideological orientation, produce different effects on public policies (Esping-Andersen, 1991) or have strict motivations, such as the search for votes, which explains certain types of behavior and public policies (Downs, 1991), and considering the centrality of health policy for social and promoting the individuals' well-being, this article aims to (I) identify whether

the individuals' dependence on the public health system influences the state capacity levels in health in municipalities, so that the increase in state capacity (potential reduction inequality of outcomes) is reflected by these dependency levels; (II) identify whether the party orientation of municipal executive governments influences the levels of state capacity in health; and (III) identify whether governments that improve their state capacity in health, and thus reduce inequality of outcomes, are re-elected, that is, politically rewarded.

After this introduction, this study is structured in another five sections. The first presents an overview of health policy and its relationship with the Federal Constitution of 1988. The second makes a theoretical discussion about the study objectives and hypotheses. The third with the methodology, which presents the construction of state capacity indicators and econometric models. The fourth presents the results and the fifth the result discussion. Then, there are the final considerations and bibliographical references.

2. Health policy, the Federal Constitution of 1988 and state capacities

The understanding of the health model that was constituted in the Federal Constitution of 1988 goes through its trajectory, which refers to a period much earlier than that. Health care in Brazil dates back to the 1930s, which linked this type of care to social security, thus denoting the conservative and conditioning nature of health care. Within the scope of *Institutos de Aposentadorias e Pensões (IAPs)*, formal social security contributors had access to health services, which, due to social security fragmentation - each job category had its own IAP - generated different types of inequalities among workers, as the different categories had different social security structures and different types of assistance (Menecucci, 2007). The constitution of these arrangements gave rise to different types of private health service providers, being promoted from the 1960s, when the public authorities used this apparatus to expand health services and coverage linked, at this time, more deeply to the Social Security, contributing to the expansion of the private sector through the purchase of its services (Menecucci, 2007).

About historical neo-institutionalism, Menecucci (2007) identifies that a set of factors such as rules, norms, choices, contingencies, among others, led to the constitution of a Brazilian health system marked by the public and private mix, so that neither even the creation of one of the largest health systems in the world, SUS, characterized by being

unique, free and universal, managed to ensure a purely public health system in Brazil. On the other hand, according to Arretche (2018), the health system that was formed in the Federal Constitution of 1988 was responsible for including 60% of the population that previously did not have access to health policy due to its conditioning, thus being responsible for the reduction of health inequalities in the period after the Constitution.

Although SUS has meant one of the greatest (if not the greatest) advances in health policy of all times, the dichotomy between the public and private system also represents one of the greatest sources of inequality among individuals in both systems, although one cannot speak of two parallel systems, since, due to its universal nature, SUS does not exclude users from the private system. Thus, the health model that was created in Brazil is made by a public system, which includes the entire Brazilian population (about 200 million people) and a private system, which includes about a quarter of the Brazilian population (50 million people). In terms of financing, the imbalance of conditions is evident, since, according to Levi (2016), the public system was responsible for 46% of the total expenditure (R\$226 billion) on health in 2013, while the private system was responsible for by 54% of expenditures (R\$271 billion). According to the same author, countries like Denmark, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have their health systems financed by the public sector in 84%, 79%, 85% and 80%, respectively. This imbalance in conditions evidenced by financing is also reflected in the results of health services, which reveal inequalities created between exclusive users of the public system and users of the private system.

Regarding the health inequalities that have been created, Boccolini and Souza Junior (2016), investigating the factors associated with inequity in the use of health care in Brazil through Pesquisa Nacional de Saúde (PNS) 2013, identify that 15% of people with 18 years or older have not used the health system, and the share of excluded people is greater among young people, men, non-whites, people with no education and those who do not have private health insurance. Econometric models also indicate a high probability of not using the health system among individuals without private health insurance. From the same research, Barros et al (2016, p. 5) identifies that “those without private health insurance have a higher prevalence of smoking, being inactive in their spare time, having a sedentary lifestyle, and consuming more meat with fat and whole milk than those with private health insurance”, thus highlighting the probable inequalities of individual well-being between those with private health insurance and those without private health

insurance. On the other hand, Dourado, Guadalupe and Aquino (2016) found that having a Fonte Usual de Cuidados (FUC) is more common among the population covered by Estratégia Saúde da Família (ESF) program, as well as by people who have private health insurance, chronic diseases or comorbidities. The authors also find that ESF was strongly associated with receiving primary health care, in addition to having a negative relationship with the fact of having private appointments such as a FUC, that is, being attended by ESF reduces the individuals' dependence on the private system.

Thus, it is evident that the hybrid model of the Brazilian health system, which brings the public and the private, is one of the explanatory factors of health inequalities among individuals in favor of those who have a private health plan, which in turn also they tend to have more resources of another order, such as financial resources, which further accentuate inequalities. However, some public policies, such as Estratégia de Saúde da Família program, tend to reduce inequalities among those who do not have a private plan and those who do. Due to the need for resources to promote policies that tend to reduce health inequalities in their multiple dimensions, state health capacities are a necessary condition to reduce health inequalities, since the expansion of the State's capacity for action, creates the conditions for it to promote its health policies and match individuals without a private health plan with those who have a private health plan.

The understanding of state capacities requires the recognition of its complexity and the polysemy of the concept, which includes different dimensions and perspectives of State action, but which in a stricter sense can be understood as its capacity to implement public policies, with all the decisions that permeate this process (Souza, 2020). According to Souza (2020, p.45), "the importance of the concept derives from the pure will of political agents or actors is not enough for goals to be achieved", so that its achievement must precede material and goals.

The conceptual operationalization of state capabilities is commonly divided into two dimensions: the technical-administrative and the political-relational. While the first concerns material and professional factors, the second concerns factors related to interpersonal interactions (Souza, 2020; Gomide, Pereira & Machado, 2017; Grin, Demarco & Abrucio, 2021). In health policy context, according to Oliveira and Coelho (2021), technical-administrative capacities are expressed by: availability of health units and services, availability of human resources, information systems, access to medicines and financing. While political-relational capacities are provided through, for example, the

council of representation of municipalities, such as Conselho Nacional de Secretarias Municipais de Saúde (CONASEMS), and inter-federative forums, such as Comissões Intergetoras Tripartite e Bipartite (CIT e CIBs).

3. Parties, inequality and health

The constitution of welfare states was largely associated with the existence of some social policies, especially those in health and education. However, for Esping-Andersen (1991) this classification criterion for welfare states is vague and does not say much about substantive aspects of these policies. Thus, the author proposes a classification of welfare states based on the decommodification metric, according to which “it occurs when the provision of a service is seen as a matter of law or when a person can support themselves without depending on the market” (Esping-Andersen, 1991, p. 102).

Based on international experiences and the types of policies that were created in different countries, Esping-Andersen (1991) proposes three types of welfare state based on the metric of decommodification. The liberal model is characterized by being the least de-commodifying, as it is primarily intended for the demonstrably poor and in dimensions just sufficient to meet basic needs, being thus also stigmatized and, consequently, discouraging access, thus increasing the dependence of the market individuals. The conservative model is characterized by its high level of fragmentation and conditioning to some type of employment relationship, so that access to the policy is conditional on contributions, as is the case with social security policies in most countries. Finally, the most decommodified model is the social-democratic model, which is characterized by being universal and does not condition access to policies to any contribution, so that individuals can choose to study or not under this model, once the dependence of individuals on the market is very low.

In practical terms, the effects of each of these models in relation to inequalities are very dynamic, since low inequality in certain periods can turn into high inequalities in others. However, broadly speaking, the liberal model is predicted to have little effect on reducing inequalities, since by targeting only the very poor, its impact only affects a portion of society, without producing any direct effect on the remainder of the distribution, which, in order to have its needs met, must resort to the market. The same effect happens to the conservative model, which, by creating different categories of

beneficiaries due to the level and type of their contribution, can increase inequalities between citizens in relation to a given public policy. On the other hand, the social-democratic model, which is characterized by being universal, tends to reduce inequalities between individuals, considering that everyone has the right to access a certain policy based on the eligibility criterion. As Esping-Andersen (1991) points out, this process is not linear and depends on some factors, such as the structure of income distribution in societies, for example, so that a social-democratic model may depend on a society of “humble” people to be effective, under the possibility of generating a middle class that demands better services and eventually resort to the market.

In political terms, the liberal welfare state model becomes viable when the right comes to power and constitutes a majority. Seeing the market as a solution to economic and social problems, the right-wing parties tend to implement public policies of a liberalizing nature, aimed at the poorest and that do not reduce citizens' dependence on the market. The conservative model is viable when the right or left does not constitute a majority and need to go to the center to form the government. While the social-democratic model becomes viable when the left comes to power and constitutes a majority, thus implementing policies that aim to reduce individuals' dependence on the market and thus emancipate them (Esping-Andersen, 1991). These relationships are the basis of the theory of party government.

By tracing the trajectory of social democracy, Przeworski (1991) shows that leftist parties had to deal with many contingencies along their path, until the original objective of socialism was abandoned to the detriment of public policies that would increase the good -being of the workers, all this made possible by the emergence of Keynesianism. Thus, we find in the social-democratic welfare state model strict ties with what was possible to materialize from the socialist ideas of the left-wing parties.

The object II of this study of investigating whether leftist parties increase the levels of state capacity of municipalities and thus reduce health inequalities is centrally based on the theory of party government, so that the hypothesis that is created from this formulation is that the answer is positive, and left-wing governments reduce health inequalities. However, it must be considered that the empirical exercise promoted in this study presupposes a potential de-commodification created by left-wing parties, since the increase in state capacities is not automatically reflected in the reduction of individuals'

dependence on the market. About the universality of the Brazilian public health system, at least in terms of rights, all individuals have the right to access the health system, however, when we are dealing with inequalities in terms of state capacities and therefore of policy outcomes, the perspective of ownership is shifted to the perspective of access to services. In summary, I argue that despite the universal design of the Brazilian public health system, the focus of this study is on potential inequalities in access to health policy services.

From another perspective, despite programmatic party ideologies, theories based on the assumption of economic voting postulate that redistribution and the consequent fall in inequality occur based on the interest of individuals in maximizing their economic gains. Meltzer and Richard's (1981) classic theory of the median voter, for example, postulates that in a society where there is inequality and universal suffrage, individuals tend to vote so that the median income becomes equivalent to the median income. Now from a party perspective, Downs (1999) states that the ultimate aim of parties is to reach power per se, so that the ideology they create and appropriate is a mere instrument for this purpose. Thus, in a society in which voters are inserted in a context of economic vulnerability and inequality, it is rational for parties to adopt ideologies that seek to combat such circumstances, so that they get these voters' sympathy and, consequently, their votes, enabling the conditions for winning elections and coming to power.

Supported in this Downsian perspective, objective I of this study is made, whose purpose is to identify whether the municipalities most dependent on the public health system have their level of state capacity expanded with a consequent reduction in health inequalities. The hypothesis that is formulated for this objective is that there is a positive correlation between the level of dependence on the public health system and the level of the state capacity indicator. The greater dependence of a population on the health system makes the parties seek to meet these needs, firstly through their discourse and ideology, and secondly through public policies when they reach the government, due to the mechanism what Downs (1999) calls "responsibility", according to which governments must implement the policies they defended in the campaign, under penalty of losing the "trust" of their voters. Due to these electoral assumptions, the indicators of state capacity and dependence on the public health system constructed to answer the objective I question were made by weighing the population aged 20 or over residing in the municipalities, as

this population is the closest of the total population of voters, which is the population 18 years or older.

4. Methodology

The concept of state capacity used in this study is understood as the state's capacity to implement public policies (Gomide, Pereira & Machado, 2017). So, dealing specifically with health policy, the measurement of the state capacity of Brazilian municipalities took place through the construction of a synthetic indicator that seeks to contemplate various aspects of the health structure of Brazilian municipalities. The construction of this indicator was inspired by the municipal health quality indicator constructed by a study by Centro de Estudos da Metrópole (CEM)¹. The synthetic indicator of municipal state health capacity of this study was built from the following indicators available in DATASUS (2020): number of basic outpatient facilities, number of health professionals, number of health teams, number of health equipment² and number of dental offices, and all these indicators were weighted by the number of resident inhabitants (data also obtained from DataSUS) total or over 20 years (depending on the objective) of the respective municipalities and concern the administrative sphere municipal. The period of analysis of this study is from 2013 to 2015, and the calculation of the synthetic indicator was annual. The period covered in this study is justified by the fact that all data used are as recent as possible, as it is a consequence of a municipal election (2012), and therefore contemplates the beginning of a term, and prior to the immediately subsequent municipal election (2016).

Although the period covered by this study is short and makes it difficult to observe significant changes in the indicators of state capabilities, and consequently of potential inequalities in access to health, all units of analysis (municipalities) are being analyzed under the same criteria. This means, for example, that both left and non-left governments have the same time conditions to improve or not their state capacity indicators, or even that all governments had the same time conditions to whether or not they improve their state capacities and whether or not they are re-elected. The point highlighted here is that the analyzes intended here are relational between the municipalities and do not depend on the size of the time series.

Operationally, all indicators that make up the synthetic indicator were divided by the number of inhabitants in the respective municipality and multiplied by one thousand. Subsequently, each indicator was standardized on a scale ranging from 0 to 1, so that they

could be compared and unified. The standardization process excluded the outliers from the sample for this purpose, so that they were assigned the respective extreme value, that is, 0 or 1, considering that their extreme values could cause analytical distortions in the standardized indicators of the other municipalities. Table 1 below illustrates the maximum and minimum values used for standardization purposes, all of which correspond to the observations of 2014 and were used for all years so that the synthetic indicator could be compared over time, so that studies futures that aim to reconstruct the same synthetic indicator should use these values as a reference. The interpretation made, for example, from the maximum value of health establishments is that the municipality corresponding to this position has 2.02 health establishments per thousand inhabitants, while the municipality with the minimum value has 0 health establishments per thousand inhabitants, which may indicate a very small number of establishments in relation to the total population. Finally, all standardized indicators were added and multiplied by 2, so that each of the 5,570 municipalities now has a state health capacity index ranging from 0 to 10 for the years 2013 to 2015.

Table 01: Maximum and minimum values of health indicators in 2014

Indicator	Minimum	Maximum
Health facilities	0	2.0242
Dentistry office	0	1.3348
Health equipment	0	1.8220
Health professionals	1.0629	22.0225
Health teams	0	1.2663

Source: DATASUS (2020). Made by the author.

In accordance with the considerations presented in the previous sections, the indicator of state capacities used in this study is a proxy of inequalities in access to health services, considering that they are a necessary condition for the services to be actually carried out. So, the inequalities of access to health services dealt with in this study relate to potential inequalities, which are not necessarily the inequalities of access that the population deals with in their daily lives. Thus, it is assumed that the increase in state capacities in a given municipality tends to reduce potential inequalities in access to health services for the population of the respective municipality.

In accordance with objective I of this study, the measurement of the dependence of the population residing in municipalities on the public health system was based on the calculation of the resident proportion who do not benefit from a private health plan in relation to the total resident population in the municipality. From the data provided by

ANS, 2020, information was obtained on the number of individuals who have a private health plan by municipalities in Brazil in each of the years and from DATASUS (2020) the number of resident individuals per municipality. According to the theoretical considerations presented in section two of this study, the dependency ratio was calculated for the population over 20 years, and ideally the calculation would be for the population over 18 years, but in limitations this age has been substituted for the next highest possible age.

To fulfill objective II of this study, the party of municipal governments was identified from 2013 to 2015, and this attribution took place from those elected in the 2012 municipal election and were carried out based on official data provided by Tribunal Superior Eleitoral [TSE] (2020). The identification of the political orientation in these governments was given by the ideological classification of the parties carried out by Miguel, Krause and Machado (2017), so that, based on the parties, the municipal governments were classified as being of the left and not of the left (center and right). Finally, to achieve objective III, the verification of the re-election of municipal governments or the candidate (identified by the CPF) was based on the relationship from 2016 and 2012 elections, so that if the winning party in 2016 was the same as in 2012, the government was considered re-elected.

All econometric models built in this study, in addition to using the variables already mentioned and justified so far, also included control variables to better measure the estimates made. These variables are: total population residing in the municipalities (DATASUS); total current revenue (SICONFI, 2020); percentage of expenditure committed with health in relation to total current expenditure (SICONFI), despite the need for municipalities to be obliged to apply at least 15% of their net current revenue (RCL) in *Ações e Serviços Públicos de Saúde* (Constituição Federal, 1998, Art. 198).

The econometric models built were of the panel data type, made possible by the arrangement of indicators for three distinct and consecutive moments. This type of model is made by the information disposition from the same unit of analysis in different periods of time, and demonstrates a higher level of sophistication compared to cross-sectional models by estimating the effects of one variable on another in a variety of circumstances. The specifications of the built models were random effects and the between effect, which is made by not making time distinctions, and instead treats the observations in different periods as being different from itself. Another model formulated was the logistic

regression, which measures the probabilistic effect of the explanatory variables in relation to the dependent variable and is also justified by its dichotomous nature (Wooldridge, 2016).

5. Results


The following subsections have been divided in correspondence to the objectives, so that the “Results 1” subsection seeks to answer the objective 1 question, and so on.

5.1. Results I

Figure 1 shows the average of the state capacity in health indicator in Brazilian municipalities and the average of the dependence level on the public system from 2013 to 2015 by region. It is observed that in the period analyzed, there is an increase in the average of the state capacity indicator in all regions, with the Northeast and Midwest regions showing the highest growth and highest level of the indicator in absolute terms, while the regions South and Southeast show the smallest growths and levels of the indicator in absolute terms. In 2015, the Northeast and Midwest had an average of the state capacity indicator around 5 points, while the average for the South and Southeast was 4.2 points.

Regarding the population's level of dependence on the public health system, throughout the period there is relative stability in all regions. The highest levels of dependency are in the northeast and north regions, followed immediately by the midwestern regions, while the lowest levels of dependency are in the south and southeast, respectively.

Figure 01: Average of the state capacity in health indicator in Brazilian municipalities and average of the level of dependence on the public system from 2013 to 2015




Source: research data. Made by the author.

Note: State capacity indicator ranges from 0 to 10, and dependence on the public system from 0% to 100%. Indicator weighting was based on the number of resident individuals aged 20 years or older

In order to spatialize the indicators of state capacity and the level of dependence on the public health system, Figures 2 to 7 below express these values through thematic maps. Figures 2, 4 and 6 address the indicators of state capacity. Although it is not feasible to individually compare the municipalities with each other, it is possible to observe the broader trends through the contrast of colors. So, the southeast region, especially São Paulo, has a large number of municipalities with lighter color, indicating a low level of state capacity, as well as the southern region, especially Rio Grande do Sul. On the other hand, the most orange and reddish regions are the Midwest and Northeast regions, in the first the states of Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul stand out, while in the second the states of Piauí and Paraíba stand out.


Figures 3, 5 and 7 express the dependence levels on the public health system. The rule is that municipalities have a high level of this indicator. However, the states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, western Minas Gerais, northern Paraná, Mato Grosso do Sul, and southern Goiás have a low dependence level on the public health system in municipalities in other states.

Figure 02: Brazil with indicators of state capacity by municipalities in 2013




Source: research data. Made by the author

Figure 03: Brazil with the percentage levels of dependence in SUS in 2013




Source: research data. Made by the author

Figure 04: Brazil with indicators of state capacity by municipalities in 2014




Source: research data. Made by the author

Figure 05: Brazil with the percentage levels of dependence in SUS in 2014




Source: research data. Made by the author

Figure 06: Brazil with indicators of state capacity by municipalities in 2014



Source: research data. Made by the author

Figure 07: Brazil with the percentage levels of dependence in SUS in 2015



Source: research data. Made by the author

Finally, Table 2 presents the results of the panel data regression models. The models were built with and without the use of log in the dependent variable to verify whether this factor had any effect on the estimated coefficients. As our main explanatory variable for the model is the level of dependence on the public health system, it is observed that the effects of dependence on the indicator of state capacity in health are positive and with statistical significance in all models built. This means that the greater

the population's level of dependence on the public health system, the higher the levels of the state capacity in health indicator, so that the potential inequality in the provision of health services is also potentially smaller, since that the greater provision of resources per inhabitant also increases their chances of accessing that resource.

Table 2. Results of panel data regression models

Indicator of state capacity in health	Dependent Variable with log		Dependent Variable without log	
	Random Effect	Between Effect	Random Effect	Between Effect
Dependence on SUS	0.0098938*** (0.0003)	0.0120642*** (0.0004)	0.0356496*** (0.0015)	0.0415016*** (0.0018)
Total Population	-0.334e-06*** (0.0227e-06)	-0.0814e-06*** (0.02.26e-06)	-0.958e-06*** (0.0968e-06)	-0.00212e-06 (0.0972e-06)
Log of total revenue per capita	0.005961*** (0.0008)	0.149951*** (0.0047)	0.028737*** (0.0039)	0.5865931*** (0.0202)
% of health expenses on total income	4.78e-08 (2.78e-06)	0.0000605*** (0.0000)	-3.87e-06 (0.0000)	0.0002143** (0.0000)
Constant	0.4647412*** (0.0337)	-1.505.291*** (0.0619)	0.9499468*** (0.1473)	-6.447607* (0.2668)
N total	16.075	16.075	16.077	16.077
N per group	5.538	5.538	5.538	5.538
R ² - between	24.05%	36.28%	17.96%	28.67%
R ² - overall	23.57%	29.67%	17.48%	22.70%

Source: research data. Made by the author.


Note: the indicator of state capacity in health and dependence on the public health system of these models was constructed based on the weighting of the population aged over 20 years old.

Statistical significance levels: *** < 1%; ** < 5%; * < 10%.

5.2 Results II

Figure 8 illustrates the percentage variation distribution of the state capacity indicator. There is no delimited pattern of behavior between the variation level by ideological orientation or region, so that there is growth and decline in both orientations and in all regions, although the median of the south and southeast regions is higher for municipalities governed by the left and the median of the northern region is smaller for municipalities governed by the left.

Figure 08: Box plot of the percentage variation of the state capacity in health indicator from 2013 to 2015 by region and ideological orientation of municipal governments




Source: research data. Elaborated by the author.

Note: NL (municipal governor's party is not left); L (the municipal government's party is on the left).

Although Figure 8 indicates that there are no clear differences in the distribution of variations in the state capacity indicator, Figure 9 demonstrates the average of the variations in the state capacity indicator by ideological orientation and region is clear. It is observed that the south and southeast regions have a higher average for the municipalities governed by the left, while the other regions have a lower average for the municipalities governed by the left.

Figure 09: Average percentage variation of the state capacity in health indicator from 2013 to 2015 by ideological orientation of municipal governments

1.



Source: research data. Made by the author.

Bearing in mind the upper average level of state capacity indicators for municipalities not governed by the left, Table 3 below expresses through the results of the panel data regression models that the municipal government party from the left, implies in a negative and statistically significant effect on the level of the state capacity in health indicator, keeping everything else constant (*ceteris paribus*). So left-wing parties, at the municipal level, have a negative effect on the state capacity indicator, while non-left parties (right and center) have a positive effect on the state capacity indicator. It is noteworthy that the dependent variable of this model is the indicator of state capacity in health, and not its variation in the period analyzed.

Table 03: Results of panel data regression models

Indicator of state capacity in health	Dependent Variable with log		Dependent Variable without log	
	Efeito aleatório	Efeito between	Efeito aleatório	Efeito between
Left party	-0.0508738*** (0.0099)	-0.0229718** (0.0094)	-0.2287863*** (0.0439)	-0.1139929*** (0.0422)
Dependence on SUS	0.0080705*** (0.0003)	0.008344*** (0.0004)	0.0283072*** (0.0015)	0.0288821*** (0.0018)

Total Population	-0.323e ⁻⁰⁶ *** (0.02.23e ⁻⁰⁶)	-0.0754e ⁻⁰⁸ *** (0.0221e ⁻⁰⁶)	-1.03e ⁻⁰⁶ *** (0.0986e ⁻⁰⁶)	-5.65e-09 (0.0983e ⁻⁰⁶)
Log of total revenue per capita	0.0074853*** (0.0009)	0.1669191*** (0.0046)	0.0342475*** (0.0041)	0.6921043*** (0.0205)
% of health expenses on total income	0.184e ⁻⁰⁶ (3.01e ⁻⁰⁶)	0.0000788*** (0.00001)	-4.00e ⁻⁰⁶ (0.00001)	0.0003188*** (0.00009)
Constant	0.6586966*** (0.0344)	-1.337474*** (0.0611)	1.748662*** (0.1527)	-6.437476*** (0.2717)
N total	16.076	16.076	16.077	16.077
N per group	5.538	5.538	5.538	5.538
R ² - between	19.14%	34.41%	14.23%	28.41%
R ² - overall	18.71%	26.28 %	13.78%	20.91%

Source: research data. Elaborated by the author.


Note: the indicator of state capacity in health and dependence on the public health system of these models were constructed based on the weighting of the total population residing in the municipality.

Statistical significance levels: *** < 1%; ** < 5%; * < 10%.

5.3 Results III


Figures 10 and 11 show the variation distribution of the state capacity indicator among reelected and non-reelected governments in 2016, with the first dealing with the indicator weighted by the population aged 20 or over, which approximates the group of voters, and the second deals with the indicator weighted by the total population. It is observed that in both distributions there are no significant differences between the elected and the non-elected groups, thus, the tendency of re-election of municipal governments cannot be verified due to the variation in the state capacity indicator. This suggests that this variation does not correlate with electoral results, or that there are many other factors that need to be controlled to measure the effect of a possible correlation between these variables.

Figure 11: Box plot of the percentage change in the state capacity indicator weighted by the population aged 20 or over and by governments re-elected or not in 2016



Source: research data. Made by the author.

Figure 12: Box plot of the percentage variation of the state capacity indicator weighted by the total resident population and by governments re-elected or not in 2016



Source: research data. Made by the author.

The results of the logistic regression model expressed in Table 5 indicate that there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between the percentage change in the state capacity indicator weighted by the population aged 20 years and over and the

reelection of municipal governments. In practical terms this means that the growth of the state capacity indicator weighted by the population of 20 years or more increases the probability of re-election of the municipal government. On the other hand, although the variation of the indicator weighted by the total population increases the probability of reelection, since the estimated coefficient is positive, it does not have statistical significance and its dimension is very small, and therefore its practical interpretation is innocuous.

Table 05: Results of the logistic regression model

Re-elected Parties in 2016 (dependent variable)	Weighting by population over 20 years	Weighting by total resident population
Percentage change in the state health capacity indicator between 2013 and 2015	0.0089159*** (0.0019307)	0.0000436 (0.0003386)
Constant	-0.9107035*** (0.0335313)	-0.8383826*** (0.0294151)
N	5.569	5.570

Source: research data. Made by the author.

Note: p-value of the explanatory variable weighted by the total population is 97.1%.

Statistical significance levels: *** < 1%; ** < 5%; * < 10%.

6. Discussão dos resultados

The results in the previous section show convergences and divergences with the hypotheses initially formulated in light of the theoretical discussion carried out. Results 1 indicate, both by descriptive analysis and by estimation analysis, that the greater dependence of voters on the public health system presents a close positive correlation with the indicator of state capacity in health, and thus with the reduction of potential health inequalities. These results converge with Downsian expectations (Downs, 1999) that parties seek, through their ideology, to attract the greatest number of voters to win the elections and reach power, later implementing public policies that meet the expectations created during the elections. Thus, as voters are highly dependent on the public health system, there is also a trend towards a reduction in potential health inequalities through increased state capacities, considering that the entire population is a user of the public health system.

On the other hand, the results 2 do not agree with the hypothesis formulated in the light of the party government theory, so that left-wing governments show a negative

correlation with the levels of state capacity in health and, consequently, with the reduction of potential health inequalities, even when controlling the econometric models by the population size of the municipalities and their capacity to implement public policies, measured by the per capita revenue of the municipalities. Descriptive analyzes indicate that, on average, non-left governments have higher levels of state capacity in health, however the distribution analysis, which focuses on the position of individual units, indicates that both non-left governments and governments that are on the left have all levels of state capacity for distribution. Thus, without a very clear and unanimous systematization about the sense of causality between the ideological orientation of governments and the level of state capacity in health, it can be considered that both non-left and left-wing governments have different levels of state capacity as a result of management.

Finally, result 3 indicates a convergence with the hypothesis formulated for this objective, as it was expected that there would be a positive correlation between the increase in state capacities in health and the reelection of governments in the election immediately after the period analyzed. Descriptive analyzes do not demonstrate a clear relationship between increased state capacities and the reelection of municipal governments, however the analysis of estimates indicates that the variation in the state capacity indicator weighted by the number of voters is positive and with statistical significance, which allows us to conclude that voters are likely to reward municipal governments through elections when they increase levels of state capacity and thus reduce potential health inequalities. The same correlation is also observed in relation to the variation of the state capacity indicator weighted by the total population and the reelection of municipal governments; however, its coefficient is not statistically significant.

It could also be questioned about the margins of discretion that local governments have to manage their resources and increase their levels of state capacities and thus reduce potential inequalities in health, considering that the linking of tax revenues to municipalities in 15% for Public Health Actions and Services (Federal Constitution, 1988) would tend to limit municipal managers in terms of their allocation preferences. However, Marengo and Cate (2021) demonstrate that municipalities have many different spending margins among them between 2013 and 2016, with a median of 23.2%, with a minimum value of 11.1% and a maximum of 35.9%, which represent a standard deviation of 4.66 and an interquartile range of 5.55 in the analyzed cycle. Although the values found

by the authors are not the reference for minimum health expenditure, considering that the total expenditure on health is adopted and not with the Public Health Actions and Services category, and the total revenue and not the tax revenues, it is observed that these dispersions indicate that local governments have sufficient autonomy to express their allocative preferences and, based on this, build their state capacities.

7. Final considerations

This article sought to analyze health inequalities in Brazilian municipalities from the perspective of state capacities, considering that these are a necessary condition for municipalities to implement their health policy and thus be able to reduce health inequalities among individuals. This objective was linked to theories, so that the validity of some of them was tested for the context and object with which they studied. Descriptive and econometric methodologies were used to answer the questions asked, always seeking to establish a relationship between the methodological choices and the theoretical foundations used to build the study. The main explanatory variables of the constructed models were the dependence of voters on the public health system, the ideological orientation of the municipal government parties and the percentage change in the state capacity indicator in the period considered.

Considering the health policy importance for the individuals' well-being, especially when considering that the dimension of well-being linked to health is related to several other dimensions of well-being, the dynamic understanding involving political policies and the promotion of state capacities, to reduce health inequalities among individuals, proves to be essential for promoting equity and increasing individual and collective well-being, especially among the worst situated. In this perspective, it was found that the greater dependence of voters on the health system is correlated with higher levels of state capacity, regardless of the party ideology of the municipal government, in addition to the fact that voters tend to electorally reward municipal governments that improve the levels of state capacity and thus reduce potential health inequalities. Additionally, it was found that the population size of municipalities tends to negatively impact the level of state capacity while the total per capita income tends to positively impact the level of state capacity in health.

Despite having sought methodological rigor both in the construction of descriptive analyzes and in the estimation analyses and having sought interpretations of the phenomena based on the combination of both, it is important to emphasize that the

analyses performed do not necessarily infer causality, which is one of the limitations of the study. Thus, it is suggested that, in addition to the analyzes carried out here, they be submitted to other analysis methodologies, such as impact assessment, which can measure causality effects more precisely. Another limitation of this study was that it did not consider the different sizes of municipalities in the descriptive analyses, which limited some conclusions about possible local management dynamics, even though the population size was controlled in the econometric models and this limitation does not invalidate the results and conclusions of the study.

For future study, it is suggested that management aspects related to the capacity of municipal governments produce state capacities and thus implement public policies be further explored, in addition to studying with the final results of health policies, and not with the potential effects that state capacities can provide, thus approaching the impacts of political phenomena of health inequalities.

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The financial dimension of state capacity and municipal management: an analysis of the recent housing policy in João Pessoa/PB

Dimensão financeira da capacidade estatal e gestão municipal: uma análise da política de habitação em João Pessoa/PB no período recente

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DOI: 10.22478/ufpb.2525-5584.2021v6n3.60062

Recebido em: 05/07/2021

Aprovado em: 22/11/2021

Abstract: Recognizing that the Federal Constitution of 1988 defined municipalities as autonomous entities of the Federation and that housing came to be considered a policy of common competence among the different levels of government, this article addresses state's capacity to produce housing policy, having as an analytical focus the municipal government. It aims to apprehend the relationship between the financial dimension of state capacity at the municipal level and the local development of social interest housing policy. For this, it analyses the municipality of João Pessoa / PB, a Brazilian city with a low degree of financial autonomy, emphasizing its budgetary and financial execution in the Housing Programmatic Function in the recent period. The following methodological procedures were used: (a) literature review on state capacity, cooperative federalism and housing policy; (b) electronic research carried out in the databases of Finbra / National Treasury, of the Sagres System of the Court of Auditors of the State of Paraíba (TCE-PB) and in the web portal of Caixa Econômica Federal, aiming to support the examination of the financial dimension of state capacity at the municipal level to produce housing policy. The results indicate the dependence of the municipal management on external sources of funds and, consequently, on the planning and development of housing policy. Onerous operations have a remarkable role on the financing of housing and slum upgrading projects and the municipality presented low capacity with regards to budget execution in the housing function.

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Keywords: state capacity. housing policy. municipal management. financial autonomy. João Pessoa.

Resumo: Reconhecendo que a Constituição Federal de 1988 definiu os municípios como entes autônomos da Federação e que a habitação passou a ser considerada uma política de competência comum entre os diferentes níveis de governo, o presente artigo aborda a capacidade estatal para produzir a política habitacional, tendo como foco analítico o governo municipal. Seu objetivo é compreender a relação entre a dimensão financeira da capacidade estatal municipal e o desenvolvimento da política de habitação de interesse social na escala local. Para isso, analisa-se João Pessoa/PB, município com baixo grau de autonomia financeira, enfatizando a sua execução orçamentária e financeira na Função Programática Habitação no período recente. Foram utilizados os seguintes procedimentos metodológicos: (a) revisão de literatura sobre capacidades estatais, federalismo cooperativo e política habitacional; (b) pesquisa eletrônica realizada nos bancos de dados do Finbra/Tesouro Nacional, do Sistema Sagres do Tribunal de Contas do Estado da Paraíba (TCE-PB) e no portal da Caixa Econômica Federal visando apoiar o exame da dimensão financeira da capacidade estatal municipal para a política de habitação. Os resultados apontam para dependência da gestão municipal em relação a fontes externas de recursos e, conseqüentemente, no que tange ao planejamento e desenvolvimento da política habitacional. Há grande peso de operações onerosas no financiamento de projetos habitacionais de urbanização e baixa capacidade de execução orçamentária do município na função habitação.

Palavras-chave: capacidade estatal. política de habitação. gestão municipal. autonomia financeira. João Pessoa.

1. Introduction

This article is part of the debate on state capacities, housing policy and municipal management. More specifically, and taking the city of João Pessoa/PB as a case study, it aims to understand the relationship between the financial dimension of the municipal state capacity and the development of social interest housing policy at the local scale.

The debate about municipal governments in the implementation of intergovernmental public policies is not new. It began to gain relevance in the late 1980's with the enactment of the Federal Constitution of 1988, reaching prominence in the 1990's and 2000's in face of the decentralization and cooperative federalism. Against this background, the Federal Constitution of 88 represents an important milestone, as it defines municipalities as autonomous entities of the federation. Furthermore, it inserts the housing policy in the list of social policies, in which health, education, social assistance and social security policies were already included, for example.

The changes that took place in these decades were of different orders (political, administrative and fiscal-financial) and had a direct impact on intergovernmental

relations and, therefore, on the process of producing public policies, especially on those policies whose competencies are shared among the three federative entities, such as the housing policy. Therefore, it became urgent for the municipalities, new federative entities, to have state capacities to face the new demands that emerged from this new context.

There is a growing number of studies that address municipal-level state capacity in the Brazilian federalism (Grin, 2021; Grin, 2016; Grin & Abrucio, 2018; Silva et al. 2020; Aguiar & Lima, 2019; Gomide, Pereira & Machado, 2017). In this article, the emphasis is on the municipal capacity to allocate resources to develop policies, considering that there are still few studies on this subject and given the relevance of financial resources for the development of any governmental action, which are characterized as one of the “central state capacities” (Grin & Abrucio, 2018; Kjaer, Hansen & Thomsem, 2002) and as one of the input capacities (Saguin et al., 2018), which are the resources that policy actors can generate, mobilize and use.

However, the approach used in this work differs from those used in previous research due to some factors. Firstly, it deals with the financial dimension of state capacity not just as the extractive or fiscal capacity of states, an analytical strategy often used in studies of state capacity. Here, this dimension is analyzed based on the availability and allocation of financial resources for a given public policy. This results from the observation that a State may have extractive capacity and decide not to invest financial resources in a certain issue that is not on the government's priority political agenda or that has low social legitimacy (Gomide et al., 2017; Loureiro et al.; 2020).

Secondly, the aim is to go beyond research that emphasizes either the federal government or the municipal government and to investigate the interdependent relationship between them in terms of state capacities. After all, as mentioned by Grin and Abrucio (2018), state capacities in subnational governments, especially in a federalist country marked by municipal political autonomy and interdependence in the implementation of public policies, cannot be seen in an absolute way. Therefore, the financial dimension of the municipal level state capacity in the process of implementing a specific and shared public policy is analyzed, assuming that such dimension is constituted not only by the availability and use of financial resources by municipal governments, but also by incentives and budgetary and financial executions by the federal government.

In addition, this study is important considering, on the one hand, the shared competence of the social housing policy among the three levels of government, and on the other, that there is a lack of debates that focus on the study of state capacities to produce this public policy at the local level. Studies in the area of housing generally prioritize approaches related to the socio-spatial, environmental, institutional, land, normative and/or project management dimensions, placing the financial dimension in a subsidiary place.

The literature review resulting from the bibliographical research illuminates the development of this article in two perspectives that are interrelated, namely: (i) the theoretical debate on state capacities, seeking to evidence its evolution and dimensions, obviously focusing on the financial dimension to enable a more fruitful dialogue with empirical findings; (ii) the historical recovery of housing policy in the federative context as a strategy to understand the normative, institutional and management changes that guided the referred policy.

As a derivation of these two perspectives, there is the following problem, lucidly outlined by Pinto (2005), namely: the production of public policies, in a federative system, occurs through the transfer of resources and through its own collection. Higher levels of dependence on resources from transfers or from federative cooperation through programs that do not guarantee resources, neither at the time nor in the amount required by the municipalities, can compromise the implementation of the policy, even if other institutional and administrative issues are resolved, in other words, despite the other capacities. In general, that type of cooperation is structured on discretionary transfers, which are more unstable in nature and generally meet the objectives of implementing sectoral actions in a decentralized manner.

In the case of budgetary and financial execution of the housing programmatic function⁴, it is important to highlight that they are predominantly related to capital expenditures, so their demand is concentrated in time, which requires that both budgetary and financial resources be ensured for their execution (Pinto, 2005). Therefore, the composition and size of the economic base of the municipalities, as well as transfers from federal entities (state governments and Union) directly affect the final budget. It should not be forgotten that there are differences in financial structures between municipalities,

⁴ The programmatic function corresponds to the highest level of aggregation of the various expenses that a competence of the Public Sector.

implying varied capacities to carry out the expenses (capital and costing) necessary to meet the requests.

It can be assumed that this reality of relative financial dependence for the production of social housing policy, with regard to transfers from the Federal Government, is not exclusive to João Pessoa, the capital of Paraíba. It is understood that financial autonomy is essential for the process of formulating and implementing the social housing policy. However, it is necessary to recognize the existence of a mismatch between municipal capacities and competences to make this process viable.

Finally, this article is divided into four sections, in addition to this introduction and final considerations. In the first section, methodological considerations are made. In the second, a brief review of the theoretical debate about the state capacity and its financial dimension is made. In the third, social housing policy is discussed in the federative context from the 2000's onwards. In the fourth section, the examination is directed to the housing policy in João Pessoa/PB in its relationship with the financial dimension.

2. Research Methodology

Methodologically, quantitative research was carried out, which has a single case study with descriptive and exploratory statistics of a historical series. Regarding the techniques, in addition to the literature review, electronic research was adopted, which was carried out on the web portal of the Accounting and Tax Information System of the Brazilian Public Sector (Siconfi), maintained by the National Treasury, and on the Sagres System, of the Court of Accounts of the State of Paraíba. The first brings together information present in various documents, such as the Summary Reports on Budget Execution/National Treasury and the Annual Account Statements of Brazilian municipalities.

It should be noted, in particular, that the data used to analyze the budget execution of João Pessoa were obtained from the open database of the Sagres System, of the Court of Accounts of the State of Paraíba (TCE-PB), which brings together, in a more detailed way, information about expenses and efforts made by the Paraíba municipalities in the recent period. It is important to note that part of the amounts indicated in the commitments present distortions because they do not consider the reversals made in the process of executing the expense. In order for the values to be corrected, Sagres makes available a

specific database for reversals, which was crossed with the base of commitments to consolidate the real values.

Data were also collected on the Caixa Econômica Federal web portal on the tab referring to the Monitoring of Public Sector Works, which enabled the identification of projects that were contracted through onerous operations (onlending/financing contracts). It is also registered that all figures and tables were elaborated by the authors from the consulted databases.

This study prioritizes the examination of expenses classified under the programmatic function Housing. However, it is important to emphasize that municipal administrations may differ in terms of the classification of budget commitments and some expenses may be classified under other functions, such as Urban Planning, for example. Furthermore, it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss issues related to the extractive capacity of local governments, with the analysis being restricted to the examination of aspects related to expenses (committed and paid) in that function. Concretely, this function is located within the scope of the Annual Budget Law (LOA), as well as, in some parts, an effort is made to understand the budget and financial execution of the housing programmatic function by establishing comparisons with others functions (urbanism, education, administration, health and social security).

Finally, in relation to the choice of João Pessoa, this is due to the fact that, among all the capitals (and cities) in the Northeast of Brazil, it is the only one that integrates the Emerging and Sustainable Cities Initiative (ICES)⁵ of the Inter-American Development Bank (BID) and which, in recent years, has received resources from the main federal social housing programs/actions (PAC-UAP, PPI/Slums, Pro-housing, Urbanization, Integration and Regularization of Precarious Settlements, FAR-Urbanização and PMCMV).

These federal programs/actions can connect with ICES in several dimensions, highlighting the following: housing production, upgrading of slum and informal settlements, urban and environmental management. ICES, in turn, brings an important dimension considered essential here to support the realization of those others, namely: financial autonomy.

⁵ In Brazil, only the cities of João Pessoa (PB), Goiânia (GO), Vitória (ES), Florianópolis (SC) and Palmas (TO) entered into a partnership with the Inter-American Development Bank within the scope of the ICES (Andrade, 2017).

As stated in the João Pessoa Sustainable Action Plan (BID, 2014, p. 56), João Pessoa

... presents a low degree of financial autonomy, with only 30% of current revenues coming from its own collection, while the average for other cities is 37% and for all Brazilian capitals the average is 52%. This points to a limitation in the municipality's autonomy and capacity to establish its priorities, since a large part of its investment capacity is conditioned by transfers from the Federal Government.

This finding, more than definitively drawing conclusions about the financial autonomy of municipal governments, shows us the need and importance of engaging in new debates and conducting studies and research that make it possible to understand such autonomy not only from the extractive perspective, but also from the budget and financial execution perspective and the real autonomy of those governments to prioritize the production of public policies that are not structured on cooperative arrangements of public policies.

3. State capacity and its financial dimension

Studies on state capacity have been intensifying in Political Science, Public Administration and related disciplines (Silva et al. 2020; Aguiar & Lima, 2019; Gomide, Pereira & Machado, 2017; Lindvall & Teorell, 2016; Cingolani, 2013). There is a vast international production on the subject and it has been expanding in Brazil in recent years (Aguiar & Lima, 2019; Gomes & Pereira, 2020).

Despite this, studies in this field are still permeated by analytical challenges: there is no single, consensual definition of this concept, which generates polysemy and makes its use problematic (Silva et al., 2020; Gomide, Pereira & Machado, 2017; Lindvall & Teorell, 2016; Cingolani, 2013; Kocher, 2010). Other authors describe this as a “background” concept, the absence of which is used to explain failures or weak performances (Saguin et al., 2018; Addison, 2009).

Faced with this dilemma, recent studies have come to understand state capacity in a multifaceted way, in which the concept is understood from the existence and relationship between multiple dimensions/sub-capacities/domains (Silva et al., 2020; Gomide, Pereira & Machado, 2017; Pires & Gomide, 2016; Gomide & Pires, 2014;

Cingolani, 2013). Therefore, it is recommended that any research on this topic must necessarily identify which dimensions it deals with (Cingolani, 2013), and answer, from the beginning, the question: capacity for what? (Hanson & Sigman, 2011). In addition, the debate on state capacity becomes more complex in federative contexts, such as Brazil, in which many public policies are co-produced by the federal and municipal governments and in which there is a high inequality of administrative capacity between local governments (Saguin & Ramesh, 2018; Grin & Abrucio, 2018; Grin et al., 2018; Papi et al., 2017; Grin, 2016; Gomes et al., 2017; Marengo et al., 2017).

Against this background, the Brazilian literature has drawn attention to the need to improve the analytical model of state capabilities to leverage its explanatory potential with regards to the action of subnational governments (Grin & Abrucio, 2018; Gomes et al., 2017; Gomes & Pereira, 2020).

The demand to broaden the understanding of municipal state capacities is related to the tension between the new municipal attributions arising from the decentralization of public policies and goods established in the 1988 Constitution and the difficulties of promoting municipal state capacities to respond to the new attributions and status assumed (Grin & Abrucio, 2018).

Most of the literature dedicated to understanding the state capacities of Brazilian municipalities has associated it with administrative capacity, using Weberian characteristics as a proxy (Gomes & Pereira, 2020). There are studies, notwithstanding, that have been dedicated to analyzing financial autonomy, one of the “central state capacities”, which is emphasized in this article and one of the items that puts most pressure on municipal governments. Although it is enshrined in the 1988 Constitution, financial autonomy remains a challenge for many municipalities, expressing the inequality in terms of administrative skills and of the ability to extract local resources (Grin & Abrucio, 2018).

In such studies, the financial dimension of state capacity is often associated with the extractive or fiscal capacity of states and treated as a dependent variable: Grin et al. (2018) adopt 4 dimensions (administrative capacity, technical capacity, institutional capacity and political capacity) to assess the performance of municipal fiscal policy; Marengo et al. (2017) use political aspects and Weberian characteristics of the local bureaucracy to investigate the municipal capacity to collect its own resources such as IPTU.

In this article, considering the character of interdependence that characterizes social interest housing policies in the current Brazilian federative system, a distinct approach is adopted, which recognizes the relevance of the extractive and fiscal capacity of municipal governments, while prioritizing the analysis of availability and allocation of budgetary and financial resources for a given public policy, which may come from different levels of government. Ultimately, the aim is to understand how the fiscal autonomy of the municipality is delineated and how it relates to fundings from the federal government and to the local development of the social interest housing policy.

4. Housing Policy in the federative context: notes on the recent period

In the early 2000s, important transformations took place in the institutional and regulatory architecture that directly influenced the Brazilian social housing policy: (i) the creation of the Ministry of Cities (MCidades) in 2003; (ii) the elaboration of the National Housing Policy (PNH) in 2004; (iii) the creation of the National System of Social Interest Housing (SNHIS) and the National Fund of Social Interest Housing (FNHIS), in 2005; and (iv) the preparation of the National Plan for Social Interest Housing (PLANHAB), in 2008.

Here, attention is drawn to the System, as it presupposes processes and dynamics between governmental spheres (federal government, states and municipalities) that involve federal coordination, cooperation and decentralization (administrative, political and financial) in the implementation of the policy, instrumentalized through plans, programs and/or projects. For Buonfiglio (2018, p.73), the System

(...) was designed as a coordination and induction mechanism from above (federal sphere), but structuring and empowering the municipal power “below”. In the perspective of an effective decentralization in the execution of the housing policy analyzed here, it can be thought of as a true pact between all the entities of the Federation, as it thought of “having a mirrored institutional structure”, in addition to the concentrated formal institutional structure in the Ministry, in decentralized apparatus (other government bodies such as Secretariats) and spheres of power beyond those institutional (with social control and popular participation) rebalancing/redistributing political force throughout the arrangement, because, beyond federated entities, combining public and private agents of organized society.

In reality, the National System of Social Interest Housing was established, but it became a 'symbolic rule' (Meyer & Rowans, 1977), granting legitimacy to the federal

government, even though it lacked effective implementation (Klintowitz, 2015). It is important to note this, as housing policy, especially that of social interest, is an area of public policy marked by high intergovernmental interdependence - both because it is a constitutionally shared responsibility and because of the high costs of its execution - and by the absence of that system and regulated federal resources (transfers), such as in the areas of health and education.

Silva (2014) highlights that the fact that the housing policy is linked to financing ends up giving prominence to the economic policies that are under the responsibility of the federal government, among which are cited the credit and savings systems, for example. Thus, considering that the constitutional responsibility for the urban policy belongs to the municipality and economic policies are concentrated in the federal government, it is noted, once again, the importance of intergovernmental arrangements and federative coordination and cooperation for the implementation of housing policy by the city government.

In this regard, Gonçalves (2009, p. 33) observes that:

in relation to federative arrangements, from this new context onwards, decentralization starts to depend more on the adhesion of subnational government levels and the federative game starts to depend more on bargains, negotiations, coalitions and inductions from the higher spheres of power, requiring intergovernmental coordination processes (ABRUCIO, 2002 and 2005). As mentioned, the extractive capacity and, consequently, the power and discretion over expenditures constitute an important dimension of the governing capacity of federative entities, since this decisively interferes in their capacity to formulate and implement policies autonomously.

It is also valid to reiterate, and reinforce, that housing policy has a high cost, implying, in most cases, the increased dependence of subnational governments (states and municipalities) in relation to the federal government. In a way, this framework induces them to adhere to the incentives and follow the guidelines defined by the Union, which, necessarily, do not dialogue with local specificities.

Therefore, it seems acceptable to recognize that achieving the objective of guaranteeing decent housing for the population as advocated by the NHP is both complex and important. This is because the housing problem needs to be tackled jointly by different levels of government both in terms of the quantitative deficit (production of new homes) and the qualitative deficit; the issues that affect precarious settlements; the socio-

environmental management of territories, etc., in order to guarantee adequate living conditions for the population.

Therefore, it is necessary the existence of state capacities of different dimensions (financial, administrative, institutional, technical and political-relational) in order to face the complex and multifaceted demands of the housing area, especially when considering the differences and the existing inequalities between the states and municipalities that make up our Federation. Furthermore, one cannot forget that housing is a commodity and its production involves different agents and interests, both private and public.

5. Housing Policy in João Pessoa/PB: analyzing the city's recent financial capacity

João Pessoa, capital of the state of Paraíba, has an estimated population of 825,796 inhabitants⁶. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of this municipality in 2018, according to data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), was BRL 20,036,726.17, the highest in Paraíba. Its GDP per capita is the 6th highest of the state, reaching BRL 25,035.80. In 2020, João Pessoa's revenue was BRL 2,576,781,782.25.

As noted by Garson (2005), the budget is affected by indicators such as population size, composition and size of the economic base, whether the municipality is a state capital or not, and whether it fulfills the necessary requirements to access resources from governmental entities.

In general, revenues from current transfers are expressive and have represented the largest share of total current revenues. According to Garson (2005), intergovernmental transfers play a very important role as an instrument of fiscal policy. This reality, however, is not exclusive to the capital of Paraíba, since the vast majority of the Brazilian municipalities depend on those transfers from the federal and state governments. Such dependence tends to have a direct impact on the production process of public policies, especially those that are of shared competence and not structured on cooperation arrangements, such as the system of public policy, as is the case with the housing policy.


⁶ Census Estimate IBGE, 2021.

Between 2003⁷ and 2020, the expenses of the João Pessoa City Hall (PMJP) in the budget function of Housing fluctuated throughout the historical series, exceptionally during the last four years, when they remained below BRL 10 million and plummeted to the amount of BRL 570 thousand in 2020.

It can be assumed that this reduction is related to changes that have taken place in the Brazilian political scenario since 2016, especially with the decrease in public investments to meet the austerity policy of the government of former President Temer, which directly impacted the maintenance of strategies of actions that had been developed since 2003, with the creation of the Ministry of Cities (Santo Amore, Leitão, 2018). It is also relevant to note that in 2019 this Ministry was dissolved, and part of its structure integrated into the Ministry of Regional Development.

Figure 1 presents, in a systematic way, the evolution of expenditure committed to the Housing function in João Pessoa.

Figure 1: Evolution of expenditure committed to the Housing function between 2003 and 2020 (in BRL million)



Source: produced by the authors based on data from Sagres (TCE-PB).

⁷ The beginning of the 2000's marked the period of resumption of federative coordination, impacting the process of production of public policies in the area of urban development, related, for example, to institutional and regulatory architecture, as well as to the financing of plans, programs and projects.

Note: Values adjusted by the Brazilian inflation rate (IGP-DI) at 2020 prices.

When examining the expenses paid in the housing budget function in the period 2003 to 2020, it is shown that the amount of BRL 78,748,707.73 was paid, which corresponds to 40.81% of the committed expense. Of all the budgetary functions in the area of urban development, housing was the one with the 2nd lowest percentage of expenses paid (7.09%), only ahead of the sanitation budget function (4.75%).

The analyzes of the settled expenses per capita in the housing function (Table 01), obtained by the ratio between the total amount settled on the population projection for the respective year in the Housing function, it appears that the aforementioned average expenditure of João Pessoa, considering the period between 2015 and 2020 was R\$9.24 (nine reais and twenty-four cents).

When the indicator paid expenses per capita in the housing function is used to examine the financial capacity of the municipality of João Pessoa, it is observed that João Pessoa, considering all the northeastern capitals, occupies the fourth place with an average of BRL 9.24, and Salvador presents the highest average in the period (BRL 13.40), as depicted in table 01. It is feasible to suppose that the differences in settled expenses per capita may, to some extent, reflect different economic, social and administrative conditions, which shape regional disparities and affect the behavior of budgetary and financial execution, not to mention that they constitute obstacles to cooperation in solving common problems. Between 2015 and 2020, the capital of Paraíba showed a negative variation (-93.0) in that indicator.

Table 1: Settled expenses per capita in the Housing function (in BRL)

CAPITALS	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Average
Salvador	8,34	24,0	3,72	19,11	13,06	12,11	13,40
Fortaleza	8,73	25,8	10,24	12,49	10,23	6,97	12,40
Teresina	7,41	6,8	5,23	5,69	31,04	9,66	10,97
João Pessoa	10,01	25,6	5,67	6,58	6,87	0,70	9,24
Aracaju	19,34	13,6	2,57	0,27	0,86	4,84	6,91


São Luís	0,00	0,9	0,21	29,45	8,91	1,41	6,82
Natal	3,62	3,6	5,57	4,28	3,95	5,08	4,35
Recife	3,36	2,5	0,52	0,28	2,15	3,92	2,12
Maceió	0,75	3,1	2,59	2,81	1,62	1,00	1,97

Source: produced by the authors based on data from Finbra/National Treasury.

As noted in the initial debate, state capacity becomes more complex in federative contexts, in particular when there are several public policies produced in a shared way by federated entities, and when considering the existence of high inequalities in terms of administrative capacity of local governments and of dependence of these in relation to other entities in the financing of policies.

By putting housing spending under a broader budget perspective and analyzing it from 2010 to 2020, it is clear that this function has low priority in João Pessoa's administration. The spending prioritization indicator suggested by Lima and Diniz (2016), given by the ratio of spending on a given function to total spending, is important to suggest what the government's priorities are and what functions are being performed to meet the needs of the community. In João Pessoa, the prioritization of expenditure in housing varied from 0.70% in 2006 to 0.03% in 2020. Other functions related to urban development also did not exceed the ceiling of 3% of total expenditure by municipal management in the analyzed period (figure 2).


Figure 2: Prioritization of settled expenses by the PMJP in functions related to urban development between 2006 and 2020



Source: produced by the authors based on data from Finbra/National Treasury.

In addition to the low prioritization, budget data indicate a mismatch between the values presented in the Annual Budget Law (LOA) and what was actually carried out by the municipal administration. Considering the period analyzed, the greatest use of the initial allocation took place in 2011, when the PMJP paid 21.16% of the amount provided for in the budget piece (figure 3).

Figure 3: Ratio between estimated amount in the LOA and settled expenses in the Housing function



Source: produced by the authors from the Summary Reports on Budget Execution/National Treasury.

Comparing budget execution with other functions (figure 3) reinforces the difficulty of the municipal administration to fulfill one of its main planning instruments, the LOA. This fact is supported by studies by Arretche (2010), who classifies decentralized policies into two types: regulated, which have federal legislation and supervision, with less decision-making autonomy for subnational governments; and unregulated ones, in which municipalities have autonomy both for policy-making and for decision-making. Education and health, for example, are classified as regulated policies, while housing, infrastructure and transport are examples of unregulated policies and, as a consequence, would have lower priority on the municipal agenda.

Similarly, Ribeiro and Salvador (2018) state that the earmarking of budget resources is a factor that has ensured greater regularity in the financial execution in the area of education in recent years. Housing financing, on the other hand, has shown an irregular and unstable behavior, among other factors, due to the lack of mandatory budget allocation, a fact that makes possible, according to the authors, greater intervention from the market in the housing policies.

It can be assumed that another explanatory factor for the non-perpetuity and for the low level of direct spending by city halls on housing was the non-effectiveness of the National System of Social Interest Housing (SNHIS) over the years, and the situation was aggravated by the launching of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), created in 2007, and the Minha Casa, Minha Vida Program (PMCMV), in 2009.

Both programs were prioritized in comparison to the SNHIS, a fact evidenced by the transfer of resources from these to PAC and PMCMV. In general, it can be assumed that such prioritization represented an increase in the availability of resources to municipalities in the housing function.


Additionally, there is a program like PAC that, in theory, would not be subject to restrictions on resources allocated under its heading, which from the financial perspective represents a fundamental aspect, especially when it comes to housing policy, on the one hand. On the other hand, forms of social control and redistribution mechanisms, as provided for in the FNHIS, were not linked to the PAC.

Third, PMCMV is structured from a logic in which the performance of municipal management occurs, in most cases, in a timely manner, not dialoguing, therefore, with

what was advocated by SNHIS, especially with regards to the production of housing in urbanized and well-located areas (Silva, 2014).

The ratio between the values foreseen in the LOA and settled in the period between 2006 and 2020 (figure 4) signals the tendency of low budget execution of functions related to urban development. Housing, environmental management, sanitation and transport, for most of the period analyzed, showed execution rates below 50%. This scenario can be attributed to the fact that expenditures in this area are mostly made up of capital expenditures, whose execution is more complex than current expenditures, which dominate functions with a high level of execution, such as a social security and administration.

Figure 4: Ratio between amounts foreseen in the LOA and settled by function between 2006 and 2020 in João Pessoa/PB




Source: produced by the authors from the Summary Reports on Budget Execution/Finbra.

The mismatch between the values present in the LOA and the effective execution of the budget in the housing area led the Court of Auditors of the State of Paraíba (TCE-PB) to notify the Municipal Housing Department, between 2014 and 2017. According to the Court's audit reports, it is a common practice in housing policy to set high expenses in the LOA and present low budget execution, a fact that indicates the relative lack of budget planning in the municipality.

Although the deficiencies in the budget execution of housing in João Pessoa are glaring, this cannot be considered an isolated phenomenon, given that this function presents an execution below 50% in most of the capitals of the Northeast (figure 5), indicating a structural deficiency in the policies formulated in this area.

Figure 5: Ratio between settled and foreseen expenses in LOA for Housing in capitals of the Northeast between 2015 and 2020



Source: produced by the authors from the Summary Reports on Budget Execution/Finbra.


Since most of the expenditure allocated to housing policy is discretionary, it remains subject to municipal management constraints throughout the year. The situation becomes even more evident in the last years of the historical series, marked by the economic crisis and the containment of public spending, especially in capital expenditure.

Regarding discretionary transfers, Garson (2005, p. 08) observes that these are “of a more unstable character and that they can meet the objectives of decentralized execution of sectorial actions, through agreements between federation entities, or simply the demands of the political game - amendments by federal and state parliamentarians to the respective budgets, with the objective of meeting the demands of their political bases”.

It is worth noting that investments made by municipal governments, which also include those in the area of urban development, are basically financed with resources obtained over a given fiscal year.

The relative instability in the budget execution in the housing area can be verified in more detail from the classification by source of resources (figure 6). Between 2013 and 2020, it is observed that 35% of the expenses settled by the Municipality of João Pessoa come from ordinary resources, 33% originate from credit operations, and 31% through transfers. Figure 6 details the composition of expenditures by source of funds each year.

Figure 6: Expenses settled in Housing function by source (nominal values)



Source: produced by the authors based on data from Sagres (TCE-PB).

Note: The analysis of the source of resources spent on the Housing function considered the period between 2013 and 2020, since this information only started to be made available by Sagres from that year onwards.

The analysis of figure 6 makes evident that João Pessoa is highly dependent on onerous resources (credit operations with the Severance Indemnity Fund - FGTS resources) arising from onlending contracts between the Union and the municipality and non-onerous resulting from agreements formalized between these two, through the use of resources from the General Budget of the Union (OGU). It is noteworthy that to the State, in the case of this article to the municipal management and with regards to onerous resources, there is a requirement that the financing amounts be returned, with the municipality having the role of directing its application.

Although the analysis carried out in this study indicates a balance between the sources of resources applied in the housing function, it is clear that even the expenditures made with ordinary resources result from the federal induction from the PMCMV or other

federal programs, such as the PAC and the Pro-Moradia. In the period between 2013 and 2020, data from the Sagres System indicate that the projects that received the highest volume of funds were the PMCMV projects: Saturnino de Brito (BRL 14, 3 million), Vista Alegre (BRL 5.8 million) and Nice Oliveira (BRL4.5 million).

The municipality of João Pessoa has 03 transfer contracts⁸ in the scope of the Pro-Moradia Program, namely: i) Upgrading of the Riverside Zone of the Sanhauá River - Ilha do Bispo, Alto Mateus, Favela do S and Varadouro Communities (Contract 0229026-30; Year: 2008; ii) Removal and Resettlement of 400 housing units, Sewage Network Installation, Water Supply, Paving, Drainage, Retaining Walls, Community Equipment, Social Work and Land Regularization (Contract: 0350330-84, Year: 2012); and iii) Upgrading and Regularization of the Riachinho Community (Contract: 0527630-83; Year: 2019). The total investment value of the three projects is BRL 62,515,858.65, of which BRL 55,020,192.89 come from transfers and BRL 7,495,665.76 from the municipal management.

It is credible to assume that the values expressed in figure 5, especially in the period between 2013 and 2016, relate to the project indicated in item ii, in view of the beginning of its execution, but also with the execution of the aforementioned in item i, as according to information from the Public Power Works Monitoring System anchored on the Caixa web portal, the last measurement occurred in 2016.

Considering the above, there are relevant aspects of the housing policy, to some extent already approached in previous sections, and that dialogue with the empirical findings: (i) the high cost of programs/projects/actions in the housing area are predominantly capital expenditures, meaning that its demand is concentrated in time, demanding that resources be ensured, in general, in the medium and long term; (ii) it is clear that resources from other sources (transfers and credit operations) significantly affected the final budget in the housing function. In any case, it is highlighted that both transfers and the composition and size of the economic base affect the budget, not only in that function, but in its entirety; (iii) housing policy is complex, multifaceted and multisectoral and different actors (state and non-state, of different scales) act in its production, which requires state capacity in the technical-administrative and political-

⁸ Information from <https://webp.caixa.gov.br/siurb/ao/pag/filtro-cid.asp>. Access in: Jun, 10th 2021.

relational dimensions "tuned", since ensuring the effectiveness of such a policy requires time and synchrony.

6. Final Remarks

This article aimed to provide an overview of the budget execution in João Pessoa, as a way to shed light on the understanding of the financial capacity of the municipal management to develop housing policy. The results obtained from the analysis of this municipality cannot be generalized to all Brazilian municipal administrations, given the heterogeneity in terms of state capacity in its different dimensions that exist among them. However, they offer interesting inputs for thinking about the potentials and limits of the implementation of social interest housing policies by municipal governments.

First, they reinforce the view that there is a significant municipal dependence on federal resources, mainly from ad hoc housing programs. This indicates low municipal financial autonomy in the area of housing, while demonstrating the growing importance that cooperative federalism acquired from the beginning of the 2000's onwards, with the promotion of different federal programs/actions for local implementation.

Second, given the financial dependence on sources of funds outside the municipality, largely due to the concentration of resources and decision-making power at the federal level, it can be assumed that, in a way, this induces the behavior of municipal administrations. In principle, this would not be a problem if such induction took place in a perennial, coordinated, cooperative and participatory manner, it could even start from pre-existing structures and instruments, enhancing them, both in the technical-administrative and political-relational dimensions. As a result of this enhancement, municipal administrations could diversify their action strategies and provide housing alternatives in different modalities.

However, what is observed is the impermanent character of such incentives, which affect the housing policy developed locally. When there are opportunities for federal financing, municipal governments tend to adhere to the housing programs proposed by the Union, directing their resources and capacities to make feasible this implementation or to complement such actions. On the other hand, in the absence of such incentives, subnational governments reduce the size of interventions and find themselves impelled to reorganize their actions, directing their scarce resources to try to respond, albeit in an incipient way, to the local housing problem.

The results also point to the relevance that onerous operations have in João Pessoa for the financing of housing projects, revealing not only the financial dependence, but an intrinsic “additional cost” to those operations, which tends to be even greater when it comes to programs and/or projects whose object is integral or partial slum upgrading actions, removals and/or resettlement in communities. This is the case of the capital of Paraíba when the transfer contracts signed are verified.

Fourth, the results also show that the social housing policy, in comparison with other areas of public policy, has weaknesses that affect the availability of financial resources and its budget execution. In public policies in which there are consolidated systems with guaranteed transfer of resources, such as health, education and assistance, and/or involving personnel expenses, such as the administration area, a better behavior is observed when analyzing the ratio between amounts provided for in the Annual Budget Law and committed by function.

This also highlights the difficulty in guaranteeing permanent resources for the housing policy, mainly due to its high cost, as noted above, and the possibility of contingency by the municipal administration itself.

Finally, it is noteworthy that this research has some limits, such as the focus on a single case, João Pessoa, and on statistical analyses. Future studies can investigate other municipal contexts, with a view to ascertaining if they also face the challenges related to the financial dimension of the state capacity at the municipal level to promote housing policy that were found in this article. They can also explore, explanatory reasons that contribute to broadening the understanding of the reduced municipal financial allocation and the low budget execution rate.

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Pandemic crisis and the institutionalization of the Unified Social Assistance System in the Metropolitan Region of Porto Alegre

Crise pandêmica e a institucionalização do Sistema Único de Assistência Social na Região Metropolitana de Porto Alegre

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DOI: 10.22478/ufpb.2525-5584.2021v6n3.60427

Recebido em: 03/08/2021
Aprovado em: 22/11/2021

Abstract: Social Assistance was considered essential to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. This article questions whether the institutionalization process of the Single Social Assistance System in the Metropolitan Region of Porto Alegre (RMPA) can be affected by the conjuncture of the pandemic crisis. By mobilizing the literature on institutional change, we seek to understand how public policy has been implemented in the context, if there have been significant changes in the structures of SA, especially in the working conditions of frontline employees. An online questionnaire was applied to workers working in the AS of the municipalities of RMPA between May and June 2020 and 53 responses from 22 of the 35 municipalities were analyzed. Research findings reveal that the crisis situation did not immediately change the studied municipal Social Assistance structures, on the other hand, made the precariousness already faced more evident.

Keywords: social assistance; institutional change; COVID-19 pandemic; implementation of public policies.

Resumo: A Assistência Social (AS) foi considerada fundamental para a mitigação dos efeitos da pandemia de COVID-19. Este artigo questiona se o processo de institucionalização do Sistema Único de Assistência Social na Região Metropolitana de Porto Alegre (RMPA) pode ser afetado pela conjuntura da crise pandêmica. Mobilizando a literatura de mudança institucional, buscamos entender como a política pública tem sido implementada no contexto, se houve alterações significativas nas estruturas de AS,

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sobretudo nas condições de trabalho dos servidores de linha de frente. Foi aplicado um questionário on-line com trabalhadores atuantes na AS dos municípios da RMPA entre maio e junho de 2020 e analisadas 53 respostas de 22 dos 35 municípios. Achados da pesquisa revelam que a situação de crise não alterou de imediato as estruturas de AS municipais estudadas, por outro lado, deixou mais evidente as precariedades já enfrentadas.

Palavras-chave: assistência social; mudança institucional; pandemia de COVID-19; implementação de políticas públicas.

1. Introduction

The complex scenario of the COVID-19 pandemic showed us how the social protection of a country is essential in mitigating its effects. The importance of public health policy and the need for continuous long-term investments in the Unified Health System (*SUS – Sistema Único de Saúde*) were notorious. But the context also showed that other social policies, such as Social Assistance (SA), are essential to contain the effects of the crisis, whether in aspects related to coordinated actions with health care, or in socioeconomic aspects; since the most vulnerable part of the population is the one that suffers most negatively from the effects of this pandemic.

However, if on the one hand the pandemic drew attention to the indispensability of this public policy; on the other hand, it is known that in recent years, especially after the impeachment of President Dilma (Jinkings, Doria & Cleto, 2016; Souza, 2016; Miguel, 2019), it has been suffering continuous disinvestment both in terms of financial and institutional aspects. All that threatens its continuity and the proposal for a universal public policy, leveraged since 2004 with the Unified Social Assistance System (*SUAS – Sistema Único de Assistência Social*).

Understanding that the institutionalization of public policy as a process initiated by the conformation of rules and norms, followed by the construction of material and symbolic structures that allow it to achieve its strategic objectives and have continuity over time, even in the face of certain opponents (Immergut, 2007, Tolbert; Zucker, 1999; Hall & Taylor, 2003; Pierson, 2004). In this article, we seek to understand the following: can the *SUAS* institutionalization process be affected by the situation of the pandemic crisis? If in the neoinstitutionalist literature, crises are seen as promoting incremental changes - given the gaps left by the norms (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010) – can we assume that the crisis caused by the new Coronavirus may encourage a movement to return to

welfare practices relegating the institutionalization of SUAS, ongoing, in the background?

In order to problematize this debate, in this article we aim to understand how the health policy of the municipalities in the *RMPA* (Greater or Metropolitan Area of Porto Alegre) has been implemented in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and if there have been significant changes in structures and affected the institutionalization process. Based on the framework about institutional change, we sought to specifically verify the following: 1) if there was maintenance or closure of public SA equipment/facilities; 2) whether there was a reduction, prioritization or expansion of specific services aimed at social protection before COVID-19; and 3) whether there was a quantitative change in the SUAS workforce, whether contracted or volunteer, and how they felt when working in SA services in the face of a pandemic crisis.

Assuming that the structures that make up the first stage of institutionalization (Papi, Dias, Santos & Johansson, 2020) are fundamental for local SA management to deal with the crisis, we verified how front-line workers acted, which inputs/tools they had to perform their functions and how they felt in the pandemic context.

This research adds to the other efforts⁴ being made in Brazil to understand the role of sectorial policies in combating the effects of the pandemic. In particular, those concerned with the functioning of social policies at the “front-lines” and how such a context can affect the (de) structuring of public policies and, consequently, their workers.

In order to meet the objectives of the article, in the pages that follow, we present the theoretical discussion, contextualizing how crises can be understood as motivating changes in the routes of institutionalization of public policies and how the trajectory of construction of SA policy in Brazil was developed. Next, we describe the methodology

⁴ From a search on *CAPE'S Portal de Periódicos* (Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel Portal of Journals) platform and Google Scholar, we sought to verify whether and how researchers are mobilizing efforts in the investigation of the COVID-19 pandemic context in the scope of SA and health care. This resulted in five academic and instructional texts (Silva; L. F., 2020; Silva; N.; Pinheiro, 2020; Moraes et al, 2020; Andion, 2020). In addition to that, the Bureau of Bureaucracy Studies at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation School of Administration in São Paulo (NEB/EAESP/FGV) carried out a survey on the working conditions of front-line professionals amidst the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil. A series of reports were launched, based on the three stages of the research, covering the different realities of bureaucrats in different public policies: education, health, social assistance, public security and the judiciary.

used in the work and present our findings, with results and discussions on the process of (de)institutionalization of SA policy in Brazil.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1. *Crisis and institutionalization of public policies*

In the debate on institutions and institutionalization processes developed in neoinstitutionalism studies since the 1970s (Berger & Luckmann, 2006; Pierson, 2004; Tolbert & Zucker, 1999), there is a concern to understand the processes that shape institutions, how they remain over time, influencing the political game and public policies⁵. Thus, if institutions can be understood as “formal and informal procedures, norms, routines and conventions inserted in the organizational structure of politics (polity) or political economy” (Hall and Taylor, 2003, p. 196) that condition the behavior of agents, public policies, organizations and endow policies with perpetuity over time. So, institutionalization can be understood as the process that leads to the construction of these procedures and structures, which are autonomous to contingency changes (Immergut, 2007, Tolbert & Zucker, 1999; Hall & Taylor, 2003; Pierson, 2004). Therefore, in this type of analysis, more than just the formal/legal structure (the first stage of institutionalization) of public policies should be taken into consideration, but, also and mainly, the conformation of material and symbolic structures that sustain such policies over time.

However, if the concept of institution points to a set of relatively long-lasting characteristics embedded in processes and policies; and institutionalization as the way that produces behaviors and structures that cannot be changed easily, how should we think about change? Above all, how shall we think about it if the connection between institution and persistence makes neoinstitutionalist approaches focus more on explaining continuities than on anything else? (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).

Part of the historical neoinstitutionalists explain the changes based on the so-called "critical situations", which can be understood as decisive moments in political life

⁵ While the sociological aspect brings the perspective that the actions of agents conform to social patterns, which later translate into rules that are reproduced and impacted on them (Berger & Luckmann, 2006; Tolbert & Zucker 1999); the historical aspect postulates the idea that the trajectory of politics and public policies (path dependence) conditions later decisions and policies, encouraging social forces to reproduce and repeat themselves (Pierson, 2004).

in which crucial choices are made, or moments of external transition that lead to certain changes and exclude others, which can lead to a path that will shape politics for years (Lipset & Rockan, 1967; Collier & Collier, 1991).

However, a generation of recent studies, dissatisfied with the idea that only exogenous shocks produce changes, argue that these can occur endogenously and incrementally, accumulating and producing a significant transformation (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). According to these authors, institutional change often occurs when government problems open space for agents to interpret and implement existing rules in new ways. However, they are only possible because institutions carry in their own dynamics a potential for change that emanates not only from the politically controversial nature, but also from a degree of openness in the interpretation and application of these rules. In short, the authors propose that the basic properties of institutions may contain within themselves the possibilities for change.

This way, incremental changes are expected when there are gaps or weaknesses between the rule and its interpretation; or in the rule and in its fulfillment. Consequently, to explain the change, Streck and Thelen (2005) produced four types of models as follows: a) Replacement, which indicates the removal of old rules and placement of new ones; b) Stratification, the placing of new rules above or alongside existing ones; c) Deviation, when changes in rules occur due to changes in the environment; and, d) Conversion, in which there is a change in the current rules due to their strategic redistribution. Analyzing the United States social security program, which today differs greatly from that conceived in the Roosevelt administration, the authors argue that institutional continuity only appears to exist, as there were continuous short-term institutional changes and adaptations that altered the system, making it possible to, simultaneously, achieve long-term stability.

In the case of *SUAS*, this reference makes it possible to question whether the crisis caused by the new Coronavirus pandemic could accelerate an ongoing process of disrupting the SA policy; given the change in the governmental environment and the demands placed on this public policy. Here, we consider that *SUAS*, even though it is well organized by federal rules (Basic Operational Norms and the National Social Assistance Policy –*PNAS*, acronym in Portuguese), it has some legal gaps, such as weaknesses in financing rules, which leave room for changes; as well as shortcomings in their material and human resources structures in the implementation of the front-line (Streck & Thelen, 2005).

As for the legal gaps, contrary to education and health care policies, SA does not have the obligation of linked constitutional transfers, which makes its funding to fluctuate and dependent on the “capacities” and “choices” of implementing federated entities. This can affect the *SUAS* institutionalization process in the national territory, as it impacts the possibilities of transforming the norms into reality, starting with the composition of the bureaucratic body of public policy. With this weakness, public policy becomes vulnerable to partisan political cycles.

As evidenced in a research carried out in the Metropolitan Region of Porto Alegre (Papi et al, 2020) about the institutionalization⁶ of *SUAS*, there are still precarious issues in the region's municipalities in order to be able to complete this process. It was verified how the material, human and symbolic structures were being composed over the years 2010 to 2019, and how workers implemented and got used to the new rules. The research concluded that it is not possible to affirm the existence of a "total institutionalization" of *SUAS* due to the constant fluctuations, in that period, in the construction of structures such as the closing of *CRAS* (Social Assistance Reference Centers) and *CREAS* (Specialized Social Assistance Reference Centers), modification and reduction, in particular, of highly complex services, and a significant drop in the number of statutory workers (those employees hired through public examinations/contests in Brazil, usually for government-related positions). As a result, we understand that in the case of *RMPA*, there were spaces for changes of the “schedule deviations” type, as suggested by Mahoney and Thelen (2009). As we will be showing in the next section, SA took a long time to become a public policy and to this day it bears the marks of its initial trajectory of charity and welfare. When “windows of opportunity”⁷ are opened in the public debate for the entry of “immediate” (and short-termism oriented) solutions to problems such as poverty, old solutions such as welfare and volunteerism, for example, are proposed; legacies capable of diverting SA from its universalizing and rights-guaranteeing conception. In the pages

⁶In 2020, we carried out the survey “Institutionalization of *SUAS* in the Metropolitan Region of Porto Alegre”, developing a theoretical and methodological framework for measuring Institutionalization. Seeking to identify how this process took place in the *RMPA* and at what stage it is between 2010 and 2019. We focused on the continuities and ruptures in the *SUAS* implementation, in particular, observing the equipment, social assistance services and teams of workers. The findings revealed fluctuations in the provision of services and the number of workers in city halls, thus indicating that the *SUAS* in the *RMPA* is in a stage of semi-institutionalization (Papi et al, no prelo).

⁷ Term coined by Kingdon (2003) to understand moments of change from crises. For the author, crises lead to windows of opportunity, enabling the modification of the agenda of public priorities and bringing a moment to define the direction of public action in a given social context.

that follow, we demonstrate the paths taken by the SA policy in Brazil as a way of explaining the stages of construction and deconstruction of this public policy.

2.2. *Legacies of social assistance in Brazil and the institutionalization process*

Despite the undeniable normative advance of the SA from the Federal Constitution of 1988 (CF/88), thus raised to the status of public policy composing the Social Security System, and with the elaboration of the Organic Law of Social Assistance (*LOAS – Lei Orgânica da Assistência Social*); the 1990s were marked by a context of decentralization - administrative and financial wise - and State downsizing, bringing great difficulties for the institutionalization of SA at the local level, as idealized (Papi, 2014). Added to the limited municipal conditions to assume new responsibilities in terms of public policies and poor federal coordination, many municipalities continued to implement welfare actions and make political use of the situation of poverty (Papi, 2014).

This panorama changed from 2004 onwards with the center-left governments - a time when a set of institutional initiatives were put in place to materialize the ideas contained in LOAS. The Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (*MDS*) was created, which sought to articulate and centralize direct income transfer and food security programs. That same year, the National Social Assistance Policy (*PNAS*) was approved and, at the same time, the *SUAS*, which consolidated the idea of articulating the three spheres of government in the implementation of public policy. With that, there was a great advance in the structures of SA in the country: according to the *SUAS* Census, until 2010, of the 5,488 Brazilian municipalities included in the database, 5,465 (99.6%) were qualified in some of the management levels established by the Basic Operational Standard - *NOB/SUAS-2005*.

Within the scope of implementation, there was the creation of public apparatus for providing services, *CRAS* and *CREAS*, the Specialized Service Centers for the Homeless (known as *Centros Pop*), in addition to the regulation of institutional hosting entities. These devices, organized by protection levels – of Basic, Medium and High Complexities – act through different services defined in the Social Assistance Services Classification, from 2009 (Brasil, 2009), offering common nomenclature and objectives in the provision of services.

From the creation of this legal and institutional framework, the State placed itself as one of the main agents of SA policy. At the federal and local levels, there were efforts

to create bureaucratic state capacities that contributed to the institutionalization of this public policy (Papi, 2017; Couto, Yazbele & Raichelis, 2006).

The government of President Dilma Rousseff (from 2011 to 2015) continued the efforts already applied in *SUAS*, adding a new range of programs and initiatives⁸, as well as increasing federal public investment in the SA policy. If the latter, during Lula's government periods, reached the amount of 27.1 billion reais, in Dilma's governments the investment reached 45.1 billion. For a public policy that does not have the guarantee of mandatory and binding constitutional transfers for its implementation and maintenance, the above data is too important, indicating that from 2004 to 2014 those governments spent important financial amounts for local governments to guarantee social rights, protection and social well-being (Papi and Joner, 2021).

However, given the political coup in 2016 that led to the rupture of the federal government's plan with the inauguration of Michel Temer, Brazil went through a process of instability (Jinkings et al, 2016; Souza, 2016; Miguel, 2019) and public policies have suffered its effects. As a result, local governments were impacted by the increase in poverty and misery⁹, as well as by the drop in revenue arising from the low mobility of the consumption and service sectors arising from the process of political and economic crisis. These factors began to strain local SA structures to respond to social situations more urgently, but with fewer resources and less federal coordination.

Amidst this scenario, the Happy Child Program (*PCF – Programa Criança Feliz*) came into effect. Focused and aimed at supporting the growth process of children up to six years of age and pregnant women, it once again brought the figure of the first lady in the management of social programs. Moreover, it gradually started to place itself as a competitor to the Service for Coexistence and Strengthening Bonds (*SCFV*), not only for using resources that would be destined to *SUAS*, but also for occupying physical structures and resources of the *CRAS*.

With the government of Jair Bolsonaro, the dismantling process of the SA at the federal level did not end. The Ministry responsible for the SA policy, again, had its name

⁸ The so-called *Brasil Sem Miséria* Plan (*BSM- Brazil Free from Misery*) involved the “Active Search” strategy, which had as its objective the Single Registry for Social Programs (*CadÚnico*) of those people outside the social protection and promotion network to guarantee them access to benefits and services .

⁹ According to IBGE (the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), the proportion of poor people in Brazil in 2016 rose to 25.7% of the population, rising to 26.5% in 2017. Within the group of nearly 55 million poor people, there is a share of 15.2 million people living below the extreme poverty line. Income is less than \$1.90 a day in 2017, equivalent to BRL\$140 a month.

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and structure changed: it became the Ministry of Citizenship (MC), with its internal structure completely modified, housing agendas such as culture and sport, social assistance, anti-drug policy and more than 20 areas with different competences (Law No. 13,844/2019). With this, the *MDS* was reduced to the status of a special secretariat, losing its strategic character in the national coordination of the SA policy. As if these institutional changes were not enough, programs were created indicating a likely return to the past of SA, which prioritized charity and volunteerism: the National Voluntary Work Incentive Program (known as *Pátria Voluntária*), in which one of its main objectives is to encourage citizens, non-profit entities and public administration to articulate for the "active participation of civil society in the implementation of actions that transform society" (Brazil, 2019, p. 01).

Finally, and with a fundamental effect on the institutionalization process of SA, was the continuous unfunding process of SA. Between 2014 and 2017, the SA budget was reduced by 45%, especially for *SUAS* services. According to data from the Ministry of Citizenship (2019), the amount invested fell from a level of 6.7 billion in 2014 to 3.8 billion in 2017. Considering the case of the state of RS and federal transfers between the Temer government (2016/2018) and the beginning of the Bolsonaro government (2019/2020), from a global perspective of the financing of the health care policy, there was a loss of resources around 51.70%. Programs were the most affected block, from 49.6 million to 12 million reais (75.76%), followed by Management, which rose from 69.8 million to 39.8 million (42.98%) and Services, which had a decrease in revenue from 354 million to 224.3 million (36.63%). Thus, not even the additional resources transferred in the context of COVID-19 (by Complementary Law 173 and MP 953/2020) were not enough to cover the past unfunding process. According to Papi and Joner (2021), considering that during the period from 2016 to 2020 the financing of Services, Management and Programs lost around BRL\$ 197 million, the resources from COVID-19 totaled BRL\$ 321 million, covering losses and adding another BRL\$ 124 million. However, despite appearing to offset the most recent losses, this amount is lower than those invested in previous governments.

Faced with this scenario of emptying the role of the federal government in the national structuring of *SUAS*, as well as the advancement of the ideals of a minimum state and the abandonment of the perspective of rights, what is the situation of the municipal SA like? Considering that, historically, municipalities depend on federal support and

coordination to develop their local actions and services; and also, the erratic process of institutionalization of the SA policy, we question the following idea: How has the pandemic altered or not this process?

3. Methodology

In order to obtain qualitative data to understand what has changed in the SA structures of the *RMPA* city halls in the context of COVID-19, as well as to unveil the working conditions of its front-line professionals in SA, we applied an online questionnaire with SA municipal workers between early May and mid-June 2020¹⁰.

The period of application of the questionnaire coincided with the initial months of the pandemic, in which only those services considered essential were authorized for face-to-face assistance. People moving around the city was not recommended, which made it impossible to apply the questionnaire via in-person interview.

The questionnaire was prepared using Google Forms, consisting of 70 open and closed questions. The questions were formulated based on 7 categories: personal and professional data; organization/reorganization of social assistance services in the pandemic; articulation with health care; health and safety of social assistance workers; SA network structure; state or federal support in implementing SA services in the pandemic context.

The questionnaire was sent by email to contacts and managers in each municipality, after telephone calls to raise awareness about the importance of participation. Social media and WhatsApp were also used to send the questionnaire link to workers in the area and to ask for it to be shared with other people who worked in the SA in the municipalities of the *RMPA*.

After collecting the data, the content of the 53 responses obtained from workers in 22 out of 34 municipalities¹¹ in the region was analyzed. The closed questions were tabulated and analyzed descriptively, identifying the frequency of the results.

Having made these methodological considerations, we proceeded to analyze and discuss the data.

4. Results

¹⁰ The questionnaire was voluntary participation and was disseminated through the municipal structures responsible for SA, mapped and contacted by us.

¹¹ Namely: the municipalities of Alvorada, Arroio dos Ratos, Cachoeirinha, Campo Bom, Canoas, Capela de Santana, Eldorado do Sul, Esteio, Glorinha, Gravataí, Ivoti, Montenegro, Nova Santa Rita, Novo Hamburgo, Parobé, Portão, Porto Alegre, Rolante, Santo Antônio da Patrulha, São Leopoldo, Sapucaia do Sul and Viamão.

The *RMPA* is made up of 34 municipalities of different sizes and socioeconomic realities, housing 4.4 million inhabitants, equivalent to 38.2% of the population of the state of Rio Grande do Sul (Rio Grande do Sul, 2020). The socioeconomic indicators of the sample municipalities, presented in Table 1, follow similar patterns: most have a low GDP per capita when compared to state and country averages, and an MHDI (Municipal Human Development Index) higher than the Brazilian average, but lower than the state average of 0.746. Out of the 22 municipalities, 11 (50%) joined *SUAS* between 2004 and 2010, and another 9 (40%) after 2010.

Table 1: Socioeconomic characteristics of the sample municipalities

Municipality	Size	Per capita GDP	MHDI	Joined <i>SUAS</i> in
Alvorada	Large	12,524.18	0.699	2005
Cachoeirinha	Large	38,959.54	0.757	2005
Canoas	Large	55,103.53	0.75	2005
Gravataí	Large	45,089.08	0.736	2010
Novo Hamburgo	Large	35,013.51	0.747	2014
Porto Alegre	Large	49,740.90	0.805	2011
São Leopoldo	Large	33,905.58	0.739	2005
Sapucaia do Sul:	Large	22,477.13	0.726	2010
Viamão	Large	14,049.15	0.717	2016
Campo Bom	Medium	43,365.16	0.745	2009
Esteio	Medium	37,789.87	0.754	2006
Montenegro	Medium	51,695.39	0.755	2017
Parobé	Medium	20,340.79	0.704	2010
Glorinha	Small	44,378.89	0.714	2004
Arroio dos Ratos	Small	16,592.98	0.698	2008
Capela de Santana	Small	17,250.61	0.661	2011
Rolante	Small	27,098.22	0.688	2011
Portão	Small	31,050.80	0.713	2012
Santa Antônio da Patrulha	Small	29,928.6	0.717	2015
Eldorado do Sul	Small	13,360.15	0.717	2017
Glorinha	Small	44,378.89	0.714	2004
Ivoti	Small	40,144.18	0.784	Not Stated

Source: IBGE (2020). NS (NI, in Portuguese): the information was not stated

It is, therefore, worth making some considerations about the population size of the sample. In the *RMPA* as a whole, 51.5% of the municipalities are small (up to 50,000 inhabitants); 21.2%, medium (up to 100,000 inhabitants); and the other 24.4% are large-sized (over 100,000 inhabitants). Thus, among the 22 cities in the sample, there is an overrepresentation of large cities (36.3%) to the detriment of small ones (40%). This deviation is greater when considering the total number of respondents: out of the 53 respondents, 36 (67.9%) are from large cities; 7 (13%), from medium-sized municipalities; and 10 respondents (18%) are from small ones. The differences in terms of frequency are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Comparison of the municipal size of the metropolitan region of Porto Alegre, the sample municipalities and the respondents

Size	RMPA		Municipalities		Respondents	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Small<50 thousand inhabitants	18	52.94	9	40.91	10	18.87
Medium from 50 thousand to 100 thousand inhabitants	7	20.59	4	18.18	7	13.21
Large>100 thousand inhabitants	9	26.47	9	40.91	36	67.92
Overall	34	100	22	100	53	100


Source: Data put together by the authors of this paper based on IBGE (2020) and research data (2020).

The 53 professionals analyzed are mostly statutory workers approved and hired through public examinations/contest (41 respondents or 77.3%), with higher education (48 respondents or 90.5%, 58% of them graduated in Social Work and another 25% in Psychology); and, at the time of the survey, 94.3% of them were working; the only 3 respondents who indicated that they were not working at that time were on leave because they were part of the risk groups for Covid-19.

Chart 1 shows us that 36 respondents (68%) work in Primary Care services, mostly in *CRAS* (17 respondents), and in Medium Complexity Special Protection services such as in *CREAS* (9); and acting, therefore, in activities of direct assistance to families and individuals in vulnerable situations, such assisting the homeless population, victims of violence, among others.

Chart 1: Distribution of respondents by municipal sector (open response, n = 53)¹²

¹² Basic attention/care services: *CRAS* (17) and *CadÚnico* (1); Medium/high complexity: *CREAS* (9), *FASC* (3), institutional care (2), shelter for children and adolescents (1), Medium Complexity (1), Special Social Protection (1), Social approach service for the population living on the streets (1); Management: Municipal Secretariats linked to Assistance/Social Development (7), Management (3), Municipal Council (1), Management and reception centers (1); Other / Not defined: Social Assistance (2); Municipal Health Department (2) and no response (1)



Source: Research data (2020).

4.1. *Changes in social assistance structures in the RMPA in the context of covid-19: results*

In general, respondents indicated that all teams continued operations, with employees belonging to risk groups for Covid-19 working remotely. In only 7 municipalities, respondents indicated that services operate with reduced and/or special hours (although some services are maintained around the clock, such as shelters). In the other 15 municipalities, service remained normal, although with some adjustments such as the scheduling of workers, shifts, booking of appointments, collective activities and cancellation of home visits. Among the issues reported, the problem of reduced teams can be observed: "Reduction of working hours ... *There are no work shifts because there aren't enough professionals for that and with the amount we have it is possible for everyone to work and still maintain the required physical distancing*" (Interviewee 51). It is also mentioned, the lack of structure to provide services in the pandemic:

The centers are open forty hours a week. I am talking about the CRAS and CREAS, that's what I know about them. However, our teams were reduced. They were reduced before the pandemic. With the pandemic, due to the sick leave of some colleagues considered as risk groups, teams got even more reduced. This has been very difficult. . . . Eventual food aid benefits increased (Interviewee 43).

In 20 municipalities, there was a report of an increase in the demand for SA services due to Emergency Assistance, the first installments of which were being paid

during the research period. More than guidance to beneficiaries about the procedures for this benefit, the effects caused by the lack of information that would be provided by the federal government and other state bodies becomes evident as follows: "There was an intense increase in the demand of users asking for help to request benefit (financial aid), to consult its availability, to be informed on how it works, to know the reason for it not being granted. We do not receive any training from Caixa (a state-owned Brazilian financial services company) . . ." (Interviewee 22).

In 9 of the 22 cities analyzed, new services were created during the pandemic, the most common being the implementation of services remotely and the creation of reception centers with the possibility of isolation for suspected cases of Covid-19; and in 18 of the 22 municipalities, respondents indicated that they had no closure of public social assistance facilities¹³.

With reduced teams, one of the possible solutions would be to prioritize some essential services. In 4 municipalities, respondents indicated that all services continued to be a priority - consequently, it can be understood that there was no prioritization of services in these municipalities. In 11 municipalities, respondents indicated the prioritization of services - from CRAS (in 7 of them), from the distribution of occasional benefits/kits with basic food staples (3), from CREAS (3) and from shelters and temporary housing (2).

We also questioned people about the use of voluntary work in these cities. In the majority of cases (12 out of 22), respondents indicated that voluntary work is not being used, but in seven municipalities there was an indication of use. In general, there does not seem to have been an increase in the number of volunteers during the analyzed period. Furthermore, out of the 22 municipalities considered, only respondents from Porto Alegre, Esteio and Campo Bom indicated that there had been dismissals of Social Assistance workers since the beginning of the pandemic.

Even so, 50 respondents (almost 95%) responded that the number of workers was insufficient to meet the daily demands of SA in the municipality where they work. In the capital and in other municipalities, reports indicate the use of minimal teams, the

¹³ Namely: Alvorada, Arroio dos Ratos, Cachoeirinha, Campo Bom, Canoas, Capela de Santana, Eldorado do Sul, Esteio, Ivoti, Montenegro, Nova Santa Rita, Parobé, Portão, Rolante, Santo Antônio da Patrulha, São Leopoldo, Sapucaia do Sul and Viamão. There were closures in Glorinha (*CadÚnico*, *CRAS*, *CREAS* and *Centro POP*), Novo Hamburgo (*Centro POP*) and Gravataí (*CRAS*, *CREAS* and *Centro POP*). In Porto Alegre, some respondents pointed out that there were no closures and others that there was closure of some shelters.


outsourcing of services, the failure to rebuild teams in the face of dismissals, and the absence of public examinations/contest. More severe cases were reported by respondents from seven municipalities - 4 large ones, namely, Cachoeirinha, Canoas, São Leopoldo and Sapucaia: teams smaller than the minimum composition defined by the NOB-RH (Basic Operational Standard for Human Resources) operating during the pandemic. In some cases, this has led to the closing of facilities: "We were unable to maintain the minimum teams, which is why 1 CRAS and 1 CREAS were closed (Interviewee 53)"; "There is no team with a minimum number of professionals according to *SUAS* regulations. This was even the reason stated by the management team to close *Centro Pop*" (Interviewee 20).

Other reports point out that the lack of employees is not exclusive to this pandemic moment, as stated by Interviewee 21 "Since 2015, the CRAS and CREAS teams have been reduced by about 50%. It's no different in the management body" and, according to respondent 43 "It hasn't even had the minimum teams proposed by NOB-RH, let alone now. It's quite outdated. . . They disbanded the HR team in our municipality".

Returning to the guiding questions of the research, the analysis shows that there was no generalized closure of public facilities during the pandemic; or significant layoffs. However, given the choice of most city halls to remove workers from risk groups and in view of a history of staff shortage, workers found themselves overloaded to perform social protection activities during a health crisis.

Ordinance No. 337 of 2020 established the need to guarantee the regular offer of social assistance services and programs as part of the fight against the pandemic; as well as stipulated measures of prevention, caution and reduction of transmission risks to be adopted by municipalities and states. According to the responses obtained, the main adaptations made by the city halls in the sample were the removal or placement in telecommuting of professionals from a risk group and the flexibility in the provision of face-to-face service to users, as shown in Graph 2.

Chart 2: Work structures provided by city halls to operate in the face of the pandemic, by respondents (n = 53)




Source: Research data (2020).

It is noteworthy that about 48% of respondents indicated that their city halls were not providing hygiene materials and PPE, basic instruments for operating in a pandemic. When we asked workers who continued to work in person about what contributions they were receiving, only half of them indicated receiving the necessary PPE; 40% said they have different working hours; 22% differentiated working conditions; 2.7% indicated receiving psychological support from the city hall; and none of the respondents were receiving additional wages for working during the pandemic. And, even though half of them were receiving PPE, only 42% said they knew how to use their PPE safely and only 18% reported receiving information and training to operate appropriately during this context - it is known that hygiene/sanitary measures and the use of masks, for example, are only effective through strict compliance with established protocols and rules.

When we show the city size cutout (Chart 3), the picture worsens among large cities, which are overrepresented in our sample, and in which only 33% of respondents indicated that they were receiving the necessary PPE and 8.3%, received information and training to operate in the midst of the pandemic.


Chart 3: Work structures provided by city halls to operate in the face of the pandemic (Percentage of responses by municipal size, n = 53)



Source: Research data (2020).

When we analyze the responses in relation to the work sectors (Chart 4), it can be seen that management workers, working mostly in the Municipal Secretariats, are the ones who most reported having received equipment, information and other differentiated conditions compared to workers at the front-lines. This fact reveals an inversion of priorities in the SA policy by the analyzed municipalities, as the workers who should be more protected and trained to serve the vulnerable public were the ones who were most vulnerable themselves.

Chart 4: Proportion of workers, by activity level, who received institutional support related to the pandemic



Source: Research data (2020).

When asked about how they felt while performing their work during the pandemic, on a scale of 1 to 5 (totally insecure to totally safe), the average of the answers was 2.2, showing strong insecurity among professionals. In the word cloud below,

Picture 2: What do you think is most important at this moment for the success of the actions of Social Assistance in combating the effects of COVID-19?



Source: Research data (2020).

According to the interviewees' reports, financial, physical and human structures are essential to carry out the daily work of SA in the municipalities. In a pandemic context and widespread social urgency, these structures, or the lack of them, have a major impact not only on the achievement of work objectives, but on the health of workers, who have been - since the implementation of *SUAS* - a very fragile 'point' of this system. A respondent's report illustrates this situation, which is repeated in most realities: "There are several *SUAS* mechanisms that have to be affirmed all the time. This is very exhausting. The dissolution of the HR area began long before the pandemic. . . The thing is not easy on the ideological level either" (Interviewee 43).

4.2 Discussion

Reflecting on the data regarding the effects of the pandemic crisis on the route of institutionalization of SA in the *RMPA*, or as the literature suggests, on gradual institutional change, we find that there is no empirical evidence of deep changes at the present time. Whether due to the "time of the research", which investigated a phenomenon in full occurrence, or due to the findings that show us a certain continuity in the management of SA. Thus, it is not possible to affirm the existence of changes in the rules, or deviations from the route in the examined reality. Incremental/punctual actions to the SA policy were taken by the federated entities, especially the Union and states, in an attempt to add to the already existing SA regulations, recommendations and regulations

to “handle” the pandemic crisis; but they do not represent changes that affect the ongoing institutionalization of SA. The changes that occurred, in terms of physical structure, were not significant, as few municipalities created new services for and during the pandemic; and in most of them there was no closure of public SA equipment and facilities.

The continuity of the SA situation in the *RMPA* refers to the precarious conditions already underway before the pandemic and which became more evident in the context of the health/sanitary crisis. The lack of workers and their few conditions affected the feeling of security and mental health of those who were already overloaded on a daily basis. The discrepancy in the treatment and support of those who work in management area and those who work at the “front-lines” were other elements that stood out equally. These facts imply the weakening of the most important link - between norms and viability of material and symbolic structures that maintain public policies over time (Immergut, 2007, Tolbert & Zucker, 1999; Hall & Taylor, 2003; Pierson, 2004) for the institutionalization of the SA policy - the worker. This is a fundamental element to be resolved by local governments, which increasingly place themselves as a space of resilience to the national dissolution of *SUAS* and its (de)institutionalization.

Another element to be analyzed is the process of change in the political “environment”, brought about by Bolsonaro’s government and the pandemic, which can lead to a change in public policy over time. As we have shown, the ongoing federal unfunding and lack of coordination can make local institutionalization efforts fragile to meet the numerous and complex social demands.

5. Final Considerations

This article aimed to verify whether the situation of the pandemic crisis of the new Coronavirus affected the process of institutionalization of *SUAS* in the *RMPA* - which could also modify the SA policy - in terms of maintenance or closing of public facilities, reduction or prioritization of social assistance services, and decrease or increase in the number of workers, as well as how they felt for performing services in a context of a health crisis.

As a theoretical perspective, we mobilized part of the literature on neoinstitutionalism that discusses the possibilities for change in the institutionalization of public policies: they can be exogenous crises, from political life, to institutions, which can lead to long-term changes (Lipset & Rockan, 1967; Collier & Collier, 1991); or

incremental changes within the internal origin of institutions, with the modification of rules based on new perceptions and interpretations of the agents involved in public policies (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).

The question about a possible change in the institutionalization of the SA policy in the *RMPA* through the pandemic crisis made us look at the recent past of Brazilian politics and how it has made its decision-making process, both at the federal and municipal levels, in terms of the management of SA. We find, already in progress, a non-financial prioritization of health policy, its conception and guidelines for social protection as a right to replace others and with its exhausted front-line workers.

The pandemic did not produce changes in institutionalization, until the closing of this research, but revealed that critical situation, which was previously underway. The research thus indicates that a change has been taking place for at least 4 years in the *SUAS* institutionalization, which may be of the 'Deviation' type (Streck and Thelen, 2005), or even due to "critical situations" in the political environment with decision-making that can lead to substantial transformations (Lipset & Rockan, 1967; Collier & Collier, 1991): starting in 2016, due to the political-institutional coup against the government at that time, the SA policy has been transfigured and maintained such situation until the culmination of the pandemic crisis (as described in section 2.2 of this article).

In addition, we were able to show that both large and small municipalities have experienced such a precarious course while controlling a health crisis, and thus they find themselves alone, in terms of federative (lack of) coordination and (un)funding. Also, as it was a research carried out in the first year of the pandemic, we have evidenced manifested effects in the SA policy through the perceptions, feelings and rules in force involving the workers: work pressure, fear, anxiety, isolation, strict protocols of social distancing and little instructional support on how SA should operate in the face of a pandemic crisis.

We believe that the research contributes to the opening of a follow-up research agenda – within a mid to long term period - of the situation of institutionalization of SA in the *RMPA* over the duration of the pandemic: were new SA management and execution rules elaborated from 2021 on? If there are new rules, were these carried out by the municipalities, states or the Union? Did the municipalities create new structures, such as services and benefits, given the advance of the pandemic from 2021 on? To what extent has the pandemic affected the amount of financial resources allocated to the maintenance

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of public facilities, services, benefits and payment of wages for SA workers at the municipal level? In view of the maintenance of sanitary protocols for the use of PPE, isolation and social distancing, how have SA workers been feeling when working “at the front-lines”, exposed to sanitary risks?

Anyway, the institutionalization of *SUAS* in the *RMPA* and in Brazil has been changing (or being modified) since the year 2016 and new research must be done to understand the magnitude of the changes and whether local governments will be spaces that rely on resilience or federal dependency. For this purpose, the literature on federative coordination and policy dismantling (Bauer, Jordan, Green-Pedersen & Hérítier, 2012) can be insightful. This article is part of a research agenda on the institutionalization and dismantling process of Public Policies, developed at the Center for Research in Municipal Management (*NUPEGEM*), therefore it only brings partial findings. The agenda must be carried on with these new theoretical and empirical questions being further investigated in the future.

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
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Local Governments, State Autonomy and the Production of Cultural Policies: The Case of the Grande ABC Region in Brazil

Governos Locais, Autonomia Municipal e a Produção de Políticas Públicas de Cultura: O caso da Região do Grande ABC

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DOI: [10.22478/ufpb.2525-5584.2021v6n3.60005]

Received in: 30/06/2021
Approved in: 22/11/2021

Abstract: This paper considers the recent cultural policies experience of the Grande ABC territory, which encompasses seven municipalities (Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, São Caetano do Sul, Diadema, Mauá, Ribeirão Pires e Rio Grande da Serra) located in the metropolitan region of São Paulo. Specifically, it intends to understand the scope and limits of local government action in this policy arena, with special attention regarding the municipal autonomy debate. Although assured by the 1988 Constitution, some authors have recently pointed out a so-called recentralization process in Brazilian federalism, with the federal government focusing on policy decision-making while the municipalities assume as a major role policy-making processes. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify a research gap regarding the cultural policy arena – to which such problematization is particularly relevant since recent studies have often highlighted experiences such as the National Culture System construction and the Cultura Viva Program formulation and implementation. Thus, what is the room left for the exercise of municipal autonomy in this policy arena, considering this territory? To address this

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research question, this paper presents the results of research activities developed through the years of 2016 to 2019 that have encompassed 20 interviews, reading documents and field research observations. Among them, we emphasize the polity aspect for local cultural policy making; the mapping of local cultural actions linked to the Cultura Viva federal program and its formulation and implementation policy processes; and the systematization of studies of local experiences in this policy arena published regarding the years from 1988 to 2018, which highlight local innovations on cultural policies historically. We conclude that it is possible to identify still relevant room left for the exercise of municipal autonomy regarding cultural policies, as well as to intergovernmental relationships related to recent policies in this arena - an indication towards an agenda for future studies.

Keywords: Local government; State Autonomy; Public policy; Cultural Policies.

Resumo: Este trabalho tem como objetivo discutir a experiência recente na produção de políticas públicas de cultura do território do Grande ABC, que abrange sete municípios localizados na região metropolitana de São Paulo. Especificamente, pretende compreender os alcances e limites da atuação desses governos locais nesta arena de políticas públicas, com a atenção especial à discussão sobre autonomia municipal. Embora assegurada pela Constituição de 1988, autores vêm identificando um processo de recentralização no federalismo brasileiro, com maior protagonismo do governo federal nesses processos e deixando aos municípios a execução de diretrizes de políticas públicas definidas nacionalmente. No entanto, há uma lacuna de estudos sobre o caso das políticas públicas culturais, arena para a qual essa problematização é particularmente relevante – com o destaque na literatura recente a experiências como a construção do Sistema Nacional de Cultura e a formulação e implementação do Programa Cultura Viva. Afinal, qual espaço permanece para o exercício da autonomia municipal nesta policy arena, tendo em vista a experiência deste território? Para responder a esta pergunta, este trabalho apresenta os resultados de atividades de pesquisa desenvolvidas pelos autores entre 2016 e 2019 e que envolveram a realização de 20 entrevistas, revisão de documentos e observação por meio de visitas de campo. Dentre eles, destacamos o levantamento sobre as estruturas institucionais locais voltadas para a produção destas políticas; o mapeamento e estudo do funcionamento do Programa Cultura Viva neste território; e a sistematização dos estudos já publicados sobre a experiência local nesta arena de políticas públicas entre 1988 e 2018, que reconhecem inovações produzidas historicamente neste território. Concluimos que é possível identificar ainda espaços relevantes para o exercício da autonomia municipal na produção das políticas públicas nesta arena, bem como nas relações intergovernamentais que envolvem algumas das políticas mais recentes - sugerindo, ainda, uma agenda para estudos futuros neste tema.

Palavras-chave: Governos locais; autonomia municipal; políticas públicas; políticas culturais.

1. Introdução

In spite of the fact that we are currently going through a process that some authors have referred to as intergovernmental incoordination in Brazil (Abrucio et al, 2020), the 1988 Federal Constitution remains a key milestone for promoting social policy in the

country and for debating aspects of decentralization of public policy in the subnational areas - in their scope, limitations and challenges (Farah, 2001, 2013; Arretche, 1996, 2004; Spink, Clemente e Keppke, 1999; Souza; Carvalho, 1999; Abrucio, 2005). However, during the most recent period of “lasting political authority” known as República Nova (New Republic) between 1995-2015 (Arretche, Marques e Faria, 2019), municipal authority has been questioned in the face of what has been identified in the literature as dynamics of (re)centralization still present in Brazilian federalism (Almeida, 2005; Kugelmas; Sola, 1999; Arretche, 2012).

In the case of cultural policy, this problematization is particularly relevant, since several studies have been published in recent years seeking to systematize the country’s experience (Rubim, 2007; Calabre, 2009), frequently highlighting the protagonism of the federal government (arising from law nº 12.343, from 2010) and the National Culture System (Constitutional Amendment nº 71, from 2012) as national and structuring elements for the creation of such policies at the different levels of government (Zimbrão, 2013; Barbalho; Barro; Calabre, 2013; Barbosa da Silva; Teles, 2021), as well as the Cultura Viva program (Turino, 2010) - an initiative by the Ministry of Culture established in 2004 that, throughout the years, has been redesigned, assigning different roles to municipalities for its operationalization (Barbosa da Silva; Araújo, 2010; Barbosa da Silva; Calabre, 2011; Barbosa da Silva; Labrea, 2014). After all, considering this scenario, what would be the room left for the exercise of municipal autonomy in the creation of cultural policies?

To answer this question, this paper aims to discuss the recent experience of the Grande ABC territory, which encompasses seven municipalities – Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, São Caetano do Sul, Diadema, Mauá, Ribeirão Pires and Rio Grande da Serra, all of them located in the metropolitan area of São Paulo. Specifically, we aim to understand the role of local governments in the area of public policy, due to their specific nature and recent institutional trajectory (Frey et al, 2016), and the role of Brazil’s federal government in it, according to the literature.

Using an interpretative approach for the analysis of public policy (Yanow, 2007), we undertook, between 2016 and 2019, different procedures for this research, such as a review of public domain documents and interviews, as well as observations in field visits. Furthermore, we carried out a bibliographic review (Czarniawska, 2014) concerning the local experiences in this subject and developed an experimental exploratory instrument

that aims to trace the presence of this category (cultural policy) in the every-day local media debate.

Thus, this work is organized into four more sections, in addition to this introduction. First, we present the theoretical framework that serves as a reference for the discussion proposed here, focusing mainly on the last decade's debate in Brazil on municipal autonomy and the formulation and implementation of policies, with particular attention to the policy arena of culture. Then, we detail the methodological procedures used to produce information on public cultural policies in the Greater ABC region in the period under study. In the next section, we indicate as results (i) the survey carried out on the institutional structures associated with the formulation and implementation of public cultural policies in these seven municipalities, examining the relationship between the national orientation expressed in the National Culture System and local institutions; (ii) the discussion on the operationalization of the Cultura Viva Program in this region, including the unprecedented mapping of all cultural actions recognized by this policy as Points of Culture in the territory since its creation - as well as the role that municipalities were progressively called to play in this policy from the perception of local actors; (iv) the systematization of information on other local experiences in the production of public cultural policies historically developed in the region, accessed through a literature review; and (v) the contributions of a follow-up of the public debate in the local media regarding these policies, in order to glimpse agendas for future studies on this topic. For the conclusion, we present as a contribution a balance regarding the exercise of municipal autonomy in the Grande ABC region for the formulation and implementation of public cultural policies. We aim to identify how different arrangements are present in this territory for the operationalization of these policies and those in which there seems to be a leading role for the federal government – signaling the need for further research in this regard.

2. Municipal Autonomy and the Cultural Policy Arena

One of the main issues in debate in the literature on federalism and intergovernmental relations in Brazil has been that which opposes decentralization and centralization (Melo, 1996; Abrucio, 2005; Arretche, 2013). Among the topics discussed are the scope and limits of the institutional arrangement for the production of public policies and the reduction of inequalities; the consequences of the design established in

the Federal Constitution of 1988 – which included municipalities as federative entities, with administrative, political, and fiscal autonomy; attention to competition or cooperation dynamics between subnational spheres that this arrangement may influence; in addition to the challenges they impose for federative coordination and intergovernmental relations.

More recently, one aspect, in particular, has been highlighted in this debate, in addition to studies on the so-called dynamics of recentralization in Brazilian federalism (Almeida, 2005; Kugelmas; Sola, 1999). Based on the contribution of Arretche (2012), different processes related to the production of public policies have been discussed, which signal the formulation and decision making (policy decision making) more associated with the Union, while the implementation or execution of these policies (policy making) would be under greater responsibility of states and municipalities (Oliveira; Lotta, 2019; Bichir, 2018). Examples in this regard are pointed out from studies on national systems of public policies - as in the cases of health, social assistance, or education (Franzese; Abrucio, 2013), which have become more present institutional arrangements in recent decades and which they imply issues such as the financing of public policies to be implemented by subnational spheres based on national guidelines – through adherence mechanisms (Farah, 2013), as well as institutional spaces for federative negotiation and the promotion of civil society participation – such as the conferences held for the constitution of these systems.

As a result, the question has been raised about whether these dynamics have been inhibiting local governments from innovating in the production of public policies or whether they have been limiting their autonomy to the implementation of national guidelines. As indicated by Licio, Mesquita and Currello (2011) – based on a study on income transfer programs, and Bichir (2018) and Bichir, Simoni Junior and Pereira (2020) – in analyzes of the Unified Social Assistance System, not always one finds in more specific studies a “strictly hierarchical relationship” (Licio; Mesquita; Currello, 2011, p. 462) between the federal government and subnational spheres. As a result, the question has been raised about whether these dynamics have been inhibiting local governments from innovating in the production of public policies or whether they have been limiting their autonomy to the implementation of national guidelines. In this sense, attention to at least three factors is suggested: the variations that may occur according to the social

policies in question; the complexities more recently identified in the specific literature on public policy implementation; and local governance dynamics (Bichir, 2018).

As Farah (2013) points out, these debates can be promoted in dialogue with subnational experiences in promoting citizenship developed since Brazil's promulgation of the Federal Constitution of 1988. After all, these experiences are recognized not only in the literature on federalism and intergovernmental relations – as indicated in Abrucio (2005), Franzese and Abrucio (2013) or Licio, Mesquita and Currello (2011), for example; but also that specifically aimed at local governments (Grin; Abrucio, 2018; Alves, Brigagão and Burgos, 2017). Some of these practices, which were characterized by involving the construction of different types of partnerships and links between state and non-state organizations (Spink, 2003), in addition to what was then recognized as new institutional arrangements (Farah, 2001), are indicated in the literature as inspiring for the constitution of national guidelines in specific public policy arenas – as in the case of urban policies (Arretche, Marques and Faria, 2019), to name just one example.

Recognizing the gap in studies in specific public policy arenas about the so-called recentralization, this work seeks to contribute to the debate in the area of culture. After all, it is possible to establish several connections between this broader debate and the specific case under analysis: the construction in the last decade of a National System of Culture (SNC) was also a choice exercised in this arena, from the Constitutional Amendment No. 71 of 2012, providing for the articulation between systems at the three levels of government, with their respective councils, plans, and funds related to the production of these public policies; as well as the emphasis in this literature on a public policy experience developed by the federal government, which progressively shared aspects of its operation with states and municipalities, given its (re)formulation and implementation for its operationalization - the case of the Culture Program Live. Medeiros and Farah (2014), analyzing the experience of the Points of Culture in the municipalities of the State of São Paulo and their communities, observe the program's implementation's heterogeneity and how institutional dynamics vary over time, adapting to correct the challenges encountered. More than that, they emphasize that this is not a linear process, but with the overlap and interaction of different institutions in which non-governmental actors play a fundamental role in redefining how policy implementation occurs.

In this sense, we propose as a question what is the space for exercising municipal autonomy, as provided for in the Federal Constitution of 1988 and widely pointed out in the literature as a fundamental factor for discussions on intergovernmental relations and the production of public policies promoting citizenship, would remain present in the arena of cultural public policy – recognizing its recent institutional trajectory (Frey et al., 2017). To answer it, we sought to analyze the recent experience of the municipalities that make up the Grande ABC region of São Paulo.

3. Methodological Procedures

This work brings together results of research and extension activities developed by the authors as part of a study group linked to a broader research project during the period from 2016 to 2019, articulated around the study of public policies for culture in the seven cities that make the Grande ABC region and guided by the qualitative-interpretative approach to public policy research (Yanow, 2007). From it, at least three procedures are considered more frequent for the production of information: observation, with different degrees of participation of the researcher in the events they are following; the interviews, in general closer to the idea of conversations, in which the important thing is not the script previously designed for the research, but the search to understand the perspective of their interlocutors regarding the public policy issues being studied - not limited to the so-called 'elites' related to the production of these policies, but also other social actors that may be related to their production according to each case; in addition to reviewing documents – which can be either those produced by the media or normative texts linked to the public policies that are under study, seeking to understand the production of positions on a topic (p. 409-411).

Specifically, the debate presented here takes as reference five procedures for the investigation developed by the authors on the production of cultural public policies in the Grande ABC region, taking as a starting point the reference to national experiences that mark the debate of this public policy arena – namely, the National Culture System and its forecast of local institutional spaces for the production of these policies, and the Cultura Viva Program, with its promotion of Points of Culture in this territory. They were: (a) review of documents made available by representatives of managing bodies linked to the theme of culture in each of the municipalities in the region in 2016, complemented by visits to each of the municipalities in that year to conduct thirteen interviews with local managers of these policies, aiming to develop a more accurate survey of the local

institutional structures in this arena – from a university extension project carried out as a result of a partnership with the Grande ABC Intermunicipal Consortium and its Culture Work Group; (b) review of public documents related to the Cultura Viva Program and its performance in this territory produced by local governments⁶ and the state government⁷, in addition to the public calls and Official publications analysis – which, systematized, allowed the mapping of Points of Culture in the region through georeferencing; (c) visits to three Culture Points (Opção Brasil/São Caetano do Sul; Companhia Teatral Quartum Crescente/Mauá; and Circomunidade/São Bernardo do Campo), with a total of 5 interviews with their representatives; (d) interviews with two representatives of the Municipal Culture Department of São Bernardo do Campo.

In this work, we also present the results of two other methodological procedures: (i) literature review (Czarniawska, 2014) regarding the experiences of the seven cities in cultural public policies between 1988 and 2018: for 12 months, between 2017 and 2018, We consulted the CAPES Journal Portal database (Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel) in order to identify academic papers on the topic based on the search terms "cultural policies" and "ABC Paulista", in addition to "cultural policies" accompanied by the names of the cities that form the region⁸; and (ii) we built an instrument, on an experimental basis, which allowed us to monitor the production of information on the topic in the daily life of the region, from the registration of tags on topics of interest gathered through an automatic internet search system, acting as a filter, able to gather, at each time interval, all the news that mention the tagged tags, compiled in a daily email received by the researchers, in the same period⁹.

4. Research Results

⁶ DIADEMA, Secretaria Municipal de Cultura. Setecidades Pontos de Cultura do Grande ABCD. Publication of the Diadema city hall through the Points of Culture Agreement 7031416/2019 - Minc/FNC – National Culture Fund. Printed in 2012.

⁷ Secretaria Da Cultura Do Estado De São Paulo. Pontos de Cultura: olhares sobre a rede de SP. Executado por Abaçáí Cultura e Arte. São Paulo, 2011. Available at: <<http://pt.calameo.com/read/0013961278ecc4871f4fc>>. Accessed on: 06/14/2021.

⁸ Furthermore, considering that the institutionalization of this theme is relatively recent in the country, we also resorted to Google Academic and indications of recent works that were being produced at the Federal University of ABC - which we had access to during the development of this research.

⁹ The tags registered for monitoring were: "Culture""Grande ABC"; "Culture""Santo André"-player; "Culture""São Bernardo do Campo"; "Culture""São Caetano do Sul"-player; "Culture""Diadema"; "Culture""Mauá"; "Culture""Ribeirão Pires"; and "Culture""Rio Grande da Serra". As one can see, in some cases we added the term "-player" to the research query as a strategy that allowed us to eliminate from the filter records that referred to the sport theme.

The following section presents the research results obtained by applying the methodological procedures described above.

4.1 Polity Aspects for the Local Cultural Policy Making

In the debate on the creation of public policy, an element that frequently arises is, apart from the analysis of public policy, the institutional structures that influence their development - or the conditions for their creation, in the literature referred to as polity (Frey, 2000). From this perspective, the National Culture System (SNC) - laid down in the Federal Constitution since 2012 - becomes fundamental for the analysis we intend to carry out on municipal autonomy in this area of public policy. The reason for such relevance is that it allows for coordination between the three levels of government for the creation and implementation of cultural policies, based on certain institutional structures, also common to the three levels of government, so that the transfer of resources is possible for these policies. A municipality that shows interest in being granted such resources, for example, should submit an accession request to the SNC through a Federal Cooperation Agreement, followed by the so-called Institutionalization of its own local cultural system - which must include, as basic requirements, as well as a law for the creation of this system, the documents regarding the existence of a Council for Cultural Policy, a Cultural Plan and a Cultural Fund, all of which at municipal level.

In this sense, it is an interesting key to the development of studies on local governments - understood from their role in producing these public policies from an institutional and organizational point of view, as indicated by Abrucio and Grin (2019).

From the point of view of the federal government, it is possible to analyze the local institutions and their relationship to the National Culture System on an online platform¹⁰. On this platform, the case of each municipality of the Grande ABC region can be observed in terms of their accession (or lack thereof) to the System and the date of accession, as shown in Table 1. In addition, this platform provides the details of the documents submitted by the municipality that would indicate the local institutionalization of its own system, thus allowing the SNC to reach its goals of coordinating and fostering the creation of public policy in this political arena.

Table 01: Date of accession of each municipality of the Grande ABC region to the National Culture System

¹⁰ Available at <http://ver.snc.cultura.gov.br/> - Accessed on 06/20/2021.

Municipality	Date of accession to SNC
Santo André	03/05/2013
São Bernardo do Campo	04/02/2013
São Caetano do Sul	12/12/2014
Diadema	26/02/2014
Mauá	19/08/2013
Ribeirão Pires	07/05/2014
Rio Grande da Serra	12/09/2013

Source: elaborated by the authors based on data available on <http://ver.snc.cultura.gov.br/> - Retrieved June 20, 2021.

However, this platform does not allow a complete understanding of the presence and operation of these local institutions in the creation of these public policies. This is because the municipality may have signed a Federal Cooperation Agreement and thus entered the National Culture System; nonetheless, afterward, it may have stopped submitting the documents related to the creation or existence of these local institutional structures.

Considering this condition, the observation activities (Yanow, 2007) carried out in the context of a university extension project in 2016, along with the municipalities of this region under a cooperation agency called Consórcio Intermunicipal do Grande ABC (Intermunicipal Consortium of Grande ABC), were essential. An organization built together by the municipalities since the 1990s (Bresciani, 2011), the Consortium articulates the seven cities around shared projects, with the participation of municipal secretaries - or representatives appointed by each local government - in specific work groups. This is the case with the theme of culture that year, whose specific Working Group developed as its main action the construction of a Regional Culture Plan, based on the mapping of existing institutions and the experience accumulated by the cities. The Federal University of ABC was a partner for the gathering, systematization, and availability of this information.

Another issue raised at that moment was the information regarding the organization of municipal cultural conferences - considered to be a fundamental part of creating such institutions in the context of the SNC. As shown in Table 2, we observe that the seven cities have an administrative department for culture, although only four of them had, in 2016, an exclusive secretariat for this area. Moreover, all municipalities had a

Cultural Policy Council from a formal point of view, that is, approved by legislation at the local according to the information available for this study – although, in one of them, the space was indicated as non-active at that time. As for the existence of local cultural plans, we found information regarding the activities of five municipalities (Santo André, São Caetano do Sul, Diadema, Ribeirão Pires, and Mauá –where the Plan elaboration took as reference the municipal cultural conferences records); as for municipal funds, apart from these, São Bernardo do Campo also has such an initiative.

Table 02: Institutional structures of Grande ABC municipalities for the creation of cultural policies in 2016

In this way, although changes may have occurred in this framework since its survey and the publication of this work, we can observe how the municipalities of the Grande ABC region organized the creation of cultural policies based on local institutional structures laid down in the National Culture System. Although all of them acceded to the SNC between 2013 and 2014, the conditions for the creation of these policies were not homogenous in 2016, either from the formal point of view, related to the existence of documents and local legislation that create these institutions, either from the practical point of view, that is, the interpretation of public administrators regarding their operation and actual contribution to the creation of these policies.

4.2 The Cultura Viva Program in the Grande ABC region

The Cultura Viva program, benchmark public policy in the recent bibliography on this subject in Brazil (Turino, 2010; Calabre; Lima, 2014; Medeiros; Farah, 2014), has existed in the Grande ABC region since its first national call for proposals as early as 2004. Its operation in the region increased in the following years with the launch of a state-level network, by the Culture Secretariat of the State of São Paulo in 2009; and local networks in Diadema, in 2005 and 2010, and São Bernardo do Campo, in 2013. Thus, the Pontos de Cultura (Cultural Spots) that have been and are currently operating in this region are part of diverse networks, arising from different calls for proposals - organized both by the federal government and municipal and state governments.

Since there was no mapping available for these Pontos de Cultura in the region, we elaborated a database from various sources. Thus, we could obtain preliminary data about the associations, their projects and the place where they operate. Afterwards, we highlighted the Pontos de Cultura of the Grande ABC region and we treated the data of this specific group, correcting information - such as grammar mistakes that interfered in


the georeferencing and updating of their data. With this work, we were able to confirm, for example, the year in which the projects were approved, when the money transfers started and if they in fact were implemented, apart from acknowledging the possibility that the projects of the Pontos de Cultura may be approved, without actually having access to money transfers from the cultural administrator responsible for the call for proposals - which would actually mean entering the Program¹¹.

With this database, maps were created using QGIS, resulting in different shapefiles - map files - for each specific call for proposals. We were able, after that, to carry out analyses by call for proposal, period, and municipality. Another contribution of this mapping is to enable an easier viewing of the distribution of the Pontos de Cultura in the region and inside a municipality.

In total, there we found 57 Pontos de Cultura projects operating in the Grande ABC territory, spread across six out of its seven cities: Santo André (3), São Bernardo do Campo (17), São Caetano do Sul (4), Diadema (30), Mauá (2) and Ribeirão Pires (3), as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 01: Distribution of Pontos de Cultura in the Grande ABC region

¹¹ This is the case of the Culture Ministry Federal Public Notice n° 03/2005, which authorized four ABC projects, but only three of them were started.



Source: Elaborated by the authors.

From a general point of view, the mapping of the Pontos de Cultura network in the Grande ABC has a robust heterogeneous character, reinforcing the study presented by Medeiros & Farah (2014) in the State of São Paulo. The projects were part of public notices with significant differences between them: each government has different rules in the accountability processes, in the available financial resources, and in the requirements for how to use them. In addition, bureaucratic and administrative support, the proximity and communication of cultural groups with the government can also vary greatly.

The network is also variable over time, counting both on initiatives that ceased to exist soon after ending the financial contributions received by the policy and on more permanent spaces, which continue with their activities – even if assuming other characteristics. Currently, once government support has been completed, part of the cultural agents interviewed still identify themselves as a Ponto de Cultura, based on the pillars of the Cultura Viva Program and its ideals - which is not necessarily perceived as a result of an effort by public managers for the network articulation of these spaces. The result of this diverse network is Points of Culture benefiting from various public notices

over time, living in the same territory, relating in different ways with the program's institutionalities, and presenting different contributions to the discussion on the redefinition of policy implementation - as per also suggest Medeiros and Farah (2014).

It is interesting to highlight the situation in the municipality of Diadema. It is possible to observe that many Points in the figure are superimposed, indicating projects that were carried out in the same space or very close to each other. Understanding that the pink squares symbolize the projects of the public notice "Pontos de Cultura - Governments", in which the projects were carried out in public facilities of the city hall, we note that some projects covered by the municipal notice - red dots - were also based in these locations or in very close addresses, showing an interesting dynamic that brings cultural groups closer to the public management for culture. This, in fact, is an inherent difficulty of cultural management at the municipal level: bringing the equipment closer to the local reality, presenting a schedule consistent with the public that they will serve. Something that seems to open space for future research agendas.

These aspects could be observed with further detail when researching the Cultura Viva program in the city of São Bernardo do Campo, both during on-site visits and semi structured interviews. In particular, we were able to understand the perception of both local public administrators and cultural operators, regarding the most recent experience that the region had with the Program, providing funding for five new Pontos de Cultura.

In conversation with representatives of one of the local Pontos de Cultura, for example, the idea that the agreement established between the public authorities and cultural initiatives would be too "bureaucratic" was a highlight: in their opinion, the amount of formal requirements would end up turning the program less democratic, since there are only few organizations that have the structure and knowledge to deal with the rendering of accounts demanded by the authorities. On the other hand, in conversation with officials, we found out that the monitoring is carried out in two manners: drafting of narrative reports and rendering of accounts, submitted to the federal government as part of the requirements of the agreement established between the entities. Furthermore, the meetings to reflect on the challenges in the implementation of the Program are considered to be too few - with the idea that the amount of work is big and there is not enough time to debate political and pedagogical matters deeply with the Pontos de Cultura and not enough human resources in the local government to offer support that is adequate to them.

In fact, this discussion becomes more important with the decentralization process of the Program, a process which started in 2007. Although, in spite of the goal of sharing responsibilities and resources with subnational levels, this decision brought about several challenges to its implementation at local level: the Program starts receiving a greater interference of municipal public administrators, since these are closer to the Pontos de Cultura and, thus, are able to better perceive what their needs are; at the same time, they receive greater interference from the local cultural operators themselves, since they manage to hold regular meetings with the local authorities responsible for the administration of the Program, in order to offer solutions to the problems faced by the Pontos de Cultura in their daily routine in each territory. We could also check with the interviews, that there is also a reference to the important role of other sectors of local government, such as budget, planning and finance departments - at moments when there are restrictions of resources, or when the public municipal budget for this area of policy is vetoed even before becoming part of the Annual Budget Law.

Thus, we realized that an important issue in the relationship between State and civil society at the local level in the Cultura Viva program is the notion of closeness between these agents, translating into opportunities for dialogue and collaboration in the formulation and implementation of public policy. Bringing municipal administrators and cultural associations closer to each other strengthens the Program and establishes bonds among the social stakeholders involved in the territory - one of the positive aspects observed in the research due to the fact that the administration of the Program is in charge of municipal authorities. It is a relevant contribution of this study to the debate on municipal autonomy and the creation of cultural policies.

4.3 Production of Public Policies on Culture in the Grande ABC Region: Beyond National References?


In order to discuss the exercise of municipal autonomy for the creation of public policy in this territory and the influence of the two mechanisms elaborated and implemented by Brazil's federal government - the National Culture System and the Cultura Viva program - we carried out a review of the literature related to the experiences of the seven cities between 1988 and 2018.

In total, 21 studies were selected, the oldest of which being from 1993 and the most recent from 2018. In order to fully understand the characteristics of this production, they were categorized by year, city to which they refer, type (paper, undergraduate or

graduate thesis, or monograph, for example) and arrangement between State and Civil Society for its operationalization (based on the analysis framework proposed by Bittencourt & Souza, 2019).

This last category proved particularly interesting to fully comprehend the nature of cultural policies in terms of municipal autonomy. The systemization of these references allows us, for example, to realize the incidence of arrangements associated with national policies, such as the Cultura Viva program and the institutions proposed by the SNC - as expressed in the categories “Cultura Viva” and “CPF da Cultura”, which is how the institutionalization of Councils, Plans and Funds has been discussed recently in the three levels of government. However, it was also possible to observe the incidence of other arrangements, as shown in Figure 2: among the categories mentioned in the bibliography, we identified direct administration of programs and infrastructure by local governments (10 publications); the Cultura Viva program and its Pontos de Cultura (7 publications); public calls for proposals for the funding of projects developed by civil society (2 publications), apart from the reference to the subject of Cultural Councils, Plans and Funds at SNC level (2). We also saw that none of the studies we found mention at least two frequent arrangements in the literature debates on the creation of cultural policies: tax waiver mechanisms and the administration of public programs and infrastructure through contracts with Social Organizations.

Figure 02: Mention to the arrangements for the creation of cultural policies in the bibliographic review



Source: Elaborated by the authors.

Another aspect worth highlighting is related to the year of publication of the consulted studies. The earliest ones are related to experiences that took place after the municipal elections of 1988 - the same year of the enactment of the Federal Constitution that granted political and administrative autonomy to municipalities; in this period, three out of the seven cities of the Grande ABC region elected a member of the Workers' Party (PT, Partido dos Trabalhadores) to be mayor - São Bernardo do Campo, Santo André, and Diadema -, which may have contributed to the similar nature of the cultural policies in the region at the time. Among the basic concepts of that approach, we found the idea of "cultural citizenship"¹², as well as the concepts of "decentralization", "participation" and "participative administration". These records are related to the interest of each administration in implementing theoretical guidelines as guidance in their role in the context of the redemocratization process and of greater municipal autonomy and are reported rather emphatically in the publications categorized within the direct administration arrangement of cultural programs and facilities.

We can also highlight three relevant experiences to the debate on municipal autonomy that introduces a historical component in the region of Grande ABC. The first one is related to the city of Santo André and refers fundamentally to the period 1989-1992 - the public infrastructure was in terrible condition when the new administration started and its new politics had the aim of "inverting priorities; the appropriation of public spaces by the population; the unequivocal boost to the full exercise of citizenship" (Frateschi, 1993, p. 63). Throughout this administration, the service of cultural action was implemented for promoting initiatives in the 21 local Community Centers with the participation of public cultural operators and assistants that would identify the cultural activities of neighborhoods and provide support to them. The Cultural Fund that had been created had a joint administration, whose participants were representatives of the cultural community and three of them were appointed by the city hall (Frateschi, 1993). Among the equipment originated in that administration, we can mention Escola Municipal de

¹² A proposal that suggests to the population to recognize itself as a cultural subject through the establishment of the right to participate in cultural policies, cultural production, cultural training, information, experimentation (invention), and fruition. Employing the concept of culture as a right, a participatory and inclusive political culture would be fostered, which would not be limited to the fine arts, but would extend to an expanded concept of culture, referred to as anthropological – according to Chauí (1993).

Iniciação Artística (EMIA, municipal school for artistic initiation), founded in 1990 in order to provide a space for enjoyment and production through performance, exhibitions and workshops - researched later on by Oliveira (2009) which deals with EMIA and its decentralization process in 2005.

Another example is the experience of São Bernardo do Campo, first reported on in Alves (1993), whose reference has been brought to recent times in the discussion in Pires (2014), which analyses the cultural decentralization approach of the Polo Cultural initiative, implemented by the Culture Secretariat during the administration of Luiz Marinho as a mayor (2013-2016). This action was defined as a work methodology based on the concept of Cultural Citizenship where the Polo Cultural constitutes a “forum where authorities and society can debate” (Pires, 2014, p. 18). The aim was to foster a participative administration and the spontaneity of local culture in neighborhoods. With that purpose, such a forum should translate into periodic open meetings at Polos Culturais. The design and the results of this policy were very similar to those of the program Ação Cultural nos Bairros, developed by the previous administration of the city.

Yet another example is the experience of Diadema, where the concept of decentralization was also observed, as in Nascimento (2013). In that article, the author points out that the city has a history of policies oriented towards social inclusion, with operations both in the center and the outskirts of the city. Contemporary with the administrations of Celso Frateschi (Santo André), Luiz Roberto Alves (São Bernardo) and Marilena Chauí (São Paulo), José Augusto became the mayor of Diadema (1989/1992) adopting a attitude that was coherent to the principles of these administrations.


In this administration, seven infrastructures were inaugurated, the Centros Juvenis de Cultura (CJC, youth centers of culture) spread across the neighborhoods of the city, with the aim of combating the social violence that threatened young people. In addition to these seven cultural centers, ten libraries and one astronomical observatory were inaugurated. The following administration, that of José Fillipi Junior (1993- 1996), allegedly maintained the coordination between cultural investments and combating violence, prioritizing culture and expanding investments. In this period the first conference for education, culture, sport and leisure was held (Congresso de Educação, Cultura, Esporte e Lazer) whose main subject was “building cultural citizenship” (Nascimento, 2013, p. 15). Since then, enjoyment, production, participation and

information have been the backbone of cultural policy. In the same administration, three more cultural centers were created in 1995, reaching ten out of eleven neighborhoods (Nascimento, 2013).

The work of Nascimento (2013) is evidence that the policies occurred regardless of the academic interest or not in researching them: during the administration of José Fillipi Junior and until 2001, for example, no publication on cultural policies was found in Diadema; even so, in this administration, there was the first Congress of Education, Culture, Sport and Leisure, a fact that was rescued and presented by Nascimento two decades later. In other words, although in this literature review Diadema's experience appears only recently, we see that there are cultural public policy practices relevant to the discussion we intend in this work being developed in the city since the 1990s; which can be extended as a relevant consideration about the scope and limits of this analysis, as well as its potential as an initial systematization that could dialogue with future studies.

As shown in Figure 3, this arrangement of direct administration of cultural programs and spaces was the only one mentioned until 2009, when publications on the Cultura Viva Program began to emerge and gain prominence in academic production. It is also from this period that works will appear on the theme of institutionalizing the structures responsible for the production of public cultural policies in municipalities, as recommended by the National Culture System.

Figure 03: Mention to the arrangements for the creation of cultural policies in the bibliographic review by year of publication



Source: Elaborated by the authors.

Thus, we consider critical to mention that these works report on the creation of public cultural infrastructure, the existence of cultural programs operating in a territorialized manner inside the same municipality (the cases of Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema), as well as the creation of institutions for the creation of public policies before the appearance of the National Culture System as a benchmark policy. This last aspect arises, specifically, in the Cultural Fund of Santo André, a case of joint administration in which two members were representatives of the cultural community and three were appointed by the city hall (Frateschi, 1993); and also in Santo André's Municipal Council for Culture, whose implementation was recognized in 2000, with the aim of institutionalizing the relationship between cultural areas and the municipal administration, allowing thus for a joint creation of cultural policies in the municipality (Barros, 2010).

4.3 Monitoring the Public Debate on the Production of Cultural Public Policies in the Grande ABC Region Through an Experimental Instrument: New Arrangements in Debate?

Finally, a last result of the research activities carried out between 2016 and 2019 on municipal autonomy and the production of public policies on culture in the Grande ABC region was the development, on an experimental basis, of an instrument to monitor the public debate registered in the local media about these policies between 2018 and 2019. After all, would we be able to map the existence of other arrangements for the production of public cultural policies that would bring us “clues” (Alvesson; Karreman, 2007) regarding the debate on the exercise of autonomy in this public policy arena?

Soon we noticed that many times the news selected by the search engine was not related to the search theme; therefore, a process of checking the information by the researchers was necessary. For this, we created a form to register this news to show the type of content linked and the arrangement related to the production of cultural public policies involved.

The form was divided into two parts: “Section 1 – General news data”; and “Section 2 – Inferred Analytical Data”. The first section is mandatory for all news selected by tags and evaluated by researchers; it focuses on identifying information, such as web address, news title and full text, date of publication, source vehicle, referenced municipality, level of government involved, policy arenas involved beyond culture and, finally, the type of news selected. This primary information is essential for later locating

the data and analyzing the disseminated content. This last topic was fundamental for filtering out what was being disseminated as the municipality's cultural agenda and what was being debated as a production of public policies.

The second section, in turn, was built to monitor the types of arrangements involved in the production of these public policies. Furthermore, this part focuses on the types of horizontal and vertical intergovernmental relationships engaged in producing and implementing the actions reported and the actors involved in these policies.

Once this instrument has matured, we monitored, during the first half of 2019, the flow of news mainly linked to online press vehicles in the ABC region, reaching 128 publications analyzed. As a result, we observe Ribeirão Pires, Santo André and Diadema as the most referenced municipalities. Concerning the government levels, we found municipal action as the main focus (71.1%), followed by the presence of the state government (18.8%). Still, more than two-thirds of the records were classified as news of events, agenda, or cultural equipment promotion. Moving on to the analysis of session two, we have a total of 99 news selected. Of these, 66.7% link information from events that took place in public cultural facilities, with 91.9% having free access.

This exercise provided us with information about the content of the public debate in the cultural arena in the Greater ABC region, which at first may be characterized mainly by the dissemination of events. However, it also served to illustrate the existence of other arrangements present in this arena - previously little noticed in the literature review and in studies that departed from the national experience on the subject, but which may be relevant as a future agenda for studies on public cultural policies in the region: public cultural facilities linked to the state government – level of government still little discussed in the literature of this policy arena – and managed through a Management Contract with Social Organizations – in the case of the Culture Factories¹³; the existence of Public Project Selection Notices¹⁴, aimed at fostering local cultural agents and financed by municipal funds - as is the case in Santo André; and the agreement between the municipality and the federal government for the construction and management of cultural equipment, which after delivery becomes the entire responsibility of the city - the case of

¹³ The Diadema Culture Factory is managed by the Poiesis Social Organization. Available at < <http://www.fabricasdecultura.org.br/gestao-poesis/> > Accessed on July 3, 2021.

¹⁴ Selection Notices for the Santo André Culture Fund. Available at < <https://www3.santoandre.sp.gov.br/agendacultural/> > Accessed on July 3, 2021.

the CEU Arts and Sports Program¹⁵, which is present in four of the seven municipalities in the region. We also observe more frequently the references and experiences of Ribeirão Pires, together with Santo André and Diadema, suggesting that a municipality that is still little studied in the literature can contribute to the debate.

5. Conclusions

With the results presented in this work - on local institutional structures, the Cultura Viva program in the region, the systemization and review of the available literature about municipal experiences in this area and the development of an experimental tool for monitoring the public debate in the region, we consider that there are important contributions to the debate on the space for the exercise of municipal autonomy in the creation of cultural policies in the Grande ABC region.

Firstly, we realized that, in spite of the relevance of federal initiatives and their role as a reference for the national debate, cultural policies, in subnational levels, are not limited to these contributions. Historically, after the 1988 Federal Constitution, municipalities have innovated in creating and implementing these public policies and, in the territory of this research, the case is the same: proposing and creating new public cultural infrastructure, with different purposes; theoretical approaches for the creation of public policies, guided by the notions of decentralization, territorialization and promotion of citizenship; and even the creation of institutions currently guided by the National Culture System are part of the experience gathered in the region.

In this sense, we see a relevant space for the exercise of municipal autonomy, even now. Despite dynamics that can be considered of recentralization in Brazilian federalism, the studied municipalities seem to remain with conditions and resources to innovate and develop public policies in this policy arena that are adequate to local demands. More than that, in cases such as the Cultura Viva Program, we saw that, in addition to a local history in this regard, there remains the perception, with public managers and cultural agents, that this dialogue between the State and Civil Society is essential for adjustments in the production of these public policies carried out by the federal government – which points to an agenda of studies on intergovernmental relations in this specific arena and the role that local governments can play in this context.

¹⁵ The CEU Arts and Sports program is present in Santo André, with two units, Diadema, Mauá and Ribeirão Pires, with one unit per municipality. Available at < <https://epracas.cultura.gov.br/> > Accessed on July 3, 2021.

Future studies may also involve arrangements developed in this region that involve the promotion of cultural actions through public selection notices and the shared management of equipment and programs - either with Social Organizations or through other experiences that promote articulation and cooperation between different levels of government, as in the case of the CEU program for Arts and Sports, for example. Another agenda is related to the systematization presented here regarding local institutions for the production of cultural public policies: it is possible to monitor these institutions to verify their presence over time, as well as deepen their role in the production of these policies based on case studies. Similarly, the systematization of the literature produced on the experiences of this region can be deepened and complemented in its gaps in terms of policies, institutional structures, and studied municipalities. Finally, the perspective of decentralization of public cultural policies in the municipalities themselves, also indicated in the literature as their territorialization, are also indicative of relevant paths for research on municipal autonomy, its challenges, and possibilities.

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