EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC IN LEGAL ANALYSIS AND COMMUNICATION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE
The concept of experimental logic of John Dewey assumes that creativity and subjectivity are the basis of a complex system of legal institutions. The aim of the article is to discuss this concept, to show its assumptions in relation to legal reasoning and to justify, based on this concept, an experimental approach to solving legal problems. A lawyer who wants to go beyond matrix thinking must develop a certain mental and practical agility. Understanding and applying the experimental logic of John Dewey allows for achieving this agility. Although the reasoning based on the assumptions of formal logic is undoubtedly necessary in the work of a lawyer, any strict application of the syllogistic form is not appropriate, as it does not refer to the actual development of law. The dichotomy between theory and practice is completely illusory, since the solution of a legal problem must take into account all its aspects, not only its formal part.
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