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# Recommending Public Policies: a case study on the World Bank and participatory budgeting

*Recomendando Políticas Públicas: um estudo de caso sobre o Banco Mundial e o orçamento participativo*

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**Abstract:** The conception of the Participatory Budgeting (PB) in the city of Porto Alegre, in 1989, marks the emergence of a participation policy at the local level that emerges as an innovative practice. The success of PB draws the attention of international organizations (IOs), which carry out its tracking and, successively, boost its phenomenon of international diffusion. However, what factors would be responsible for the PB methodology after its implementation in a location? In order to seek empiricism in our analysis, we propose a case study about the World Bank's action, selecting the location of Maputo as the unit of analysis. We verified the methodology resulting from the transfer process to deduce which mechanisms are decisive for its operationalization. We argue that endogenous factors within our unit are determinants for the type of operationalization that PB will assume.

**Keywords:** International Organizations; World Bank; Participatory Budgeting.

**Resumo**: A concepção do Orçamento Participativo (OP) na cidade de Porto Alegre, em 1989, demarca o surgimento de uma política de participação a nível local que desponta como prática inovadora. O sucesso do OP chama a atenção de organizações internacionais (OIs), que executam o seu rastreamento e, sucessivamente, impulsionam o seu fenômeno de difusão internacional. Contudo, quais fatores seriam responsáveis pela metodologia final do OP após sua implementação numa localidade? Para consubstanciar empirismo à nossa análise, propomos um estudo de caso acerca da atuação do Banco Mundial, selecionando como unidade de análise a localidade de Maputo (Moçambique). Verificamos a metodologia resultante do processo de transferência para deduzir quais mecanismos são decisivos para a sua operacionalização. Argumentamos que fatores

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endógenos à unidade são determinantes para o tipo de operacionalização que o OP irá assumir.

**Palavras-chave**: Organizações Internacionais; Banco Mundial; Orçamento Participativo.

## 1. Introduction

International organizations (IOs) are often involved in tracking policies implemented by national and local authorities. Using verification and evaluation of policy programs, these organizations influence policymakers directly through the sponsorship of policy and conditional loans and indirectly through their conferences and the publication of official reports (Dolowitz; Marsh, 2000). The position occupied by IOs in the international arena allows them to scientifically analyze political matters and identify the most effective innovations for countries' domestic problems (Nakamoto; Nomura; Ikeda, 2021).

These practices reached the heart of international organizations especially during the 1990s when IOs engaged in the core of social policies (Faria, 2018). In the same period, the principle of social participation in deliberation processes at the local level came to be supported by national and international actors (Milani, 2008). Amid this debate, the Participatory Budget (PB) creation in the city of Porto Alegre (Brazil) in 1989 attracted international actors' attention intrigued about its participation practices (Avritzer, 2008). International organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank, started their engagement in the diffusion process of this policy, promoting the PB through the publication of manuals and aiding the development of experiences in other locations around the globe (Oliveira, 2016).

When it comes to the phenomenon of policy diffusion the literature tends to account for its practices as a series of processes, concentrating efforts on understanding how political innovations are spread and from which structures they circulate. These studies, however, are not interested in examining whether there is evidence of the policy's effectiveness after it is implemented in an adopting location (Dobbin; Simmons; Garret, 2007). The analyzes of policy transfer processes, on the other hand, seek to find what occurred during this process, as the level of convergence that a policy has achieved and its degree of variability (Marsh; Sharman, 2009). Given these different approaches and scopes, and considering our concern to contribute to the analysis of political transfer, we set on the following question: which factors are decisive for the final framework of the

PB transferred by an IO? In the course of a policy transfer process until its implementation phase, which mechanisms are decisive to define the final product of this public policy?

We carried out a case study on the World Bank and participatory budgeting, analyzing the institution's role in the international diffusion of the device and then evaluating the transfer process headed by the Bank to Maputo City, in Mozambique. Thus, we seek to analyze causal mechanisms responsible for the operationality of the model implemented in the unit of analysis. We claim that factors endogenous to the location are more salient to define the PB model in a policy transfer process, even if supported by the technical recommendations of an IO. However, due to the methodological nature of this research, we do not seek to go beyond the limits of this investigation or suggest our claim to be valid for other cases of policy transfer. We adopt the case study approach to use theories (policy diffusion and transfer) to decipher the knowledge exchange between an IO and a municipality and the results arising from these practices.

As placed these assertions, our paper is arranged as follows: we reserved a topic below to investigate the state of the debate about diffusion processes and the role of international organizations, as well as what is the literature on policy transfer at the local level telling us so far. Next, we explain the assumptions of the case study to settle the method's importance in our empirical investigation. Finally, we assess the World Bank's actions to promote the PB and the program methodology implemented in the Municipality of Maputo. The conclusion closes this work.

## 2. Diffusion and transfer of public policy

In this topic, we overview some points of the discussions related to policy diffusion and transference processes. It is necessary to emphasize that these concepts, although presenting methodological distinctions, are complementary and interactive. Therefore, underlining their distinctions and common conceptual denominators is crucial for the scope of this work.

### *2.1. The policy diffusion process*

The term "diffusion" is described in the literature as a range of processes (Elkins; Simmons, 2005). For authors such as Strang and Soule (1998), diffusion can be categorized as an outcome of a disseminated practice or policy; in Eyestone's (1977)

definition, the phenomenon is characterized as a pattern of successive adoptions of a given policy; on the other hand, for Klinger-Vidra and Schleifer (2014), the term is posited as a causal process in which diffusing mechanisms transmit an item – or a public policy model – from its point of origin to an adopting one. It occurs when innovation circulates through interaction channels between actors of a social structure (Rogers, 1995). Within these channels, outputs of a government's policy have the potential to affect the agenda preferences of other governments (Strang, 1991).

Although the concept of diffusion has variant definitions, Elkins and Simmons (2005) point out that most scholars see the phenomenon not as a result, but as a class of mechanisms and processes interlinked to achieve a likely outcome. In general, the literature considers that the most widespread policies are those that already have been tested and had satisfactory degrees of effectiveness according to the purposes they sought to answer (Coêlho, 2016). After all, it makes more sense for government officials to incorporate into their agenda practices that have been tried and tested beforehand instead of spending time and political capital to devise new experiments whose success are uncertain. "Why reinventing the wheel if other governments have already found the institutions and programs that produce positive change?" (Wampler, 2016, p. 157).

For the diffusion to take place, four coordinated political processes are essential. First, the agenda political setting is prominent for delimiting the policies to be implemented. Second, there is the information exchange stage, when political actors are aware of the functioning of a particular government policy or practice. Therefore, the key actors define the model to be adopted, adjusting it in accord with their political will and functional needs. Finally, the policy is implemented (Karch, 2007).

### 2.1.1. Diffusion of innovations or good practices

At the same time, it is suitable to ask ourselves: what policies will be disseminated in the international arena? The answer is, as stated above, those that have been tested and had a satisfactory degree of success. Regarding this assertion we find ourselves in a field that is inserted in the discussions about diffusion, which is classified in the literature as political innovations (Berry; Berry, 1999; Lenschow; Liefferink; Veenman, 2005; Farah, 2008). Specifically, in the domain of public policy, the analysis focus on the dissemination of what is seen as new or that differs from the "conventional". Initiatives aimed at disseminating policies labeled like this interpret programs in circulation either

as “good practices” (or “best practices”) or as innovations (Farah, 2008). Innovation is characterized, therefore, as a new and successful arrangement that gathers potentially useful elements for solving a specific problem in further contexts and locations (Farah, 2006).

The diffusion of policies is deep-seated to the concept of innovation as this technique inherently implies the adoption of preexisting inventions given the expectation of political or social improvement. Farah (2008) points out this presupposes the comparison between different cases to find a “formula” or model that fits the demands of the adopter. Thus, if there is a common problem among different locations, that innovation tends to be seen by external actors as virtually useful. Policymakers are inclined to shape their beliefs based on the experiences of other countries, updating acquaintance as information about an object builds up. Insofar as this happens, hypotheses about the effectiveness of a given innovation are either discarded or reinforced. The likelihood that the formulators' beliefs harmonize with the model of a policy will be linked to the existing evidence about the functioning of this policy (Dobbin; Simmons; Garret, 2007).

According to Dobbin, Simmons, and Garret (2007), the policy would gain widespread acceptance from the following grounds: when countries advocate, through their leadership, the direction to be followed; when specialists engaged in the dissemination of knowledge convince decision-makers through theorizing feasible justifications; and, finally, when these same individuals present data on the adequacy of a policy to a given context or under given circumstances. Hence, innovative policy enters the radar of diffusion processes through specialized authorities and their performance, as is the case with epistemic communities. This category of experts is distinguished for their competence to make assessments, judgments, and recommendations based on their body of knowledge (Liese et al, 2021), which allows them to identify the policies considered most effective. For example, the technical staff of IOs would promote formal theories with political implications, and thanks to their rhetorical reach these new practices would legitimize their adoption by political actors (Dobbin; Simmons; Garret, 2007).

### 2.1.2. The role of IOs in the diffusion process

Concerning the actors involved in the diffusion process we highlight the prominent participation of International Organizations. It is typical for IOs to drag

policies classified as innovative and propagate them by offering technical assistance so that governments can reproduce them based on the collected knowledge (Faria, 2018). Given the high position they hold for defending values deemed universal these institutions are seen as serving a legitimate social purpose. In addition, the specialized knowledge of their technical staff means that the IOs have an expressive reputation as agents who address issues based on rational and technical purposes (Barnett; Finnemore, 2004; Faria, 2018; Liese et al, 2021). This gives IOs authority over the burden delegated to them and clarifies their capillarity degree in debates involving the formulation of the political agenda in the multilevel sense.

Institutions such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations (UN) – and here we bear the role of their agencies and their multifaceted institutional bodies – became increasingly concerned about the dissemination of ideas, programs, and institutions around the world. Its power to directly influence national policymakers expands, either through its conditional lending policies or through the dissemination of knowledge about policy models in conferences and reports (Dolowitz; Marsh, 2000).

IOs can also actively participate in local implementation by advocating the transfer of instruments and norms collaboratively with national and sub-national authorities (Nay, 2014). The specialized authority of international bureaucracies is expected to exert greater influence on units that lack cognitive resources or experience within their bureaucracies, as these locations have greater demand for external information and advice. In general, those are governments with lower material capacities and budgets, with ministries poorly equipped in terms of human and financial resources (Liese et al, 2021). It is commonplace for these multilateral institutions to recommend hiring specific consultants or sending experts from their agencies, which does not necessarily mean that they will be involved in harmonizing practices in local political systems (Dolowitz; Marsh, 2000). That is, policy recommendations by IOs would be considered an output, while the implementation process by bureaucrats at the domestic level would be a potential outcome (Liese et al, 2021).

### *2.2.Transfer and implementation of Public Policies*

While diffusion is addressed in discussions as the result of a chain of processes, public policy scholars, in contrast, are more likely to look at policy transfer, analyzing its

nuances in terms of degree and variability (Marsh; Sharman, 2009). This is because while the works on diffusion tend to emphasize structures – which involve a contingent number of adopters –, the transference topics privilege agencies, giving prevalence to the referred units and the performance of agents (Coêlho, 2016). Diffusion research addresses general patterns characteristic of the spread of innovations within political systems, focusing on spatial, structural, and socioeconomic reasons for investigating patterns of adoption. The analysis of political transfer, on the other hand, investigates the underlying causes and inner contents of these exchange processes between actors (Bennett, 1991; Jordana; Levi-Faur, 2005; Knill, 2005).

Despite both phenomena being observed as distinct paradigms, it is important to emphasize that their practices are complementary. As stated by Marsh and Sharman (2009), the literature lays the relationship between structure and agency as dialectic: structures provide the context in which agents act, restrict or facilitate their actions. Simultaneously, they interpret these structures and adapt them while they act. It is interesting to emphasize this interaction between both concepts to show how such dynamics affect the processes here described. Furthermore, despite the methodological differences between diffusion and transfer, both approaches generally identify four common mechanisms as their catalysts: learning, political competition, coercion, and emulation (Coêlho, 2016). These mechanisms receive different degrees of attention within discussions on diffusion and transfer. However, we confer special attention to learning and emulation mechanisms. As transfer analysis places special emphasis on the first one (Marsh; Sharman, 2009), the latter involves the notion of "borrowed ideas" from other models (Coêlho, 2016). So, untangling both definitions and their practices is convenient for the discussions proposed here.

### 2.2.1. Learning and Policy Emulation

The learning mechanism consists of a rational decision by governments to simulate foreign institutions or practices in an attempt to produce more efficient political results (Rose, 1991). Such a process can led to a partial or complete transfer of a policy, through a bilateral approach (between units or agents) or a problem-solving proposal in transnational policy networks or epistemic communities (Marsh; Sharman, 2009). Nonetheless, there is a problem in making learning inferences based on meetings and exchanges of information among policymakers, as those events do not necessarily mean

that an adopter has entirely assimilated the learning content from the other part. Evidence of using external experiences is not necessarily evidence of learning, just as importing a technology does not furnish a copy of that model in particular (Bennett, 1991).

The emulation mechanism is in turn characterized by a process of policy imitation, in symbolic or normative terms (Coêlho, 2016), by using evidence from a rehearsed experience to draw lessons entailed in an outside program (Bennett, 1991). Throughout that process actors aim to copy successful policies and arrangements elsewhere (Klinger-Vidra; Schleifer, 2014). In some dimensions emulation can yield lessons and convergences relating to the policy's initial purpose – objectives, program content, or policy instruments (Bennett, 1991) –, but Coêlho (2016) reinforces that due to the particularity of this appropriation of "borrowed ideas" the mechanism is not guided by rational and planned decisions. Therefore, the operationalization of policy instruments incurs adaptability failures once in the context of local institutions' dynamics. As an imperfect duplication of the original model it is expected that the success of the emulation and its degree of convergence depends on the information accessible to the emulator (Klinger-Vidra; Schleifer, 2014).

2.2.2. The local context as a variable

As reminded by Elkins and Simmons (2005), the information exchange environment in the international arena is a winding path. Inequacies could be developed as a result of cognition biases and predictable limitations during the processes of learning and emulating a practice. Currently, national policymakers have difficulty in fully assessing the consequences of imported programs. In addition, although international actors such as the IOs have a high level of scientific knowledge their ideas are subjected to political conditions of a particular context (Fang; Stone, 2016).

Studies on policy convergence emphasize the importance of exported object resonance in importer cultural and institutional contexts (Waarden, 1995; Strang; Meyer, 1993). Discussions about convergence patterns interpose not only the interactions between actors in the international arena but also how domestic factors behave in the face of the entry of policy instruments (Lenschow; Liefferink; Veenman, 2005). In this sense, debates in the public policy field play a balancing role as they look at the transfer from the perspective of domestic conditions (Marsh; Sharman, 2009).

To allude to the importance of local factors in the transference processes, Farah (2008) states that the adopting location is not a passive unit, but virtually defines the

characteristics that will be incorporated into the innovation throughout its adoption process. If the local bureaucracies' agenda does not provide proper mechanisms for operating a program, practices that lifted it to the status of innovation become irrelevant. Also, this could happen as a consequence of: (I) the municipality does not glimpse the benefits of a policy, considering it expendable for social and political reasons linked to the place itself; (II) the adoption of the program is not a priority in the scope of government actions due to a tradeoff between available resources and desired outcomes (Farah, 2008). It is also worth highlighting the problem with bounded rationality. Weyland (2007) sheds light on this issue by naming it as a problem for the learning process among governments. By not fully mastering political information, adopters run the risk of not learning effectively from the practices of an innovation. Lastly, we point out the cultural aspect. Political discourses by local authorities encompass narratives about internal change processes and can even guide a policy reshape based on adjustments for local reality (Lenschow; Liefferink; Veenman, 2005).

## 3. Research methodology: Case Study

For our analysis, we employ a qualitative design using a case study as a model. The use of the qualitative method is an important tool for research that dialogues with the IR field, as it has advantages when dealing with complex phenomena, which involve interactions between structural and agent-level variables. In particular, the intensive study of one or a few cases allows grasping distinct concepts with a closer look at their conceptions (Bennett; Elman, 2007).

We assert that our predilection for a case study is motivated by our need to verify the assumptions behind causal relationships in a model (Seawright; Gerring, 2008). Researches approaching case studies are interested in finding conditions that transpose into specific results, as well as the mechanisms that induce their occurrence, instead of prioritizing a frequency estimation in which these conditions and their results occur within a phenomenon (George; Bennett, 2005). Accordingly, a case study is useful for examining in detail the operation of causal mechanisms in individual cases. Thereby, analyzing a single case we can observe intervening variables, operating aspects of a certain causal mechanism, and identify the conditions that perpetuate it (George; Bennett, 2005).

Furthermore, a case study is auspicious for filling gaps that quantitative methods and statistical models fail to provide satisfactory answers to. In methodological terms, research on international diffusion tends to use quantitative techniques to explore a large number of cases (large-N cross-case analysis) to produce generalizations regarding the reasons and the outcomes of the process. By contrast, the policy transfer literature tends to use qualitative analysis to assess a small number of cases (small-N) (Marsh; Sharman, 2009). The study with a limited number of cases facilitates its use to clarify a theory and interpret it from a pedagogical lens (George; Bennett, 2005).

In this sense, such approach serves our purposes of avoiding an analysis exclusively absorbed in the tracking diffusion processes, as well as focused on a contingent number of actors, and allow us to look closely at the transferred object (the PB recommended by World Bank) and our unit of analysis (Maputo). Regarding the variables, we consider the PB implemented in the selected unit as our dependent variable, whereas we classify the local context as the defining variable of the operational methodology that the instrument assumes after its transfer process is concluded.

## 4. The World Bank and PB: the international diffusion and transfer to Maputo City

The World Bank is a famous case of a International Organization involved in the diffusion of ideas. In addition to its status as a leading financial institution, the Bank spends approximately $200 million a year providing analysis and advice to client countries, in particular as a mean of influencing the political priorities of developing nations (Knack et al, 2020). An important hallmark of the World Bank is that these services are provided in partnership with government officials. In other words, national and local bureaucracies act together with the Bank's specialists for diagnosing problems and, based on the information exchange, those specialists formulate policy recommendations to resolve such complexities (Knack et al, 2020). So, how are these practices present in the promotion of Participatory Budgeting?

### *4.1. The World Bank and the diffusion of Participatory Budget*

The World Bank's commitment to promoting Participatory Budgeting dates back to the second half of the 1990s. In October 1996, a conference held in Washington recorded the first signs of interest aroused by the Bank in PB technology (Oliveira, 2013). On that occasion, 20 experiences conceived in Latin America of a partnership between civil society and government were presented. Among them, Porto Alegre’s PB stood out

and was considered one of the experiences with the greatest potential for social impact. From then onwards, relations with the city of Porto Alegre were strengthened and thematic events to promote the device were organized between the technical staff of the institution and delegations from the city of Rio Grande do Sul[2] (Oliveira, 2016).

When discussing the guiding principles of this policy, the Bank highlights characteristics such as transparency, the democratization of participation channels, and the inclusion of economic sectors in the negotiation process for the allocation of expenses (World Bank, 2011). The organization's documents on the PB highlight the need for participation in developing countries, where the promotion of governance, transparency, and social justice reforms would be possible with a sense of shared responsibility through citizen participation (Moynihan, 2007).

> PB is a good entry point to establish strong links between elected governments and the civil society, even when it is not very strong. In effect, it is being demonstrated that PB generates a high level of Social Capital. At the same time, the existing social organizations are reinforced and new ones tend to emerge, as service organizations, linked in the first instance to obtaining a share of the public resources for very concrete improvement of their constituencies. Also PB has a demonstrated side effect that is the modernization of local administrations and their gradual transformation into more "open to the public" institutions (World Bank, 2009, p. 103).

Initially, the PB goes through a dynamic of recognition by the Bank. Afterward, this movement is transformed into evaluation and recommendation activities, until the organization starts to carry out its implementation through direct channels (Oliveira, 2013). Around the 2000s, the dynamics and projects related to PB were accentuated. Over time, technical staff from the World Bank specialized in PB who had previously worked in the URB-AL program or integrated projects in other institutions join the Bank's institutional body (Oliveira, 2013). Those specialists then proceed to confection instructional manuals on the PB methodology, directly contacting municipal authorities to provide assistance to implement the device.

This promotion of the PB by the Bank also took place through international meetings and with the help of financing projects in municipal locations. Oliveira (2016) emphasizes that two events coordinated by the institution were fundamental for promoting the diffusion of PB in the African continent: one held in Porto Alegre (2006)

[2] As an example, the author mentions the holding of an International Seminar on Participatory Democracy in the city of Porto Alegre, which was sponsored by the World Bank's Development Institute. The event was attended by experts and observers from American countries.

and the second in Durban, South Africa (2008). Through the realization of these events, several African countries – some of which had already developed experiences that were still embryonic – were able to acquire know-how for the development of practices derived from this innovation.

The World Bank also sponsored a series of workshops on participatory budgeting, as well as assisting hundreds of citizens in PB activities with its Community Empowerment and Social Inclusion program (World Bank, 2005; Goldfrank, 2012). Another project in the same direction was the Civil Society Budget Initiative, initiated by the Department of Social Development in 2000. The initiative sought to promote accountability and transparency in the management of public expenditures, involving civil society groups in budget processes. As its activities advanced, the initiative moved towards a type of "coalition" between the World Bank, civil society organizations (CSOs), local governments, and donor agencies. Such mobilization predisposed these actors to collaborate in providing technical and financial support for the capacity building of CSOs committed to the development of PB experiences in countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (World Bank, 2005).

### *4.2. Participatory Budgeting in Maputo City*

#### 4.2.1. Local conditions in Maputo/Mozambique

Before going into the transfer process performed by OI in our unit of analysis, it is interesting to highlight some important local conditions to know the context in which this policy is inserted. Levistky and Way (2012) describe Mozambique as a case of "competitive authoritarian regime": in these regimes, democratic institutions prevail and are seen as a condition to posit in power, but due to the historic dominance of parties that emerged from violent and ideologically motivated conflicts, public arenas are in the hands of a representative minority associated to these parties. In the Mozambican context, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) has dominated the political spheres of Maputo since national independence in 1975.

Another noteworthy property of the Mozambican context is the civil society's low adhesion to participatory processes. The country has an optional preferential vote system and voter turnout in municipal elections is traditionally low, although this index varies in each electoral process, reaching the 50% mark in 2013 (Dias, 2015). The population is also characterized by a strong bond with local leaders, whether in terms of political life

or namely the most trivial – such as influential party figures and religious leaders (Dias, 2015). Such proselytism influences aspects of political life in the country, as it acquiesces the transit of political elites among social strata and reduces constraints on party dominance (Sumitch, 2010). Those dynamics weaken civil society's recognition of the role of autarchies and weaken citizens' commitment to the public sphere (Dias, 2015).

4.2.2. The trajectory of PB in Maputo City

Within Mozambican sociopolitical particularities, Maputo was the first municipality in the country to develop participatory budgeting practices (Dias, 2015). The PB program was introduced by the economist and Frelimo exponent Eneas Comiche. After being elected President of the Municipality in 2003 he introduced the inclusion of citizens in decision-making processes as one of the goals for the municipality development. This proposal brew when during his terms Comiche implemented PROMAPUTO, a program that aimed at deepening participatory governance and qualifying local institutions to deliver services to the local community (Nguenha, 2009; World Bank, 2020). As a result of PROMAPUTO, the Municipality underwent a gradual decentralization of power to district administrations (Nylen, 2014). Encompassed by the programs that constituted these reforms was the PB, which bear being implemented in 2008 (Jamal, 2017). That is, the movement of its implementation was borne out top-down, as it started from a political initiative coming from the local leaderships.

It was in this very context that World Bank was involved in activities to promote PB in Sub-Saharan Africa, as part of its agenda for the dissemination of best practices across the African continent. Circumstances converged for Comiche and his political office to participate in a series of international conferences in order to address technical knowledge about PB and its methodological marks (Nylen, 2014). As a result, municipal delegations in Maputo made travels in pursuit of improving expertise about participatory budgeting, including a teaching workshop promoted by the World Bank in Porto Alegre in 2006. These training trips contributed to the formulation of the first versions of the Maputo PB operational methodology (Oliveira, 2013).

Maputo went through two participatory budgeting experiments that took place in 2008 and 2010 (Dias, 2015). In the first year, the program's initiatives covered 64 neighborhoods, but out of the projects that emerged, a portion of them was not implemented or the implementation process was financially bumpy. This reality served as the basis for a model and methodological revisions so a recycling process could be

started in 2011 when 44 of the poorest neighbors of the Municipality were selected to receive PB instruments (Nguenha, 2014).

However, it should be noted that we will not invest in a thorough analysis of the two early methodologies mentioned, as their implementation process took place internally without direct interference from the World Bank. What should be pointed, as Dias (2015) observes, is that both attempts registered weaknesses in their functionality and, soon after, in the results achieved. This weakness led the Bank in partnership with the municipal authorities to bring a diagnosis of the process and to propose a new PB methodology for Maputo.

4.2.3. The PB of Maputo City under the auspices of the World Bank

In the World Bank's assessment of Mozambican PB experiences, the institution points out that the projects are in nature more consultative than deliberative. The Bank reinforces that programs could reach maturity if they placed people's participation at the center of their priorities (World Bank, 2009). “These are experimental practices, which lack methodological consolidation, technical training and greater consistency in political support” (Dias, 2015, p. 16).

Due to the difficulties presented by the two first versions of Maputo’s PB, the Bank started a policy project so that the program did not become a stillborn experiment in the Mozambican capital. Thus, in 2010, its institutional design was revised with the help of external consultants from the Bank to resume its activities (Oliveira, 2013). In June 2011, consultant Louis Helling and Portuguese PB expert Nelson Dias were appointed by the World Bank to deliver a new project to the President of Municipality David Simango[3].

After meetings with officials from the Simango office, the Bank's consultants presented the following proposal: the Bank would be responsible for donating technical assistance and would provide Dias' services as a full-time consultant, on condition that the local authorities agree on the following pillars:

1. Neighborhood meeting participants should discuss and decide on micro-projects in a concrete way, rather than narrowly focused areas of priority need.

[3] During this context, the municipal power was under the command of David Simango. Nylen (2014) notes that, although Simango was not effectively opposed to the PB idea, at the same time he was not enthusiastic about supporting a project idealized by his opponent.

2. Neighborhood secretaries, councilors, and city block chiefs should be prevented from controlling decision-making processes; their responsibilities being exclusively the organization of meetings and assisting in the execution of projects.
3. Monitoring groups should be elected from among the participating citizens.
4. Resources for the PB should be included in the annual budget, in addition the budget being financed locally and not dependent on external donors (the Bank's proposal was for an annual PB budget of 50 million Meticais or US$1,555,000).
5. The PB must be institutionalized to preserve from the same volatility as previous experiments and effectively become part of local administrative activities (NYLEN, 2014).

This third PB methodology prescribed by the World Bank – which began in April 2012 – functioned as a kind of PB "microproject", in which the incorporation of annual budgets into its program served as an effort to reconstruct deliberative procedures among neighborhoods (Nylen, 2014). The readapted version by the Bank also stipulated in its methodology the following cycles: (I) budget definition – that is, a plan of citizen participation in the presentation of the proposals – for the most voted projects in each neighborhood; (II) budget execution, so projects could be implemented and delivered to the population (Dias, 2015).

Eventually, Simango agreed with the terms set by the Bank, putting as a counter-proposal the reduction of the budget required by the institution in half of the amount, so that could reflect the financial reality of the city – the 50 million Meticais stipulated would be reduced by half and would represent 1.7% of the Maputo's total public budget. Still, in the final document, the President signaled a commitment that as municipal revenues increased, the portion allocated to the PB would increase proportionately (Nylen, 2014).

The cycle of PB meetings in Maputo took place in 2012. In that year, 2,706 citizens from the 16 neighborhoods participated at in-district meetings, a number the corresponded to a percentage of 0.68% of a population of 399,601 inhabitants. In the following year, the participation of 3,446 participants was registered, equivalent to 0.90% of a civil society composed of 383,936 citizens, in 2013 (Nylen, 2014). It was also found that a significant number of participants did not stay until the end of the discussions. For example, in 7 of the 16 neighborhoods that measured numerical data during the 2013

round, an average of 54% of the participants voted, with the highest rate in the Bagamoyo neighborhood (78%) and the lowest in Magazine (39%). In other neighborhoods, monitoring groups also pointed out that abstention rates and the number of votes were lower than those present, despite not providing concrete numbers (Nylen, 2014). These numbers suggest a low level of adherence by the Maputo civil society, which contrasts with the Bank's stipulations that society should be included in participatory processes.

Notwithstanding the guarantee of sovereignty (Avritzer, 2003) to the population of Maputo can be observed in constitutive terms, given the principle of citizen participation, there was no process of participatory universalization among social segments. According to the findings of Nylen (2014), the predominance of members or individuals linked to Frelimo in PB meetings was evident. In the words of a district administrator interviewed by the author, most of the participants were directly linked to the district's administrative apparatus, which in turn were politically active city block leaders or neighborhood secretaries linked to Frelimo.

Similarly, Nylen (2014) identifies a total absence of civil society organizations (CSOs) throughout the processes related to the PB in Maputo. The only civil society organizations observed were either extension of Frelimo or were fundamentally service-oriented rather than fulfilling the purpose of serving as voices for sectors of society. In other words, the weaknesses of Mozambican society to engage in interactions and dialogue with the State apparatus (Nguenha, 2014) were prevalent in this new cycle of PB. Consequently, the fact that party members prevailed in the deliberative channels of the program entangled budget definitions by the neighborhood citizens.

About budget execution for the implementation of projects, Nylen (2014) found that out of the 16 proposals from 2012 scheduled for completion by the end of that year, only one had been inaugurated, two were on schedule, and six were in progress but delayed, and seven were in the process of being executed. When consulting members of the monitoring groups – all of them Frelimo members – approximately half demonstrated to be aware of the status of the project, while the other half had no information about its progress. The slowness and vacuum of information concerning the projects allow us to conclude, then, that the limitations of the PB in Maputo also extend to one of the most crucial stages of the deliberative process, which is its implementation phase. With no guarantee that they will have the basic infrastructure for the core problems of their

communities, citizens are unable to exercise effective decision-making power and remain dependent to local party elites.

## 5. Conclusion

In a portion of the Participatory Budgeting literature, there is a belief that a methodical design with the proper technical support will be a sufficient condition to guarantee tangible changes in the political and social environment, mainly by fostering participatory engagement within the population. In this case study, we demonstrate that this is an imprecise argument. The third version of the Maputo PB endorsed by the World Bank ended up confined to the power structures dominated by the Frelimo party. Notwithstanding the Bank's aspirations to adopt a design of inclusive nature and anchored at responsible governance principles, endogenous factors were instrumental in bringing this attempt to a halt.

The analyzed case also demonstrates that political transfer practices financed by an international organization, especially in a context where there is a strong presence of partisan power structures, do not guarantee convergence in the aspired assumptions. Since the World Bank is unable to exert direct influence on political and social aspects inherent to the context, the strength of the party elites and the municipal administration stands out and is more decisive for the operationalization of the model.

We also inferred that the World Bank's political agenda for participatory budgeting presents itself as a restrictive formula. From the institution's programmatic point of view, the case exposes that participatory budgeting practices do not necessarily subvert old clientelist traditions, providing more open and transparent policy-making processes. On the contrary, in the context of a competitive authoritarian regime like the one in Mozambique, policies in this sense can be implemented and strengthen the administrative apparatus in instances of direct contact with the population.

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