


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# The Informal Labor Market and The Costs of Sovereign Borrowing

*O Mercado de Trabalho Informal e os Custos dos Empréstimos Soberanos em Países Emergentes*

Natalia Dus Poiatti<sup>1</sup> 

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**Abstract:** The informal labor market or informal sector is responsible for an economically significant fraction of GDP production in emerging economies. Taking the informal sector to be all economic activity intentionally concealed from tax authorities to avoid tax payments, an increase in the sector adversely impacts the government ability to collect tax revenues and may increase the probability of sovereign default. In turn, higher probability of sovereign default makes borrowing in costlier international financial markets. However, the current macro-finance models do not properly account for the role of the informal sector in explaining sovereign default risk. In this paper, I estimate a vector autoregressive model measuring the causal relationships between sovereign spreads, a measure of default risk, and the size of the informal sector. The results indicate that the size of the informal sector is as important as formal output variations in explaining sovereign spreads. Therefore, policies designed by emerging economies to reduce the size of the informal labor market are important to decrease the costs of borrowing in international financial markets and increase the financing options for productive investment.

**Keywords:** Sovereign Spreads; Informal Labor Market; Dynamic Model; Tax Evasion.

**Resumo:** O mercado de trabalho informal ou o setor informal é responsável por uma fração economicamente significativa da produção do PIB nas economias emergentes. Considerando-se que o setor informal é toda a atividade econômica intencionalmente oculta às autoridades fiscais para evitar pagamentos de impostos, um aumento no setor afeta negativamente a capacidade do governo de coletar receitas tributárias e pode aumentar a probabilidade de inadimplência soberana. Por sua vez, uma maior

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probabilidade de inadimplência soberana torna os empréstimos nos mercados financeiros internacionais mais caros. No entanto, os atuais modelos de macro-finanças não representam adequadamente o papel do setor informal na explicação do risco soberano de inadimplência. Neste artigo, estimo um modelo de vetor auto-regressivo que mede as relações causais entre spreads soberanos, uma medida de risco de inadimplência, e o tamanho do setor informal. Os resultados indicam que o tamanho do setor informal é tão importante quanto as variações de produção formal na explicação dos spreads soberanos. Portanto, políticas elaboradas pelas economias emergentes para reduzir o tamanho do mercado de trabalho informal são importantes para diminuir os custos de empréstimos nos mercados financeiros internacionais e aumentar as opções de financiamento para investimentos produtivos.

**Palavras-chave:** Spreads Soberanos; Mercado de Trabalho Informal; Modelo Dinâmico; Evasão de Impostos.

## **1. Introduction**

The informal labor market is responsible for an economically significant fraction of GDP production in some countries, an average of 36.7 per cent of the "official" GDP of developing countries in 2005 (Schneider, 2007). Some advances have been made in understanding the economic and political consequences of informal labor market production (Schneider and Enste, 2000). By defining the informal sector to be all economic activity intentionally concealed from tax authorities in order to avoid tax payments, an increase in the sector is associated with a lower tax base *ceteris paribus*. At the same time, if the economy requires a determined level of public expenditure and the government is limited on its financing capacity, an increase in informal employment may lead to a higher default risk, which is equivalent to a higher probability of not repaying its debts obligations.

If a government has a higher default risk, investors require higher rates of return to lend to it in order to be compensated for the additional risk taken in their investment. In this case, the government faces higher cost of borrowing in international financial markets, what may lead to a lower ability to finance public projects and government consumption. Sovereign spread is the measure of relative default risk employed in this paper. It is defined to be the difference in a government bond's yield, or its cost of public borrowing, and the yield of the anchor country's bond of the same maturity. The anchor country is the United States, the country characterized by the lowest risk of default in most studies.

There is an open question in the literature: what is the impact of an increase in informal employment on default risk and on the cost of public borrowing in international

markets? In this paper, I estimate a structural vector autoregressive model to answer this question and find that if informal employment exogenously increases by 1 percentage point, sovereign spreads increase by approximately 0.2 percentage points; and the impacts of informal employment or formal output exogenous shocks on sovereign spreads have the same magnitude.

The literature on the determinants of cost of public borrowing, measured by sovereign spreads, comprises a wide range of methodologies. The empirical macro-finance literature focuses on single-equation regressions of sovereign spreads on economic shocks. Cline (1995); Cantor and Parker (1996); Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010); Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) contribute to this strand of literature. Since the variables that determine sovereign spreads are also impacted by them, the estimators used on the single-equation linear regression models may be biased if they do not address the endogeneity of the regressors.


Uribe and Yue (2006) provide both an empirical and a theoretical framework to address the relationships between variations in sovereign spreads and formal GDP production, by properly dealing with the endogeneity problem. They estimate a vector autoregressive model that allows the identification of exogenous shocks to spreads and GDP, which supports the negative impact of an increase in formal production on spreads.

In this paper, I estimate a vector autoregressive model that includes sovereign spreads, formal output and the size of the informal labor market as an additional variable. It allows the identification of exogenous shocks to all variables in the system. As noted by Elgin and Uras (2013), the ability to generate tax revenues and to repay outstanding government debt may be adversely impacted by an enlargement in the informal labor market. Figure 1 graphs the average size of informal labor market against average sovereign spreads from 1994 to 2011. It shows that spreads and the size of informal labor market commove over the business cycles.

According to Loayza and Rigolini (2006), the correlation of informal employment and the business cycles is negative. Uribe and Yue (2006) find that the correlation between the cyclical component of output and spreads is negative. Therefore, both informal employment and spreads are higher in economic downturns. Elgin and Uras (2013) present evidence of positive impact of informal employment on sovereign default risk through single-equation regressions of sovereign spreads on informal employment and other economic shocks. That paper considers some instruments for informal employment: the law and order index and the capital-to-output ratio. However, the law

and order index is related to political risk, an important factor determining spreads (e.g. Baldacci et al., 2011; Bekaert et al., 2014). Also, the capital-to-output ratio is related to macroeconomic financial stability, which explain a significant fraction of spreads (e.g. Basurto et al., 2010; Georgoutsos and Migiakis, 2013). Furthermore, the relationships between spreads and macroeconomic conditions may not be unidirectional and a single equation model of sovereign spreads on informal employment may provide misleading measures.

**Figure 01:** Informal Employment and Sovereign Spreads over the Business Cycles



**Notes:** The blue line represents the average level of informality from 1994 to 2011 and the red line represents the average sovereign spreads during the same period. The average is computed over the following sample of emerging countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand.

**Data source:** informality, ILO; spreads, J.P. Morgan's EMBI spreads.

Following Uribe and Yue (2006), I consider a dynamic vector autoregressive model where informal employment, macroeconomic variables and sovereign spreads impact each other, both in a contemporaneous and in a lagged fashion. In order to identify the exogenous informal employment shocks and the other parameters in the model, I assume some identification restrictions guided by theory. According to Kingdon and Knight (2004), job search in developing countries can take from 2 to 4 years on average, due to the structural inefficiencies characterizing the labor market in developing economies. Therefore, I assume labor market adjustments take time to respond to output shocks. I also assume the financial markets variables respond contemporaneously to news about the state of the economy. In contrast, decisions about consumption spending and



employment move slower and take at least one quarter to respond to country spreads shocks (Sims, 1986). The results are also robust to other identification strategies and are available upon request.

The dataset is an unbalanced panel in quarterly frequency, from the first of quarter of 1994 to the third quarter of 2011. There are 11 countries in the sample: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand. By estimating the vector autoregressive model, I show that an exogenous increase in the size of the informal labor market significantly impacts spreads, even when we control for formal output movements. The next sections are organized as follows: Section 2 defines the vector autoregressive representation of the model; Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 presents the single-equation model estimation; Section 5 discusses the dynamic multi-equation model estimation; Section 6 concludes and gives directions for future research.

## **2. Methodology**

This paper aims to measure the potential impacts of changes on the size of the informal labor market on sovereign spreads. Informal employment impacts the government ability to raise tax revenues and may impact sovereign spreads. The simplest model of spreads in the literature are represented by linear regressions on macroeconomic variables:

$$y_t = \sum_{j=1}^J b_j x_t^j + e_t$$

where  $y$  represents the sovereign spreads and  $x$ , the ‘ $J$ ’ explanatory variables for all periods ‘ $t$ ’ present in the estimation.

Since sovereign spreads also impact the variables that determine them and the relationship between spreads and macroeconomic conditions is not unidirectional, a single equation model of sovereign spreads on informal employment may provide misleading results. Therefore, I consider a dynamic multi-equation model where informal employment and sovereign spreads impact each other, both in a contemporaneous and in a lagged fashion. Our empirical model is a structural vector autoregressive model, denoted by:

$$A Y_t = \sum_{k=1}^K B_k Y_{t-k} + C u_t$$

where the vector ‘Y’ consists of the ‘N’ variables used in the estimation: sovereign spreads, the size of the informal labor market, and additional macroeconomic variables guided by economic theory. The subscript ‘t’ accounts for the periods present in the estimation. The matrix ‘A’ give the contemporaneous response of any variable in ‘Y’ to each of the variables in the system. In the model which includes sovereign spreads ‘s’, formal output ‘y’ and the size of the informal labor market ‘i’, matrix A can be represented by:

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & a(ys) & a(is) \\ a(sy) & 1 & a(iy) \\ a(si) & a(yi) & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

where a(ys) and a(is) are the impacts of formal output and the size of the informal sector on sovereign spreads, respectively, the main parameters of interest in this study; a(sy) and a(iy) are the impacts of sovereign spreads and the size of the informal sector on formal output; a(si) and a(yi) are the impacts of sovereign spreads and formal output on the size of the informal sector.

The auto-regressive order of the VAR ‘K’ is given by the Schwarz Information Criterion. The ‘N’ by ‘N’ matrices ‘B<sub>k</sub>’ gives the response of the current variables to the Kth lag of the variables. The ‘N’ by ‘1’ vector ‘u’ consists of the structural shocks to the ‘N’ economic variables. The structural shocks are normally distributed N (0,1) with zero autocorrelation. The matrix ‘C’ is set so that the scaled shocks ‘Cu’ match the variance-covariance matrix of ‘Y’.

By pre-multiplying both sides of the equation by the inverse of ‘A’, we obtain the reduced-form vector autoregressive model:

$$Y_t = \sum_{k=1}^K b_k Y_{t-k} + e_t$$

The reduced-form vector autoregressive model gives the statistical properties of the data and does not need any economic assumption to be estimated. It can be estimated by OLS, which give us estimates of b<sub>k</sub> and of the error terms e<sub>t</sub> = A<sup>-1</sup> Cu<sub>t</sub>. The structural model estimation requires identification or an economic interpretation. Given the equivalence between the structural and the reduced-form vector autoregressive model, the following conditions hold for all ‘k’ and ‘t’:

$$b_k = A^{-1}B_k \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Var}(e_t) = \text{Var}(A^{-1}Cu_t) \quad (2)$$

Condition (1) gives us ‘N\*N\*K’ equations and condition (2) gives ‘N\*(N+1)/2’ equations due to the symmetry of the variance-covariance matrix. Therefore, we have

' $N \times N \times K + N \times (N+1)/2$ ' conditions for the estimation of ' $N \times (N-1)$ ' parameters in 'A' (the contemporaneous impact of a variable on itself is always one), ' $N \times N \times K$ ' parameters in 'B', and ' $N$ ' parameters in 'C'.

Therefore, the system can be identified if we impose additional restrictions in 'A'. The identifying restrictions must be guided by economic theory. Since Sims(1986), it is usual to identify structural VARs by assuming financial variables to move faster than real variables. We follow the tradition and impose the following identification restriction: informality impacts spreads contemporaneously, whereas it is not allowed to respond to spreads on the same quarter. It is equivalent to set  $a(sy)=0$  and  $a(si)=0$

Also, given the structural inefficiencies characterizing developing countries, we assume labor market adjustments take more than a quarter to occur. This assumption is based on the structural inefficiencies characterizing the labor market in developing economies, which make the job search period relatively high. According to Kingdon and Knight (2004), job search in developing countries can take from 2 to 4 years on average. Therefore, informality impacts the economy contemporaneously, while being affected by economic shocks only after the first quarter. It is equivalent to set  $a(yi)=0$ .

By imposing those theoretical conditions, the matrix A is:

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & a(ys) & a(is) \\ 0 & 1 & a(iy) \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Now, we need to estimate ' $N \times (N+1)/2 - N$ ' parameters in 'A', ' $N \times N \times K$ ' parameters in 'B', and ' $N$ ' parameters in 'C', which is equivalent to the number of equations in (1) and (2). Therefore, the structural model is identified and can be estimated.

After identifying the structural model, I estimate impulse response functions and study the response of spreads to structural shocks over the business cycles. I find that a positive informal employment shock significantly increases sovereign spreads. In addition, the impacts of output and informality shocks on spreads have the same magnitude. Therefore, informal output shocks seem to be as important as formal output shocks in explaining sovereign spreads.

### **3. Data**

The dataset is an unbalanced panel in quarterly frequency, from the first of quarter of 1994 to the third quarter of 2011. The developing countries included are the ones for which the J.P.Morgan's Emerging Markets EMBI spreads are available: Argentina,

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Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa and Thailand. The developed countries included are: Belgium, France, Germany and United Kingdom, which are considered in the literature about differences between emerging and developed countries over business cycles (Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2008). Table 1 contains a concise definition of the variables employed here to explain sovereign spreads. The column named ‘references’ lists reference papers that have already tested whether those variables are important to explain country risk and whose results are going to be discussed and compared to the results produced here.

**Table 1: Definition and References of the Explanatory Variables**

Variable	Definition	References
Informality	Ratio of self-employed workers to total employed population. Source: ILO	Elgin and Uras (2013)
Risk-free Rate	Three-month US Treasury bill rate discounted by the average percentage increase in the US GDP deflator over the previous 4 quarters. Source: Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis.	Uribe and Yue (2006) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
GDP	Total value of final goods and services, in current US dollars, divided by the US GDP deflator. Source: IMF	Cline (1995), Cantor and Parker (1996) and Uribe and Yue (2006)
Debt-to-GDP	Stock of long-term foreign liabilities of public debtors and private debtors with guaranteed repayment by a government institution, divided by the GDP. Source: IMF	Akitoby and Stratmann (2008); Edwards (1984); Eichengreen and Mody (1998); Min (1998)
Government Consumption	Government purchases of goods and services, in current US dollars, divided by the US GDP deflator. Source: IMF	Edwards (1984); Min (1998); Akitoby and Stratmann(2008)
Tax Revenue	Net worth increase from taxes, in current US dollars, by the US GDP deflator. Source: IMF	Edwards (1984); Min (1998); Akitoby and Stratmann(2008)

### *3.1. The Informal Labor Market*

The informal labor market, as defined by the 15th International Conference of Labor Statisticians (1993), consists of "units engaged in the production of goods or services with the primary objective of generating employment and incomes to the persons concerned" and where "labor relations -- where they exist -- are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and social relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees." This concept refers to the characteristics of the economics units rather than the characteristics of the jobs themselves. Therefore, it does not tell apart jobs in the formal labor market that are not subject to income taxation and labor regulation from the regulated positions. The 17th International Conference of Labor Statisticians (2003) defines the concept of informal employment to refer to the jobs not subject to "national labor legislation, income taxation, social protection or entitlement to



other employment benefits". Therefore, it includes in the informal group the unregulated jobs belonging to any productive unit.

However, precise estimates of the size of informal labor market are scarce. In many developing countries, labor force surveys do not include questions able to measure informality (the informal labor market or informal employment). The challenge is to measure the informal labor market or informal employment among the paid employees and employers. In order to fill in the gap, many ad hoc surveys have been conducted in those countries (Charmes, 2009). Also, the International Labor Organization (ILO) bureau of statistics has been conducting its own survey since 2004. However, the data available for many countries do not fit the international definitions and are, thus, not comparable. Furthermore, data on informality is only available for some countries, recent periods and very low frequency: less than one observation a year for each country.

Since a reliable direct measure of informality is unavailable for many countries, we take a frequently used informality proxy: the ratio of self-employed workers to total employed population, excluding the agriculture, husbandry, fishery and forestry sectors. Self-employed are the workers whose remuneration depend directly upon the profits from the job exercised. It includes mainly unregulated jobs, not subject to income taxation. Labor force surveys convey data on self-employment since the 1980s. Data is provided by the International Labor Organization, key indicators of the labor market database (LABORSTA) and has been a long-standing proxy for informality. We exclude self-employed in the agriculture, husbandry, fishery and forestry sectors in order to take into account the structural changes related to urbanization and modernization in developing countries. Charmes (2009) shows there is high correlation between self-employment and informal employment. According to Fiess et al (2010), in Argentina 75%, Brazil 61%, and Mexico 77% of the informal workers are found in small firms and most of them in single person firms, being self-employed. Also, the share of informal workers in those firms is over 80%.

Other studies have also considered firm level surveys to study informality. For instance, Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) take the informality proxy from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES). However, the use of the WBES is doubtful since it only covers firms with a minimum of five employees and informality is more likely in smaller firms. Also, informal activity can be underestimated since firms tend to conceal information that goes against social norms and is subject to legal punishment. Person level surveys also lead to biased estimates. An OECD study (OECD, 2008) has estimated

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the size of the informal economy for seven countries to be the number of employed not covered by legal employment requirements. However, the number of respondents reporting not to receive the due social security benefits was unrealistically high (Andrews et al., 2011).

Informality could also be proxied by estimates of tax evasion. National tax authorities have developed audit methods to measure the amount of undeclared income. However, not only access to the data may be restricted, but also the authorities usually select to audit individuals more prone to evade tax payments. Overall, the available measures of tax evasion would lead to biased estimates of the informal economy (Schneider and Enste, 2000).

There are also model-based estimates of the size of the informal economy: the currency demand method, the electricity consumption method and the multiple indicators and the multiple causes method (MIMIC) (see Schneider and Enste, 2000 for a detailed description). The currency demand method assumes the informal economy mainly makes use of cash transactions and that changes in the size of the informal economy are caused by either change in taxation or government regulations. The method is based on the estimation of a money demand equation as a function of taxation and government regulation, in addition to traditional determinants of money demand (e.g. real income, interest rates). Variations in the size of informality are associated with variations in money demand due to changes in taxes and government regulation, after controlling for other factors. This method can be criticized for relying on an unrealistic assumption: a constant and equal velocity of money across countries. For instance, the demand for money is sensitive to financial shocks, such as the use of debit cards.

The electricity consumption method assumes that economic activity implies energy consumption. Based on that reasoning, electricity consumption is used as a proxy for total economic activity, including both the formal and the informal labor markets. The size of the informal economy is defined to be the difference between the total GDP implied by electricity consumption and the official GDP. However, the elasticity of electricity to output is not constant over time and across countries. Moreover, many informal activities do not rely significantly on electricity consumption or rely on a substitute source of energy (Schneider and Enste, 2000). The Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) is a system of simultaneous equations modelling the size of the informal economy (unobservable) as a function of explanatory variables (observable). In the system, it also models the consequences of the informal economy (observable) as

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a function of the size of the informal economy. These model-based estimates have been criticized for not being robust, not having an established theoretical foundation and relying on unsettled assumptions such as ad-hoc causes and consequences of informality (Buehn and Schneider, 2007). Further, national statistical authorities incorporate an adjustment for the non-observed economy on the official GDP figures, what leads to biased estimates when informality is measured as a proportion of the official GDP (Andrews et al., 2011).

National statistical offices usually compute the non-observed economy as the difference between the GDP measured as the total expenditures in goods and services and the GDP measured as the total payments received by all individuals in a country. The non-observed economy could also be a proxy of informality. However, the estimates of the non-observed economy are not available for all countries and, when available, do not follow a unique methodological approach. In 2005-2006, the United Nations provided a questionnaire sent to the national authorities to establish a common measure of the non-observed economy. However, the estimates are only available for a limited number of countries and usually one point in time (Andrews et al., 2011). Although the share of self-employed is not equal to informality and includes also some formal activities, it has been a long-standing proxy for informality. Differently from other informality measures, it is available for a large sample of countries and on the quarterly frequency. Table 2 suggests that the share of self-employed has a substantial standard deviation for the sample period and countries considered in this study.

### *3.2. Macro-Finance Variables*

The IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS) provides the following nominal series: gross domestic product and government consumption. Government consumption is government purchases of goods and services, including most expenditure on national defense and security. It excludes public military expenditures that are part of government capital formation. The real series are the nominal series divided by the GDP deflator, which are employed in the estimation.

Measures of government finance are available from the IMF's Government Financial Statistics (GFS). Government tax revenue is the net worth increase from taxes. External debt is the stock of long-term foreign liabilities of public debtors and private debtors with guaranteed repayment by a government institution.

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The emerging country spread is measured by the JPMorgan's Emerging Markets Stripped Global Bond Index (EMBI Global Stripped). It is an average of public bonds spreads over US treasury bonds of similar maturity, weighted by market capitalization. It is stripped from collateralized flows, what controls for differences in collateral across countries. It covers American dollar-denominated Brady bonds, loans and Eurobonds issued or guaranteed by emerging market governments. In order to be included, countries must be low or middle income for the last two years, according to the World Bank classification.

The US interest rate on three-month US Treasury bill is the measure of world nominal interest rate. It is available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The world real rate is obtained by discounting the nominal rate by the average percentage increase in the US GDP deflator over the previous 4 quarters. The Chicago Board Options Exchange provides the measure of volatility of the S&P500, the VIX.

*3.3. Seasonality and Trends*

**Table 02: Summary Statistics**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Average</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Sample Size</b>
GDP	244.94	566.34	870
Risk-free Ratio	0.01	0.02	870
Informality	0.24	0.14	543
Government Consumption	35.18	82.11	870
Tax Revenue	27.72	66.77	522
EMBI Spreads	0.05	0.06	760

**Notes:** GDP, Government Consumption and Tax Revenue are real series, defined in constant American dollars; Informality, J.P. Morgan's EMBI Spreads and the risk-free rate are free of units of measurement, by construction.

**Source:** Informality, ILO; GDP, Government Consumption and Tax Revenue, IMF; spreads, J.P. Morgan; Risk-free rate, Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis.

All economic series are seasonally adjusted using the Census X11 filter. They are also checked for any remaining seasonality. The financial series exhibit no trend and are taken in the levels. However, the economic time series usually have a stochastic trend and a business cycle component (Nelson and Plosser, 1982). We test for the presence of unit root using Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) panel unit root tests. The test combines the p-values from the individual cross-sections unit root tests, as proposed by Fisher (1932). If we cannot reject the presence of unit-root, we take the first-difference of the series. If there is no unit root, we take the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter to separate the permanent and transitory components of the economic series. The Hodrick-



Prescott filter minimizes the squared differences between the series and its trend component and penalizes for incorporating volatility into the trend. The trend volatility is measured in relation to past and future values of the series. As discussed by Pedersen (2001), the Hodrick-Prescott filter is less distorting than other filters built to be optimal in the mean-squared error criterium. We also consider whether the results are robust to distinct detrending methodologies. For instance, we consider the economic series have a linear trend instead. The results are robust and do not change significantly and are available upon request.

#### **4. Single-Equation Models**

What are the macroeconomic variables explaining sovereign spreads over the business cycles? Variations in total income or output are likely to impact a country's ability to repay its external public debt; hence, total output is our first candidate. In fact, Cline (1995), Cantor and Parker (1996) and Uribe and Yue (2006) show that country spreads increase during economic downturns *ceteris paribus*.

However, not only a country's total income is important to determine its public solvency. Changes in the government available income are also important. Government consumption and tax revenue have a direct impact on government surplus (negative and positive, respectively) and may reflect the government engagement in honoring its international agreements. In a single equation estimation framework, Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) conclude that contractionary fiscal policies decrease spreads whereas Edwards (1984) and Min (1998) conclude that fiscal variables are not statistically important to explain spreads once other macroeconomic fundamentals have been taken into account. Furthermore, variations in the size of the informal labor market also impact the ability to generate future tax revenue and honor public debt services.

Previous studies (e.g. Edwards, 1984; Eichengreen and Mody, 1998; Min, 1998; Akitoby and Stratmann, 2008) have also considered the ratio of debt to output (a measure of debt sustainability) to be a determinant of sovereign spreads. They have found a statistically significant positive coefficient on the debt-to-GDP ratio, when included among other explanatory variables in a linear regression framework. Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) provide evidence that higher levels of public debt are associated to higher spreads as they signal fiscal profligacy and may lead to an unsustainable debt path.

In table 3, we present the results of a linear regression of spreads on economic variables, cross-section and time-fixed effects. Regression 2 shows the results when considering the following explanatory variables: output, external debt and the size of the informal labor market. All the coefficients are statistically different from zero and match our theoretical expectations.

**Tabela 03: Sovereign Spreads Regressions**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>
Informality	0.12 (2.04)*	0.16 (2.47)*	0.09 (2.11)*
Output	-0.24 (-7.73)*	-0.20 (-5.33)*	-0.03 (-0.92)
Dedt		0.01 (2.38)*	
Government Consumption			0.00 (0.15)
Tax Revenue			0.01 (2.40)*
Adjusted Rsquared	0.8	0.8	0.9

**Notes:** (1) This table reports results from regressions of EMBI spreads (end-of-quarter) on a set of explanatory variables: output, informality, debt, government consumption, tax revenue, country and time fixed-effects. Observations related to time of sovereign default are excluded. (2) The estimated parameters and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported for each variable included in the regressions. (3) The t-statistics are computed using standard errors robust to heterocedasticity. (4) \* denotes significant at the 5% level.

**Data source:** informality, ILO; Output, Government Consumption and Tax Revenue, IMF; spreads, J.P. Morgan's EMBI spreads.

However, the dynamics of debt are likely to be endogenous and nonlinear. In regression 3, we present the results with the inclusion of government consumption and tax revenue, the government policy variables, and the exclusion of the external debt variable. The informality coefficient is positive and statistically significant, as theoretically expected. Although the coefficient on output is statistically insignificant, there is a number of concerns regarding the government policy variables: there are may be lags between the implementation and the decision-making period; and they may also change endogenously in response to output changes (e.g. the automatic stabilizers). In fact, the coefficient on output becomes significant when the debt and the government policy variables are dropped out in regression 1.

Although the results suggest output and the size of the informal labor market may be important to explain sovereign spreads, they may be determined by the spreads variable itself. Spreads may also reflect changes in lagged economic and political conditions. Therefore, a multi-equation dynamic model is more appropriate to provide an answer for our research question.

## **5. Multi-Equation Models**

The vector autoregressive models (VARs) are estimated using the least squares estimator with country fixed effects. The lags are selected using the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). The SIC penalizes for the loss of degrees of freedom from the inclusion of additional explanatory lagged variables and maximizes the explanatory power of the model. After estimating the model, we compute and plot the impulse response functions using the estimated coefficients. This is a way to visually represent not only the contemporaneous impact, but also the time path of the effects of structural shocks on each variable in the VAR. Since the VAR parameter estimates are imprecise, the impulse response functions also inherit parameter uncertainty. Therefore, we report confidence bounds around the impulse responses. The bootstrap confidence bounds are constructed as follows: (a) Estimate the VAR using the least squares estimator and save the residuals. (b) Draw a random sample of the residuals with replacement and twice the sample size length. Each observation of the random sample consists of the same time "T" residuals for all equations in the VAR. (c) Construct a simulated series using the estimated parameters, the random residuals, and the initial conditions (e.g. random values from the original series). (d) Re-estimate the model using the simulated series, generate the impulse response functions and save the residuals (We are back to step (a). Repeat the process ten thousand times). (e) Use the estimated impulse response functions to generate the confidence intervals.


### *5.1. Informality and Spreads over the Business Cycles*

What are the relationships between informality and spreads? Loayza and Rigolini (2006) provide evidence that informal employment increases during economic downturns. In addition, sovereign spreads are also higher during economic downturns. Therefore, we need to control for business cycles movements in order to estimate the impacts of informality on spreads. Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of a VAR on informality, spreads and output, which controls for the business cycles. According to the Schwarz Information Criterion, we include three lags of each variable.

The contemporaneous effects of spreads shocks on output and informality and of output shocks on informality are zero, by the identification restrictions. According to "Response of GDP to Informality", output moves below trend after a positive shock to

informality. The impact becomes statistically significant after the first quarter. The consistency of the estimation to different identification strategies is also verified. Consistently, Schneider (2005) shows that an increase in the informal economy in developing countries leads to a decline in the "official" output growth. However, informality does not respond significantly to output movements.

**Figure 02: Impulse Responses for the Vector Autoregressive Model: Informality, Formal Output and Sovereign Spreads in Emerging Countries**



**Notes:** (1) The solid line represents the point estimate of the impulse response. (2) The broken lines represent the two standard deviations error bands. (3) The response of informality and spread is in percentage points. (4) The first column graphs report the response of informality, GDP and spread, respectively, to a one standard deviation informality shock. (5) The second column graphs report the response of informality, GDP and spread, respectively, to a one standard deviation GDP shock. (6) The third column graphs report the response of informality, GDP and spread, respectively, to a one standard deviation spread shock.


**Data source:** informality, ILO; GDP, IMF; spreads, J.P. Morgan's EMBI spreads.

What are the impacts of output and informality shocks on sovereign spreads? Cline (1995) and Cantor and Parker (1996) provide evidence of countercyclical country spreads, Neumeier and Perri (2005) are supportive of reverse causality and Uribe and Yue (2008) suggest causality in both ways. Also, Elgin and Uras (2013) shows that an enlargement in the informal sector potentially increases spreads.



Consistently, figure 2 shows that spreads respond positively not only to negative output shocks "Response of Spread to GDP", but also to positive shocks to informality "Response of Spread to Informality". We also check whether the results are robust to distinct de-trending methodologies. We can summarize the effects of contemporaneous structural shocks on sovereign spreads: a 1 percentage point positive informality shock contemporaneously increases sovereign credit spreads by 0.16 percentage points; a 1 percentage point positive formal output shock decreases spreads by 0.14 percentage points on the same quarter.

**Figure 03: Impulse Responses for the Vector Autoregressive Model: Informality and Formal Output in Developed Countries**



**Notes:** (1) The solid line represents the point estimate of the impulse response. (2) The broken lines represent the two standard deviations error bands. (3) The response of informality is in percentage points. (4) The left-hand side graphs report the response of informality and GDP, respectively, to a one standard deviation informality shock. (5) The right-hand side graphs report the response of informality and GDP, respectively, to a one standard deviation GDP shock.

**Data Source:** informality, ILO; GDP, IMF.


In contrast, Figure 3 shows the estimation results for a VAR on informality and output for developed countries (EMBI Spreads are not included because they are not available for developed countries). A positive shock to the level of informality leads to an increase in the cyclical component of output. In fact, Schneider (2005) shows that an

increase in the informal economy is associated with an increase in the economic growth rate in developed economies. In the next sections, we consider whether the informality shocks are proxying for changes in fiscal policy.

### 5.2. Robustness Check: Controlling for Fiscal Policy

In Figure 4, we present the results of a structural VAR including informality, fiscal policy, output and spreads variables. Firstly, fiscal policy is proxied by the level of debt. The inclusion of the debt variable increases the explanatory power of the model. A positive shock to debt decreases output and increases spreads significantly. It is also associated with more significant increases in spreads than a negative output shock. The results are consistent with previous findings in the literature (Edwards, 1984; Eichengreen and Mody, 1998; Min, 1998; Akitoby and Stratmann, 2008). Moreover, informality and output shocks still explain spreads significantly when we control for debt shocks.

**Figure 04:** Impulse Responses for the Vector Autoregressive Model: Informality, Fiscal Policy, Formal Output and Sovereign Spreads in Emerging Countries



**Notes:** (1) The solid line represents the point estimate of the impulse response. (2) The broken lines represent the two standard deviations error bands. (3) The response of spread is in percentage points. (4) The graphs report the response of spreads to informality, fiscal policy, GDP and spreads one standard deviation shocks, respectively.


**Data source:** informality, ILO; GDP and Fiscal Variables, IMF; spreads, J.P. Morgan's EMBI spreads.

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Secondly, fiscal policy is proxied by the tax revenue variable and the results are available upon request. The effects of output and self-employment shocks on spreads are similar to the equivalent effects implied by the non-fiscal VAR. The statistical significance declines in general and the fiscal variables do not have a statistically significant effect on spreads. Consistently, Edwards (1984) and Min (1998) also conclude that fiscal variables are not statistically important to explain spreads once we control for other macroeconomic variables.

### *5.3. Robustness Check: Controlling for External Conditions*

**Figure 05:** Impulse Responses for the Vector Autoregressive Model: Informality, Formal Output, Sovereign Spreads and External Conditions in Emerging Countries



**Notes:** (1) The solid line represents the point estimate of the impulse response. (2) The broken lines represent the two standard deviations error bands. (3) The response of informality and spread is in percentage points. (4) The graphs report the response of spreads to informality, GDP, risk-free rate, VIX and spreads one standard deviation shocks, respectively.

**Data source:** informality, ILO; GDP, IMF; spreads, J.P. Morgan's EMBI spreads; Risk-Free rate, Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis; VIX, Chicago Board Options Exchange.

Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) provide evidence of cross-country co-movements in sovereign spreads, not explained by changes in the domestic economic conditions. In this study, we consider some indicators of external conditions and potential drivers of co-movements across sovereign spreads which have established empirical foundations: the world risk-free rate and VIX, the stock market volatility indicator. In fact, Uribe and Yue (2006) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005) show the world interest rate can have a significant impact on sovereign spreads. Also, global risk aversion, measured

by the VIX, the implied volatility of the S&P500 index, can explain sovereign credit spreads (Pan and Singleton, 2008).

In Figure 5, we present the impulse responses of a VAR including informality, output, spreads, along with the world risk-free rate and the VIX. The effects of informality and output innovations on spreads are similar to the previous findings, although the magnitudes are about a quarter lower for both variables and the adjusted R-squared for the spreads regression decreases to 0.54. While the risk-free rate innovations do not seem to have a significant impact, the VIX leads to great variations on the sovereign spreads.


According to Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) and Krishnamurthy (2010), when global risk aversion (the VIX) is higher, the international demand for riskier assets decreases and the demand for safer assets increases, what was called “flight-to-quality”. This paper presents evidence that when global risk aversion increases the demand for emerging market bonds decreases, thus “flight-to-quality” helps explain spreads in emerging markets.

#### *5.4. Interpretation of Informality Shocks*

The literature on the possible causes of informality is vast. Sánchez, Duque and Ruiz (2009) and Mondragón-Vélez et al (2010) show that informality can increase when labor market rigidities are relatively high. Labor market rigidities can be represented by wages and non-wage costs, such as health and pension contributions, which cannot be fully adjusted according to the business cycles. In contrast, employers may adjust labor costs more easily in the informal sector, decreasing the employee’s payments during economic downturns. Therefore, employers may be tempted to take part in the informal sector when labor market rigidities are relatively high. In the present study, we show that positive informality shocks in developing countries lead to lower production levels and higher spreads, even when controlling for changes in fiscal policies.

Figure 6 shows that sovereign spreads and labor costs commove over the business cycles, thus the identified informality shocks may be associated with changes in labor costs. However, labor costs could not be included in the vector autoregressive models presented here due to the lack of data in quarterly frequency. Therefore, the association between labor costs, informality and sovereign spreads should be the topic of future studies.

**Figure 06:** Labor Market Rigidities and Sovereign Spreads over the Business Cycles



**Note:** The blue line represents labor costs and the red line represents sovereign spreads during the same period. Labor Costs are defined by the share of minimum wage to average wage in Colombia and Mexico (wratio) and by the percentage increase in minimum wage for the other countries (wmin).

**Data source:** Minimum Wage and Average Wage, ILO; Spreads, J.P. Morgan's EMBI spreads.

## 6. Conclusion

This paper proposes a novel empirical framework to study the relationships between informality and the cost of sovereign borrowing in developing countries. It measures the statistical relationships between them, by considering exogenous shocks to both in a dynamic multi-equation model. It shows that an increase in informal employment increases the cost of public borrowing, measured by sovereign spreads, meaningfully. In contrast, it shows that a larger informal labor market in developed economies is associated with future marginal increases in output. It would be interesting



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to study whether the informal labor market is more efficient and/or whether it loses less income bribing auditors in those economies. More efficiency in the informal labor market and less corruption are two mechanisms through which higher informality could increase production efficiency. Future studies should also address the relationships between informality and sovereign spreads in developed countries. In addition, it would be interesting to study what is preventing the government from saving resources and insuring against both high informality and spread times. More government insurance could lead to smoother tax rates, lower informality levels and, in turn, lower spreads.

Once producers are credit-constrained in the private financial system, the government should be able to give credit to potentially more innovative and efficient producers. As a result, informality would decrease in the most productive labor markets and less resource would be wasted with corruption. In turn, economic productivity and welfare would increase. The public screening of the producer's type and the provision of credit according to the potential productivity could be less expensive than the implementation of other enforcement mechanisms, such as mobile audit teams, currently supported by the World Bank.

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# Local Economic Development (LED) and Public Policies (PPs): Foundations and agenda for the retail sector in Brazil

*Desenvolvimento Econômico Local (DEL) e Políticas Públicas (PPs):  
Fundamentos e agenda para o setor de varejo no Brasil*

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**Abstract:** This present article aims to know and disseminate the maturity process in public policies by the Brazilian retail sector, assuming the need to consider its peculiarities, as well as its multiplicity and diversity of business profiles for the elaboration, articulation, and management of public policy agendas. The continued and historic process of integration between Public Policies (PPs) and Local Economic Development (LED) in Brazil has been gaining better moments than in the past, but it still requires advances in the qualification of all the leaders involved (political, governmental, legal, social and business) and allowing public retail policies to be implemented in parallel with the economic and social development of the local and regional community in which it operates.

**Keywords:** Public Policies (PPs); Local Economic Development (LED); Retail Sector.

**Resumo:** O presente artigo objetiva conhecer e disseminar o processo de maturidade em políticas públicas por parte do setor do varejo brasileiro, tendo como pressuposto a necessidade de considerar as suas peculiaridades, bem como a sua multiplicidade e diversidade de perfis de negócios para a elaboração, articulação e gestão de agendas de políticas públicas. O processo continuado e histórico de integração entre as Políticas Públicas (PPs) e o Desenvolvimento Econômico Local (DEL) no Brasil vem conquistando melhores momentos do que no passado, porém ainda requer avanços na qualificação de todas as lideranças envolvidas (políticas, governamentais, jurídicas, sociais e empresariais) e permitindo que as políticas públicas do varejo sejam

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implementadas em paralelo com o desenvolvimento econômico e social da comunidade local e regional no qual está inserido.

**Palavras-chave:** Políticas Públicas (PPs); Desenvolvimento Econômico Local (DEL); Setor de Varejo.

## **1. Introduction**

The fields of Public Policies (PPs) and Local Economic Development (LED) in Brazil have been the target of integration, promoting greater maturity in these fields, both in terms of theoretical formulation and in terms of the feasibility of better political, economic and social consequences, although these results have not yet provided levels of growth and development in the country in the expectations that Brazilian society yearns for and needs.

This integration is fundamental for the achievement of even better times since Local Economic Development (LED) reflects the question “what”, the final objective sought by society, in other words, and “the capacity of a given society to overcome obstacles to the realization of its potential” (Castro & Oliveira, 2014, p. 22). Public Policies (PPs) reflect the question “how?”. The process to make the objective, conditions, and resources necessary for its purpose viable, in other words, materialized in the set of actions, projects or programs that must be developed by the municipalities, states, the federal government, social and business agents to meet the basic and complex needs of society, with goods and services that guarantee better living conditions for the population and promote economic and social development.

Thus, the feasibility of this long-sought integration between Public Policies (PPs) and Local Economic Development (LED) in Brazil must be built on the basis and importance of each of these processes (PPs & LED).

When one thinks of sectorial public policies as being specific policies for a sector or segment in which the State or society operates, such as health, education, sanitation, housing, security, transportation, industry, agribusiness and retail, this subset of general public policies must objectively reflect and overcome the real needs or peculiar demands of a sector, such as retail, as well as its integration and impact on other sectors or segments of the same society.

The objective of this present article is to understand the maturity process in public policies by the Brazilian retail sector, assuming the need to consider its

peculiarities, as well as its multiplicity and diversity of business profiles in the elaboration, articulation, and management of public policy agendas.

Considering that the process of accelerating Brazilian economic development has started from 1930, this integration between Public Policies (PPs) and Local Economic Development (LED) will only occur, with greater incidence, from the 2000's onwards (Castro & Oliveira, 2014).

Sectoral public policies focused on economic and social development, whether regional or local, need to be structured and organized based on objective public policy agendas, which serve as a tool for articulating and managing public policies.

In the case of the Brazilian retail sector, these agendas must emphasize the themes and intrinsic characteristics of the sector. They must demonstrate their essential characteristics that must be derived from their diversity of segments and obtaining their dissemination among all the actors involved.

In addition to the technical and political quality of these agendas, their management must take into account effective processes of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of public policies, integrated and focused on local economic development.

## **2. Foundations and Importance of Local Economic Development (LED)**

The main objective of Local Economic Development (LED) is to build the economic capacity of a given location, region, state, municipality, or territory, aiming at improving its economic perspective and the quality of life of its agents and residents (Swinburn, Goga, & Murphy, 2019). In other words, development, in the social and economic sense, is “the capacity of a given society to overcome obstacles to the realization of its potential” (Castro & Oliveira, 2014, p. 22).

From the 1970s, municipal governments and communities in Brazil realized that business and capital were moving from one region to another, according to the competitive and market advantages (Porter, 1986; 1989). Then they started to seek this economic capacity, as well as social, with the expansion and attraction of investments, aiming at the improvement of their business environment and the generation of jobs and income (Swinburn, Goga, & Murphy, 2019).

These improvements, to be effectively achieved, must involve the commitment and articulation between its main agents and governmental, political, legal, social, and

business leaders, cooperating in the permanent improvement of the situation of the region or location where development is taking place.

The great English naturalist and biologist, Charles Darwin (1809-1882), said: “It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but those who respond best to changes”. This statement reminded me that the collective prosperity of a community will depend on its ability to change according to the dynamics of the regional, local, and even global economy.

If Local Economic Development (LED) is based on a structured and integrated process of “planning” and not just isolated actions of “acting without planning”, the likelihood of change in improving the local and regional context is overwhelming!

Among the specific strategies for the correct planning in local and regional development, there is the search for the improvement of the business and investment environment, aiming to increase the productivity and competitiveness of businesses, entrepreneurs, and local workers. They must also aim to improve local and regional communities with a view to improving the quality of life, innovating in economic and social opportunities, in the fight against conditions of poverty and misery. Thus, these strategies will contribute to the growth and improvement of the conditions of the local environment, making it more competitive, productive, and prosperous (Swinburn, Goga, & Murphy, 2019).

But how can you strengthen the economy of a locality or region? Well, first you must know the profile, the specifics, and the potential of the local and regional environment. These characteristics have the power to strengthen or weaken the economic capacity of these locations.

In order to weaken the region, it is enough not to know this profile, these specificities, and potentialities, focusing only on “doing without planning” for daily survival (in the popular saying: “selling lunch to buy dinner”), without the integration and commitment of all in improving the conditions of everyone in their local and regional environment.

In order to strengthen the region, the first step is to get to know this profile, these specificities, and their potential, focusing correctly on the “planning” of their competitive advantages (Porter, 1986; 1989). In other words, to know its profile and its peculiarities that add value to the economy and the local community, to develop and sell differentiated products and services, its quality of service, and the loyalty of its consumers. Develop

their ability to attract, generate, and retain external and internal investments, among other special conditions created and developed based on the creativity and innovation of local actors (public, private, and third sector).

In summary, to know the strengths and weaknesses of these regions, their threats and opportunities to be mapped in a structured and integrated strategic planning process for their Local Economic Development (LED) for a medium- and long-term period and with broad mobilization and participation of its stakeholders (all intervening agents).

Therefore, the local public power (municipal governments), regional (state government), national (federal government) and political, judicial, social and business leaders must create the conditions so that private and public enterprises, as well as public-private partnerships (PPPs) can generate economic and social prosperity for all.

Nowadays, economic and social challenges are integrated with political challenges in multiple aspects; international, federal, regional, state, territorial, municipal, and local.

But how to deal with the political aspects?

### **3. Foundations and Importance of Public Policies (PPs)**

Political aspects are fundamental to Local Economic Development (LED) but as public policies.

Before, we need to understand that the term “politics” is derived from the Greek adjective politikós, originated from pólis, which means, everything that refers to the city, to the general and public interest.

According to the Greek sage and philosopher Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC), "Politics is the art of the common good". So, real politics has a noble mission: to converge divergent interests in favor of the majority and the common good of society. So, for politics to exist, it is enough to have a collective of people with some interests. Well, but what is the difference between policies and public policies?

Politics is the process of mediation and solution to conflicts of interest and values between members of society. Politics would be, then, the set of procedures that express the power relations between the members of society. These procedures are intended for the peaceful resolution of conflicts over public goods (Magalhães & Bouchardet, 2019).

Public policies, according to Magalhães and Bouchardet (2019), are the result of political activity itself in the allocation of resources and in the provision of public goods

and services to society. It comprises the set of State interventions, projects, and actions aimed at generating impacts on social relations (Agnaldo dos Santos, 2017).

The term “Public Policy” is a concept widely applied today in the speeches of political leaders and public and private managers, but its origin goes back to post-revolution 1789 France in a universal and collective vision. It reaches the 20th Century, especially in academic approaches in (1) the United States of America in 1930 and its founders as a research area and in (2) Western Europe after World War II (1945), adopting the vision based on the right that every citizen has, regardless of their social status.

Public policies can be considered as guiding and providing guidelines (rules, principles, and procedures) that guide the action of public authorities in public matters. They are spelled out in laws, decrees, ordinances, programs, projects that guide a set of actions, and the application of resources.

Public policies are also materialized in a set of actions, projects or programs that have the State as a reference and should be developed by municipalities, states, the federal government, social and business agents to meet the basic and complex needs of society, with goods and services that guarantee better living conditions for the population and promote economic and social development.

What is the importance of Public Policies (PPs)? This importance can be defined according to some of its main objectives:

- Promote Local Economic Development (DEL), social and cultural in the municipality, state and/or country;
- Expand and enforce the citizenship rights that are won in struggles and social mobilizations;
- Regulate conflicts between social actors (conflicts of interest of classes and groups); and
- Responding to the demands (needs) of the various sectors of society with needs for development.

As society is composed of several actors with specific and even divergent interests, public policies can be divided into sectors. These are the so-called sectoral public policies, as is the case with public policies aimed at the retail sector.



#### **4. Public Policies (PPs) for the Retail Sector**

Sectorial public policies are policies specific to a sector or segment in which the State or society operates, such as health, education, sanitation, housing, security, transport, industry, agribusiness, and retail.

Sectoral public policies constitute a subset of the larger set of public policies, demonstrating the specific needs or demands of a sector, but which generally interact and impact other sectors or segments of the same society.

Sectorial public policies in Brazil were characterized, since their origin in the first half of the 20th century, by the predominant performance of some sectoral axes over the others and had, as an initial domain, the articulation promoted by the areas of foreign trade and industry, through the performance of its sectoral associative entities and or its business leaders.

However, since 1980 this bi-sectorial characteristic has been complemented by other economic sectors, due to the political, economic and social scenario of the time, which required the need for state reform with fiscal, structural and regulatory adjustment, a greater opening of the domestic economy, the implementation of privatization projects and the concession of public services.

These phenomena were verified in Brazil, following the experience also lived in Latin America and resulting from the globalization process and the social engineering project with the support and guidelines of major international financial organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (Silva, 2013).

Another internal factor that also facilitated the expansion of sectors to be valued in sectorial public policies, was the Federal Constitution (1988) that expanded social participation, and the Real Plan (1994) that brought economic stability.

From 1990 onwards, the experience and the power of articulation of the industrial sector, generated the Industrial and Foreign Trade Plan (PICE), making the sector benefit from tax exemption processes, tax incentives, credit and other benefits (Bonelli & Veiga, 2003).

Other sectors, such as agribusiness in 1991, have a higher priority with the new orientation of agricultural policy focused on a more liberal model of public policies, based on the free functioning of markets and respect for contracts, with less government intervention.

This context opens more space for other sectors such as small and medium-sized companies, retail, tourism, and others that are beginning to participate more actively in the public policy arena.

Retail is one of the most important sectors of the Brazilian economy in terms of job and income generation and also in its economic and social representativeness.

In order to get a better view, the trade and services sector led GDP growth (Gross Domestic Product, economic production indicator) in Brazil from 2017 to 2018, representing 75.8% (Agência Brasil, 2019). On average, only the retail sector, which is the trade that sells directly to end consumers, represents around 45% to 65% of Brazilian GDP, depending on the economic scenario.

To demonstrate the recent relevance (2017 to 2018) and even with a scenario of economic and social challenges in Brazil of these times, the trade sector grew, in this period, 2.3% and Brazil, in all its sectors, grew only 1.1% (Agência Brasil, 2019).

The retail sector encompasses a diversity of segments and activities developed by entrepreneurs in the trade and services sector that reflects and receives a direct impact on society as a whole. This challenge of formulating and implementing public policies requires better organization and qualification in the sector, with adequate structuring of general and specific demands that promote the prevention, maintenance, and correction of potential and real needs.

The following are some specific demands of the retail sector that can be considered as topics of sectoral public policies:

- Monitor and contribute to the effectiveness of tax reform in Brazil;
- Disseminate the experience of the Municipal Public Security Councils (CONSEPs);
- Expand access to state programs that use video surveillance cameras in partnership with the Military and Civil Police in the Brazilian states;
- Encourage the creation of Parliamentary Fronts for commerce, services, and entrepreneurship in Brazilian municipalities;
- Increase the participation of micro and small companies in government procurement; and
- Drafting or updating Municipal Law to regulate traveling fairs.

## ***Lima. Local Economic Development (LED) and Public Policies (PPs)***

These needs are received and interpreted by those who occupy public power, but they are taken and influenced by an agenda that is elaborated in the sector, generating political pressure and/or social mobilization to overcome these demands.

The retail segment is advancing, in Brazil, in a process of maturity in sectorial public policies. In 2017, the CNDL - National Confederation of Shopkeepers, in partnership with SEBRAE Nacional - Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support Service, held several seminars, studies and research on Brazilian retail within the PNDV - National Retail Development Program which visited 17 (seventeen) units of the federation (16 states and the federal district), with the participation of 1,385 retail, political and government leaders, who built 437 general proposals and which were technically translated into 69 consolidated public policy proposals for the retail (National Confederation of Shopkeepers [CNDL], Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support Service [SEBRAE Nacional]; Institute for Evaluation, Management & Education [IAGEE], 2017).

Among the main results in these public policy activities, there are public policy proposals classified into 8 (eight) themes that guide the challenges to be overcome by Brazilian retail (CNDL, SEBRAE-Nacional, & IAGEE, 2017).

- i. Strengthening trade and local economic development;
- ii. Urban mobility and infrastructure to revitalize shopping centers;
- iii. Public security;
- iv. Business education and management assistance to Micro and Small Enterprises in the Retail Sector;
- v. Tax system;
- vi. Credit and financing for the trade and services sector;
- vii. Modernization of labor laws; and
- viii. Support for retail innovation.

When quantified and consolidated by a guiding theme, public policy proposals for retail were listed, as shown in the following table:

**Table 1: Retail Challenges in Brazil by Theme**

<b>Guiding topics for retail demands</b>	<b>Number of proposals</b>	<b>%</b>
Strengthening of trade and local economic development	116	26,5%
Urban mobility and infrastructure to revitalize shopping centers	79	18,1%
Public Security	64	14,6%
Business education and management assistance to micro and small companies	63	14,4%
Tax system	43	9,8%
Credit and financing for the Commerce and Services sector	40	9,2%
Modernization of labor laws	22	5,0%
Support for retail innovation	10	2,3%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>437</b>	<b>100,0%</b>

**Source:** CNDL, SEBRAE Nacional and IAGEE (2017).

It can be seen that the 4 (four) main themes that together represent 59.26% (or n = 259) of the total of 437 public policy proposals for retail were as follows, in order of the number of proposals:

- Strengthening of trade and local economic development: 116 proposals or 26.5% of the total;
- Urban mobility and infrastructure to revitalize shopping centers: 79 proposals or 18.1% of the total;
- Public security: 64 proposals or 14.6% of the total; and
- Business education and management assistance to micro and small companies: 63 proposals or 14.4% of the total.

It is worth mentioning that these proposals were consolidated in a document and handed over to the parliamentary leaders (Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate) at the end of 2017, as well as to the federal and state governments that were the target of meetings to generate public policy agendas. In 2018, the document “Retail manifesto, elections 2018” was delivered to candidates for the federal and state legislative and executive.

## **5. Integrating Retail Sectorial Public Policies with Local Economic Development (LED)**

In order to achieve greater maturity with public policies, CNDL - National Confederation of Shopkeepers, in a new partnership with SEBRAE Nacional - Brazilian

Service of Support to Micro and Small Enterprises, is promoting the Public Policies 4.0 Program to be developed in the period from 2018 to 2019, with the elaboration of public policy agendas in states not visited in the previous program, with the re-elaboration or updating of public policy agendas in the states already visited, as well as the dissemination of public policies in the states whose FCDLs (Federations of the Shopkeepers' Chambers) have not yet started processes for articulating public policies with political and government leaders.

One of the different aspects of the PP 4.0 program is the focus on local and regional development, seeking to reconcile the culture of common interests and shared objectives between the retail sector, other sector public policies and the common good of Brazilian society and/or local communities, in other words, integrating public policies (PPs) with local economic development (LED).

The results of these leadership meetings should be compiled in order to materialize demands, action plans and public policy proposals that must be articulated with political and government agents, through a public policy agenda.

Although we consider the development achieved in Brazil since 1930, the formulation and implementation of public policies aimed at promoting local economic development (LED) only occurred, with greater incidence, from the 2000s (Castro & Oliveira, 2014).

This achievement was made possible, even with a delay, from the redefinition of the attributions of the municipalities within the framework of Brazilian federalism, after the Federal Constitution of 1988. The sectoral legislation resulting from this redefinition, required the creation of councils at the state and municipal levels, objectively materializing mechanisms of closer approximation between governments and citizens who use public services (Castro & Oliveira, 2014).

Based on this phenomenon, sectorial public policies focused on economic and social development of the entire territory or locality need to be structured and organized based on objective public policy agendas, which serve as a tool for the articulation and management of public policies.

According to Muller (2004, p. 22 as cited in Jardim & Silva, 2009), the elements for identifying public policies are as follows:

- i. The existence of a set of concrete measures;
- ii. Decisions of a somewhat authoritarian nature;



- iii. Being part of a general framework for action is never an isolated action;
- iv. Always have an audience; and
- v. Have defined objectives.

Thus, sectoral public policy agendas must keep these parameters of quality and consistency, so that they can be effectively implemented and overcoming the two major challenges of the public policy cycle in Brazil, which are the formulation and implementation stages.

These agendas must emphasize the themes and the intrinsic characteristics of the sector, demonstrating the peculiarities of local retail and achieving its dissemination among all interested parties (stakeholders).

Although this pro-dissemination action is significant today, the analysis of the dissemination process is still incipient in the country, mainly concerning subnational governments, especially the dissemination of programs and policies at the municipal level (Farah, 2008, p. 86).

The preparation and validation of public policy agendas for retail become a fundamental strategy for the success and development of the sector, in the improvement of its business environment and in the local and regional development where retail and citizens reside.

## **6. Further considerations**

The central objective of this article was achieved, because knowing the process of maturity in public policies by an economic and social sector - the Brazilian retail, to assume the need to consider its peculiarities, as well as its multiplicity and diversity of business profiles in the preparation, articulation, and management of public policy agendas.

Educational processes aimed at their current and future leaders are also required, in order to expand their mobilization and awareness aiming at the definitive achievement of consolidation as a strategic sector for the development of Brazil.

The maturity in public policies for retail contributes, in an extremely relevant way, to the expansion of the retail development level, as well as improving its business environment, increasing its representativeness in the economy and society.

The application of public policy agendas for retail becomes a methodology that has contributed a lot to overcome the demands of the sector, however it requires other

important strategies such as the qualification of current and potential retail leaders in the formulation of public policies, such as the application of objective strategies of articulation with political and government leaders, as well as the valorization of public policies in the management of the FCDLs in each state and the CDLs in each municipality of the country.

As a fundamental tool, public policy agendas for retailers must be continuously updated, following the dynamics of politics and the economy, and must also keep parameters of quality and consistency, so that they can be effectively implemented and overcoming the two great challenges of the public policy cycle in Brazil, which are the stages of formulation and implementation.

In addition to the technical and political quality of the agendas to be prepared, the management of this agenda must consider processes of monitoring & evaluation (M&E) of public policies, as a way to maximize the probability of its implementation and longevity.

Therefore, my experience in these processes of construction of sectorial public policies has shown that we will not only be able to mobilize and raise awareness among retail leaders, but also contribute to the better organization of the sector in the external spheres (generating demands on the political and governmental sectors). We will also be able to do this in its internal environment, as a sector that has advanced a lot in associative effectiveness and leadership qualification, in the union of efforts aiming at the development of the business environment for retail, contributing to the development of the entire Brazilian society. Society still needs a better organization and this starts with the organization of its internal sectors and its leaders, allowing the development of retail public policies to be implemented in parallel with the economic and social development of the local and regional community.

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# Climbing the Ladder: Technological Innovation, the Chinese State, and the Political Economy of Development

*Escalando a Escada: Inovação Tecnológica, o Estado Chinês e a Economia Política do Desenvolvimento*

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**Abstract:** Since the end of the 1970s, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has stood out in the international conjuncture with impressive growth rates, in many years with up to two digits. In a development strategy coordinated by the Chinese State, foreign investment associated with national companies produced, in just over three decades, the largest GDP worldwide by purchase power parity, in 2014. Among theoretical perspectives of Arrighi on the dynamics of the Chinese rise; Mazzucato on the role of the State in technological investment; and Chang on State regulation and intervention in the promotion of development, the thesis that the Chinese State has a crucial role as a promoter of economic and technological development, and leader of the PRC in the advent of the Fourth Industrial Revolution - the so-called Industry 4.0 – is defended. In a favorable conjuncture in terms of systemic accumulation, the PRC is projected as a major power in the international system, with economic and technological capacity in disputing hegemony as a result of its successful strategy of international insertion and development.

**Keywords:** Technological Innovation; Political Economy; China; Development.

**Resumo:** Desde os anos finais da década de 1970, a República Popular da China (RPC) destaca-se na conjuntura internacional com taxas formidáveis de crescimento, em muitos anos com até dois dígitos. Em uma estratégia de desenvolvimento coordenada pelo Estado

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chinês, o investimento estrangeiro associado a empresas nacionais produziu, em pouco mais de três décadas, o maior PIB mundial em paridade do poder de compra, em 2014. A partir das perspectivas teóricas de Arrighi sobre a dinâmica da ascensão chinesa; de Mazzucato sobre o papel do Estado no investimento tecnológico; e de Chang sobre a regulação e intervenção estatais na promoção do desenvolvimento, é defendida a tese de que o Estado chinês possui papel crucial como motor e promotor do desenvolvimento econômico, tecnológico e dirigente da RPC no advento da Quarta Revolução Industrial – a chamada Indústria 4.0. Em uma conjuntura favorável em termos de acumulação sistêmica, a RPC projeta-se como grande potência no sistema internacional, com capacidade econômica e tecnológica de disputa de hegemonia como resultado de sua bem-sucedida estratégia de inserção internacional e de desenvolvimento.

**Palavras-chave:** Inovação tecnológica; Economia Política; China; Desenvolvimento.

## **1. Introduction**

The fast Chinese development, since the end of the 1970s, coincides with the period known as "Reform and Opening", after the death of Mao Zedong, leader of the Chinese Communist Party until 1976. After a transition period led by Hua Guofeng (1976-1981), another generation of leaders, led by Deng Xiaoping, took power. Beginning in 1978, the implementation of economic reforms, first proposed by Zhou Enlai and followed by Deng, aimed to raise the Chinese Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in order to project the country as a major economic power in a long-term perspective. Therefore, the great objectives of modernization of China consisted of, based on the GDP of 1980, to double it in 1990 and to quadruple it in 2000, as well as the ongoing modernization of the country (PIRES; MATTOS, 2016, p. 76).

In order to guarantee fast economic growth and the modernization of industrial standards, in the 1980s the Special Economic Zones (ZEE), led by Hong Kong, and later expanded to other regions of the Chinese coast, were promoted. Such zones are dedicated to the production and export of consumer goods, and were first established with expatriate Chinese capital, which subsequently attracted foreign investment. Such an investment, which reached more than US\$ 450 billion in the early 2000s, according to Arrighi (2008),

[...] took advantage of the economic expansion trolley, which [foreign capital] did not initiate or lead. [...] In any case, even then foreign capital (mainly that of the United States) needed China more than China needed foreign capital. American companies, from Intel to General Motors, 'are faced with a simple requirement: invest in China to take advantage of cheap labor and the rapid growth of the country's economy or lose the race to their rivals'. China, which used to be just a



manufacturing center, has become the right place to manufacture and sell high-tech products. (ARRIGHI, 2008, p. 359, own translation)

What attracted foreign investment, therefore, was a conjuncture of factors already present in the country, and with intense participation of the Chinese State. Together with the ZEEs, the establishment of Economic and Technological Development Zones (ZDET) created spaces for learning new techniques and production methods, technologies and management models (PIRES; MATTOS, *op.cit.*, p. 77), such as joint ventures with foreign companies.

As noted earlier, more than merely the entry of foreign capital into the Chinese economy was responsible for its sustained economic growth in recent decades. Arrighi highlights

The most attractive feature, as we will argue, was the high quality of this reserve [of labor] in terms of health, education and self-management capacity, combined with the rapid expansion of supply and demand conditions for the productive mobilization of this reserve within China itself. Furthermore, this combination was not created by foreign capital, but by a development process based on native traditions - including the revolutionary tradition that gave rise to the PRC. Foreign capital intervened late in the process, supporting it in some directions, but undermining it in others. (ARRIGHI, *op.cit.*, p. 357, own translation)

With the advent of the 2000s and its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), Chinese development stood out as the first leading producer and exporter of manufactured goods, being the main source of imports from the European Union and the United States (WTO, 2018). Nevertheless, the country is the largest creditor of US Treasury bonds, with US\$3 trillion accumulated in international reserves in 2019 (PBC, 2019), which places China in a prominent position in liquidity and backing its economic development. Likewise, there is the strengthening of the Renminbi as a rising international currency option, currently the fifth largest stock registered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2019). These results demonstrate a successful process of four decades of rise, in an international system of fierce competition for resources and insertion of high added value in the world economy.

In the following chapters, this article intends, from the historical perspectives of Arrighi, Chang, and Mazzucato, to discuss the origins, strategies and catalysts of the Chinese development process, based on the role of the Chinese State not only as an intervener, but as an “entrepreneurial promoter” of development.

## **2. Arrighi and the Dynamics of Chinese Ascension**

In his analysis of the fundamentals of the Chinese ascension in the 21st century, Arrighi highlights how the Chinese process of opening did not happen under the precepts of the Washington Consensus<sup>2</sup>, in a clash in which the author highlights Smith against Friedman: being a process led by the State, it has its own characteristics, apart from the liberalization of the economies of the West. In order to guarantee their insertion and presence in the largest middle class in the world (BAI, 2018), transnational companies transfer technology to joint ventures with Chinese companies, according to requirements regulated by the State. The opening process was regulated so that it would generate international competitiveness in Chinese industry, not technological losses and dependence on foreign capital. As the author points out,

More generally, deregulation and privatization have been much more selective and have progressed at a much slower pace than in the countries which followed the neoliberal recipe. In fact, the main reform was not privatization, but the exposure of state-owned companies to competition against each other, with large foreign companies and, above all, with a basket of newly created private, semi-private and community companies. [...] the role of the Chinese government in promoting development has not diminished. On the contrary, the government has invested enormous amounts in the development of new sectors, in the creation of new Export Processing Zones (ZPEs), in the expansion and modernization of higher education and in large infrastructure projects, to an unprecedented level in any country of comparable per capita income. (ARRIGHI, op. cit., p. 362, own translation)

Therefore, in contrast to the neoliberal prescription of "shock therapies" - in which the state is reduced to the minimum and macroeconomic policies are relegated to private agents and their interests - the Chinese development process stands out for its gradual process of economic openness, keeping certain guidelines of national development strategies and international insertion. When competition is stimulated between agents of capitalist production - and not only among workers, who receive incentives for technological qualification and employment - higher levels of productivity, scale, and technological degree are obtained, which generates an economic activity with the capacity

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<sup>2</sup> The Washington Consensus is understood as the liberalizing economic measures advocated by the United States since the 1980s, such as: fiscal and tax reforms, generalized deregulation and privatization, in addition to the uncompromising defense of property rights (Williamson, 1990). Such measures are ubiquitous in the current "austerity measures" in several tax reforms underway worldwide.

for hegemonic competition in an interstate level. Currently, the increasing qualification and growth of labor income in China makes industrial wages comparable to those of Portugal (YAN, 2017), whereas, since 2016, Chinese wages in all sectors are higher than Brazilians and represent around 70% of the salaries in lowest incomes countries of the European Union. At the same time, despite the trends of manufacturing relocation to countries with lower labor costs, such as Sri Lanka and Vietnam (DUFFIN, 2019), the size of the Chinese domestic market counterbalances this situation, since in many sectors the country will represent about 20% of the global market - similar to the North American and Western Europe markets -, largely due to the consumption capacity generated by the same appreciation of the domestic market (FT, 2017).

The international implications of the Chinese rise are highlighted in an ongoing hegemonic dispute<sup>3</sup> with the United States, which has shown a path of relative decline in its influence. The internal motivating elements which originate such a dispute are based on the “Chinese Dream”, the conclusion of the development process registered in the last decades. The country pursues the goals of moderate prosperity until 2021, the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party (PCC); and fully developed by 2049, the centenary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). According to Xi Jinping, China seeks

[...] achieving the goal which in the founding centenary of the Communist Party of China we will culminate in the integral construction of a modestly accommodated society and that in the founding centenary of New China we will come to transform our country into a modern, prosperous socialist country, powerful, democratic, civilized, and harmonious, thus making the dream of the great revitalization of the Chinese nation come true. (XI, 2014, p. 38, own translation)

In this search for development, as an ideal for the revitalization of the Chinese nation, economic instruments are used as a means to reach new levels of material accumulation and relative position in the international system. According to Losurdo (2017), the development of Chinese socialism is characterized by the exercise of political power from the Chinese Communist Party, despite the different forms of ownership existing in the Chinese economy, and therefore, in economic power. In this case,

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<sup>3</sup> In references to hegemonic disputes, the Gramscian concept of hegemony is used in international relations, in which it is established that the norms and principles governing international politics are agents of conviction and/or coercion (AGNEW, 2005, p. 57). Thus, the exercise of power is not exclusive to economic, political, and military circles, but also part of a geopolitical idea of an international order, in which rival strategies can compete with each other - which currently occurs between China and the USA.

economic power is sustained as an instrument for the political cause of strengthening Chinese socialism. The author points out that

This is a model characterized, at the economic level, by the coexistence of different forms of ownership; [...] unlike 'political capital', the economic capital of the [Chinese] bourgeoisie shall not be the object of total expropriation, at least while it serves the development of the national economy, and therefore, indirectly, to the socialist cause. [...] The fact remains that the coexistence of different forms of ownership is offset by the strict State control managed by the Chinese Communist Party. (LOSURDO, 2017, pp. 18-20, own translation)

The developments in the international system of the Chinese ascension put the dominant and emerging powers in conflict of interest. Therefore, in order to forge an international order which brings more benefits to China and its allies, the Chinese Dream aims to attract other emerging powers, based in a logic of "benefits to other countries". Such benefits are generally linked to trade intensification and infrastructure construction, proposed by China to different regions, such as the land and sea routes established by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially in Eurasia, Africa, and more recently the movements for the inclusion of Latin America through China-Celac Forum. Other developments of a competing international strategy include initiatives of alternative financial structures, such as the BRICS New Development Bank (NBD), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the growing international reserves in Renmimbi.

In summary, Arrighi highlights the process of the Chinese rise in internal factors, identified and encouraged over the decades of establishment of the PRC based on the Chinese Communist Party guidelines. The Chinese State, based on various support mechanisms, such as the establishment of foreign trade zones; attraction of technological innovation through joint ventures; strengthening of the domestic market by raising labor income; expansion with quality of higher education; and incentives for the return of capital and workers from the Chinese diaspora, promoted the development and rise of the country in the international system over the last four decades of Reform and Opening. This process, due to its magnitude, results in changes in the correlation of forces in the international system. The ongoing hegemonic dispute with the United States, mainly in the establishment of zones of influence and in the race for the state of the art of new

technological standards of the Fourth Industrial Revolution - the so-called Industry 4.0 - is a result of the Chinese development strategy.

In the next chapter, from the perspective of Mazzucato, it will be analyzed how the Chinese State has become a purposeful actor in such a technological dispute, and how this process has corroborated for a national promotion of development.

### **3. Mazzucato and the Chinese Entrepreneurial State**

In her views on the State catalytic role in the development process, Mazzucato highlights how public funding is crucial in the scientific research process which opens opportunities for innovation. The author advocates for

[...] the fact that public sector financing usually ends up doing more than correcting market failures. [...] the public sector can in fact create new products and its corresponding markets. Two examples include his role in the dream that made the internet or nanotechnology possible when those terms did not even exist. When envisioning new spaces, [...] the State leads the growth process instead of just encouraging or stabilizing it. (MAZZUCATO, 2014, p. 91-92, own translation)

Basic research, that is, scientific research for the public good, made available from universities, elaborates the accumulation of knowledge necessary for complex applications made available in new markets, of disruptive technology - the one which permanently raises productivity levels. The Schumpeterian “creative destruction” of disruptive technologies seeks to raise industrial productivity with each new technological cycles. However, the State is an essential actor in the process, due to the uncertain nature of innovation, which makes the private sector averse to investment. Also according to Mazzucato,

[...] the steam engine, the railway, electricity, electronics, the car, the computer, the internet. Each had its share of destruction and creation, but each also led to an increase in global wealth. [...] Technological change is a good example of a truly unique situation. [...] Investment in basic research is a typical example of a ‘market failure’: it is a situation where the market alone would not produce enough basic research, so the government needs to intervene. (MAZZUCATO, op. cit., p. 93-94, own translation)

Currently, the disruptive technological cycle in dispute is the so-called Industry 4.0 - allusion to the Fourth Industrial Revolution -, which consists of several General Purpose Technologies (GPTs), such as Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), Big Data, Cloud


## Nascimento. *Escalando a Escada*

computing, Internet of Things (IoT), 5G, artificial intelligence, among others (IEDI, 2017, p. 2; PEDERNEIRAS, 2019). Such technologies are disruptive and trigger a new technological-industrial cycle, as they are capable of infiltration by various sectors; improve over time and reduce scale costs; in addition to facilitating the generation of other new products and processes (MAZZUCATO, *op. cit.*, p. 97). GPTs have the ability to digitally connect the entire production chain, in order to increase productivity and competitiveness through greater integration of value chains. Its applications, among other technologies, are very diverse:

- a) Cyber-Physical Systems are used to improve efficiency in production lines;
- b) Internet of Things, combined with 5G, allows data traffic capable of coordinating networks of autonomous vehicles;
- c) Artificial Intelligence allows unprecedented levels of automation (MUNIZ; NASCIMENTO, 2018).

Such technological innovations have the capacity to become GPTs with the potential to support new levels of production for organizations and countries which invest in their applications.


**Figure 01:** Timeline of industrial revolutions, according to their main GPTs. Over time, they have been used to make production processes more competitive and efficient.



Source: MUNIZ; BIRTH, *op. cit.*




**Figure 02:** Informative scheme, showing the main GPTs associated with the Fourth Industrial Revolution. This set of innovations is capable of impacting both the manufacturing processes and the daily life of home users.



Source: MUNIZ; BIRTH, *op. cit.*

In order to compete for the leadership of the ongoing technological cycle, investment in research and development (R&D) is becoming increasingly greater among the main powers of the international system.


**Figure 03:** Larger gross investments in R&D, in billions of dollars by purchasing power parity (PPP), from 1996 to 2013. The massive growth of Chinese investment since 2000 stands out, which demonstrates the Chinese commitment to dispute the leadership of the international technological competition.



Source: American Institute of Physics, 2016.

In order to lead the state of the art of technological competition in the 21st century, Chinese investment in R&D grows exponentially, with emphasis on the technologies of Industry 4.0. The governmental program Made in China 2025 focuses on the digitization and automation of production process, in order to deepen the objectives of the Five-Year Plan 2016-2020 and the Medium and Long Term Program for the Development of S&T 2006-2020 (MLP 2006-2020). The governmental strategy aims mainly at: innovation as a development strategy; support for advanced manufacturing; focus on the emerging industries of information technology, as well as strategic ones - aerospace, nuclear and biological; and maintaining the investment goals of 2.5% of GDP for R&D, 60% of the economic growth derived from advanced technologies, and the limit of dependence on foreign technologies at 30% (ARBIX; MIRANDA; TOLEDO; ZANCUL, 2018, pp. 149-150). To achieve these goals, competition for the intellectual property standard - the international patent registration - is also a field of dispute between the powers of the international innovation system.

**Figure 04:** The top ten countries in terms of patent applications in 2014. The productivity of Chinese investment in technology is highlighted, being the isolated leader in patent applications, while disputing the second position for R&D investments.



Source: WIPO, 2016, p. 23.

Although the total gross investment in R&D is still not the largest available, in some areas China is already leading the efforts of powers to implement the new

technological standards of Industry 4.0. The largest financing in artificial intelligence, the largest patent registration, and the largest volume of scientific articles published in this field are already assumed by the Chinese position, in addition to an industry valued at US\$ 150 billion (ROBLES, 2018).

As long as investment in science and technology rises, China is expected to compete for technological leadership with the United States in the 21st century. The American position on this dispute is rhetorically ambiguous, but regarding State practice, it is as the Chinese. Mazzucato highlights

[...] the State proactive approach on shaping a market in order to drive innovation. [...] the United States is also a place where the State plays an entrepreneurial role, making investments in radically new areas. The State provided financing in early stages when venture capital fled, while commissioning a highly innovative activity in the private sector which would not have happened without public policies with a defined vision and strategy. (MAZZUCATO, *op. cit.*, p. 109, own translation)

International development experiences show the role of the State in promoting technological innovation and forming new markets with greater added value. Despite the *laissez-faire*-style rhetoric in favor of economic liberalism, State support for sensitive and strategic areas for maintaining its economic power is also part of the American reality, one of the crucial pillars for sustaining its hegemony. Still according to Mazzucato,

[...] at the frontiers of knowledge, the mere existence of a national innovation system is not enough. Over time, more expressive results can be achieved when the State acts as an important player in this system. [...] the State, through its numerous agencies and laboratories, has the potential to disseminate new ideas quickly. It can also be skilled, using its regulatory functions and its ability to commission and acquire to shape markets and drive technological development. In this way, it acts as a catalyst for change, the spark that ignites the fire. (MAZZUCATO, *op. cit.*, p. 110, own translation)

Among the government agencies and legal systems favorable to technological innovation with State leadership in the USA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) stands out, responsible for promoting the defense industry, an important manufacturer of General Purpose Technologies (GPTs); Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), a program to foster innovation in small companies, based on the supply of products established as necessary by the US government; the Orphan Drug Act, which together with the National Institutes of Health (NIH) produces new

drugs and highly complex biomedical research, favoring the chemical-pharmaceutical complex; and the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), in which several government agencies coordinate research for the application of nanotechnology as solutions for several areas, in order to benefit commercial and public use. Along with State support and its promotion of R&D, collaboration between such government agencies has resulted in several technologies which underpin American economic power, such as computers, jets, nuclear energy and biotechnology. (MAZZUCATO, *op. cit.*, p. 110)

Industry 4.0 demands a high volume of investment in resources, so that gains in scale result in higher levels of productivity, which restricts most of its industrial applications, at first, to the great powers in science and technology. The records of intellectual property of GPTs, in the coming decades, will determine the main competing powers for the technological standard to be used in industry worldwide in this century; Based on the initiatives of the Chinese State in the modernization of its industrial system, the Chinese insertion in such a process is at an advanced stage, which provokes competition with the US innovation industry.

Such technological dispute is evidenced in the ongoing Sino-American trade war. The case of Huawei, a Chinese technology company, explains the growing tensions between the two main technological powers worldwide. The dispute over the establishment of 5G technology has caused clashes between the US government and the company; from extradition requests from high-ranking officials (Al Jazeera, 2018), to laws banning the use of their technology in sensitive areas, on charges of possible espionage. The United Kingdom and the European Union are examples of possible reticent partners in relation to the use of Chinese technology in areas such as defense systems and nuclear energy (STEVIS-GRIDNEFF, 2020).

#### **4. Climbing the Ladder: Chang and Chinese Development**

In his postulations on development strategies from a historical perspective, Ha-Joon Chang argues that, in order to make their technological superiority prevail, the great industrial powers advocate “free trade” in the international economy, industrial and fiscal policy strategies weak or nonexistent, in order to prevent the development of competitors in the long run. After a protectionist trajectory in the historical period of their nascent industry, the so-called developed countries (PADs for Chang) practice low tariffs, since

their superiority of productive scale makes their products highly competitive internationally; such products, present in less competitive countries, find ease of insertion - due to “free trade” - amidst local industries with less productive capacity. The author highlights how, in their historical development trajectories, at the end of the 19th century,

[...] many European countries have substantially abolished tariff protection. At the same time, most of the rest of the world was forced to practice free trade by colonialism. [...] and, in the case of some nations nominally 'independent' (such as Latin American countries, China, Thailand, Iran, and Turkey), through unequal treaties. (CHANG, 2004, p. 34, own translation)

Therefore, the liberal discourse of non-state intervention, in fact, is a rhetoric used to facilitate competition in the international division of labor. In the Chinese case, European colonialism resulted in a later recovery process called the “rejuvenation” of the Chinese Dream. The Opium Wars<sup>4</sup> (1840-1842) are described as the decline of Chinese society, representing the foreign domination, and that “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is the result of the historical overcoming of this period, which began more than 170 years ago (XI, *op. cit.*, p. 37). Thus, the Chinese historical development perspective is the search for autonomy in international economic competition; and as already demonstrated, with an active State policy to promote industry, science and technology. On the similarity of policies adopted by different development strategies, Chang affirms how

[...] virtually all PADs actively used interventionist industrial, commercial and technological (ICT) policies to promote the nascent industry during the catch-up period. [...] The State both subsidized industry and resorted to various public investment programs, especially in infrastructure, but also in manufacturing. The development of internal technological capacity was encouraged through financial support for research and development, education, and training. [...] In addition, some governments have created institutional mechanisms to facilitate public-private partnerships (for example, public-private joint ventures and industrial associations closely linked to the State). (CHANG, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-37, own translation)

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<sup>4</sup> Xi strongly describes the Opium Wars as a “war of aggression” and an “unequal treaty”, a historic process in which China must seek sovereign insertion as a developing country: “The Opium Wars were a British war of aggression against China from 1840 to 1842. In 1840, in response to Chinese opposition to the import of opium from British merchants, the British government sent troops to invade China on the grounds of protecting trade. [...] In 1842, British troops invaded the Yangtze River area and forced the Qing government to sign the Nanjing Treaty, the first unequal treaty in the history of modern China.” (XI, *op. cit.*, p. 39, own translation)

The Chinese development strategy includes and applies all the policies mentioned by Chang as characteristics of a country in an advanced stage of catch-up, with some attributes, including PADs: use of advanced techniques in industrial production; large volume of participation in international trade - China is the country with the largest participation in world trade, responsible for 12.4% of transactions in 2017 (China Power, 2019); high public investment, both in production and R&D development; in addition to active market shares - only two of the twenty-five largest Chinese companies are private; of these, twenty-three are among the hundred largest in the world (Fortune, 2019).

The intense participation of the State in any national development strategy is undeniable. State capacity to coordinate fiscal policies to promote research, innovation and technology; investment in State-owned companies - or participation in mixed companies - which introduce new techniques and procedures in production; and support for national production up to the maturity stage for international competition; it is a common element among countries which have engineered successful development trajectories; ironically, it is common for many of the PADs to defend the consumption of their products by countries with less competitiveness, while the latter are the same ones which follow the recommendations not pursued by the formulators of minimum State measures, such as those of the Washington Consensus.

## **5. Final Considerations**

This article sought to analyze how, since the 1970s, China has stood out for its impressive economic growth, up to double digits per year. The development strategy coordinated by the Chinese State, with high rates of industrial, educational and technological investment - associated with foreign capital -, led the country, in three and a half decades, to the highest world GDP in terms of purchasing power, in 2014.

The theoretical perspectives of Arrighi highlight the dynamics of the Chinese ascension, based on the strategies of establishing Special Economic Zones (ZEEs) and Economic and Technological Development Zones (ZDET) - the State direction for economic growth and development -, along with investment from the Chinese Diaspora and foreign investment. Educational investments in research and technology have kept pace with the capital investments needed to maintain Chinese impressive growth for decades.



The paradigm of the Entrepreneurial State of Mazzucato, when dealing with the role of the State in technological development, highlights the importance of public investment in the innovation process, which leads to higher levels of productivity and competitiveness in the world economy. Long-term State planning identifies key areas for strategic investment, coordinates efforts and sets goals. The Five-Year Plans, as well as strategic studies, such as Made in China 2025, show the Chinese State active and purposeful role in establishing a national development strategy with objectives, methods and results; such planning is essential to the Chinese process of international rise.

Based on Chang and his position on State intervention in promoting development, with active ICT policies, the Chinese State has a crucial role as a promoter of economic, scientific, and technological development, and a leader in implementing the techniques and processes of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The current PADs have adopted strategies similar to the Chinese in their historical development trajectories, with intense participation and investment in industrial, technological and protection policies for their nascent production networks in the face of intense international competition.

In a context of intense interstate competition for the accumulation of resources and access to markets, the PRC projects itself as a great power, with a gradual economic and technological capacity to dispute hegemony in the international system. Its current successful national development strategy allows the country to have a privileged international insertion in economic, scientific, and technological terms.

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## Actors, Institutions and Ideas: explaining the approval of 10% of GDP for education in Brazil

*Atores, Instituições e Ideias: explicando a aprovação dos 10% do PIB em Educação no PNE 2014-2024*

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**Abstract:** The article tests the explanatory power of three models of public policy analysis to understand the approval of a minimal 10% of GDP spending on education during Congress consideration of the 2014-2024 National Education Plan (PNE, in Portuguese). The pluralist theory and the neoinstitutionalist approach focus on actors in the decision-making arena while the multiple stream model helps understanding the setting of governmental agenda and its political context. This is an interesting case to study as there was a long process of deliberation involving disputes among alternatives supported by different social and political actors, including the government. Given the fact that the 10% was an old demand presented by the education policy community and that it had been rejected in previous governments, the central question of the article is: how was it possible to approve the 10% of GDP spending on education in 2014? By mobilising some analytical categories from the three analytical models, it is argued that all three models are useful for explanation, but they shed different light on the process.

**Keywords:** National Education Plan; Pluralism; Neoinstitutionalism; Multiple Streams; 10% of GDP on Education.

**Resumo:** O artigo testa a capacidade explicativa de três modelos de análise de políticas públicas para o entendimento da aprovação do gasto de 10% do PIB em educação durante a tramitação do Plano Nacional de Educação (PNE) 2014-2024. Os modelos pluralista e neoinstitucional observam principalmente a arena decisória e seus atores ao passo que o de múltiplos fluxos foca na entrada do problema na agenda governamental a partir de seu contexto político. Trata-se de um caso interessante, pois houve um longo processo de

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discussão que refletiu a disputa de propostas por diferentes atores sociais e políticos, inclusive o governo. Tendo em vista que a definição de um patamar com base no PIB era uma demanda antiga da comunidade de políticas educacionais e que já havia sido rejeitada anteriormente, a pergunta central do artigo é: como foi possível aprovar os 10% do PIB em educação? Ao mobilizar categorias analíticas dos três modelos teóricos, argumenta-se que há ganhos de explicação nos três casos, pois iluminam-se aspectos diferentes do processo.

**Palavras-chave:** Plano Nacional de Educação; Pluralismo; Neoinstitucionalismo; Múltiplos Fluxos; 10% do PIB em Educação.

## **1. Introduction<sup>3</sup>**

In June 2014, a new National Education Plan was sanctioned by President Dilma Rousseff (from the Worker's Party) and valid for the period 2014-2024. The plan sets clear and measurable goals for national education at all levels and modalities of education. Among the several debates that occurred during Congress consideration of the proposal, one stood out for having been quite conflicting: increasing public spending on education to a minimum level of 10% of GDP. However, some actors did not see the need for this level of spending.

Indeed, even nowadays there is a dispute over whether or not 10% would be needed to increase the quality of Brazilian education. In July 2018, for example, during President Michel Temer (from the MDB party) administration, the National Treasury Secretariat (STN), subordinated at the time to the Ministry of Finance, released a study showing that Brazil was among the countries that spent more on education and that, given demographic dynamics pointing to a decrease in school age population, the expenditure of that time, estimated at 6% of GDP, was understood as sufficient to ensure school attendance without compromising fiscal rules, such as the constitutional minimum application in education or the spending cap on all public expenditure, approved in 2016. The report, written by government bureaucrats, asserts that the problems of Brazilian education was not related to the level of spending, despite being boasted as such:

Despite the strong social pressure to increase spending in education, there is evidence that the current low quality is not due to insufficient resources. This observation is not specific to Brazil, considering that it is already established in the literature on the subject the view that policies based only on the

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expansion of educational "inputs" are, in general, ineffective (STN, 2018, p. 2).

Nearly a year later, members of the Ministry of Education (MEC) of the new elected government of Jair Bolsonaro adopted the same rhetoric as the STN document, but take a step further: they make public their disagreement over the 20 goal set in the National Education Plan, which aims to achieve 10% of GDP in public investment in education. In the words of The Minister of Education, Abraham Weintraub, the goal 20 deserved to be reviewed by the National Congress, because, although Brazil "is already spending 7% of GDP on education", the increase in spending would not guarantee the improvement of education. The undersecretary of Basic Education, Jânio Endo Macedo, also shares the understanding that the current resources allocated for education are enough:

"(...) the money largely we have here. What we want is to create more efficiency. If there is a need to complement, we will. But there is no need to reach 10% of GDP, I can assure you that."

Given that previous governments have also resisted increasing the federal minimum expenditure on education, being even the subject of a presidential veto in the past, the central question of this article is: how was it possible to enact the goal of 10% of GDP in education in the PNE 2014-2024? What explanatory factors were present (or absent) that allowed the approval of a audacious target of 10% of GDP in public investment in education? To answer this question, we mobilise some public policy analysis models in order to attempt an explanation.

The National Education Plan 2014-2024 had a long process in the National Congress. The bill was submitted at the end of 2010 and enacted into Law in 2014, four long years of discussions involving many social and institutional actors in the debate. One of the main controversies that largely explains the delay in its approval was exactly the issue of financing. The original bill forwarded to Congress by the Executive stipulated 7% of the application of GDP in education, but the final result was the definition of a minimum level of 10% of GDP in educational spending.

This text, therefore, will test the capacity of some theoretical and analytical models to explain the result. We chose three analytical models that mainly observe the decision-making arena that involves public policies, seeking to understand why the policy was approved in this way and not in another (Sabatier, 2007). Pluralist theory places great



emphasis on the groups that participated in the debates, so in this analytical perspective, it is central to identify which social groups had access to the decision-making arena. Its limitation, on the other hand, refers to the conception that the State would have a neutral role, of mere processor of organized demands (see, for example, Milliband's criticisms, 1995 [1969] or Bachrach and Baratz, 2011 [1962]).

In the neo-institutional approach (Peters, 2005; Shepsle, 1989; Shepsle and Boncheck, 1997; Immergut, 1996 and 1998), institutions are understood as central because they generate effects on behaviour and, therefore, on the choices of individuals who participate in the decision-making arena. In this case, the State (or the institutional configuration of the decision-making arena) is not neutral. One limitation we found in this model is that, although institutions matter, different actors, at different times, can occupy the same institutional space. Thus, there may be new actors in place and their values or world views may differ and influence the formation of preferences and, thus, choices. For this, the multiple stream framework (Kingdon, 2003; Cairney and Jones, 2016) was mobilized in which the ideas or solutions advocated by groups (or people) are incorporated into the analysis so that the interaction (or even coincidence) of the contextual conditions of the political environment with the available alternatives and the ability to make the problem public may produce the opening of a political window that increases the chances of approval of a public policy.

The next sections present, in this order, brief notes on the PNE, the applications of pluralist theory, the neoinstitutional model and the multiple streams. In conclusions, we make an overall evaluation of the explanatory capacities of the models and speculate how these findings could explain the chances of a paradigm shift in education that is in place in the current political scenario.

## **2. The PNE, its Actors and Visions of the Problem of National Education**

All National Education Plans are a law that have to be approved by Congress and sanctioned by the President of the Republic. It establishes guidelines, goals and strategies for education in a period of ten years. The PNE is a constitutional mandate.

For a better organization and development of this exercise, we chose the discussions surrounding the current 2014-2024 PNE target number 20 which establishes:

"to increase public investment in public education in order to reach at least 7% (seven percent) of gross domestic product - GDP of the country in the 5<sup>th</sup> (fifth)

year of this Law and, at least, the equivalent of 10% (ten percent) of GDP at the end of the decade" (PNE, target 20).

The first PNE in the country was for the period 2001–2010, a law sanctioned with nine vetoes by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The first PNE was the result of mobilization of organized civil society, after a process of discussions through conferences and forums (Bodião, 2016) which, as we will see, will also happen in the case of the current PNE.

With regard to financing in the previous PNE 2001-2010, there were two proposals: the increase in investments in GDP in education to 7%, present in the bill forwarded by the Executive, and another legislative bill of popular initiative, which already suggested, at that time, the investment of 10% of GDP in education. It can be observed that already in the 1990s there were groups discussing about investment for education, believing that the amount invested was little to achieve a quality education comparable to other countries. One of the presidential vetoes at the time was precisely on the financing of education, which established the target of 7% of GDP in education as it was approved by Congress (Saviani, 2007). There are no records of lawmakers attempting to overturn the presidential veto. For many analysts and members of the educational policy community (Rocha, 2011, p. 194-196), this veto would compromise the execution of the plan itself as there would be not enough funding for its implementation (Bodião, 2016).

As the date of expiration of the 2001-2010 PNE approached, on December 20<sup>th</sup>, 2010, the Executive forwarded to Congress a bill to renew the plan. However, as the procedure took almost four years, the final plan ended up covering the years 2014 to 2024. Several discussions arose about the original proposal, among them the most controversial one, which provided for the financing of 10% of GDP in education.

After several discussions, in October 2012 the PNE is approved in the Lower House. It is then forwarded to the Federal Senate, where some changes were analysed and made. In January 2014, the bill returns to the Lower House and in June of the same year it was approved and sanctioned without any veto by the then President Dilma Rousseff.

### **3. Analysis from the Pluralist Perspective: the actors who participate**

In defence of common interests, individuals unite and organise themselves into associations, trade unions, political parties, among others. These organizations seek to

participate and influence the decisions of governments, a larger institution that holds the decision-making power. In the pluralistic model of analysis, actors are central to explain what kind of public policy will be approved (output) and, provided they have access to power (Dahl, 1961), they can influence the decision-making process by defending their interests (Rocha, 2006; Hill, 2005, p. 28). Power, from Dahl's (1961) perspective, is divided into multiple centres, different actors may have more or less power of influence depending on the sector area in dispute (Schlosberg, 2008). In democratic and pluralistic systems, there would be a multiplication of free associations, therefore, widening political participation. In democratic pluralism theory, the groups that have access to the decision-making arena and the power to convince or more pressure ability will achieve the approval of the public policy they defend (Vasconcelos, 2005). In this sense, the outcome of the policy would be explained by organized groups that managed to influence the decision-making process and, in this perspective, the State would be neutral, that is, it would be a political stage that can be occupied by different actors and interests at different times. In other words, Dahl, the most famous of the pluralists, starts from the premise that, in Western industrial societies (i.e., in democracies), any group can influence government or access power, and therefore no group is, a priori, dominant, in clear opposition to Mills' elite theory (1956 apud Schlosberg, 2008, p. 145). This is how the pluralist theory is applied in the analysis of public policies in which the identification of groups – that is, of the actors who participate – their interests and what they defend is central. As pointed out, this theory is applied to democratic regimes, because it starts from the premise that the participation of any social group is possible. Different groups can participate in the debate and each can play a role at different times, depending on the public policy under discussion, and not necessarily the same groups will have access to or participate in all areas (Dahl, 1961; 1995).

Applying to the case of the 10% of GDP for public education, the most relevant explanatory factor, from a pluralistic perspective, would be the identification of interest groups that had access to power and what they defended (or represented).

In the case of the current PNE, several actors, groups, social movements and policy communities were mobilized and united on several fronts of the discussion on the minimum level of spending on education, bringing together researchers and specialists in educational issues, education professionals, trade unionists, organizations focused on educational actions and social movements.

Among the actors or organizations involved in the discussions it can be highlighted: the National Campaign for the Right of Education, the All For Education Movement, the actors involved in the Basic Education Conference and the National Education Conference, the National Association of Researchers in Education Financing (FINEDUCA), the National Confederation of Workers' Education (CNTE), the National Students Union (UNE) and the UBES (Brazilian Union of Secondary Students).

The National Campaign for the Right to Education is the union of several civil society organizations, with the aim of joining forces to press for the promotion of the right to education. The Campaign was created in 1999 with civil society organizations that attended the World Education Summit in Dakar in 2000. These organizations came together joining various political forces, mobilising and exercising political pressure in the defence of the right to education (Simielli, 2008). The Campaign also played an important role in the preparation, discussions and mobilization of the 2014-2024 PNE. It worked actively and strategically during the 2010 National Education Conference (CONAE) (Bodião, 2016).

The general coordinator, Daniel Cara, was one of the main articulators in the defence and approval of 10% of GDP for education. He actively participated in the public hearings in Congress (Silva, 2015), and also acted as a national mobilization agent, traveling around Brazil to discuss with teachers, parliamentarians and education associations advocating the importance of the approval of the PNE. Recognized by the Lower House as an exemplary representative in the fight for the approval of the PNE, Cara was awarded the Darcy Ribeiro award in 2015 (CD, 2015). Among the public hearings held in the House of Representatives, on 20/march/2012, Daniel Cara, presents a fiscal estimation for "CAQi" - Student Cost for Quality of Education -, amounts that would be necessary, as argued, to provide quality education. As Cara puts it: "any careful study on student cost-quality and the overall cost of the PNE will reach a level close to 10% of GDP".

Thus, the central argument of the actors who mobilized to increase spending on education is put into place: without the 10% of GDP it would not be possible to achieve a quality education in Brazil. The Campaign, with the support of trade union organizations representing education professionals, presented the document entitled "Why 7% for education is not enough?" and distributed it to the then president of the Education Committee in the Lower House, Fatima Bezerra (from the Worker's Party and a public

school teacher and union leader) and to the deputy secretary of MEC and coordinator of the FNE (National Education Forum), Francisco Chagas, with a history of acting in the trade union movement, including on the board of CNTE.

The “All For Education Movement”, on the other hand, was launched in 2006, and brought together institutes and foundations with the support of private sector business. This movement aims to "improve Brazil by boosting the quality and equity of basic education". During the discussions of the PNE, the representative of the movement who participated in the public hearings in the Lower House was Professor Mozart Neves Ramos, post-doctor in chemistry, professor and ex-dean of the Federal University of Pernambuco, had also been secretary of education of the state of Pernambuco. In the Senate, Priscila Cruz was the representative of the movement, one of the founders of the Movement All For Education, and its executive director, holds a master's degree in public administration, and develops projects in the third sector. Currently the partners of the movement are financial institutions such as Bradesco Foundation, Itaú Social, Telefonica Vivo Foundation, Unibanco Institute, Lemann Foundation, Natura Institute, among others. Despite being a group that acted strongly in the debates of the PNE it is interesting to note that Mozart Ramos, speaking in a public hearing in the Lower House on behalf of the movement, does not mention the defence of 10% of spending on education. It presents and defends Capi, but at the same time argues that the problems of education are not only lack of resources. In other words, although there are no records of the Movement All for Education opposing the adoption of 10% of GDP in education, there is also no open advocacy to it either.

Another important event in terms of mobilization of actors was the holding of the Conference of Basic Education and the National Conference of Education (CONAE), held between 2009 and 2010, and organized by the government, with the participation of several entities from all over Brazil. Conferences were held at the municipal, state and federal district levels, delegates were elected representing their respective municipalities and states at the national conference and the central theme of the conference was: Building an Articulated National System: The National Education Plan, Guidelines and Action Strategies. According to the final document of the National Education Conference, about 3.5 million Brazilians were mobilized during its debates, about 2% of the population, involving various entities, associations, education professionals, managers, parents and all those concerned with education (CONAE, 2010). One of the

recommendations expressed in the final document of the national conference was the suggestion to increase spending on education by 10% of GDP.

Another important actor in the debate was the National Association of Researchers in Education Financing, FINEDUCA, which aims to contribute to "the public authorities guaranteeing quality public education for all", linked to the National Campaign for the Right to Education. Its importance in the process was through the publication of technical notes explaining the importance of PNE target number 20, such as the note "Why should the Federal Union complement CAQi in the PNE?", launched in 2011. There was also participation in public hearings held in the Lower House and the Federal Senate (Silva, 2015), always based on discussions related to the financing of education and the importance of the approval of the 10%.

The National Confederation of Education Workers, CNTE, brings together several education unions in the country and within the discussion process of PNE was present, holding seminars with the presence of the actors mentioned above, participation in several public hearings, publications on education that contemplated the PNE, proposals for several parliamentary amendments in the two legislative houses, participation in the sessions, among other actions.

Finally, the Student's Union (UNE) and the Secondary School Students Union (UBES) mobilized on several occasions during the consideration of the bill in the National Congress, taking students to the galleries and, in some interpretations, it was a presence that put pressure on the rapporteur of the matter in the Special Committee that, at the last minute, accepted the suggestion to insert the proposal of 10% of GDP in its report to be sent to floor consideration.

In short, many groups accessed and tried to influence the decision-making arena, especially the members who dominated the debate: the All for Education Movement, the National Campaign for the Right to Education and FINEDUCA. Associations and trade unions also supported and participated in public hearings. In this sense, pluralist theory is useful to identify groups that had access to the decision-making arena in a specific sectoral area (education) and that will not necessarily be the same in other discussions.

Thus, expressing what the pluralistic theory predict: civil society groups that were best organized and pressured were the ones that obtained the desired result and thus the approval of their preference in an effectively democratic order.



On the other hand, there are some limitations of pluralist theory to explain the case of 10% of GDP in education. First, it is assumed that the State is neutral and, therefore, there would be no institutional filters or state actors influencing the final result. Secondly, considering that many of these same groups had already participated in the same decision-making arenas in previous governments and had not succeeded, the mere presence or participation of these actors, as expected by pluralist theory, does not seem to be sufficient to explain the final choice. After all, why could not this proposal have been approved in previous settings if the groups were organized and participated in the decision-making process in the past? In the next section, we introduce the institutional configuration of the decision-making arena to increase the explanatory capacity.

#### **4. An Analysis from Neoinstitutionalism: the configuration of the decision-making arena**

The neoinstitutionalist model considers the institutional configuration of the decision-making process of public policies, emphasizing that institutional rules are an important factor in the process. It is important to emphasize that this model continues to consider the preferences of society, however, it emphasizes that institutions will filter these preferences and the final choices will depend on institutional rules. In other words, the institutional configuration of the decision-making arena will create incentives and constraints for the behaviour of individuals (Hall and Taylor, 2003; Arretche, 2007; Gomes, 2006; Peters, 2005; Shepsle, 1989; Shepsle and Boncheck, 1997; Immergut, 1992 and 1998).

In the construction of the PNE there was the participation of several segments of society, previously described in this article. But there are particularities of the decision-making arena that influence behaviour and, therefore, the decision-making process. Unlike other public policies (such as decisions in health or social assistance that decide many policy action in inter-management forums or ministerial ordinances), many of the educational policies are (or should be) mandated to be considered by Congress, a arena of public debate and great exposure for parliamentarians and the government itself with potentially a much higher number of participants.

In the Lower House, the government bill was initially forwarded for consideration in the committees of education and culture, finance and taxation, constitution and justice and citizenship. Subsequently, in June 2011, a special committee was set up, composed

of twenty-five members, and with MP Ângelo Vanhoni (PT-PR) as rapporteur, an institutional position with agenda powers and - not coincidentally - a member of the President's party. As we know, the rapporteur has the prerogative to analyse all proposed amendments and suggestions for amendments, guided by the political consensus possible to be achieved, including the interests of the government and, finally, suggest an updated version of the proposal for the consideration of lawmakers. After holding several public hearings with experts and civil society organizations and several requests for extension of deadlines for the completion of the committee's work, parliamentarians were able to suggest amendments to the bill. A total of 2,915 amendments were submitted, of which 445 were accepted by the rapporteur.

Several amendments by various parties proposed an increase in the percentage of spending on education in GDP. MP Pauderney Avelino (DEM-AM) even proposed the level of 20% of GDP. It is noticeable, therefore, that even opposition parties to the government used the strategy of putting the rapporteur and the government under the delicate political situation of having to reject suggestions of increases in spending on education. In the first report, the Worker's Party rapporteur informs that he had rejected amendments that increased spending because there would have been an agreement to establish the level of 7% from the fifth year of the PNE and 8% in the last year. In the second report presented in June 2012, the target of 10% public spending on education is finally inserted. According to newspaper articles at the time, the rapporteur would have made a last-minute change and the Ministry of Education would have positioned itself with caution on the decision to approve the 10%: "In terms of federal government it is the equivalent to putting [the budget] of the Ministry of Education within the Ministry of Education, that is, it means to take R\$ 85 billion from other ministries [to allocate] to Education. It is a political task difficult to perform", explained the Minister of Education at the time.

Then the bill was forwarded to the Senate. In this house, some modifications were made that Bodião (2016) considers relevant, such as the expansion of the understanding of what would be "public spending" by incorporating the possibility of computing expenses or subsidies to philanthropic and similar institutions. However, the level of 10% was maintained.

Upon returning to the House for its final vote on the floor, on April 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2014 the final vote approves the bill on the floor by almost unanimity of the members present. The

exception was the complementation of separate votes, registered by two Members of Parliament who criticized the "gender ideology" contained in the proposal, that is, even in these two cases there was no question of the level of 10% of GDP spent on education.

Unlike other public policies that can be decided in decision-making arenas with more restricted participation of actors – such as decisions inside Cabinets, as the ordinances that regularly the Ministers of Health and other collegiate bodies put forward – in the case of the PNE, the decision and debate were public and participation expanded. Thus, it is observed that the decision-making arena, the National Congress, exposed parliamentarians to a public debate of difficult opposition. The government, which would be the only one that could constitute itself as a veto group against increasing the spending, was in a delicate situation of having to oppose the expansion of education funding, being a party strongly linked to organizations, social movements and unions that have historically always advocated more resources for education. The rapporteur attempted a midway solution by establishing 8% of GDP application in his first report, increasing slightly, but leaving close to what the government suggested. But concerning voting, it did not create any mobilization rule, so the president's only option would be to exert a partial veto.

Additionally, 2014 was a year of national elections and the President's veto would be a high risky movement in electoral terms – the President was seeking re-election and a veto would be strategically used by the opposition in elections to show that the Workers' Party was against more resources for education – that is, the costs would be high and, still, riskin Congress to overturn a presidential veto which would thus receive the political credits of having guaranteed the increase in spending on education. If the President vetoed the 10% of GDP provision, she could be uneasy with her electorate and militancy, given the public image built with strong public support.

In short, the strong mobilization of specific groups, as presented in the previous section, combined with an institutional arena in which debates are public, dramatically raised the costs of the government to veto or oppose the proposal to increase spending even if its preference was to establish a lower level in the 20<sup>th</sup> goal of the PNE. But, as noted, these two elements – mobilization of interest groups and a decision-making arena of high public exposure – were not new so that it is not yet possible to answer the question of how it was possible to approve the target of 10% of GDP satisfactorily. In the next

section, we mobilize the analytical arsenal of multiple streams so that we can essentially incorporate context factors into the analysis.

### **5. Analysing from the lens of the Multiple Stream Framework: the context, ideas and opportunities explored by the actors**

The role of ideas in decision-making, the coincidence of political moments marked by the political context and the role of actors within policy communities that defend a certain vision and solutions to problems in addition to the ability of certain actors to articulate interests and enable support for a given proposal are the central analytical elements of the multiple streams framework (Barcelos , 2013; Capella and Brazil, 2015; Rocha, 2011, p. 194-196). This framework is strongly critical of the rational model, because decisions in public policies would not be made rationally, but would be related to opportune moments when a "political window" opens to solutions that are waiting for problems based on the garbage can model. Ideas about problems do not come out of nowhere, they're long thought out, and they wait for the right time to increase their chances of getting on the government agenda.

Kingdon (2003) categorizes three dynamics (or streams) so that a problem increases its chances of becoming part of the government agenda: problems, public policies (alternatives), and politics. Problems must be identified and recognised as problems that deserve attention of the government. This is a stream that typically takes a long time to build the public image of a problem, maybe over several years or decades. Public policies or alternatives are proposals for solutions to a problem, presented by epistemic communities or specialists. Finally, the stream of politics refers to the level of political support for the recognition and priority of solving the problem. In this case, there are three important elements: the national mood, the campaigns carried out by groups or the change of government, which increase the chances of proposals entering the government agenda.

In this model, the opening of a "political window" of opportunity is considered a critical moment. This is the time when the three streams intersect (or coincide): the problems have been recognised as priorities, there are proposals for solutions and the political environment is supportive. This moment of opening this window - which opens and closes quickly - depends on a political entrepreneur with the task of exploring this moment, connecting people who have the same ideas and support.

This model seems quite appropriate to explain how the 10% of GDP could be approved at that moment, that is, by a combination of factors specific to that political context. Schematically, we can apply this model as follows.

*5.1. Problems Streams: how the image of problem was built*

The problem was built over time on the grounds that government investment in education was low or insufficient. In the early 1990s, Brazil invested less than 4% of GDP in education and the Brazilian educational reality was of high illiteracy rates, deteriorated schools, large numbers of children not attending school, among other problems. This image construction took a long time. History identifies the struggle and difficulties of public school since the 1930s with the New School movement. With the process of redemocratisation of the country in the mid-1980s, greater attention to education began to be paid as popular participation resumed. The constitution-makers of 1987-1988 were clear about education being a social, universal and subjective right (Menicucci and Gomes, 2018) and, since this moment, the debate around the need to increase and allocate more resources for education has been present as a demand of several organized groups of civil society. In the 1990s, there were forums and conferences to discuss education (Moura, 2013) that build a policy community. The perception of this group was that the investment in education by the government was not enough and with the increase in the amount invested a better quality education could be achieved. Thus, an image was built over the years in which the amount spent on education was too low and should be increased, that the raise in the amount invested per GDP in education would contribute to educational quality, improving school structures, educational indicators, and thus guaranteeing the right to quality public education for all. This culminates, during the 2014-2024 PNE, in the defence of investing 10% of GDP by the groups that have already been described previously.

*5.2. Public policy stream: what are the alternatives to solving the problem existed?*

*Which groups defended what?*

The existing alternatives were public investment of 7% of GDP in education, which subsequently changed to 8%, defended by the government, and the investment of 10% of GDP for education, defended by organized civil society. These alternatives were defined through parliamentary amendments during the public debate in various instances

within the National Congress and had already been presented in previous governments as discussed earlier. Additionally, during Congress consideration of the current PNE, there is a refinement of the (technical) arguments that would justify the increase in the level of public spending: based on a fiscal estimate that calculated the "Student Cost Quality of education" (CAQi) establishing how much each level, stage or modality of education would cost, compiling technical information that estimated how much it would be necessary to achieve a quality education. In other words, the argument was that it was no longer a question of repeating previous proposals to guarantee "a minimum" of expenditure, but rather of specifying what should be the expense required for effective quality education all over the country.

Thus, from the point of view of the discussion of alternatives, there was a proposal to solve the problem of low spending on education in Brazil with technical information defended by a community of experts.

*5.3. The Streams of politics: what was the national mood? What is the political context?*

The national mood was in support of the approval of the 10%. The groups were mobilised and present in the discussion process - entities linked to education, unions and social movements as we saw earlier. Add to this, that the theme education has traditionally had a high support of public opinion in general. Groups and parties to the left of the President's party defended the level of 10% of GDP, that is, potential competitors of the voters of the ruling party; as well as opposition parties (more to the right) also seized the political moment to advocate for the government to increase its commitment to public spending on education, exposing the President to take a position on this. Given that the Workers' Party government had links to trade unions and social movements that made up a community of educational policies and that the motto of the government at the time was "participation as a method of government," it would be politically risky for the President (or her economic team) to publicly oppose increasing resources for education. It is also possible to speculate that the demonstrations of June 2013, demanding improvement of public services - and that generated an increase in bad/low evaluation of the government - may have been additional elements taken into consideration by the President. The approval of 10% of GDP in education, close to national elections, dramatically raised the political costs of the President vetoing such a measure.



*5.4. How do streams intersect and open a political window of opportunity?*

There are two moments to the opening of the political window of opportunity. The first was the articulation and strategic action of civil society organizations during the Education Conference (CONAE), capable of mobilizing and articulating interest groups. A second political window was the proximity of the elections in 2014 (possibility of change of government), because a presidential veto to an old demand of the education community, many belonging to organizations and movements with historical links with the president's party, would be an extremely risky political movement to be exploited by opposition parties.

Parliamentarians historically linked to the educational theme and civil society organizations, including trade unions, join the already consolidated movements in order to convince the rapporteur of the proposal to approve the 10% of GDP for education. A political entrepreneur who worked strongly was Daniel Cara, coordinator of the Campaign for the Right to Education movement, which presented technical studies, justifying the need to expand resources for education. Together with other organizations or interest groups - entities, foundations, NGOs and student movement, among others detailed by BODIÃO (2016) around the idea of defending a quality public school to all Brazilians - they argued that the government's proposal of 7% of GDP was insufficient. As a political entrepreneur, Cara articulated key people from various organizations, parties, in addition to having a high public exposure in the media.

Although within this group, there were disagreements regarding the need to apply 10% of GDP as a solution to the problems of education, there were no public opposition to this position of the members of this community of specialists.

In short, factors of the political context or that specific political moment complete the analysis of the approval of 10% of GDP in education: the institutional and political conditions of that moment were favourable and, in fact, increased the chances of approval of the proposal with the opening of a political window, expertly explored by various social and political actors of the educational policy community.

**6. A Summary of Explanatory Power: for the Past and for the Future**

After the application of the models presented and considering the entire configuration of the decision-making arena of the public policy object of study of this

exercise, it can be considered that all three models analysed here explained well the choice of policy as it was approved, each presenting the specificities of the PNE, that is, each allows an interpretation that depends on the analytical and theoretical lens that is intended to be given.

One can observe that each analytical model contributed in its own way to the final explanation.

The pluralist theory presents the discussions around organized groups that pressure and have access to the decision-making arena. In the policy studied here, many groups have mobilised and made themselves present in the whole process of discussion of the PNE. It should also be emphasised that the approved proposal was suggested by these groups at the national education conference, not accepted by the government in the bill sent to Congress, the capacity to mobilize and pressure these groups is an important explanatory factor.

A limitation of this model is in relation to the role of the State, which would be neutral, a mere processor of demands. Considering this statement, the role of the institutions in the final decision was incorporated, with the neo-institutional model as analytical guide. Institutions matter. The high-exposure public decision-making arena, the National Congress, made opposition to the groups' demands highly costly to parliamentarians, especially those of the President's party.

Finally, the third model that helped explain the approval of the PNE was the multiple streams in which the aspects of context associated with the ideas that epistemic communities defend for years or decades on end are decisive to explain the approval. This point seems particularly relevant to us, because the actors involved in the defence of the increase of public resources for education and the institutional configuration of the decision-making arena (the National Congress) were present in previous moments, especially during the consideration of the previous PNE (2001-2010). However, in this case, these two factors were not sufficient to ensure the approval of the proposal of 10% of GDP in education. In fact, the image of the problem was already mature at the time of the current PNE consideration by Congress, having proposals for technical and politically viable solutions and the fact that the government is historically linked to the themes defended by civil society organizations, opened a "political window" of opportunity in which rejecting the proposal would bring high electoral costs for the President's party.

Finally, if it is possible to apply this same exercise as a way of speculating what would be the chances of the current government reversing the proposal of 10% of GDP in education, as it defends, we can say that the chances seem small. From the point of view of the groups that would mobilize to support the reduction of spending, these are small and restricted, essentially, to technicians and specialists linked to the fiscal area of the government, as actors of the former Ministry of Finance and the current Ministry of Economy, which are also the current managers and leaders of the Ministry of Education. On the contrary, groups that have the capacity to mobilize in favour of maintaining the status quo are not only majority but also include actors with organizational capacity – as seen recently in street mobilizations in the defence of education – in addition to education remaining supported by the vast majority of public opinion.

From the point of view of the institutional arena, as we have seen, Congress is an arena in which political actors have high public exposure, especially for their voters. Unlike, for example, a pension reform, on the grounds that "privileges" would actually be eliminated; in the case of education this argument is much more fragile, except, perhaps, for the expenditures on public higher education. In view of the support of public opinion in general for education, it would be quite difficult to position itself publicly in favour of reducing resources for education. A possible alternative would be the use of presidential decrees or other unilateral legislative instruments, which could change the status quo immediately, thus creating a new fact. Still, the chances of political and public opposition to such a strategy - in addition to possible judicial questions - seem, at the moment, quite likely.

Finally, with regard to context and from the multiple streams' framework, it can be speculated that:

- From the point of view of the problems, the arguments that Brazil already spends a lot on education and that the problem would be to make actions more efficient is certainly gaining ground in the current public debate. However, to date – in August 2019 – this argument does not seem to be widespread enough to get public support for a proposal to reduce spending. But it should be noted that this model of analysis informs that the circulation of an idea and its acceptance takes time and, perhaps, we are still at an early stage, but that it can grow over time.

- From the point of view of alternatives, that is, public policy proposals, the option of the current Ministry of Education is to invest in institutional designs that encourage

more efficient management models (i.e., more results with the same or fewer resources), greater flexibility in hiring staff and contracts and promoting a more active role of private educational institutions as an alternative provision of educational services. Maybe the proposal called “Future-se” for higher education is the most exemplary case of this attempt to change the paradigm of public funding in education as established since the Federal Constitution of 1988.

But conceivably, it is with regard to the flow of politics the less obvious speculation. On the one hand, the change of government signals the intention of major structural transformations of the Brazilian State as a goal (or ideal) of the new government as a whole, that is, in different sectoral policy areas. On the other hand, there is still no public support for the interpretation that enough is already spent on education and that the problem would only be a matter of better management or efficiency. On the contrary, the widespread feeling is still that education should be a priority for governments and that what it has been done to date remains insufficient. At least so far, there are few visible political actors who publicly and openly defend the thesis that increasing spending on public education is unnecessary.

Thus, at least in the current scenario of August 2019, what seems to be more likely is the maintenance of the status quo: the goal of 10% of GDP on public education is maintained, but in practice it is not achieved.

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# Introducción progresiva de alimentos orgánicos y agroecológicos en la alimentación escolar en el municipio de São Paulo: un análisis de los instrumentos de acción pública

*Introdução progressiva de alimentos orgânicos e agroecológicos na merenda escolar no município de São Paulo: uma análise a partir dos instrumentos de ação pública*

*Progressive introduction of organic and agroecological foods in school meals in the city of São Paulo: an analysis based on public action instruments*

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**Resumen:** El artículo analiza la implementación del Plan Para la Introducción Progresiva de Alimentos Orgánicos o de Base Agroecológica en la Alimentación Escolar en el municipio de São Paulo, Brasil, a través del cual se pone en práctica la adquisición de productos de la agricultura familiar, siguiendo la Resolución no 04/2015 del Fondo Nacional para el Desarrollo de la Educación (FNDE). El objetivo consistió en comprender el proceso político, a partir de la red de acción pública y los instrumentos que ésta produce. Con este fin, se movilizaron estrategias de investigación documental y entrevistas semiestructuradas. La investigación documental se basó en búsqueda de la legislación nacional y subnacional correspondiente. Para las entrevistas, se convocó a representantes de cuatro instituciones gubernamentales y de la sociedad civil. Los

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resultados muestran que los actores involucrados en la formulación de la política presentan convergencia de ideas en el diseño de instrumentos de acción pública.

**Palabras claves:** Instrumentos de acción pública; Alimentación escolar; Orgánicos; Agroecología; São Paulo.

**Resumo:** O artigo analisa a implementação do Plano de Introdução Progressiva de Alimentos Orgânicos ou de Base Agroecológica na Alimentação Escolar no município de São Paulo, Brasil, plano este que coloca em prática a aquisição de produtos advindos da agricultura familiar, seguindo a Resolução nº 04/2015 do Fundo Nacional para o Desenvolvimento da Educação (FNDE). O objetivo foi compreender o processo político a partir da rede de ação pública e os instrumentos que ela produz. Para tanto, foram mobilizadas as estratégias de pesquisa documental e entrevistas semiestruturadas. A pesquisa documental baseou-se em levantamento da legislação nacional e subnacional correspondente. Para as entrevistas, foram acionados representantes de quatro instituições governamentais e da sociedade civil. Os resultados mostram que os atores envolvidos na formulação da política apresentam convergência de ideias no desenho dos instrumentos de ação pública.

**Palavras-chave:** Instrumentos de ação Pública; Alimentação escolar; Orgânicos; Agroecologia; São Paulo.

**Abstract:** The paper analyzes the implementation of the Plan for Progressive Introduction of Organic and Agroecological Items in School Meals in the city of São Paulo, Brazil. Such policy provides for the acquisition of products derived from family agriculture according Resolution 04/2015 of the National Fund for Education Development (FNDE). The objective was to understand the political process involved, from the point of view of public action network and its instruments. For this purpose, we performed documentary research and semi-structured interviews. Documentary research was based on a survey of national and subnational legislation, while interviews were performed with representatives of four government and civil society institutions. The results show that the actors involved in policy formulation have converging ideas in what refers to the design of public action instruments.

**Keywords:** Public action instruments; School meals; Organics; Agroecology; São Paulo.

## **1. Introducción**

Uno de los tópicos relevantes en la agenda de los tiempos actuales se refiere a la calidad de los alimentos, a la reducción en el uso de pesticidas y, por lo tanto, al tipo de organización social que puede estructurarse en base a modelos alternativos de producción de alimentos, como por ejemplo la producción orgánica desarrollada en centros urbanos.

En la ciudad de São Paulo, los establecimientos agrícolas vinculados a la producción de alimentos orgánicos se concentran en los extremos del municipio, y el mantenimiento de sus actividades implica la formulación e implementación de políticas

públicas. Un importante ejemplo de política reciente es el plan, en curso, de introducción progresiva de alimentos orgánicos y agroecológicos en la alimentación escolar municipal. Esta política ha sido creada a partir de la Ley Municipal 16.140, de 17 de marzo de 2015, de conformidad con la Resolución nº 04/2015 del Fondo Nacional para el Desarrollo de la Educación (FNDE). En este contexto, surgen varias preguntas que pueden investigarse, tales como: ¿Cuáles son las implicaciones de un modelo alternativo de producción y consumo en el territorio, insertado en el territorio por la nueva política? ¿Cómo se comportan los actores sociales frente a este nuevo modelo?

De esta manera, para el presente estudio nos propusimos como objetivo *comprender el proceso de formación de la política pública de introducción progresiva de alimentos orgánicos y agroecológicos en las comidas escolares en la ciudad de São Paulo, sus respectivos actores y los instrumentos de acción pública que surgen en ella y de ella*. Se trata de un estudio de caso basado en investigación documental y en el análisis de narraciones de actores estratégicos insertados en la política en cuestión, y que resulta en una tipología de los Instrumentos de Acción Pública (IAP) en ella identificados.

El texto se estructura en cuatro secciones, además de esta introducción y de las consideraciones finales. La primera sección está dedicada a una explicación breve de los conceptos de agroecología y agricultura orgánica, ya que los términos se utilizan a menudo sin definición precisa en la legislación y en otros instrumentos de política. La segunda sección es una nota metodológica en que se exponen las decisiones tomadas en la investigación. La tercera presenta el marco teórico de la Acción Pública y de sus instrumentos y herramientas. La cuarta corresponde a la descripción y análisis del caso.

## **2. Agroecología, agricultura orgánica, agricultura familiar: definiciones**

Los términos agroecología y agricultura orgánica – al igual que otros relacionados, como agricultura alternativa, producción agroecológica, alimentos orgánicos, etc. – aunque se refieran a conceptos distintos, suelen ser tratados como equivalentes tanto en el uso diario como en ciertos documentos públicos, incluso instrumentos legales. Esto se puede ver en la política objeto de este artículo, centrada en la introducción de alimentos orgánicos o agroecológicos en la alimentación escolar en el municipio de São Paulo.

Como se mencionó, esta política se creó con base en la Ley Municipal 16.140, de 2015. Un examen rápido de esta ley demuestra que no hubo mayor preocupación, por

parte de los legisladores, de distinguir ambas nociones: el instrumento prevé la introducción en las comidas escolares municipales de “alimentos orgánicos o agroecológicos”, a los cuales se refiere siempre en forma conjunta y sin diferenciación. A todo efecto práctico, los dos términos son tratados en esta ley como sinónimos<sup>5</sup>.

Para mejor distinción de los conceptos de agroecología y agricultura orgánica, debemos recurrir a literatura académica. Allí encontraremos varios trabajos, como los de Assis y Romeiro (2002), Barboza, Thomé, Ratz y Moraes (2012), Moura (2017), entre otros, que comparten la interpretación de que la agroecología es un campo de conocimiento, mientras que la agricultura orgánica es una práctica o sistema de producción. Assis y Romeiro (2002) explican:

La agroecología y la agricultura orgánica no deben verse como sinónimos, ya que en el primer caso, la agroecología es una ciencia, con límites teóricos bien definidos, que busca interrelacionar el conocimiento de distintas áreas con el objetivo de proponer un camino a seguir para la agricultura, que respete las condiciones ambientales impuestas por la naturaleza a esta actividad económica [...] [y] en el segundo caso, la agricultura orgánica es una práctica agrícola y, como tal, un proceso social (Assis & Romeiro, 2002, p. 73, traducción nuestra).

Desde esta perspectiva, la agroecología se puede definir *grosso modo* como una disciplina (o campo de conocimiento) destinada a aplicar principios ecológicos a la producción de alimentos. Aunque el nombre agroecología tenga su origen en 1928, cuando fue empleado por primera vez por el agrónomo ruso Basil Bensin (Canuto, 2017), la delimitación de la agroecología como disciplina científica tuvo su impulso a partir de la década de 1960, como reacción al modelo de agricultura que se hacía dominante en consecuencia de la llamada "revolución verde", basado en el monocultivo extensivo y en el uso a gran escala de insumos industriales, como fertilizantes y pesticidas químicos (Moreira & Carmo, 2004).

En Brasil, tanto el gobierno como los sectores productivos vinculados a la agricultura y ganadería adoptaron el paquete de la "revolución verde", expandieron la frontera agrícola, y promovieron los sectores químico y mecánico a través del crecimiento del mercado de insumos agroquímicos, semillas y maquinaria agrícola. En el sector financiero, se abrieron y subsidiaron líneas especiales de crédito "vinculadas a la compra

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<sup>5</sup> El texto integral de la Ley Municipal 16.140/2015 se encuentra disponible en <http://legislacao.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/leis/lei-16140-de-17-de-marco-de-2015> (acceso en 20 feb. 2020).

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de insumos agrícolas, es decir que sólo aquellos que compraran el conjunto de insumos en el paquete tecnológico podrían acceder a préstamo" (Ehlers, 2008, p. 24, traducción nuestra). Además de los conflictos por la tierra y de problemas sociales y violencia en el campo, la modernización de la agricultura brasileña ha implicado problemas ambientales como "la contaminación del agua, de los alimentos y de muchos trabajadores rurales, la destrucción de los bosques, la erosión del suelo e incluso desertificación de ciertas áreas" (Ehlers, 2008, p. 24-25, traducción nuestra).

En ese contexto, la agroecología se desarrolla como un campo disciplinario relacionado con la búsqueda de sistemas agrícolas más sostenibles, en los que la fertilidad y la productividad del suelo estén garantizadas por mecanismos biológicos y por la regulación natural de las plagas. En la base del enfoque se encuentra una "filosofía de producción coherente con las leyes y dinámicas que rigen los ecosistemas, es decir, la producción con y no contra la naturaleza" (Barboza et al., 2012, p. 389, traducción nuestra). Se opone a la forma hegemónica de producir de la agricultura convencional, que se desarrolló sin tener en cuenta las consecuencias ambientales a largo plazo y la dinámica de los agroecosistemas.

A la vez que se establece como campo disciplinario, afluyente de otras disciplinas como la ecología y la agronomía, la agroecología también se ha convertido en un movimiento político y socioambiental. Según Barboza et al. (2012), el movimiento agroecológico "fue más allá de su enfoque en el tema estrictamente tecnológico y comenzó a incorporar otros temas y cuestiones sociales, asumiendo una conformación cercana a la de un movimiento social" (Barboza et al, 2012, p. 390, traducción nuestra). Así, incorporó valores como el respeto por el conocimiento popular, la preservación de la cultura y de la biodiversidad, entre otros que pueden asociarse con una forma no hegemónica de producción.

Entre estos valores, uno de los principales es la agricultura familiar, que se ha convertido en una de las categorías estructurantes de la propuesta agroecológica, ya sea vista como disciplina científica o como movimiento político. Como señala Moura (2017), las características ambientales, culturales, sociales y económicas de la agricultura familiar son "elementos estructurantes de la praxis y la teoría agroecológica" (Moura, 2017, p.26, traducción nuestra). Si la agricultura convencional se caracteriza cada vez más por la explotación empresarial de grandes extensiones de tierra con monocultivo y uso intensivo de insumos industriales (pesticidas, fertilizantes), las prácticas agroecológicas forman un

sistema alternativo cuyos protagonistas son los pequeños y medianos productores y campesinos de la agricultura familiar.

El concepto de agricultura familiar se encuentra bien definido en la legislación brasileña, y resulta de un largo tiempo de construcción de un referencial global, en un movimiento que se inició en la década de 1970 y se fortaleció en Brasil con el Programa Nacional para el Fortalecimiento de la Agricultura Familiar (PRONAF) en los años 1990. De acuerdo con la Ley Federal 11.326, de 24 de julio de 2006, el agricultor familiar es aquel que cultiva un área de hasta cuatro módulos fiscales<sup>6</sup>, utiliza predominantemente el trabajo de su propia familia y obtiene de esa actividad una proporción importante de sus ingresos. Esta definición permite que las características del agricultor familiar varíen regionalmente: el tamaño en hectáreas de las fincas consideradas familiares es variable (dada la variación del módulo fiscal), y a ello se suman otros factores de diversidad, de orden histórico y cultural<sup>7</sup>. En la región Sur del país, por ejemplo, la tradición predominante en agricultura familiar es la de los “colonos”, con intensas prácticas cooperativas. En el Noreste, por el contrario, los agricultores que se ajustan a la definición suelen ser campesinos beneficiados por programas de reforma agraria y con deficiencias organizativas. En el caso de la política enfocada en este artículo, los agricultores familiares afectados, como se verá a continuación, se organizan en cooperativa.

Así entendido el concepto de agroecología y la centralidad que asume la agricultura familiar en la propuesta agroecológica, la agricultura orgánica puede ser vista como uno de los sistemas o prácticas de producción agrícola consistentes con el enfoque agroecológico. Es cierto que los orígenes de la agricultura orgánica son anteriores a los del movimiento agroecológico en sí: se suelen situar a principios del siglo XX, cuando el investigador inglés Albert Howard propuso cultivar sin el uso de cualquier insumo químico (Ehrers, 1994). Lo mismo se da con otras prácticas también clasificables como agroecológicas, como la agricultura biodinámica (que surgió en Alemania alrededor de 1934), la agricultura biológica (cuyas bases fueron lanzadas en 1930 por el suizo Hans-Peter Müller), y la agricultura natural (propuesta en Japón en 1935 por Mokiti Okada).

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<sup>6</sup> El módulo fiscal es una unidad de medida agraria utilizada en Brasil desde 1979. Se expresa en hectáreas y varía de un municipio a otro, teniendo en cuenta el tipo predominante de explotación y el nivel de ingresos de los productores, entre otros factores. La unidad sirve como parámetro para la clasificación de las propiedades rurales, de acuerdo con la Ley Federal N° 8.629, de 1993, clasificándolas en pequeñas propiedades (aquellas con extensión inferior a 1 módulo fiscal), pequeñas (de 1 a 4), medianas (de 4 a 15) y grandes (más de 15) (Caldas & Jayo, 2012).

<sup>7</sup> Para una discusión en mayor profundidad, ver por ejemplo Schneider y Niederle (2008), Sabourin (2011), y Faysse, Bonnal y Sabourin (2016).



Todas ellas compatibles, con diferentes matices, con las pautas de lo que hoy se conoce como disciplina y movimiento agroecológicos.

En términos generales, la agricultura orgánica excluye los insumos químicos sintéticos (fertilizantes y pesticidas), así como los organismos genéticamente modificados (semillas híbridas y variedades transgénicas) que garantizan la productividad de la agricultura tradicional, y propone en su lugar el uso de fertilizantes naturales, el reciclaje de los materiales orgánicos generados en la unidad de producción, el mantenimiento de la cubierta vegetal, viva o muerta, en el suelo, la rotación e intercalación de cultivos, el aumento de la biodiversidad y el control biológico de plagas, entre otras técnicas. Aunque no exista un vínculo obligatorio entre esas prácticas y la agricultura familiar, incluso porque las mismas también están presentes en ciertos modelos de agricultura empresarial a gran escala<sup>8</sup>, sus principales practicantes suelen ser agricultores familiares pequeños y medianos, como los afectados por la política objeto de este artículo.

### **3. Nota metodológica**

El estudio es cualitativo y se lleva a cabo a través de un estudio de caso según Stake (1995). Este autor distingue tres tipos de estudios de caso: intrínsecos, instrumentales y colectivos. En el primero, el investigador busca entender un caso sólo por el interés suscitado por ese caso, es decir, el caso en sí es el interés de la investigación. En el segundo, el objetivo es que un caso estudiado proporcione información para comprender un fenómeno más amplio, a través de un proceso de inducción. El estudio de caso colectivo, por su vez, corresponde al estudio instrumental extendido a más de un caso. Lo que se presenta en este trabajo se aproxima de un estudio de caso intrínseco, ya que la comprensión del caso en sí mismo, es decir, la formación de la política de introducción progresiva de alimentos orgánicos y agroecológicos en la alimentación escolar en el municipio de São Paulo, es el interés específico.

Con respecto a la recopilación de datos, además de la revisión de literatura, se movilizaron estrategias de investigación documental y entrevistas semiestructuradas en profundidad. La investigación documental se basó en una búsqueda en la legislación nacional y subnacional correspondiente. Para las entrevistas, realizadas en el primer semestre de 2018, han sido contactados representantes de cuatro instituciones

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<sup>8</sup> Mori, Jayo, Saes y Farina (2005) describen un ejemplo de agricultura orgánica practicada a mayor escala.

gubernamentales y de la sociedad civil: COOPERAPAS (*Cooperativa Agroecológica dos Produtores Rurais e de Água Limpa da Região Sul de São Paulo*), CODAE (*Coordenadoria de Alimentação Escolar da Secretaria Municipal da Educação*), Casa de Agricultura Ecológica y MUDA-SP (*Movimento Urbano de Agroecologia em São Paulo*).

La elección de los cuatro entrevistados procuró contemplar las distintas inserciones institucionales en esa política. Los entrevistados ocupan posiciones estratégicas en sus respectivas instituciones, y elegimos citarlos en el trabajo en forma anónima, refiriéndonos solamente a la institución u organización en la que trabajan.

Para caracterizar los instrumentos de acción pública (IAP), las entrevistas siguieron un guión básico común que abordó los mecanismos de control social y gobernanza, las fuentes de fondos, las instituciones municipales involucradas y el funcionamiento de los contratos. El análisis de las entrevistas se realizó a partir de la identificación de las narrativas de los actores (Langley, 1999), lo que subsidió la construcción y el análisis de una tipología de los instrumentos de acción pública presentes en el caso, y en la construcción de la política.

#### **4. Instrumentos de Acción Pública: enfoque conceptual**

El concepto de Instrumentos de Acción Pública (IAP) es útil para analizar los dispositivos relacionados con la formación de políticas públicas en general, y sobretudo aquellas que surgen de un juego complejo entre actores sociales, económicos y políticos. El debate, basado en gran medida en teorías francófonas sobre el enfoque cognitivo y la acción pública (Nonato, 2015), se centra en los procesos de gestión de decisiones políticas, teniendo en cuenta la fragmentación de los lugares de poder y la interdependencia entre actores, acciones y racionalidades (Massardier, 2006).

De esa forma, los instrumentos se caracterizan como elementos que apoyan las políticas públicas, las influyen y, de otro modo, incluso pueden representar riesgos para la formación misma de ellas. En otras palabras, los instrumentos de acción pública dan vida a un complejo mecanismo técnico y a la vez social que organiza las relaciones sociales entre el poder público y sus destinatarios, de acuerdo con los significados y representaciones que es responsable de llevar y administrar (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2012). Cuando se aplica al campo político y a la acción pública, un instrumento es "un dispositivo técnico con una vocación genérica, que tiene una concepción concreta de la

relación política/sociedad y está respaldado por una concepción de la regulación" (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2012 p.22, traducción nuestra).

En una interpretación inicial presente en Hood (1986) y Salamon (2000), "*instruments*" (instrumentos) y "*tools*" (herramientas) tienen la misma definición, lo que implica una noción de instrumento más orientada a la configuración institucional, burocrática y operativa, sin tener en cuenta la dimensión política y subjetiva señalada por Lascoumes y Le Galès (2012). Esto llevó a Hood (2007) a considerar la diferencia entre los dos términos, proponiendo que "*tools*" está más vinculado a las herramientas que utilizan las instituciones formales, mientras que "*instruments*" se relaciona a los enfoques que consideran las propias instituciones e insertan connotación política en su análisis (Archipavas, 2016).

Dentro de ese cuadro es posible diferenciar niveles de observación, distinguiendo instrumento, técnica y herramienta. El instrumento desde este punto de vista es un tipo de institución social (como el censo, el mapa, la regulación, los impuestos, etc.); la técnica es un dispositivo que sirve para poner en funcionamiento el instrumento (la nomenclatura estadística, el tipo de representación gráfica, el tipo de ley o decreto), y la herramienta es un microdispositivo dentro de una técnica (una categoría estadística, la escala del mapa, la obligación y la sanción previstas por un texto, etc.) (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2012; Ollaik & Medeiros, 2011).

Dadas las definiciones de acción pública, instrumento, técnica y herramienta, también es conveniente comprender los diferentes tipos de instrumentos gubernamentales con base en sus respectivas áreas de influencia en la acción pública. En general, los instrumentos pueden clasificarse según su *nodalidad*, *autoridad*, *recursos* utilizados y *organización* (Hood, 1986, 2007).

*Nodalidad* representa la capacidad del gobierno para operar como un nodo (punto focal) en una red de información. Los instrumentos de nodalidad son, por lo tanto, aquellos que se basan predominantemente en el uso de los recursos de información disponibles para el gobierno. *Autoridad*, a su vez, denota el grado de poder legal y la legitimidad del gobierno; de esta manera, los instrumentos de autoridad son aquellos que se basan en el uso de poderes de mando y control por parte de quienes gobiernan la sociedad. Los *recursos* se refieren a fuentes de financiamiento, y los instrumentos de recursos (o de tesorería) consisten en subsidios, incentivos o desincentivos fiscales y

financieros, créditos, etc. Por fin, *organización* denota la capacidad de dirigir la acción, que puede ser ejercida por la burocracia, la policía, alguna entidad privada, etc.

Basándose en estas cuatro categorías, Hood (1986, 2007) desarrolla una tipología de los instrumentos, sistematizada en el Cuadro 1. Aunque se han propuesto otras tipologías en la literatura (Lascoumes & Simard, 2011; Amorim & Boullosa, 2013), elegimos a ésta para nuestro análisis de la introducción de alimentos orgánicos y agroecológicos en la alimentación escolar en la ciudad de São Paulo.

**Cuadro 1:** Tipología de instrumentos de Hood, según objetivos y procedimientos

	<b>Instrumentos basados en nodalidad</b>	<b>Instrumentos basados en autoridad</b>	<b>Instrumentos basados en recursos</b>	<b>Instrumentos basados em organización</b>
<b>Objetivos</b>	Aconsejamiento, capacitación, relatorios y registros	Regulación, licitación y licencias	Donaciones, préstamos, premios y repases	Administración directa, empresas públicas y consultores
<b>Procedimientos (herramientas)</b>	Provisión y entrega de informaciones	Consejos consultivos, compromisos publicos en general	Creación y financiación de grupos de interés	Conferencias, comisiones de investigación, reformas administrativas, etc.

**Fuente:** Elaborado a partir de Hood (1986, 2007) y Ollaik y Medeiros (2011).

## **5. Descripción del caso y análisis a la luz de la tipología de instrumentos**

### *5.1. Trayectoria y evolución de la política agroecológica en el municipio de São Paulo*

Se puede decir que los primeros movimientos articulados desde el Estado para influir en la agricultura urbana y periurbana en São Paulo tuvieron lugar a nivel estadual, durante el gobierno de André Franco Montoro (1983-1987), aunque sufrieron discontinuidades en los años siguientes (Caldas & Jayo, 2019; Giacché & Porto, 2004). Después de la década de 1980, el primer marco legal importante para el tema ocurriría a nivel municipal, con el Plan Director Estratégico (PDE) de 2002 para el municipio de São Paulo (Ley Municipal 13.430, del 13 de septiembre de 2002), que reconoció en su Sección Décima (artículos 51 a 53) los objetivos de la modalidad de agricultura urbana y sus estrategias principales.

Otro hito importante es el Programa de Agricultura Urbana y Periurbana, conocido como PROAURP, instituido por la Ley Municipal 13.727/2004, que trajo

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incentivos a la producción local así como asistencia a la implementación de proyectos de huertas comunitarias, educativas, medicinales, ya fuesen destinadas al autoconsumo o a la generación de ingresos. La implementación de dos Casas de Agricultura Ecológica, iniciativa de la Secretaría de Verde y Medio Ambiente posterior a 2004, impulsó aunque de manera frágil la agricultura familiar y la agricultura urbana sobretodo en la zona sur de la ciudad de São Paulo. En 2010, la Ley 13.727/2004 recibiría nuevas reglamentaciones a través del Decreto nº 51.801 / 2010.

Y otro hito fundamental para la viabilidad de la política agroecológica en São Paulo fue el Plan Director Estratégico (PDE) de 2014, que definió directrices para el crecimiento urbano de São Paulo hasta el año 2030. Entre sus objetivos, sobresalen la implementación de una política pública de tierras, la regularización de loteos irregulares, la preservación de áreas verdes, la prioridad al transporte público, la contención de la propagación urbana, el ordenamiento del proceso inmobiliario y otros (Cámara Municipal de São Paulo, 2014, p.9). Por lo tanto se reconoció la necesidad de promover la contención urbana, el uso sostenible de áreas verdes mapeadas, y la preservación del ecosistema (Nakamura, 2017).

La trayectoria de las políticas públicas implementadas en los últimos 15 años, y sobretodo la influencia de PDE 2014, culminaron en el Decreto Municipal nº 56.913, del 5 de abril de 2016, que reglamenta la Ley 16.140/2015 y prevé la inclusión obligatoria de alimentos orgánicos o de base agroecológica en la alimentación servida a escolares em el Sistema Municipal de Educación de São Paulo. Los objetivos principales de este decreto consistían en estimular la producción de orgánicos a nivel municipal por agricultores locales, y desencadenar la formación de una estrategia para la adquisición e inserción graduales de esos productos en las comidas escolares del municipio.

La implementación y el monitoreo de esa inserción gradual de alimentos orgánicos y agroecológicos en la alimentación escolar se encuentra bajo la responsabilidad de la Coordinación de Alimentación Escolar (CODAE) de la Secretaría Municipal de Educación (SME). Para ello, se creó un Comité de Gestión compuesto por representantes de la administración pública, de la sociedad civil, del Consejo Municipal para la Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (COMUSAN) y del Consejo de Alimentación Escolar (CAE).

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En el centro de la estrategia está el mecanismo de compras públicas<sup>9</sup>. Dentro de la planificación municipal, el Decreto 56.913/2016 estableció metas progresivas, de forma a lograr en 2026 el 100% de estos productos en las comidas escolares en el sistema educativo del municipio (Tabla 1).

**Tabla 1:** Progresividad para la adquisición de alimentos orgánicos o agroecológicos, según las metas, por año (en % del valor)

Ano	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Meta	3%	5%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	80%	100%

Fuente: Decreto 56.913 del 5 de abril de 2016.

*5.2. La experiencia de COOPERAPAS en la venta de alimentos orgánicos para la alimentación escolar en la zona sur de São Paulo*

Como se mencionó, la organización social es uno de los elementos principales de la construcción de la política de suministro de alimentos orgánicos al sistema educativo municipal focalizada en este artículo. Desde 2011 se viene formando y desarrollando en forma de cooperativa la primera organización de agricultores del municipio de São Paulo: COOPERAPAS (*Cooperativa Agroecológica dos Produtores Rurais e de Água Limpa da Região Sul de São Paulo*). Ubicada en el distrito de Parelheiros, en el extremo sur del municipio, esta organización cuenta actualmente con 34 miembros.

Desde el principio, COOPERAPAS tiene como uno de sus retos insertar a sus miembros cooperados en el mercado orgánico, lo que ha ido consiguiendo a lo largo de los años mediante la participación en programas federales de compra de alimentos, como el Programa Nacional de Alimentación Escolar (PNAE) y el Programa de Adquisición de Alimentos (PAA).

El desarrollo de la actividad agrícola estructurada en esta región (extremo sur del municipio de São Paulo) fue posible gracias a la creación de dos Áreas de Protección Ambiental (APAs): el APA Capivari-Monos, por la Ley Municipal 13.136, de 2001, y el APA Bororé-Colônia, por la Ley Municipal No. 14.162, 2006 (Figura 1). Dentro de los límites de las dos APAs, se han fomentado prácticas agrícolas que no dañen el medio

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
<sup>9</sup> Para detalles sobre la relación entre compras públicas y alimentación escolar, ver Caldas y Nonato (2014, 2013).



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ambiente, valorando los sistemas agroforestales, la agricultura orgánica, la permacultura, la biodinámica y especialmente la no utilización de agroquímicos, pesticidas y pesticidas.

**Figura 1:** Ubicación de las APAs Capivari-Monos y Bororé-Colônia em el município de São Paulo



**Fuente:** Elaboración de los autores.

Coherentemente con Baccarin et al. (2017), es razonable esperar que la participación de agricultores en políticas públicas como esta sea facilitada por el hecho de que integran entidades colectivas como COOPERAPAS, dándoles mayor posibilidad de seguir las llamadas públicas y superar dificultades burocráticas. Sin embargo, esta suposición se puede relativizar si la entidad colectiva no actúa realmente como representante del agricultor, como por ejemplo cuando constituye un mero intermediario en la comercialización de productos, dejando de transmitir a los miembros las ventajas de precio logradas. En este sentido, es necesario analizar la forma en que opera la organización, especialmente en lo que se refiere a sus asociados/miembros cooperados y al sector público, en la construcción de instrumentos de acción pública.

*5.3. Instrumentos de acción pública identificados en el caso*

Para este análisis, volvamos a la tipología propuesta por Hood que presentamos en la Figura 1, para distinguir los tipos de instrumentos identificables en las narrativas de los actores entrevistados, en términos de (i) *nodalidad*; (ii) *autoridad*; (iii) *recursos* y (iv) *organización*. Con este fin, se examinarán las respuestas de los participantes a la siguiente pregunta: ¿Cómo se ha traducido esta política pública en términos de gestión (directa o indirecta), construcción de espacios para la participación (como foros y consejos), financiamiento y monitoreo?

(i) Nodalidad

Desde el punto de vista de la nodalidad, se puede observar una elevada capacidad gubernamental para proporcionar información de manera centralizada en la relación entre agricultores, cooperativas y autoridades públicas. Esto se puede medir con base en la producción de informes, registros y comunicaciones oficiales, y en la provisión de capacitación. La política para la introducción progresiva de alimentos orgánicos o agroecológicos en la alimentación escolar comenzó a construirse a mediados de 2011, y gran parte de las acciones de planificación y coordinación de políticas fue diseñada y ejecutada de forma a legitimar la acción formal y nodal de la *Coordenadoria de Alimentação Escolar* de la SME (CODAE-SME).

El representante de CODAE entrevistado señala que el municipio cuenta con herramientas para garantizar que la política de compra de alimentos orgánicos llegue al 100% de los alumnos registrados en la red educativa, lo que incluye no solamente las escuelas bajo el manejo directo o mixto del municipio, sino también las que forman parte de la red subcontratada. El entrevistado entiende que para éso es necesario mantener una plataforma continua para el suministro de información y registros oficiales, y monitorear la evolución de la política; en resumen, actuar de manera nodular. Una de las herramientas señaladas es el portal web CODAE-SME, que, en opinión del entrevistado, está tomando el frente con respecto a la sistematización de acciones y *accountability*.

Una forma de materializar la nodalidad es proporcionar capacitación a los productores (la capacitación es por cierto uno de los instrumentos de nodalidad, como muestra la Figura 1). En este sentido, es importante mencionar la integración entre CODAE y CAE, que es el brazo de actividad diaria de la municipalidad en los locales donde se administran los alimentos. Tanto los representantes de la CODAE como los del

CAE, cuando entrevistados, señalaron esta intersectorialidad como punto a favor en el control e inteligencia de la política y en la capacitación de los actores involucrados, tomando por base la experiencia de la primera convocatoria pública que involucra a COOPERAPAS.

Un contrapunto relevante señalado por el agricultor asociado de COOPERAPAS entrevistado es el hecho de que el gobierno y la burocracia en general insisten en la creencia de que los agricultores necesitan asistencia técnica rural, configurando en sus palabras un "prejuicio" en relación a las habilidades y conocimientos específicos de la región y de aquellos que allí producen. En otras palabras, los agricultores de COOPERAPAS esperan incentivos alternativos del gobierno, que vayan más allá de la asistencia técnica convencional.

(ii) Autoridad

Con respecto a la autoridad, vale la pena destacar cómo, basándose en consejos consultivos y otras herramientas de participación, el gobierno logra que sus preferencias prevalezcan en los momentos de regulación, es decir, en licitaciones, licencias y convocatorias públicas.

El mayor objeto de autoridad en estos momentos es el control sobre las llamadas públicas. El entrevistado de CODAE enfatiza en su narrativa la relativa facilidad para inspeccionar lo que se produce y por lo tanto se ofrece a través de una llamada pública. A la vez, también en el sentido de fiscalización y participación, menciona la importancia del retorno (*feedback*) de los usuarios, tanto directos (escuelas) como indirectos (alumnos que consumen los almuerzos escolares y otras categorías interesadas, como padres, nutricionistas y educadores).

El representante de MUDA-SP, sin embargo, señala un límite a la participación de usuarios directos e indirectos, con respecto a las llamadas públicas específicamente:

Creo que hay cierto espacio donde la sociedad civil no puede influir, porque es un espacio de la Municipalidad: la elaboración de una convocatoria pública, la forma en que se construye internamente, los caminos burocráticos, la relación con lo legal, creo que todo esto es algo en que [...] la sociedad civil tiene poca influencia" (traducción nuestra).

Por lo tanto el entrevistado considera que el modelo de llamada pública implica poca participación y control social. Agrega que esa participación y control eventualmente surgirán en momentos posteriores a la llamada, por ejemplo cuando los agricultores y las

cooperativas vacían algunas llamadas frente a un nivel de demandas incompatible con la realidad de quienes producen.

En opinión de la agricultora vinculada a COOPERAPAS entrevistada, aunque la Secretaría de Educación parece estar dispuesta a recibir las demandas de los agricultores y convertirlas en parte operativa de la política, el proceso se ve obstaculizado por la alternancia de personas en los puestos ejecutivos, de tal manera que un eventual (y frecuente) recién-llegado poco sabe sobre el andamio y la presión ejercida sobre esta política, lo que en última instancia reduce dicha disposición.

En palabras de la misma entrevistada, los consejos de política pública relacionados con el tema son muy activos. Los dos más importantes con respecto al juego de autoridad son el COMUSAN y el CAE. De acuerdo con el sitio web del COMUSAN, su composición actualmente consta de dos tercios de representantes de la sociedad civil y un tercio de representantes del gobierno, con un total de 42 miembros titulares e igual número de suplentes, con mandato de 24 meses y derecho a reconducción. El CAE, por otro lado, tiene tres representantes nombrados por el Poder Ejecutivo, seis representantes de entidades de docentes, estudiantes o trabajadores del área, seis representantes de padres de estudiantes, nombrados por los Consejos Escolares y por las Asociaciones de Padres y Maestros, uno de los cuales es necesariamente un representante de la comunidad indígena, y seis representantes nombrados por entidades civiles organizadas. A pesar de que estos consejos son cada vez más sólidos y entrelazados, ellos conviven con el riesgo de vaciarse y desviar la agenda, sobretodo cuando se considera el aspecto siguiente del análisis, los recursos.

### (iii) Recursos

En cuanto a los instrumentos basados en recursos, es importante destacar las fuentes de financiamiento, ya sea provenientes de préstamos, transferencias, donaciones e incluso premios. Desde el punto de vista de las herramientas señaladas por Hood (Figura 1) para este tipo de instrumento, la creación de líneas de financiación previnculadas a grupos de interés es lo que permite la consistencia y continuidad de determinada agenda.

Cuando se trata de los recursos involucrados en la implementación de esta política, existen tres plataformas principales de financiación: (a) las transferencias realizadas por el Gobierno Federal a través del FNDE; (b) asistencia técnica y programas de crédito ofrecidos y repartidos entre los tres entes federativas (federación, estado y

municipio); y (c) donaciones y premios que surgen de acuerdo al progreso y la movilización de los agentes.

La adquisición pública de productos de la agricultura familiar para alimentación escolar se realiza con los recursos federales del FNDE. La compra de productos orgánicos específicamente podría ir más allá de esa fuente de fondos, pero la CODAE la viene utilizando para la compra de orgánicos inclusive. El plan de introducción progresiva prevé la compra únicamente de orgánicos en 2026, mientras que en 2018 el objetivo era el 5% del valor (Tabla 1). Por el momento, el presupuesto de origen federal se viene utilizado tanto para la compra de alimentos como para el pago de proveedores subcontratados.

En opinión de la agricultora de COOPERAPAS entrevistada, el PRONAF "es maravilloso" como fuente de financiamiento para el agricultor, pero requiere garantías que muchos agricultores familiares no alcanzan, especialmente aquéllos que no detienen la escritura (propiedad formal) de la tierra que cultivan. "Es como si el agricultor no tuviera ninguna garantía que ofrecer: tiene su propia capacidad de trabajo, pero eso no es suficiente para un banco", dice la entrevistada. Lo que se puede observar cotidianamente es la influencia de los programas *Micro Bacias* y *Micro Bacias II* del gobierno estadual, que han permitido financiar un camión recientemente comprado por COOPERAPAS, además de invernaderos. La entrevistada se considera satisfecha con el apoyo operativo y también con la infraestructura brindada en los últimos años a nivel municipal, ya que las reuniones mensuales y generales de COOPERAPAS se llevan a cabo en las instalaciones del Consejo de Alimentación Escolar.

En opinión del representante de MUDA-SP, existe una gran preocupación con las pautas dadas por el gobierno federal, que pueden dañar la agenda agroecológica. El entrevistado explica que, en un escenario de crisis institucional y económica, después de años de inversión en políticas públicas para el desarrollo rural, resulta prácticamente imposible no considerar los recortes presupuestarios y el riesgo de retroceso en algunos logros conseguidos a lo largo de los años, lo que puede poner en riesgo la continuidad de la política.

#### (iv) Organización

Finalmente, los instrumentos organizativos se encuentran visibles en los atributos de la estructura administrativa responsable por implementar la política: una administración predominantemente directa, regida por empresas públicas y concesiones,

con influencia de consultores privados, etc. La percepción anteriormente mencionada del entrevistado de MUDA-SP, con respecto a la disputa por participación e influencia en la política, pone en evidencia otra cuestión: ¿cómo se determinan los límites de la administración estatal y privada, los acuerdos y la gobernanza en general? Esta pregunta aparece casi explícitamente cuando, como ya se mencionó, el entrevistado de CODAE enfatiza que el objetivo de la política es llegar al 100% de los estudiantes registrados en la red educativa, independientemente de que la escuela esté bajo administración directa o mixta del municipio, o forme parte de la red subcontratada.

El representante del CAE da por sentado que supervisa la producción de géneros comprados en el ámbito de la política y destinados a alimentación escolar. Por medio de la planificación de los ciclos de producción, el CAE es responsable de esta actividad, en un primer momento. Una de las herramientas organizativas provenientes del Estado son las comisiones de investigación. En cuanto a esto, el entrevistado de MUDA-SP subraya el buen funcionamiento del Consejo de Alimentación Escolar (CAE), del Consejo Municipal para la Seguridad Alimentaria y la Nutrición (COMUSAN), del Comité de Gestión de la Ley Orgánica y de otros espacios de investigación y debate públicos. Un ejemplo de la acción investigativa de los consejos fue la proyección pública que se logró dar, en 2017, a un intento de política pública en que se proponía distribuir un alimento ultraprocesado, la llamada "farinata", a personas en situación de vulnerabilidad. En consecuencia, el apoyo popular terminó generando resistencia a un objeto impuesto por el poder ejecutivo municipal.

## **6. Consideraciones finales**

El presente estudio tuvo como objetivo observar el proceso de formación de una política pública para la introducción progresiva de alimentos orgánicos y agroecológicos en la alimentación escolar en la ciudad de São Paulo, y los respectivos instrumentos de acción pública que surgen de (y en) la misma. Con base en la formulación e implementación de la Ley Municipal 16.140/2015, en la tipología señalada por Hood (1986, 2007) y en las entrevistas obtenidas de actores involucrados en el proceso, resultó posible trazar algunas consideraciones.

Con la ayuda de la tipología de Hood para el análisis de los instrumentos (Figura 1), se puede concluir que existe una convergencia narrativa, un *guión* común, entre los diversos actores involucrados. En los cuatro frentes que componen la tipología



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(nodalidad, autoridad, recursos y organización), es posible notar que todos los encuestados construyen la misma idea central implícita del plan.

En términos de instrumentos de *autoridad*, se señaló el funcionamiento de los consejos y la multiplicidad de actores que participaron en la formulación del dispositivo legal que gobierna el plan, a pesar de que el mecanismo de convocatorias públicas es el más decisivo y el gobierno puede hacer prevalecer sus preferencias.

En cuanto a la *organización*, se señala el papel de las autoridades públicas en la inspección y el seguimiento de las acciones. Sin embargo, debe considerarse que la escala de adquisiciones tiende a crecer casi exponencialmente hasta 2026 de acuerdo con la progresividad de las metas (Tabla 1), lo que eventualmente puede conducir a un cambio en los instrumentos. La eventual aparición de compañías dispuestas a proveer estos servicios puede cambiar el escenario, estableciéndose gradualmente un control indirecto por parte del Estado.

En cuanto a la *nodalidad*, los dos últimos puntos conducen a la consideración de que el Estado ha ejercido sus acciones de manera nodal hasta el presente momento, y cuenta con un aspecto a su favor relacionado con la dimensión de los *recursos*: el FNDE como fuente vital para el funcionamiento de la política.

Por fin, lo que se puede señalar en general es la construcción de una acción pública como resultado de una red cuyos actores comparten creencias, y que por el momento buscan perseguir sus intereses a través de la aproximación y el consenso, y no de la ruptura o el embate. También es posible observar que hay funcionarios públicos identificados con la política de agroecología. También es posible señalar que este proceso pone en evidencia una Cooperativa con diferentes acciones, creada hace pocos años, pero con el propósito de liderar la inserción sistemática de alimentos orgánicos y en transición agroecológica en la red de suministro municipal en São Paulo.

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# Public Management and Performance: a Case Study on the Results Management of the Government of the State of Ceará

*Gestão Pública e o Desempenho: o Estudo de Caso sobre a Gestão por Resultados do Governo do Estado do Ceará*

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## **Public Management and Performance: the case study on management by results of the government of the state of Ceará.**

**Abstract:** The present study is focused on the performance in the public sector regarding more specifically the Brazilian public management and Ceará. It is aimed at conforming the investigative method in which a qualitative and exploratory research was used through a methodological approach through documentary analysis and a case study. This manuscript shows the path of public management and performance in Brazil, identifying the main facts that characterized these phenomena and how culture has behaved in terms of results and its reflection on the performance of the government of Ceará. The findings of previous studies on management and measurement of performance in the public sector were not sufficiently clarified. The research reported here seeks to fill this gap, examining the influence of management results on the performance of the public sector. The results show that the new practices introduced by the management of results demonstrated significant advances in the economic, fiscal and administrative policies of the State, but the progress made under the environmental and social aspects were not enough to mitigate social and territorial inequalities. The culture of the management of results also shows that this essay is different from previous demands.

**Keywords:** Performance; Public Management; Management through Results; Public Service.

**Resumo:** Estudo sobre o desempenho no setor público sob o enfoque da Gestão pública brasileira e cearense. Com vista a conformar o método investigativo, recorreu-se a uma

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pesquisa qualitativa, de caráter exploratório, por meio de uma abordagem metodológica mediante a análise documental e via estudo de caso. O escrito mostra o percurso da Gestão pública e o desempenho no Brasil, identificando os principais fatos que caracterizaram estes fenômenos e como se comportou a cultura por resultados e seus reflexos no desempenho do governo do Ceará. Os achados de estudos anteriores sobre gestão e medição do desempenho no setor público não foram suficientemente esclarecidos. A pesquisa ora relatada procura preencher esta lacuna, examinando a influência da gestão de resultados no desempenho do setor público. Os resultados evidenciados denotam que as novas práticas introduzidas pela gestão de resultado demonstraram sensíveis avanços na política econômica, fiscal e administrativa do Estado, porém os progressos ocorridos sob os aspectos ambiental e social não foram suficientes para atenuar as desigualdades sociais e territoriais. A cultura da gestão por resultado, também, mostra este ensaio diferente em relação a demandas precedentes.

**Palavras-chave:** Desempenho; Gestão Pública; Gestão por Meio de Resultados; Serviço Público.

## **1. Introduction**

The modern perspective on Public Management reveals not only a recurrence of themes, dilemmas and paradoxes but also a constant search for more knowledge to solve practical implications, such as managing and measuring performance (Mota, 2013; Capobiango, Nascimento, Silva, Faroni, 2013).

In practice, there are pressures for more and better services, immediate solutions to economic, fiscal and social problems, through the efficient use of resources, accountability and transparency of the acts of the rulers (Mota, 2013; Bao *et al.*, 2013; Cavalcante, 2019).

Bouckaert & Halligan, (2008) point out that administrative culture is a decisive factor that influences the implementation of performance management and measurement processes. Similarly, the attitude of politicians and managers is relevant in the *design* and implementation of reforms, administrative and management processes (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Brusca, Manes Rossi and Aversano, 2017).

Based on the literature on government performance, this step aims to conduct a study on performance in the context of the Brazilian Public Management and management of results in the Government of Ceará. Within this scope, we seek to achieve these specific objectives: a) to highlight the evolution of public management approaches and performance; b) to describe the phases of Brazilian Public Management; c) to display the management model as a result of the Government of Ceará.



The methodology used consisted on a bibliographic and documentary review of the literature and constitutional devices applied to government performance and on The Brazilian Public Management regarding the management of the applied result in Ceará. In fact, the study is classified as descriptive and exploratory, with qualitative analysis, through documentary analysis and a case study.

The main findings of this manuscript recognize the important role of state outcome management practices in improving fiscal, economic and administrative performance. For this purpose, they contribute to cultural, normative changes and in their organizational processes. The results also show the advances in social and environmental issues, but they are still far from dictate an end of poverty, poverty and social and territorial inequalities.

The data of this study allow an overview of the culture of results, how the processes improved the influences of public policies and added public value. It should be also understood that a performance measurement system is needed in which an efficient diagnosis of government programs should complement an effective interaction with organizational capabilities.

This manuscript is organized into five sections, including the introduction herein reported. Next, there is a literature review. In the immediately later section, the context of the study is shown, in order to, if firmly, outline the case study analysis, and the final considerations. In the last segment, the main results are evidenced, and proposals are offered for future research.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

### *2.1. The Evolution of Public Management and Performance Schools*

The evolution of Public Management makes up five "eras of administration" (Bao *et al.*, 2013). The first is called pre-classical because it precedes the conscious creation of public administration as a formal field of study. During this period, it is clear the importance of public managers in the process with politicians in establishing the trust and legitimacy of the political and legal order, as well as the performance of the government (Bao *et al.*, 2013; Mota, 2013).

The performance, at that time, was related to the measurement: what, why and how the activities should be measured and reported, in order to improve the governmental

result (Eliuz *et al.*, 2017; Monteduro, 2017). Also, the performance was linked to its evaluation, being perceived as guiding the direction of priorities and was used to evaluate the merit and quality of individual and collective effort (Ensslin *et al.*, 2017).

The second "era" refers to bureaucratic management. For Bao *et al.* (2013), classical management is concerned with administrative efficiency, the competence of its activities and the regulation of its acts and decisions. The focus was based on the definition of goals and objectives through a hierarchical system.

At this stage, there was a transformation based on rules and processes for the market. Due to the management reforms, there was another impulse, then directed to Performance Management and Measurement (PMM) (Monteduro, 2017).

At that time, the United States sought inspiration from European models for democratic practices. Constitutions and laws were presumed as logical and necessary foundations to ensure democracy. Administrative problems and inefficiency in the provision of services, however, revealed the insufficiency of the legal order. It was found that the creation of sound and also responsible political institutions would not be able, by itself, to operate in order to obtain an effective performance (Freitas, 1999; Mota, 2013).

In the modern state, by assuming dimensions of service delivery, efficiency has become an important stage. Proposals for an independent administration of politics and based on studies and own knowledge, such as a science (Mota, 2013).

Subsequently, there was a search for the principles of Administration. The advance was, however, concomitant with the frustrations and disappointments with the inefficiency of the Public Administration. Attempts to implement political neutrality and professionalization of public management faced political obstacles (Mota, 2013).

The study of Public Management should, therefore, consider the context of a more comprehensive and holistic view. The model was characterized by an excessive focus on control, resulting in reduced efficiency, transparency and objectivity mechanisms - hence the slowness and privilege of interests of specific groups and low performance (Mota, 2013).

Assuming as impossible the neutrality and distancing from politics, as well as the universality of practical principles, the best proposal would be to compromise public managers with essential values - conformed in ethics, equity, efficiency and effectiveness - that would condition behaviors and management practices.

The current hegemonic discourse configured the government as having become unsustainable and financially burdened. The responsiveness of the authorities and the government's priorities have been the subject of debate. Therefore, with an intense political, ideological and economic component, a broad movement of administrative reforms aimed at changing the role and functioning of the State has been experienced. Assisted by intensive sponsorship of multilateral organizations, reforms in search of better performances have occurred in central countries (Freitas, 1999; Cavalcante, 2019).

Thus, the movement of the New Public Management (NGP), the "third era", signed by a broad set of beliefs, doctrines and experiences that served as a reference framework in the evaluation and redesign of the public sector. Under the NGP agenda, PMM appeared as a way to reinvent and improve the efficiency, effectiveness and quality of the government (Gomes, Mendes, Carvalho, 2017).

The NGP emerged intensively based on a narrative about the shortcomings of the bureaucratic model and suggested reforms with support in neoliberal doctrines, aimed at reconfiguring the role of the State (Mota, 2013; Cavalcante, 2019).

NGP consisted of a set of deliberate changes in structures and processes in order to achieve better performance. It is a prescriptive, post-bureaucratic model for management structuring, supported by the principles and guidelines of competitiveness and private organizations (Mota, 2013; Verbeeten and Speklé, 2015; Cavalcante, 2019).

*Ex positis*, management should only target services, not run them. There was a preference for outsourcing and hiring out. Through several private providers, the benefits of competition between them could be used, avoiding monopolies and allowing greater flexibility (Mota, 2013).

The focus on performance would lead governments to increase productivity, cost-effectiveness in service delivery (Carter, Bob, 2013). In addition, the introduction of competitive mechanisms between government agencies, the instruments of managerial flexibility, were foreseen as incentives and means for improving management (Cavalcante, 2019).

Bouckaert and Halligan, (2008) point out that NGP is a two-level phenomenon. In the political feature, the doctrine propagates the improvement of public services through the import of concepts, techniques and principles of private initiative. Meanwhile, at the most technical level, the set of specific concepts and practices includes an emphasis on performance, measuring costs, processes and result indicators; preference

for leaner and more specialized organizational formats, with typical market mechanisms, such as openness to competition, payment for performance and focus on customer-citizen services.

The government would focus its efforts on its essential and exclusive activities, directing and ensuring the supply of society's needs through transfers to the private sector and the third sector (Mota, 2013; Cavalcante, 2019).

The belief in changes favored the proposal of a reinvention of Public Management because they brought new optimism. It was, therefore, a new paradigm of transforming the public sector through administrative reforms that focus on results in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and quality in the theory of governance. Thus, NPG moved to governance (Jurnali, 2015; Han, Kim, 2017).

Public Governance (GP), the fourth school, covers participation, rule of law, transparencies, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, efficiency and effectiveness, accountability, strategic vision and equity. As such, the availability and dissemination of information on policies, programs and results relating to services are the central elements, whose main objective is to improve accountability, because it offers greater attention to markets, PMM, citizen satisfaction and government transparency (Jurnali, 2015)..

GP is a format of bureaucracy, coordination and division of labor, influencing planning, management and decision-making. These governance structures establish PMM models that seek an interconnection of public policies, through new evaluation processes, and that allow intersections of the public and private sectors (Tabi; Verdon, 2014; Virtanen, Vakkuri, 2015).

As means and instruments of policies, GP caused changes and consequences; interest in networks beyond hierarchies, arrangements of partnerships between public, private and non-profit organizations; emphasis on negotiation and persuasion skills - and revitalized PMM's skills. (Bao et al.,2013; Han, Kim, 2017; Cavalcante, 2019).

The modernization by the GP involves the process of shaping a new institutional design based on the definition of political goals, of meeting the interest of groups that exercise power through a system of norms (Barabashev, Klimenko, 2017; Han, Kim, 2017).

In fact, the GP postulates the complex and fragmented nature of policy definition and implementation processes (Dal Molin, Turri, Agasisti, 2017). These organizational

and institutional conditions at each level of administration can influence the implementation of reforms (Dal Molin, Turri, Agasisti, 2017).

According to Bao *et al.* (2013), the GP emphasizes three characteristics to establish trust and legitimacy. First, it is focused on value, because it is argued that the goal is to promote the public good, not only to improve efficiency, effectiveness or responsiveness in the implementation of a given program. The second characteristic is to emphasize the creation of processes that facilitate the generation of implementable agreements between *stakeholders*, which will produce maximum public value. And the final feature is the creation of public good as a co-production process, involving the citizen, the private market and the non-profit sectors (Cavalcante, 2019).

The role of government is not to regulate, distribute or redistribute public benefits, but also to serve as a catalyst for shared ownership of the public good (Bao *et al.*, 2013; Cavalcante, 2019). Instead of disaggregation, integration; instead of competition, it emphasizes collaboration; and, finally, the substitution of pecuniary motivation by the professionalization of bureaucracy and the inclusion of social agents in policymaking (Cavalcante, 2019).

The three characteristics discussed emanated that government performance needs to be seen from the perspective of the organic integrity of a political system in which the public, private, and non-profit sectors work together to create the uniqueness of a community. This view emphasizes the synergistic influence of social institutions in the creation of a shared system of values, agreement on governance processes and structures and the respective roles that all sectors play in the creation of the common good (Bao *et al.*, 2013; Cavalcante, 2019)..

The last stage refers to value-based performance. The value-centric approach combines strategy and performance management. This approach facilitates the integration of strategic leadership with the most tactical and operational concerns of PMM (Bao *et al.*, 2013). It highlights the importance of relationship management skills in establishing trust in the government, which requires managers and employees to place the values of policy in the project at the center. It is negotiated both horizontally and vertically, as well as inside and outside, sharing performance among various *stakeholders*. (Bao *et al.*, 2013).

This approach expands the learning capacity that requires participants to create imaginative solutions. It encourages self-reflection on the best course of action and

performance criteria. Values are necessary for the creation of moral integrity, regardless of whether dealing with people or political systems. In the absence of this shared integrity, the participants of the process will resort to confrontation and the use of force to deal with their dissatisfactions (Bao *et al.*, 2013).

Finally, this subject offers a rich opportunity to prepare a research agenda, focusing on how differences in values shape the meaning of efficiency, effectiveness and government outcomes.

## *2.2. The Reforms of Brazilian Public Management Directed to Performance*

The Brazilian Public Management was first constituted in a Patrimonialism State that was characterized by an intense public and private interest, where the State Entity was the Royal Family.

The administrative reform of 1936 focused on general administration activities; sought to assemble a body of bureaucrats; it was based on the "principles of administration" and the model prescribed in the Taylorist/Fayolian/Weberian theory (Capobianco, Silva, Faroni, 2013; Faria, Faria, 2017)..

Later on, came the bureaucratic model, which sought to combat the excesses of the previous statutory. The bureaucratic model was based on the modalities of rational-legal authority, explaining impersonality in relationships, formalization of communications, division of labor, hierarchization of authority and merit-based on competence (Bresser-pereira, 1999).

In this context, decree-law no. 200/67 implemented the decentralization of the federal administration's staff; management for the private; union for municipalities; and the establishment of administrative systems (Capobianco, Silva, Faroni, 2013; Faria and Faria, 2017).

This standard materialized decentralization through the creation and expansion of municipalities, foundations and state enterprises, giving greater autonomy than to the organs of direct administration. Despite this advance, there was the "Counter-Reform" introduced by the Federal Constitution (Bresser-pereira, 1999). Nonetheless, there were advances in the requirement of public tender and the transfer of social actions from the federal sphere to the other federative spheres.



This political-institutional periodization did not separate the administrative reforms of the structural movements that occurred at the political and economic level to the extension of the country's modernization process, including transformations that occurred in the management plan (Capobianco, Silva, Faroni, 2013; Faria; Faria, 2017).

The market imposes agility and an intense ability to adapt to change, due to technological complexity. Therefore, the bureaucratic model, with its dysfunctions, did not meet the institutional objectives, being replaced by the management standard.

The Management Reform has three interconnected dimensions - social, economic and administrative. The first addressed the well-being of the population; the economic dimension was aimed at strong state intervention; and the administrative aspect was linked to the crisis of governance and credibility of the State (Paes de Paula, 2005).

Hence, this was a response to the crisis in which the State was going through, a cost reduction strategy to make the administrative machine more efficient (Paes de Paula, 2005; Mota, 2013; Cavalcante, 2019).

The Management Model was highlighted with the implementation of the Ministry of Federal Administration and State Reform, which began to have as its function the operationalization and elaboration of the Master Plan of the Reform of the State Apparatus.

The Management Reform promoted the decentralization of social services to states and municipalities; delimited the area of operation of the State, establishing a distinction between the exclusive activities of the State and social and scientific activities, which were transferred to the non-state public sector, and the production of goods and services to the market; the distinction between the activities of the strategic core, which must be carried out by politicians and senior officials, and service activities, which may be the subject of external contracts; the separation between policymaking and its implementation; greater autonomy for executive agencies; ensure accountability through administration for objectives, the creation of social control, in combination with increased transparency, while reducing the role of internal control (Bresser-pereira, 1999; Faria and Faria, 2017) .

The model of the reform had three pillars: (1) proposed a new classification of what is public property; (2) distinguished in its text the three types of public administration; and (3) segmented three necessary levels of state action.

First, public property would be classified into two types: state public property and non-state public property. The first is the assets under state control and the second is all goods of public interest, even if these are not from the State.

The second pillar provides details of the three types of public administration: patrimonialism, bureaucratic and managerial. It is noteworthy that the Management Administration does not deny all the principles of Bureaucratic Administration, which is based on results and not on processes (Faria and Faria, 2017).

The third pillar delimited the levels of state action in three sectors of activities: exclusive activities; non-exclusive social and scientific services; and the production of goods and services for the market (Bresser-pereira, 1999).

The exclusive activities of the State are not delegable, such as armed forces, security, collection and tax inspection, etc. Non-exclusive services are those whose public goods and services may be provided by non-state public organizations or by private entities subject to social control. And the production of goods and services for the market is found in economic activities close to the structure of the State.

The strategic core has the function of formulating, supervising and evaluating the implementation of public policies, being composed of the summit of the Three Powers and The Public Prosecutor's Office.

After the FHC government, the social aspect arose. It manifests itself in the alternative experiences of Public Management and has roots in the ideas of political heirs for the re-democratization of the country, with emphasis on social movements and non-governmental organizations (Paes de Paula, 2005).

In the following governments, however, the continuity of managerial practices was observed, including in regard to social policies that were consolidated in the "movimentalist" field (Paes de Paula, 2005).

The "movimentalist" field focused on the claim of citizenship and the strengthening of the role of civil society in the conduct of political life because it questioned the State as the protagonist of management, and the idea of the public as synonymous with the state.

In this context, governments multiplied throughout the country with innovative proposals, which housed various experiences of social participation. Thus, the insertion of the "movimentalist" field was expanded, and this began to work in municipal and state governments (Jacobi, 2000).

### **3. Case Study**

#### *3.1. The Management of Results of the Government of Ceará*

The Management of Results (MR) can be conceptualized as the organizational processes that focus attention on behavioral aspects and manages means for the implementation of the government's strategic orientations. (CEARÁ, 2019b).

MR seeks to make a culture with focus on achieving strategic results; promotes global visibility into the priorities of the strategy through the entities; systematizes greater agility and better information; ensures the resources and organizational and financial focus necessary for the main objectives of the State; and stimulates learning through monitoring (CEARÁ, 2019a).

According to MARCOPLAN (2016) and CEARÁ, (2019a), the principles of The RGP are: Focus on clear and unequivocal target audiences; Guidance for long-term results; Flexibility and administrative agility; Valorization and professional commitment to results; Integrated, convergent and collaborative public governance; Participation and social control; and Fiscal and financial sustainability.

The State, in 2003, adopted the MR model and its adoption took place in a context of strong fiscal restriction (Maciel, Correa, *et al.*, 2019). In this context, the Management Committee for Results and Fiscal Management was implemented, aiming at assisting the Governor in the definition of the guidelines and measures to be followed by the agencies. The matrix of strategic results was also created, and the Situation Room was established to monitor government indicators, which means that it translated its effort to institutionalize the MR (Maciel, Correa, *et al.*, 2019; Maciel, Duarte *et al.*, 2019).

The MR had an entrepreneurial conception, seeking high standards of efficiency and effectiveness, with ethics and transparency, with the objective of reducing costs and focusing on citizen satisfaction ((Maciel, Correa *et al.*, 2019; Maciel, Duarte *et al.*, 2019).

According to Holanda (2006) and Maciel, Duarte, *et al.* (2019), the MR prioritized three aspects of action: proposing measures to achieve the fiscal balance; promoting a shock management and modernizing the administrative structure and obtaining credit operations to finance state activities. Another advance was the elaboration of the strategic plans of the secretariats and guidance in the understanding of the Government Plan and, consequently, the alignment of sectoral plans with the government's intentions. With this effort, all departments began to count on an array of

results and a linking with the government results; reduction in the number of programs; computerized system focused on public accounts, government actions, socioeconomic indicators and the municipal profile (MARCOPLAN, 2016).

In 2006, the growing focus on results stood out with the incorporation of an analysis chapter in the annual accountability reports of the State Court of Auditors (Netherlands, 2006; Maciel, Duarte, et al., 2019; MARCOPLAN, 2016). There was also the definition of the portfolio of priority projects, the results control panel and, finally, the Monitoring System of Actions and Priority Projects, instruments that contributed to the monitoring of the physical and financial execution of the projects (Maciel, Correa, et al., 2019). This system aimed at a better management of the project portfolio (Maciel, Correa, et al., 2019; Maciel, Duarte, et al., 2019).

In 2007, the elaboration of the Management Model was defined in Law No. 13,875/2007, which included the implementation of the project monitoring structure, which began to have different levels of monitoring according to its classification in: government strategies, sectoral and complementary strategies (MARCOPLAN, 2016; Maciel, Correa, et al., 2019).

In 2009, the State Planning Network was established, with the objective of conducting the processes of planning, budgeting and project management. The structure of the network started to count on the Sector Planning Unit, whose purpose was to unify the coordination of planning instruments, with the project monitoring offices and the objective of performing intensive monitoring of priority projects (MARCOPLAN, 2016).

Another important advance came with the participatory methodology for the preparation of the Multiannual Plan (PPA) 2016-2019. In the meantime, the PPA was made with the participation and support of civil society.

In 2016, the Government verified the need to resume the strategic vision and strengthen the MR. In this context, an overview of weaknesses in the implementation of the management model was found, in addition to the need for investment and improvement in strategic indicators (Maciel, Correa, et al., 2019).


This reality brought the challenge of creating a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system so that the results and efforts were measured, contributing to evidence-based decision-making, prioritization of public resources and transparency (Maciel, Correa et al., 2019; Piovan et al., 2019).

Hence, the Government modified it to a comprehensive system of governance, (Piovan *et al.*, 2019). This new model has a governance structure, connecting the planning and monitoring processes with the agreement of annual commitments, effected through the Results Agreement, which aligns efforts with the strategy, articulating a logical chain between the inputs for the implementation of initiatives, which, in turn, produce deliveries that contribute to the achievement of the planned results (Maciel, Correa, *et al.*, 2019).

It aims, therefore, to achieve in the short term the strategies established in the Strategic Development Plan and in the Sectoral Strategic Agendas, in accordance with the established guidelines of the current PPA. Once the agreement is defined, the monitoring of actions begins, which culminates in the evaluation of the secretariat's performance at the end of the period (Maciel, Duarte *et al.*, 2019).

In this approach, decisions made based on private interests are avoided and advances to promote and redirect public policies in achieving effective and efficient changes (Maciel *et al.*, 2019).

**Figure 01:** Evolution of the MR Model of the Government of Ceará




Source: (CEARÁ, 2019a).

### 3.2. Analysis of the MR model of the government of the state of Ceará

The state of Ceará has an area of 148.800km<sup>2</sup>, equivalent to 1.7% of the National Territory, and in 2019, the population was estimated at 9.1 million inhabitants, representing 16% of the population of the Northeast and 4.3% of the demographic contingent of Brazil. In terms of population density, it obtained an indicator of 56.76 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>. About the infant mortality rate, it has decreases over the years, according to Graph 1 (IBGE, 2019).

**Graph 01:** Infant Mortality Rate



Source: IBGE, IPECE.

In relation to public spending, in revenues obtained in 2017, it raised r\$ 28.4 billion reais and applied the amount of R\$ 24.6 billion reais, with a budget surplus of R\$ 3.8 billion, which demonstrates fiscal balance (IBGE, 2019)

In the same period, Ceará occupied the 3rd place in the ranking of the states that invested the most in infrastructure and public equipment, applying 989 million reais (IBGE, 2019). Corroborating with the data recently released in 2018, the Federation of Industries of Rio de Janeiro indicated that the Government of Ceará had the best fiscal situation in Brazil.

**Graph 02:** Quarterly Evolution of the GDP in Brazil and Ceará 2006.3/2019.3



Source: IBGE, IPECE.



The monthly household income per capita in 2019 was 942 reais, occupying the 18th place in Brazil (IBGE, 2019). Regarding the quarterly evolution of GDP Ceará and Brazil (%), 2006 to 2019, see graphic 2

The data reveal the result obtained by the state economy in 2006, which was influenced by the performances of the three sectors of the economy of Ceará: the agricultural – grain crops; the industrial- processing industry, civil construction, mineral extraction and electricity, gas and water; and the services - retail trade.

According to this information, the growth of the retail segment of Ceará occurred due to the positive movement based on the recovery of the purchasing power of wages, the ease of access and availability of credit lines (CEARÁ, 2007).

In 2009, the State accounted for the 3rd economy of the Northeast region and the 12<sup>th</sup> in Brazil, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP), at market prices, of R\$ 60.79 billion and a per capita income of R\$ 7.385.00 (CEARÁ, 2010).

In 2010, Ceará's GDP grew above the average of the increase in the Brazilian GDP. The internal market was responsible for contributing to the economic growth, encouraged by household consumption and private investment. The Government encouraged important activities in the generation of employment and income, such as civil construction, by reducing the IPI for construction materials (CEARÁ, 2010).

As a result of the Brazilian macroeconomic crisis, in 2015, all states showed a drop in their GDP. According to graph 02, there was a sharp drop because in the previous year, the Soccer World Cup occurred, which at the time boosted tourism, leveraging the service sector and the GDP of Ceará (CEARÁ, 2016a).

The GDP in 2019 maintained the pace of growth started in the second quarter of 2017. Ceará shows higher GDP growth rates than the rest of Brazil since the third quarter of 2018 (CEARÁ, 2020). In all economic sectors, Ceará showed growth.

In the area of tourism, Ceará achieved the highest growth in the activities of the sector throughout the country, according to IBGE data (2020), consolidating itself as the main point of aerial connections in the Northeast and one of the main gateways for foreign tourists in Brazil. Moreover, the state ended 2019 with an important balance of jobs with a signed portfolio.

As far as security is concerned, homicides have halved, in the best result of the decade. The rate per 100.000 inhabitants, which reached 56.9 in 2017, fell to 24.7 in 2019.

In Fortaleza, where the problem of violence was even greater, the drop was more significant, from 78.1 homicides per 100.000 inhabitants in 2013 to 24.8 (CEARÁ, 2020).

Concerning the GDP *per capita*, in 2019, the projection for the country was R\$ 34.429 and Ceará's was R\$ 18.878, representing 53.63% of the national GDP per capita (CEARÁ, 2020). For the year 2020, the projection of GDP growth in Ceará is a positive rate of 2.38%, being above of the projected rate for Brazil - of 2.25%.

When analyzing the PPAs and their strategic axes of the governments of 2004/2019, it is perceived that the strategic results express the great commitments of management with society and are systematically monitored with support in their respective indicators.

The analysis of the evaluation of the PPA, the programs, the strategic results and indicators by strategic axes, aims to measure the advances and challenges that persist for the Government, allowing to assist the decision-making of strategic decisions, as well as serves as a transparency instrument - Table 01.

- *Multiannual Plan 2004/2007*

In this period, the PPA reflected the implementation of the GPR model cycle, which was summarized in three basic stages: planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The planning stage defined the strategic results, setting goals and their indicators by axis of operation of the Government Plan.

The second phase occurred when the sectoral strategic plans were drawn up. This exercise also involved streamlining programs. Then, the strategic plans were implemented (MEDEIROS, LISBOA, NOGUEIRA, 2009).

The third stage consisted on Monitoring and Evaluation whose scope was the idealization of public policy. In terms of monitoring, the Government initiated it through the Sector Performance Report (RPS) and the Global Performance Report (RPG). The RPS is a document in which each Secretariat self-evaluates the programs and displays their performance, serving as accountability, and transparency of public spending.

The PPA 2004/2007 showed the “Ceará Vida Melhor” axis, which stood out and was responsible for 58% of the resources. This guideline comprised a series of strategic objectives, which guided and articulated the government's policies, programs, projects and actions, among which are: reducing the situation of extreme poverty; decreasing

infant mortality; improvement of life expectancy at birth; reducing illiteracy; education (CEARÁ, 2007).

The Ceará “Empreendedor” axis was responsible for 27% of the resources, with the focus directed on the expansion of competitiveness. The achievement of this axis is conditioned to a developmental action of the economy, expanding physical capital and improving human capital. In this sense, five strategic results are being worked on: diversified economic growth; international insertion; quality job creation; fiscal balance; competitive infrastructure (CEARÁ, 2007).

Thus, in this period, this axis enabled diversified economic growth, GDP growth, *per capita income*, inflow of international trade, 37.000 new jobs and a decrease in public debt in relation to the GDP.

Concerning the AXIS of “CE Integration”, the government was unable to achieve the planned strategic results, as it did not improve the territorial distribution of income and employment and territorially balanced social inclusion, as income and occupations were concentrated in the Metropolitan Region of Fortaleza.

The CE axis “citizen service” was turned to government activities that enabled and improved the transparency of Public Management through the creation of channels of interaction with the citizen, through two equipment’s - the State Ombudsman and the Government Portal.

Moreover, the efficiency in the use of the public resource was improved through the Primary Result. Under this pretext, the Government worked with a careful fiscal management, resulting in a Primary Surplus, ensuring the amortization of public debt (CEARÁ, 2007).

- *Multiannual Plans 2008/2011 and 2012/2015*

In “the participatory, ethical and competent government” axis, sectoral and thematic policies were proposed to promote intersectorality, reduce social and regional inequalities, which required the adoption of modern instruments and practices of tax planning and management, aiming at democratizing the formulation and monitoring of

public policies, providing transparency on information and perform, with due competence, at the service provided to the population.

For this purpose, the results are: Citizen participation in the formulation and control of public policies; Qualified and agile management; Increased investment capacity; and Efficiency in public spending.

It is observed that this axis was the largest driver of resource allocation, being responsible for 42% (2008/2011) and 41% (2012/2015). We highlight the improvement of the processes of relationship with the media, the dialogue with representations of society, and the relations with the powers constituted through the PPA, elaborated in a participatory way in workshops in the eight macro regions of Ceará (CEARÁ, 2016b).

**Table 01:** Evolution of Strategic Axes through the 2004/2019 PPAs

Strategic Axes		2.004	2005-2007	Total	%
PPA 2004/2007	CE Entrepreneurship	1.543.707.221,11	5.392.595.876,21	6.936.303.097,32	27%
	CE Better Life	3.640.023.889,00	11.079.838.206,00	14.719.862.095,00	58%
	CE Integration	105.062.970,00	277.586.908,00	382.649.878,00	2%
	CE at the service of the Citizen	760.500.663,00	2.473.445.813,00	3.233.946.476,00	13%
<b>Total</b>		<b>6.049.294.743,11</b>	<b>19.223.466.803,21</b>	<b>25.272.761.546,32</b>	<b>100%</b>
Strategic Axes		2.008	2009-2011	Total	%
PPA 2008/2011	Fair and Solidary Society	3.903.277.126,00	12.458.678.986,00	16.361.956.112,00	35%
	Economy for a better life	3.156.899.662,00	7.202.378.300,00	10.359.277.962,00	22%
	Participatory, Ethical and Competent Government	4.392.933.115,00	15.298.919.779,00	19.691.852.894,00	42%
<b>Total</b>		<b>11.453.109.903,00</b>	<b>34.959.977.065,00</b>	<b>46.413.086.968,00</b>	<b>100%</b>
Strategic Axes		2.012	2013-2015	Total	%
PPA 2012/2015	Fair and Solidary Society	7.395.485.300,40	21.090.867.960,07	28.486.353.260,47	34%
	Economy for a better life	4.172.782.210,41	16.462.665.353,30	20.635.447.563,71	25%
	Participatory, Ethical and Competent Government	6.771.555.476,32	27.014.720.161,12	33.786.275.637,44	41%
<b>Total</b>		<b>18.339.822.987,13</b>	<b>64.568.253.474,49</b>	<b>82.908.076.461,62</b>	<b>100%</b>
Strategic Axes		2.016	2017-2019	Total	%
PPA 2016/2019	CE Management Results	16.277.311.498,00	55.116.385.810,00	71.393.697.308,00	68%
	CE Welcoming	405.639.666,00	1.352.301.497,00	1.757.941.163,00	2%
	CE of Opportunities	2.848.592.768,00	6.739.731.115,00	9.588.323.883,00	9%
	CE Sustainability	1.023.896.938,00	1.936.183.404,00	2.960.080.342,00	3%
	CE of Knowledge	1.468.202.950,00	3.851.903.268,00	5.320.106.218,00	5%
	CE of Health	2.782.770.912,00	9.438.197.668,00	12.220.968.580,00	12%
	CE Pacific	451.025.517,00	1.551.909.036,00	2.002.934.553,00	2%
<b>Total</b>		<b>25.257.440.249,00</b>	<b>79.986.611.798,00</b>	<b>105.244.052.047,00</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Own elaboration.

This also occurred with the increase in the state's investment capacity, which was confirmed as a result of a responsible fiscal policy. The government's effort to increase its collection through actions to obtain tax efficiency and combat evasion linked to the implementation of a management control policy of current spending, strengthening public savings and lowering the level of indebtedness, allowed the Government to be able to maintain its public investment program (CEARÁ, 2016b).

In the Fair and Solidary Society axis, strategic results are consolidated to reach new levels in the provision of social services, to improve living conditions, work and guarantee rights to the population.

To evaluate the effective improvements of the policies that are part of this Axis, five strategic results were defined: Expanded and Quality of Basic Education; Higher and Vocational Education with emphasis on the Potentialities of the State; Population with Access to Decentralized Health and Quality; Improve the population's Safety guaranteeing their rights; and Youth Opportunities for Productive and Social Insertion.

This axis in the PPA represented 35% (2008/2011) and 34% (2012/2015) of the public resources. The role of Education as the basis of the state development project stands out, and its policy aims to ensure more equal opportunities in promoting personal, social and economic development.

Thus, the implementation of these guidelines allowed the evolution of the Basic Education Development Indexes - State IDEB in the initial and final grades of elementary school; the Basic Education Development Index - IDEB of the State High School Network; the decrease in the illiteracy rate of people at the age of 15 years and above; the increase in the Net Schooling Rate of High School; and the Average Education of People who are 15 years and older.

In the economy axis for a better life, the objective was to promote economic growth that reflected on social indicators, combined with environmental protection and the modernization of infrastructure for development. Thus, it guided the government action towards five strategic results: Economic Growth with Competitiveness; Increased Environmental Sustainability; Reduction of Interregional Inequalities; Higher income of Society and a better Distribution of it; and Expanded Strategic Infrastructure.

To ensure the required bases, the government defined as a result the "Expansion of strategic infrastructure" based on the improvement of logistics in the transport sector and the increase of water accumulation capacity, such as: expansion of the port of Pecém, implementation of the Refinery and Steel and the Export Processing Zone - EPZ, as well as the strengthening of water infrastructures (CEARÁ, 2016b).

- *Multiannual Plan 2016/2019*

The Ceará axis of Democratic Management for Results is the organization of government actions, in a way planned for an effective and efficient execution to contribute to the development of integrated public policies and whose attention is specifically directed to the needs of the citizens. In this sense, it seeks to ensure in the state, the constant economic growth, fiscal and budgetary financial balance and the reduction of inequalities immanent to the social realities in force (CEARÁ, 2020).

This axis is the main one and is responsible for 68% of the resources, having as a starting point the achievement of results through strategic, democratic, inclusive and participatory planning. Besides that, it aims to agree on feasible, measurable and transparent results, endowed with efficiency and effectiveness through strategic agreements (CEARÁ, 2020).

This model adopts the contractibility of results, instigating change of attitude of public managers and awareness about the agreed commitments. This conditions the planning, budgeting and the management formulation cycle. Therefore, the integration of strategic axes, the linkage of processes, resources, programs and products with the results were obtained, as well as the internalization and sharing of mechanisms of intensive monitoring and perennial evaluation (CEARÁ, 2020).

#### **4. Final Considerations**

The evolution of Public Management is evidenced in this manuscript through its approaches, characterizing its most relevant ideals and lead concepts. Soon after, the repercussion of these movements in the Brazilian context was shown. Finally, management was configured through the results of the Government of Ceará which characterized the PMM policy.

Therefore, the objective of the study was certified to highlight government performance under the context of the Brazilian Public Management, as well as the state's MR and the



positive compliance with its public policies, which were described and analyzed through the case study.

The Brazilian state's effort to promote performance was characterized by the implementation and consolidation of models materialized by administrative reforms, which required time and concentrated effort, superior sponsorship, discipline, and continuity, with the aim of implementing and rooting a culture of results in the state's institutions.

We also highlighted the MR policy of Ceará, demonstrated through an austere and effective fiscal policy, which served as a reference for the other federative units once it evidenced the strengthening of the Culture of MR of managers and politicians in the development and implementation of public policies and transparency in the government's priorities.

The institutionalization of this model means changing the behavior of civil servants, politicians, and partners to a vision of long-term results and a value for common well-being.

However, the advances evidenced by the State in regard to social and environmental results, have not advanced in the same way. Thus, the existence of concentration of wealth, the wide and evident poverty of the region and the urban violence of the state remains severe. Despite environmental investments and institutional exercises in the conduct of an environmental policy, urban problems still highlight the mismanagement of garbage and solid waste collection in general and a defective urban mobility, which will have to be fixed in the not-too-remote future.

Moreover, this work systematizes practical and theoretical knowledge related to the area of Public Management and performance in Brazil and Ceará, evidencing its path and identifying the main facts that characterized this way of knowledge, serving as a support for future theoretical works and practical tasks related to the subject.

Additional empirical research is necessary and indispensable in order to enrich the understanding of the specificities of the MR.

As a limitation of this issue, we have the perspective of the study on public performance in relation to a region of the Brazilian State, reducing the generalization of results.

The practical evidence of the study expresses that the Government should be careful to develop a culture by the way of result once its reflexes interfere in the service offered and in the public performance. As for the academic implications, the implementation of The

MR through PMM practices serve as expedients that assess and measure the government's performance.

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# Percepción de la comunidad académica de una institución de educación técnica y tecnológica sobre las políticas públicas para combatir la violencia contra la mujer

*Perception of the academic community of technical and technological educational institution about the public policy violence against women*

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**Resumen:** En el escenario actual, mucho se ha revelado y debatido sobre la política pública para enfrentar la violencia contra las mujeres en diferentes entornos de la sociedad, especialmente dentro de las instituciones técnicas y de educación superior. Por lo tanto, el artículo tiene como objetivo conocer la percepción de la comunidad académica de las políticas públicas, para enfrentar la violencia contra las mujeres. También, se enfoca en mejorar la divulgación y generar conocimiento sobre instrumentos y mecanismos de la política. La base teórica se basa en conceptos de desarrollo sostenible y políticas públicas de género relacionadas con el enfrentamiento a la violencia contra la mujer. Para ello, se aplicó un cuestionario elaborado sobre la herramienta digital Google forms, lo cual fue enviado a la comunidad académica, de forma aleatoria, para verificar la percepción y el conocimiento sobre las políticas públicas para enfrentar la violencia contra la mujer. Los resultados indicaron que el 75% de los encuestados saben acerca de la Ley Maria Penha. Sin embargo, saben poco al respecto, pues el 65% considera que esta ley protege muy poco. Aún así, el 85% declaró que la violencia contra la mujer altera la dinámica del desarrollo social y regional, y el 88% percibe que en el municipio de Porto Velho se producen muchos casos de violencia contra la mujer. En vista de los resultados de la investigación, se descubrió que las percepciones sobre el conocimiento de los detalles de la política para enfrentar la violencia contra la mujer son escasas, mientras que

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la percepción sobre la presencia de violencia contra la mujer en la vida cotidiana es manifiesta o evidente. Por lo tanto, se recomienda promover acciones más efectivas que lleguen a la sociedad en general, a partir de la intensificación de debates dentro de las comunidades académicas.

**Palabras claves:** Violencia contra la mujer; Desarrollo sostenible; Políticas Públicas.

**Abstract:** Currently, much has been publicized and debated about the public policy to combat violence against women in various place of society, especially within technical and higher education institutions. Therefore, the article aims at knowing the perception of the academic community about public policies to confront violence against women. It also focuses on reinforcing the dissemination and generating knowledge about the instruments and mechanisms of politics. The theoretical basis is based on concepts of sustainable development and gender public policies related to facing violence against women. To this end, a questionnaire elaborated in the Google form digital tool was applied, being sent to the academic community in a random to verify the perception and knowledge about the public politics to confront violence against women. The results indicated that 75% of the respondents know about the Maria Penha Law, however, know little about it, of which 65% believe it protects little. Still, 85% said that violence against women alters the dynamics in social and regional development, and 88% realize that in the municipality of Porto Velho there are many cases of violence against women. Given the results of the research, it was found that the perceptions about the knowledge of details of the policy to confront violence against women are scarce, while the perception about the presence of violence against women in everyday life is manifest. Thus, it is recommended to promote more effective actions that reach society in general, starting from the intensification of debates within academic communities.

**Keywords:** Violence against women; Sustainable development; Public Policy.

## **1. Introducción**

El tema de la "violencia contra la mujer" se incluye en los Objetivos del Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS), un documento formado por 17 objetivos globales y 169 metas establecidas en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. El objetivo número 5 se compromete a alcanzar la igualdad de género y el empoderamiento de todas las mujeres y niñas. El subtítulo 5.2 señala la eliminación de todas las formas de violencia contra todas las mujeres y niñas en los ámbitos público y privado, incluyendo el tráfico y la explotación sexual y de otros tipos (Organización de las Naciones Unidas en Brasil [ONUBR], 2017). En el documento "Transformando o nosso mundo: a Agenda 2030 para o desenvolvimento sustentável", los ODS abarcan temas del desarrollo social y económico, con temáticas sobre la educación, la igualdad de género, el calentamiento global, el medio ambiente, la salud, la pobreza, entre otros. Por lo tanto, el documento muestra que el desarrollo sostenible completo depende de la mitigación de la violencia



contra la mujer en diferentes países. Actualmente, la violencia contra las mujeres es una de las formas más crueles de limitar su autonomía y ampliar la desigualdad de género a lo largo de la vida y en diferentes espacios sociales como la familia, las instituciones educativas, el trabajo, espacios públicos o privados, en la política, en la internet, y otros (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo [PNUD], 2019).

La creación del indicador del desarrollo relacionado con el género en los documentos del Índice de Desarrollo Humano ajustado por género (IDG), preparado por las Naciones Unidas, señala las desigualdades de género en las dimensiones de la salud reproductiva, autonomía y actividad económica. El IDG indica la relevancia de estudiar el tema 'violencia contra la mujer' porque este tema se caracteriza por ser un problema público preocupante, que puede afectar negativamente las dimensiones identificadas en el IDG, entre otros aspectos sociales (PNUD, 2019). Es importante destacar que Brasil ocupa el quinto lugar en el ranking mundial de violencia contra la mujer, en el que una mujer es asesinada cada dos horas; y a cada minuto, 9 mujeres son golpeadas en el país, y una mujer es violada cada 11 minutos. Además, el 30% de las víctimas no hacen la denuncia (Instituto Patrícia Galvão, 2018). Por lo tanto, se puede deducir que la violencia se absorbe en la rutina de la sociedad civil, representada por un alto número de agresiones y muertes de mujeres (ONUBR, 2017).

El Mapa de la Violencia Contra la Mujer de 2018, una encuesta realizada por la Comisión para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer de la Cámara de Diputados, destacó la ocurrencia de 14.796 casos de violencia contra la mujer en Brasil, en los cuales el 58% de los casos, el agresor era un compañero o cónyuge de la víctima (Câmara de Deputados, 2018). En este contexto, en el Estado de Rondônia, los casos corresponden en promedio al 5% de la cantidad de violencia contra la mujer, que ha ocurrido en Brasil. Y, en el 2018, se registraron más de 1.500 medidas de protección otorgadas hasta el final de su tercer trimestre, según una encuesta del Ministerio Público de Rondônia. Esta realidad, en la ciudad donde se ubicó la investigación, Porto Velho / RO, evidenció, en el mismo año, el registro de 2,331 casos de violencia contra las mujeres dentro de una población de aproximadamente 500 mil habitantes (Coordinación de Comunicación de Porto Velho [COMDECOM], 2018). Es decir, la ciudad anfitriona de la comunidad académica estudiada, presenta importantes registros de violencia contra la mujer.

Este contexto de violencia contra la mujer puede caracterizarse como una realidad con una solución compleja. Por lo tanto, entendemos que para que se produzcan

transformaciones sociales significativas, especialmente en términos de valoración de la vida, el individuo y la comunidad tienen un papel importante, ya que ellos mismos son responsables de tales transformaciones, garantizando así el progreso del desarrollo sostenible. Ante todo esto, se hace necesario conocer y discutir temas relacionados con las Políticas Públicas para combatir la violencia contra la mujer (Onofre, 2009).

Los últimos trece años han sido decisivos para construir la trayectoria del fortalecimiento de las Políticas de protección para las mujeres en Brasil. Esto fue posible a través de debates impulsados por un movimiento global, para reducir la desigualdad de género, con el objetivo de lograr un desarrollo sostenible. Este movimiento político se expandió con la participación de activistas y gerentes brasileños, contribuyendo así al desarrollo de políticas públicas concretas, para la realización de los derechos y garantías de las mujeres, entre los cuales destacamos la Ley Maria da Penha (Martins, Cerqueira y Matos, 2015). En este contexto, la Ley Maria da Penha es el resultado de la lucha feminista para crear un recurso legal, con el propósito de combatir situaciones de violencia contra las mujeres, permitiendo cambios significativos en el ámbito de sus derechos (Bandeira, 2014).

En este estudio, empíricamente, se considera que en la última década de operacionalización de la política para enfrentar la violencia contra las mujeres, hubo una expansión de su conocimiento social sobre este problema. Dicho conocimiento se amplió mediante la difusión de instrumentos de política, el monitoreo de estadísticas sobre casos contra las mujeres y la mejora constante de la implementación de políticas por parte de la red de otros órganos involucrados. La difusión de esta información contribuyó al amplio debate, incluso en entornos educativos y académicos. Sin embargo, es posible considerar que hay hombres y mujeres insertados, incluso en ambientes académicos, que aún nutren el desconocimiento sobre varios aspectos relacionados con el tema de la violencia contra la mujer.

Ante esta realidad, se decidió investigar la percepción de los funcionarios y estudiantes que conforman la comunidad académica de una institución técnica, tecnológica / de educación superior, con respecto a las políticas públicas para combatir la violencia contra la mujer. Ante la hipótesis que considera que, los servidores y estudiantes insertados en la comunidad de instituciones educativas, difunden y promueven debates sobre políticas y problemas sociales que, por lo tanto, pueden ampliar el conocimiento de las políticas para afrontar la violencia contra la mujer. De este modo, buscamos responder

la siguiente pregunta: en un entorno de comunidad académica, ¿cuál es la percepción del público sobre la política pública para enfrentar la violencia contra la mujer?

Este artículo tiene como objetivo conocer la percepción de la comunidad académica sobre las políticas públicas para enfrentar la violencia contra la mujer, dentro del ámbito de una institución de educación técnica y tecnológica con sede en la ciudad de Porto Velho / RO. Para ello, se aplicó un cuestionario a los servidores y estudiantes que conforman la comunidad académica, a través de la herramienta digital. *Google forms*, el cual fue enviado de manera aleatoria a grupos formados a través de la aplicación *Whatsapp*. La investigación fue apoyada por una revisión teórica que relaciona los conceptos del desarrollo sostenible y políticas públicas de género, identificando las estrategias y características de las políticas públicas relacionadas con el enfrentamiento sobre la violencia contra la mujer. Además de encuestar la percepción y el conocimiento de los participantes encuestados, esta investigación también refuerza la difusión de los instrumentos y mecanismos de política pública, para abordar la violencia contra las mujeres, así como generar conocimiento para los participantes de la investigación sobre el tema, mediante responder el cuestionario, con el objetivo de ayudar a combatir la violencia.

## **2. Desarrollo sostenible y Políticas públicas de género**

La idea de desarrollo está estrechamente vinculada a las condiciones y la calidad de vida de la población. De esta manera, Lage (2001) considera que la administración pública orientada hacia el desarrollo sostenible debe buscar atender temas relacionados con dimensiones relacionadas con temas ecológicos, económicos, sociales, culturales, tecnológicos y políticos, entre otros. Así, el autor deja una idea de que la formulación de políticas que trata de cumplir con los criterios de desarrollo sostenible, debe equilibrar las cuestiones.

Como destacó Onofre (2009), el punto de partida para el desarrollo económico de una región implica una comprensión de la dinámica de las relaciones sociales, considerando que están guiadas por políticas públicas de desarrollo. El autor muestra que el Informe Brundtland de 1987 conceptualiza cómo satisfacer las necesidades de las generaciones actuales, sin comprometer las necesidades de las generaciones futuras. En otras palabras, el desarrollo sostenible debe entenderse como la comprensión de que la sociedad puede buscar el progreso, sin poner en riesgo a las generaciones futuras.

El desarrollo sostenible sugiere un cambio en los sistemas actuales de producción y organización de las sociedades humanas, lo que en última instancia, significa que el desarrollo sostenible implica la transformación de la cultura y el comportamiento humanos. Ante esto, se señala que el crecimiento de la economía depende de la mejora de las condiciones educativas que favorecen el desarrollo de nuevas tecnologías. La preocupación con la perspectiva social sobre la sostenibilidad implica el bienestar de la condición humana y los medios para permitir la calidad de vida de esa condición (Onofre, 2009).

Según Souza (2016), el individuo es el agente y usuario del desarrollo, ya sea con sus propiedades culturales, morales y sociales. Por lo tanto, ratifica lo que afirma la Declaración N ° 1 de la Conferencia de Estocolmo: el hombre es el resultado y el artesano del medio ambiente que lo rodea, porque es el mismo que le brinda el apoyo material y el que le brinda la oportunidad de desarrollarse intelectual, moral, social y espiritualmente (Naciones Unidas [ONU], 1972). En este sentido, se puede decir que las mejoras en la sociedad, encaminadas al desarrollo sostenible, se idealizan a través de Políticas Públicas implementadas por funcionarios gubernamentales con la participación de la sociedad. Porque el desarrollo sostenible se puede lograr mitigando los desvíos morales sociales, ya sea reduciendo la desigualdad social que abarca varios factores como la salud, la seguridad, la educación, el bienestar social, la economía, el empleo, la pobreza y otros; constituyendo el compromiso del gobierno.

En el contexto citado, Rúa (2012, citado en Belchior, 2016, pág. 36) destaca que las políticas públicas comprenden un "conjunto de procedimientos destinados a la resolución pacífica de conflictos sobre la asignación de bienes y recursos públicos", marcados por las relaciones de poder, generalmente bastante complejas, que incluye a varios actores del Estado y la sociedad. Mientras que para Souza (2018), las políticas públicas pueden resumirse como el campo de conocimiento que busca, al mismo tiempo, "poner al gobierno en acción" y / o analizar esta acción (variable independiente) y, cuando sea necesario, proponer cambios en el rumbo o curso de estas acciones (variable dependiente). Por lo tanto, las políticas sociales también comprenden políticas gubernamentales "con respecto a la acción que tiene un impacto directo en el bienestar de los ciudadanos, al proporcionarles servicios o ingresos" (MARshall, 1967 como se cita en Nascimento, 2016, pág. 319). En este núcleo, las políticas sociales se incluyen como

políticas públicas de género que buscan proporcionar a las mujeres las mismas condiciones de bienestar social (Nascimento, 2016).

Scott (1986, pág. 21), un autor importante de estudios de género, afirma que "el género es un elemento constitutivo de las relaciones sociales, basado en las diferencias percibidas entre los sexos". También, señala que el género es un tema transversal, ya que puede combinarse con diferentes áreas de conocimiento y puede abordarse mediante políticas públicas en diversas áreas de actividad, como la salud, la autonomía y la actividad económica. Tradicional e históricamente, las relaciones sociales entre mujeres y hombres son desiguales, ya que está marcada por la sumisión femenina a la determinación sociocultural masculina, derivada de la imposición de normas de conducta hacia las mujeres y, los debido ajustes o incumplimiento de estos preceptos. Sin embargo, podemos percibir que el concepto y el modelo patriarcal están experimentando gradualmente un proceso de deconstrucción en la sociedad (Souza & Baracho, 2015).

Para Nascimento (2016), las políticas públicas de género se insertan dentro del alcance de las políticas públicas sociales y se formulan de tal manera que incorporen los derechos políticos, civiles y sociales, o los derechos humanos de las mujeres. Dentro de este ámbito, las políticas públicas para combatir la violencia contra las mujeres, que, según Martins et al. (2015), se constituye en el seguimiento de las acciones desarrolladas en los Estados y Municipios brasileños, por ser uno de sus mayores desafíos. También, enfatizan que el monitoreo de las políticas y su efectividad requiere un proceso efectivo de comunicación continua entre las entidades federadas.

### **3. Políticas públicas para combatir la violencia contra las mujeres**

La Ley Maria da Penha (n.º 11.340 / 06) es considerada como un instrumento de política pública que delimitó varias acciones estatales para enfrentar la violencia contra las mujeres. Fue promulgado el 7 de agosto del 2006 y representa uno de los avances legislativos más relevantes desde la llegada de la Constitución Federal de 1998, ya que significa el reconocimiento de la violencia contra las mujeres como una violación de los derechos humanos (Martins et al., 2015). Actualmente, la ley es la representación nacional de la lucha de las mujeres contra la opresión y la violencia, a pesar de que existen brechas en los códigos penales y civiles, así como acciones desmembradas.

De esta manera, la política desnaturalizó la violencia como parte de las relaciones familiares o privadas, ya que la Ley Maria da Penha no trata la violencia solo

como un delito en las normas brasileñas, sino también como una violación de los derechos humanos y una falta de respeto a la dignidad humana. Estos elementos se defienden con vehemencia en la Constitución brasileña de 1988 en sus artículos: 1.º Obligación de respetar los derechos; 8.º garantías judiciales; 24.º Igualdad ante la ley y 25.º protección judicial. En este sentido, Brasil es un precursor entre otros países en diferenciar la naturaleza específica de la violencia de género (Souza y Baracho, 2015).

La Ley Maria da Penha determina un conjunto de directrices que deberían ser adoptadas por el gobierno, como en el caso de su art. 8.º, que establece que las políticas públicas apuntan a frenar la violencia doméstica y familiar contra las mujeres, a través de un conjunto articulado de acciones la Unión, los Estados, el Distrito Federal y los municipios y las acciones no gubernamentales. De esta manera, se fortalece la institucionalización de la Política Nacional para Combatir la Violencia contra la Mujer (Brasil, 2006).

La Política Nacional para combatir la violencia contra la mujer<sup>4</sup> tiene el propósito de apoyar conceptos, principios, pautas y acciones para prevenir y combatir la violencia contra las mujeres, asegurando así la asistencia adecuada a las mujeres en circunstancias de vulnerabilidad. Pues, se entiende que la violencia contra las mujeres es un problema de máxima seriedad, además de caracterizar la existencia de sus efectos, extendiéndose desde el ámbito físico hasta el psicológico de las mujeres víctimas (Souza, 2016). Con este fin, esta política es una acción conjunta consolidada e instituida por el Pacto Nacional para Combatir la Violencia contra las Mujeres.<sup>5</sup> Constituir una implementación de políticas amplias y articuladas en los sectores de la salud, la educación, la seguridad pública, la asistencia social, y entre otros, para dar a conocer la complejidad de la violencia contra las mujeres en todas sus expresiones (SPM, 2011).

Sin embargo, en estos trece años de vigencia de la política, hay lagunas en la aplicabilidad de la Ley Maria da Penha, especialmente en relación con las medidas de protección que tardan 48 horas en ser validadas por el juez. Esta espera puede extenderse

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<sup>4</sup> La Política Nacional para Combatir la Violencia contra la Mujer fue desarrollada por la Secretaría de Políticas para las Mujeres (SPM), en el 2004 y 2007, a través de la participación social, para explicar los fundamentos conceptuales y políticos que guían la formulación y ejecución de políticas públicas formuladas y ejecutadas (Secretaría de Políticas para la Mujer, [SPM], 2011).

<sup>5</sup> Acuerdo federativo entre el gobierno federal y los gobiernos de los 26 estados, el Distrito Federal y los gobiernos municipales, para la planificación e integración de acciones intersectoriales, la responsabilidad del poder judicial y de los ministerios y secretarías que conforman las tres esferas del gobierno (Secretaría de Políticas para Mujeres / Presidencia de la República, [SPM / PR], 2011).



por más tiempo, principalmente cuando el procedimiento ocurre durante el fin de semana. Souza (2013) también destaca las fallas con respecto a las medidas de protección urgentes, en los casos en que las mujeres corren el riesgo de muerte, ya que consideran que es difícil brindar atención completa, que incluye la aplicación, el monitoreo, la fiscalización y la protección efectiva en torno a la mujer que es una víctima de la violencia. Otra dificultad se refiere a la escasez o problemas en la infraestructura material y humana de Estaciones de Policía, Tribunales, Refugios en un distrito / municipio, lo que impide la operacionalización de la política.

La existencia de fallas en las medidas de fiscalización para garantizar la agilidad y el monitoreo del cumplimiento de estas medidas de protección, es una realidad en Brasil. Es evidente que faltan servicios especializados, con personal técnico calificado, que actúen como actores participativos y decisivos en la mejora de las políticas públicas para enfrentar la violencia contra las mujeres. Según Rolim & Falcke (2017), los empleados que implementan políticas no reciben información clara sobre los objetivos de los programas, habiendo así divergencias entre los objetivos de las políticas y los operadores, con dilemas administrativos y la necesidad de adaptar las políticas a la realidad de cada localidad. Se entiende que cada ambiente tiene sus singularidades, causando la dispersión entre la formulación y la implementación de políticas públicas, transformando el servicio precario e insatisfactorio en la mayoría de los casos.

Otro problema que debe puntuarse es la incapacidad para abordar el objeto de la violencia, que a menudo carece de asistencia profesional adecuada para tratar el caso, y los actores involucrados. La cuestión de la humanización reaparece con la necesidad de reconocer al otro como sujeto de derechos. Estas percepciones se hacen más evidentes cuando se revelan los estereotipos sobre la violencia, la víctima y la extrañeza producida en los lugares de atención (Vieira & Hasse, 2017). Este evento no debe coexistir bajo ninguna circunstancia, es imperativo que la víctima se sienta protegida, apoyada y bienvenida por los miembros del personal técnico. La universalización y estandarización de la asistencia a las víctimas de la violencia contra la mujer es necesaria.

Sin embargo, a lo largo de una década, la Política Nacional para Combatir la Violencia contra las Mujeres también acumula mejoras y mejorías en su implementación. Podemos considerar como innovaciones: la creación de tribunales de violencia doméstica y familiar contra la mujer; la prohibición de la aplicación de sanciones pecuniarias a los agresores; la posibilidad de otorgar medidas de protección de emergencia; y el carácter

híbrido de acciones, que pueden ser al mismo tiempo, tanto penales como civiles. Estos cambios pueden considerarse como mecanismos para fortalecer y consolidar la política (Martins et al., 2015).

Sin embargo, a pesar de las complejidades de implementar la Política, Ramalho y Juvêncio (2011) afirman que con la legislación específica, la sociedad, finalmente, ha tomado una posición realmente digna de los estándares actuales, donde se aprende que también las mujeres son dignas de respeto, por su capacidad física, emocional e intelectual. Esta concepción se hace cada vez más madura en la conciencia social, a través de la difusión de políticas y estadísticas socializadas en varios medios, la expansión de debates en entornos colectivos, corporativos y académicos, y la diversificación del marketing social para diferentes audiencias, contextualizada en diferentes entornos sociales, culturales y económicos. En cierto modo, este movimiento tiende a reducir las desigualdades en la sociedad, formulando una nueva concepción de la mujer, mitigando las urgencias para combatir el problema de la violencia y otras formas de opresión de género (Amaral, Santos & Souza, 2016).

En el ambiente de una institución de enseñanza, es posible, esencialmente, formular una nueva concepción de la mujer en la sociedad, a través de estrategias de enseñanza, promoviendo la transformación de este entendimiento. En este entorno existe una sinergia de conocimientos e intercambios, tanto del alumno como del profesor. En esta interacción, ambos disfrutan y aprenden, con la posibilidad de desarrollar la responsabilidad social de los ciudadanos, generar conciencia y alterar el desarrollo social local, desde una perspectiva sostenible (Wanzinack y Signorelli, 2015). Por lo tanto, entendemos que la educación puede ser la clave primordial para proporcionar al individuo una vida digna, además de desarrollar sus habilidades intelectuales y morales, expandir sus propios conocimientos, difundir sus habilidades personales en la sociedad y mejorar la calidad de vida en la comunidad (Freire, 2007).

El conocimiento y el ámbito de la gestión pública están vinculados por la construcción de conocimiento, habilidades para impactar el interés público. Matias-Pereira (2012), asegura que la gestión pública es una cuestión de legalidad y legitimidad y otros valores en el contexto sociopolítico, tanto interno como externo. La gestión pública proporciona medios para aprovechar el desarrollo económico, cultural, ambiental, tecnológico y principalmente social, especialmente a través de políticas públicas y

sociales, con el objetivo de fortalecer la ciudadanía del individuo, a través de la dinámica establecida entre el Estado y la sociedad.

#### **4. Metodología**

La metodología adoptada presenta objetivos de estudio exploratorio, que pretende proporcionar una mayor familiaridad con el problema del conocimiento sobre la Ley Maria da Penha, para hacerlo más explícito o construir hipótesis (Gerhardt y Silveira, 2009). Presenta un aspecto cuantitativo, ya que proporciona rigor en la presentación de resultados y, cualitativo, ya que los participantes pudieron elegir alternativas que mostraron su conocimiento subjetivo sobre el tema propuesto. También, es una investigación realizada mediante el método *encuesta*, que se ocupa de la recopilación de información, de manera aleatoria, sin establecer contacto con el participante de la investigación.

La *encuesta* en este estudio tiene una característica exploratoria y está relacionada con el método de investigación, cuyo objetivo primordial es ofrecer vestigios para futuros estudios, buscando así descubrir nuevas posibilidades y dimensiones, trascendiendo la comprensión del tema (Babbie, 1999). La investigación con forma de *encuesta* ocurre a través de la obtención de datos o información sobre las características u opiniones de un determinado grupo de personas, indicados como representantes de una población específica (Fonseca, 2002). Así el público específico de esta investigación estaba compuesto por estudiantes de cursos técnicos posteriores y tecnólogos superiores presenciales nocturnos y servidores de la institución. En el campus investigado, la comunidad académica está compuesta por 117 estudiantes de educación superior, 38 de educación técnica y 105 funcionarios públicos. Unas 85 personas participaron en la investigación. El cuestionario se aplicó en la comunidad académica del 6 al 20/05/2019, siendo analizado y presentado en forma de gráficos. La recolección de datos se realizó a través de un cuestionario *en línea* cerrado y estructurado con nueve preguntas en forma de *Google forms*, que fue enviado por correo electrónico y una aplicación de teléfono celular, de manera aleatoria Totalizando una muestra de 85 participaciones, en el transcurso de quince días.

Para aumentar la investigación, se solicitó información a las instituciones públicas que trabajan con la política para enfrentar la violencia contra las mujeres. Por lo tanto, se pretendía también difundir el conocimiento sobre estas instituciones a la


comunidad a través de este artículo. La información se refiere a los objetivos institucionales y a la cantidad de asistencia a mujeres en situaciones de violencia en el Centro de Referencia Especializado para Asistencia Social (CREAS), en la Oficina del Defensor Público del Estado de Rondônia y el Ministerio Público del Estado, a través del Sistema de Acceso a la Información (e-SIC).

## 5. Resultados

Entre los estudiantes y funcionarios que respondieron a la encuesta, 54 (64%) son mujeres y 31 (36%) son hombres. En esta investigación, se considera que las siguientes respuestas parten de la percepción de los participantes, de acuerdo con sus vivencias personales y su conocimiento sobre el tema abordado.

En el primer gráfico, presentamos la percepción que tienen los encuestados sobre la ley Maria da Penha, ya sea a través de los medios de comunicación, discursos, conferencias, campañas de sensibilización, vecinos, amigos, en su entorno laboral o docente. Independientemente de si es un conocimiento superficial o una comprensión sólida de sus derechos y las acciones involucradas, consideramos para este análisis que la ley del año 2019 completó trece años, y con ésto, se espera una mayor comprensión social de esta política. También, se espera que esta década de implementación institucionalizada de la Política para enfrentar la violencia contra las mujeres, esté deconstruyendo significativamente las estructuras sociales basadas en la visión patriarcal, en la cual, las mujeres tienen poco acceso a los derechos y al poder para elegir.

**Gráfico 1:** Conocimiento sobre la ley de Maria da Penha




**Fuente:** Elaborado por las autoras.

El gráfico 1 muestra que 64 participantes consideran conocer y saber un poco sobre la ley. Se supone que la diversidad de información sobre la política puede no producir una calidad en la comprensión de las personas, constituyendo a estudiantes o funcionarios públicos que no están familiarizados con la ley, incluso teniendo en cuenta los trece años, dentro de una comunidad académica. Ante esta realidad, cuestionamos la razón de esta incompreensión, ya que son académicos con un grado superior o técnico, y son empleados de una institución educativa, un ambiente en el que se promueven diferentes procesos educativos, incluidos los debates sobre diferentes temas sociales. Creemos que en el entorno académico, este público tiene acceso a varias discusiones sobre este tema.

A pesar del importante progreso institucional en las políticas públicas para combatir la violencia contra las mujeres, su efectividad puede considerarse un fracaso en términos de acciones y medidas. Según Pezzi (2009), el poder judicial brasileño a veces tiene una estructura procesal larga para procesar y juzgar casos, yendo en contra del ritmo dinámico en que ocurren los casos de violencia. También, podemos considerar que incluso con la expansión de las campañas de sensibilización, puede haber cierta disociación en la percepción de diferentes audiencias, por ejemplo, para las mujeres adolescentes o las mujeres de edad avanzada en cuanto al entendimiento y el significado para ellas sobre el contenido de las campañas. Aunque la ley Maria da Penha en su artículo 2° indica que los derechos inherentes a la persona humana deben garantizarse a todas las mujeres, independientemente de su clase, raza, origen étnico, orientación sexual, ingresos, cultura, nivel educativo, edad y religión (Brasil, 2006). Por lo tanto, es necesario intensificar la realización de proyectos educativos que incluyan dinámicas para alentar la no violencia contra las mujeres en entornos educativos y académicos.

**Gráfico 2:** Percepción sobre la eficacia de la ley Maria da Penha




**Fuente:** Elaborado por las autoras.

El gráfico 2 muestra una mayoría de 55 participantes quienes consideran que la Ley Maria da Penha protege poco. Posiblemente, en esta conjetura, algunas dificultades experimentadas que pueden reflejar la percepción sobre la insuficiencia de protección de la política son: la ineficacia de las medidas de protección; fallas en la aplicación de los códigos penales y civiles, dado que el delito a veces no se registra como violencia doméstica; además de las acciones de bienvenida no integradas para la víctima, que a veces colabora para que la mujer denunciante todavía constituya un contacto frecuente con el agresor (Pezzi, 2009; Amaral et al., 2016; Carvalho, 2019). La Ley Maria da Penha se implementa para defender completamente a la víctima. Sin embargo, las medidas de protección otorgadas son medidas parciales. En el cual, muchas veces, coloca al Estado como inerte frente a las amenazas de muertes denunciadas, hechos como éste pueden guiar la comprensión de las personas sobre la ineficacia de la política. Sin embargo, vale la pena mencionar que la ley ha traído avances significativos en el escenario de violencia contra las mujeres en Brasil, en relación con la notificación de delitos, la difusión de campañas y la amplia difusión de este derecho a todas las mujeres (Pezzi, 2009).

**Gráfico 3:** ¿Conoce usted la actuación de las instituciones públicas del Estado de Rondônia sobre el enfrentamiento a la violencia contra la mujer?






**Fuente:** Elaborado por las autoras.

El gráfico 3 muestra que 54 participantes consideran conocer el desempeño de las instituciones públicas en el Estado, que pueden demostrar la eficiencia de las discusiones o debates académicos, o incluso la información transmitida en varios medios de comunicación. De lo contrario, ocurre con los otros participantes que afirman no saber o que nunca han oído hablar de las instituciones, lo que puede ser evidencia de que no identificaron a las instituciones que conocen la cuestión presentada, o también pueden mostrar una falta de comprensión de la información y el conocimiento transmitido. El entorno de la institución educativa puede funcionar como un espacio para movilizar y sensibilizar acciones, para la difusión de diversos conocimientos sobre éstos y otros asuntos. Está implícito que puede haber lagunas con respecto a los conocimientos de las personas que forman una comunidad académica cuando se trata de detalles de la política. Principalmente, cuando uno se imagina que en estos ambientes puede haber mujeres en situaciones de violencia u hombres que reproducen situaciones de agresión. En este caso, es necesario promover acciones globales de orientación e información regional que puedan generar significado para la comunidad académica.

**Gráfico 4:** Marque las instituciones que usted conoce



**Fuente:** Elaborado por las autoras.

En esta pregunta, los participantes pudieron verificar más de un elemento. Así, en el gráfico 4, se descubrió que una mayoría de 54 participantes reconoce más las instituciones que llevan a cabo actividades de represión policial, entre una variedad de otras instituciones que trabajan en otras áreas de la política para combatir la violencia contra las mujeres. Este conocimiento puede estar relacionado con la percepción social, de cuál es el primer lugar donde se debería buscar asistencia para la víctima, que posiblemente sea un cuerpo vinculado a la atención médica o estaciones de policía.

Las instituciones públicas contenidas en el cuadro anterior tienen responsabilidades específicas para la integración de funciones, acciones y servicios, con el objetivo de implementar la Política para combatir la violencia contra las mujeres. Ellas promueven la promoción de programas y políticas previstas en la Ley Maria da Penha y propagan el respeto a la dignidad de la persona, como se describe en la Constitución de 1988, en su artículo 1.º. Para expandir la difusión de estos organismos, este estudio también propone presentar una descripción del desempeño de cada uno de ellos dentro del marco de la Política.

La Secretaría Municipal de Asistencia Social y Familia, cuyos 27 (39%) participantes en la investigación dijeron que conocen, es responsable de garantizar una protección básica, social y especial, no solo para las mujeres sino para todos los

ciudadanos que lo necesitan. Además de proporcionar servicios, programas y proyectos que benefician a las familias en el municipio de Porto Velho - RO (Porto Velho, 2019).

El Ministerio Público del Estado de Rondônia, destacados por 31 (45%) participantes, es un organismo que tiene la tarea de supervisar el cumplimiento de las actividades de las organizaciones públicas y privadas que atienden a las mujeres en situaciones de violencia, además de representar a la sociedad, respecto a quejas, buscando responsabilidad civil y penal del agresor, a través de medidas de protección en defensa de la mujer (Couto, Rocha, Ribeiro, Siqueira, 2018).

A través del Sistema de Acceso a la Información (e-Sic), el Ministerio Público del Estado de Rondônia dio un informe respecto a 134 mujeres víctimas de violencia, que fueron atendidas en el 2018. De esta cantidad, todas continuaron con las denuncias, sin renunciar a las mismas. Estos datos demuestran el papel que desempeña el Ministerio Público en la sociedad y cómo la política para enfrentar la violencia puede ayudar a las mujeres en situaciones de violencia.

Y la Estación de Policía Especializada para Asistencia a las Mujeres y la Familia (DEAM), cuyos 56 (81%) participantes más reconocidos entre las cinco opciones de elección, es un organismo estratégico para la Ley Maria da Penha, vinculada a la Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, que tiene la función táctica de reprimir los crímenes contra las mujeres, iniciando investigaciones policiales. DEAM representa el comienzo de medidas de protección y la intercesión del estado para víctimas y agresores (Santos, 2008).


La Oficina del Defensor Público del Estado de Rondônia, que obtuvo una cita de 35 (51%) participantes, es la institución que brinda asistencia legal. Realizan el servicio de orientación a las mujeres sobre los derechos garantizados tales como: pensión alimenticia, custodia de los hijos, acceso a programas sociales y entre otros que se ajustan a esta situación (Couto et al., 2018).

El Centro de Referencia Especializado para Asistencia Social en Atendimento, designado por 13 (19%) participantes, es uno de los organismos más necesarios para ayudar a las víctimas de violencia doméstica. El CREAS ofrece servicios especializados, tales como: trabajo social, psicología y asesoramiento jurídico. En ese centro son realizados la recepción y construcción de un plan individual que se lleva a cabo con la mujer, teniendo el objetivo de esbozar una estrategia y metodología para enfrentar la situación de violencia y su ciclo (Centro de Referencia Especializado en Asistencia Social

para ayudar a las Mujeres Víctimas de Violencia Doméstica [CREAS], 2019). En el 2018, CREAS realizó 175 consultas psicológicas, 101 psicosociales, 141 visitas domiciliarias, 422 procesos de demandas espontáneas, 103 denuncias y 165 procesos a la Red de Instituciones de Afrontamiento. Estos datos pueden representar la relevancia del CREAS para la sociedad.

**Gráfico 5:**

¿Cuáles de esos elementos usted entiende y conoce como violencia doméstica?




**Fuente:** Elaborado por las autoras.

El gráfico 5 muestra que los participantes reconocen más la violencia sexual, psicológica y física. Entendemos que esta percepción puede tener una correlación con la cantidad más alta marcada por los encuestados, en relación con la identificación del DEAM, ya que pueden correlacionar la violencia sexual y física con las características de las asistencias prestadas en la estación de policía.

Dentro del ámbito de la violencia contra las mujeres, se pueden revelar diversas formas de violencia y con diferentes grados de intensidad. Por lo general, la violencia física o incluso el feminicidio tienden a ser el resultado de una sucesión de otras formas de violencia (Day, 2003). Habitualmente, la violencia que se practica repetidamente contra las mujeres es: física, psicológica y sexual (Brasil, 2011), información compatible con los tipos de violencia más reconocidos por los participantes de la investigación.

Sin embargo, existen otros tipos específicos de violencia contra la mujer, a saber: patrimonial, moral y además de física, psicológica y sexual (Onofre, 2009).


**Gráfico 6:** ¿Altera la violencia contra la mujer la dinámica sobre el desarrollo social y regional en el municipio de Porto Velho – RO?



**Fuente:** Elaborado por las autoras.

El gráfico 6 muestra que 72 encuestadas entienden que la violencia contra las mujeres afecta el proceso del desarrollo regional. El desarrollo regional no solo está compuesto por el factor económico, sino que está integrado al factor social y ambiental, teniéndolos como temas importantes para que sean analizados, en el medio ambiente, los elementos de la desigualdad regional, cultural y física. Además de las condiciones que incluyen la salud, la educación, la vivienda, la calidad de vida combinada con el factor de los ingresos (Becker & Wittmann, 2008). En este intento, la violencia contra las mujeres es un problema público de preocupación, debido a la creciente cantidad de feminicidios absorbidos en la rutina de la sociedad civil e incorporados a la vida cotidiana de las personas, como una realidad con una solución compleja. La muerte de una mujer puede ser un desequilibrio trágico en el sistema social, ambiental y económico constituido en torno a la víctima, como la familia, el trabajo y otros (Belchior, 2016).

**Gráfico 7:** ¿Es una problemática social la violencia contra la mujer?




**Fuente:** Elaborado por las autoras.

En el gráfico 7, vemos que los participantes perciben que la violencia contra las mujeres es un problema social. Entendemos que para que ocurran transformaciones sociales significativas, principalmente en términos de valoración de la vida, el individuo y la comunidad tienen una importancia expresamente ética en la lucha contra la violencia y en la resignificación cultural de la equidad entre mujeres y hombres, ya que todos son responsables de tales transformaciones. El aumento de la violencia contra las mujeres va en contra del desarrollo sostenible de la región, por lo que esta transformación colectiva es necesaria (Cerqueira, Matos, Martins y Pinto Júnior, 2015).

Si la violencia contra la mujer perjudica la calidad del desarrollo regional, se entiende que este problema es un problema social. Es un fenómeno que ocurre en todas las clases sociales, y en las clases más altas puede haber intimidación al exponer sus vidas personales a terceros, lo que dificulta la denuncia del agresor. En el entorno académico, ya es generalizado que la violencia contra las mujeres está significativamente influenciada por el aspecto cultural arraigado y reforzado en todas las clases sociales. Por lo tanto, es necesario desarrollar políticas, programas y proyectos sociales para deconstruir esta cultura reproducida entre los ciudadanos (Souza, 2016; Meneghel y Portella, 2017). De lo contrario, la violencia se perpetúa de generación en generación, como algo normal (Casique y Furegato 2006; Souza y Baracho, 2015; Carvalho, 2019).

**Gráfico 8:** ¿Suceden muchos casos de violencia contra la mujer aquí en el municipio de Porto Velho – RO?



**Fuente:** Elaborado por las autoras.

En el gráfico 8, los encuestados dicen que perciben que hay muchos casos de violencia contra las mujeres en la ciudad de Porto Velho. Esta percepción puede representar la proximidad y frecuencia con la que los participantes del estudio escuchan historias, leen noticias o experimentan realidades en las que las mujeres se encuentran en

situaciones de violencia. Esto refuerza la necesidad de debates, difusión e intercambio de conocimientos sobre la Política Nacional, para enfrentar la violencia contra las mujeres en las comunidades académicas. Dichas actividades pueden ayudar a deconstruir la cultura paternalista, sexista y misógina, y empoderar a hombres y mujeres, para que no reproduzcan el papel de agresor y, ellas, el de la víctima.

## **6. Consideraciones Finales**

Este estudio tuvo como objetivo conocer la percepción de los funcionarios y estudiantes que conforman la comunidad académica de una institución de educación técnica y tecnológica, sobre las políticas públicas para enfrentar la violencia contra las mujeres. Con un enfoque también en expandir la difusión de los instrumentos y mecanismos de la política, así como generar diversos conocimientos sobre el tema a los participantes de la investigación. Todo esto surgió de la siguiente pregunta: ¿Cuál es la percepción que tienen los estudiantes y los servidores públicos dentro de la comunidad e institución académica sobre las políticas públicas para enfrentar la violencia contra la mujer?

Para lograr esto, se buscó la teoría para el estudio, la comprensión del desarrollo sostenible y su relación con las políticas de género, así como la Política para enfrentar la violencia contra las mujeres. En el cual, se concluyó que el desarrollo sostenible completo también depende de la mitigación de la violencia contra las mujeres. Entendemos que la violencia contra la mujer es un fenómeno que puede considerarse como una epidemia social de orden mundial, que puede ocurrir dentro de diferentes clases sociales, independientemente de su origen étnico, edad o género, y afecta la calidad de vida de las personas.

En esta investigación se puede concluir que de las 85 personas que respondieron voluntariamente el cuestionario, la mayoría, el 64%, eran mujeres. La mayoría de los encuestados conocen la ley, sin embargo, saben poco acerca de la ley Maria da Penha y entienden que protege poco. En cuanto al conocimiento del desempeño de las instituciones públicas en el Estado de Rondônia, en la lucha contra la violencia doméstica, declararon que saben al respecto. No obstante, es significativo la cantidad de personas, un (36%) que desconocen o nunca supieron nada sobre estas instituciones. La mayoría de los participantes entiende la violencia doméstica como: violencia física, sexual y



psicológica, que también son las más publicitadas en los medios de comunicación y registradas en los sistemas policiales.

Además, la mayoría de los participantes comprende que la violencia doméstica afecta el proceso del desarrollo regional y que puede considerarse un problema social. Finalmente, se dan cuenta de que en el municipio de Porto Velho hay muchos casos de violencia doméstica. Sin embargo, es preocupante también, los pocos encuestados que señalaron cierta ignorancia sobre la política, ya que contrasta con las otras respuestas, y la dinámica de la comunidad académica, que por su naturaleza, genera espacios para el debate sobre diversos temas sociales.

Podemos observar empíricamente que la institución investigada está compuesta por un público diverso en contextos culturales, económicos y sociales. E aunque en los ambientes académicos es establezcan espacios de debate sobre temáticas sociales, podemos notar que el conocimiento expresado sobre la política de afrontamiento a la violencia contra la mujer, puede influir en la reproducción de entendimientos generalizados y cotidianos sobre este asunto. Por lo tanto, la intensificación de espacios para debates, campañas de información y encuestas de percepción puede ayudar a disminuir la negligencia con respecto al conocimiento más específico y detallado de la política, para combatir la violencia contra las mujeres. Estas acciones podrían aclarar o alentar a las mujeres y otros públicos a buscar ayuda o recurrir a la denuncia, si es necesario.

En este estudio, también se percibió la necesidad de diversificar los mecanismos de divulgación de políticas públicas para expandir la información esencial y específica sobre las estructuras de servicio de la política en la sociedad local. Porque, a pesar de que la política tiene trece años de actividad en Brasil, se observó que todavía hay personas que no conocen los detalles de la ley Maria da Penha, sus innovaciones en la defensa de los derechos de las mujeres y, principalmente, quiénes son los responsables de su implementación.

Además, en el curso de la elaboración de los fundamentos teóricos de esta investigación, faltaron estudios científicos que podrían profundizar el tema en la ciudad de Porto Velho, lo que hace que el desarrollo de la investigación sea urgente y relevante. Por lo tanto, se espera que este artículo pueda contribuir a la reflexión sobre la importancia en el desarrollo de acciones, dentro y fuera de las comunidades académicas, para combatir la falta de conocimiento de las personas sobre las políticas de

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enfrentamiento respecto a la violencia contra las mujeres, de modo que estas últimas presenten resultados sociales más eficaces.

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## REVIEW

# “Social Movements, Institutionalization and Public Policies” (2019), by Gurza Lavalle, Carlos, Dowbor, & Szwako

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The 1990s and 2000s marked the consecration of participatory experiments undertaken in Brazil, such as participatory budget and public policy councils, which drew the attention of international cooperation agencies and scholars around the world, and gained a new dimension with the PT experience in national level (2003-2016). The development of empirical research on participatory institutions, social movements and public policies in recent years has contributed to shedding light on the varied and complex interactions established over decades between social movements and state institutions, and to highlight the insufficiency of perspectives that analytically separate social movements and State. The absence of analytical tools to understanding the recent

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transformations in the relations between State and society in Brazil in its complexity has imposed on scholars the challenge of revising theoretical assumptions and innovating conceptually and analytically.

An indispensable contribution to the debate is the book “Social movements and institutionalization: social policies, race and gender in post-transition Brazil”, released in August 2019, organized by Adrian Gurza Lavalle, Euzeneia Carlos, Monika Dowbor and José Szwako. Product of ten years of research and reflection by the Democracy and Collective Action Research Group (NDAC), the work proposes the domain of agency approach to analyze the processes of institutionalization of demands, values, interests and resources of action by social movements and civil society organizations in the State, guided by the assumption of the mutual constitution between State and society, in a radically relational perspective. Although motivated by contextual concerns in the post-transition Brazilian scenario, the proposal aims to build a useful conceptual framework for understanding medium-range institutionalization processes in different contexts.

The book is organized in presentation, preface, opening and eight chapters divided into two parts. In these brief lines, we will go through the work with special attention to the theoretical-conceptual approach proposed by the organizers in the book's presentation section, and its application in empirical analyzes in the following eight chapters.

In the opening chapter of the book, the authors start from the diagnosis that the analytical assumptions that support the main theories oriented to illuminate the relationship between collective organization of interests and values and the State and its institutions, namely: pluralism, neo-corporatism and theories of social movements, ended up making invisible or inducing restrictive readings of institutionalization processes. In the case of pluralism, conceiving the institutionalization of the social actors' capacity for action in the State and the permanent access of certain actors or interests to the State's decisions, they argue, would compromise its character as a disputed arena - a fundamental assumption of this theoretical current. Neo-corporatism, on the other hand, despite dedicating itself to the analysis of institutionalization processes of structures of intermediation of interests, privileges monopolistic structures and concentrators of power, in highly crystallized configurations and operating at high levels of authority. Thus, the authors point to its inadequacy to the analysis of heterogeneous actors and interests, and less stable representation arrangements, located in regions of medium political altitude (that is, intermediate level of authority) and with medium-range institutionalization.



Finally, the theories of social movements, used as a conceptual framework by much of Brazilian literature, in part identified processes of institutionalization with demobilization and co-optation, by assuming a separation between movements and the State in a dichotomous and contentious key. Recent advances in this literature have challenged this analytical separation and sought to expand the instruments to deal with institutionalization processes, recognizing the expansion and complexification of forms of action and organization, but, they point out, insufficiently theorized such processes. The authors argue that it is necessary to establish analytical lenses that focus at the interaction processes of social movements with State institutions, and to detect degrees of institutionalization and influence of these actors in decision-making processes, as well as their effects for the actors themselves.

The path proposed by the authors to establish this analytical lens is a review of the historical neoinstitutionalist debate to understand the nature and functioning of state institutions and, more specifically, of works that theorized about the mutual constitution between State and society and about state capacities, including authors such as Charles Tilly, Michael Mann, Peter Evans and Theda Skocpol. Therefore, they seek to establish a balance between State-centered and society-centered perspectives.

The core of the domain of agency approach is the review and expansion of the polity approach, and the adaptation of the concept of institutional fit elaborated by Skocpol (1992). The polity approach, developed by Skocpol, is dedicated to analyzing State-society interaction processes and their results regarding the possibilities of the adaptation of the actors and their capacity of mobilizing the institutional context for engineering fit within the State, making State institutional selectivity operate continuously in favor of their interests.

The authors seek to advance the analytical specification of the concept of institutional settings in terms of variations in their nature and the level of authority in which they operate, and the effects on the propensity for action by the actors and on the results of interactions, especially when they are articulated in configurations, being able to establish domains of agency. Defined by the authors as institutional settlements resulting from processes of State-society interaction in continuous construction, which gain their own density and allow the actors to direct the selectivity of political institutions in their favor, expanding their capacity for action and granting them the power of agency, the institutional settings have variable durability and influence depending on the level of

authority in which they operate (vertical or horizontal). Institutional fit constituted at different hierarchical levels can be articulated horizontally and vertically in configurations of greater or lesser reach, constituting domains of agency - spheres of competence related to the actors' capacity for action in a public policy context. The establishment of domains of agency favors the capacity of agency and decision of certain actors to the detriment of others.

The reconstruction of the processes of interaction that result in fit and domains of agency and the verification of the effective agency capacity of the actors in these configurations constitutes, according to the authors, an empirical research agenda. The capacity of action by social and state actors is built in the interaction process and is conditioned by the results of previous interactions.

The definitions of fit and domains of agency reflect the methodological strategy of centrally addressing endogenous factors to the interaction processes and the actors involved in it, and the relational process-oriented character of the approach. The authors present three types of interdependent and complementary mechanisms in the processes of engineering fit and their consolidation in domains of agency - institutional, relational and social, whose presence and relevance should be identified in the empirical analyzes.

In line with the assumption of mutual constitution, the concept of state capacities gain centrality in the model proposed by the authors, in interlocution with the neoinstitutionalist debate and with Brazilian debate, notably Abers & Keck (2013), Pereira (2014), Pires & Gomide (2016) and Bichir et al. (2017). The authors argue that the accumulated state capacities (or their lack) structure the ways in which the State is challenged and the chances of influence of social actors in the decision-making process of a given public policy. And, conversely, the state instruments of action and intervention and, therefore, the state capacities, have socio-political genesis and are structured by State-society interactions. Thus, public policy instruments may have an endogenous origin and be interactively forged within institutionalization processes, constituting, in some cases, as institutional fit. Understanding instruments as plug-ins has the potential to reveal variations in the chances of access to the State by certain actors over time. The authors seek, therefore, to cover in the analytical model the “other side” of the relationship - the institutional conditions of the interaction processes, and the effects of these in the State institutions and in the public policy process, in a radically relational and promising way for a wide range of research interests.

The chapters that follow the presentation, organized in two parts, apply the analytical model in systematic studies of institutionalization processes in a variety of sectoral policies, federative levels and regional contexts. The first, entitled “Social movements and policies in post-transition Brazil”, comprises four chapters focused on in-depth analysis of the historical construction of institutional settings and domains of agency in processes of State-society interaction in social policies.

In her chapter, Monika Dowbor explores how the Municipal Health Movement sought, over 35 years, to create institutional fit and configurations such as the National Health Council and the Bipartite and Tripartite Commissions, institutionalized by law, to guarantee their achievements and make their influence more stable on the decision-making processes in the face of uncertainties generated by the alternation of power, and how the movement itself has been transformed into organizational terms and repertoires of action, which did not mean the extinction of collective action.

Patrícia Tavares de Freitas' chapter deals with transformations in the immigration policy in the city of São Paulo from the reconfiguration in the field of collective actors with the growing immigration of Bolivian origin, and from the party dispute in the city between PT and PSDB, from 1980 to 2012. Analyzing three cycles of State-society interactions, the research demonstrates the construction of an internally polarized domain of agency, crystallized into two configurations with different profiles in terms of institutional settings, policy conceptions, specific institutions, parties and civil society organizations.

In the third chapter, Euzeneia Carlos analyzes the process of engineering fit and domain of agency by the urban popular movement in the state of Espírito Santo from 1980 to 2010. The author identifies important mechanisms for the construction of institutional fit in the case studied: the relationship with “institutional incubators” made up of religious organizations, and with party coalitions in municipal elections. She also shows that the relationship with religious organizations and parties since the movement foundation has favored the construction of organizational capacities to engineering new institutional fit.

The fourth chapter, by Maria do Carmo Albuquerque, analyzes cycles of mobilization of the movement of children and adolescents and the formation of defense coalitions around the so-called guarantor paradigm, which forged institutional insertions

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in the socio-educational policy in the city of São Paulo, achieving changes institutions in politics according to this paradigm.

The chapters in the first part of the book feature the richness of the contribution of systematic longitudinal studies that capture changes in the configurations of actors and institutional fit over time. Furthermore, they show that the construction of institutional fit within the State is enhanced by the construction of broader coalitions of actors, with emphasis on religious organizations and political parties.

The second part of the book, “Movements, race, gender and public policies”, consists of four chapters aimed at applying the domain of agency approach to the analysis of the institutionalization of demands of the black and feminist movements in public policies. In these, issues of race and gender are central and tension the universalist character prevalent in social policies. The inclusive effects of the institutionalization of universalist demands may, according to the authors, make the institutionalization of demands for inclusion of marginalized groups invisible and precluded. The reflection on the particularities and challenges involved in the process of building institutional fit by these movements and groups encourages the authors to apply the domain of agency approach in the following chapters.

In her chapter, Flavia Rios reconstructs the institutionalization process of the Brazilian black movement from 1985 to 2016, in a double sense: in its institutionalization and reconfiguration of its organizational structure and in the construction of institutional fit in the State. The author identifies that, in this process, the institutionalization of the racial equality agenda in Brazil is more directly associated with the dynamics of interaction between political activism and the executive, participatory and bureaucratic spheres of the State than with representation in the legislative sphere.

Layla Carvalho, in the sixth chapter of the book, analyzes the interactions of the Feminist Health Network, the Articulation of Black Brazilian Women and the Network for the Humanization of Childbirth and Birth with the National Policy for Integral Attention to Women's Health and the Rede Cegonha Program of Ministry of Health between 2004 and 2011. The analysis sheds light on the interactions between activists and the State, their effects on policies, the heterogeneity of activism networks and their capacity for agency in complex dynamics of cooperation and disputes.

In the seventh chapter of the book, Vera Schattan Coelho and Adrian Gurza Lavalle deal with the challenges for the vocalization and institutionalization of demands

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of the black feminist movement and organizations linked to the Wajãpi indigenous people, focused on the health sector, and for the reception of these demands by the authorities and professionals. The authors demonstrate that the formulation and reception of demands are not the product of the actors’ will, but capacities produced in interactive processes that, in turn, have different reach in terms of institutionalization in the two cases analyzed.

In the eighth chapter, José Szwako and Renato Perissinotto analyze the construction of the idea of gender by militants and Paraguayan feminist organizations and their institutionalization in sexual and reproductive health policies and in the fight against violence against women. In dialogue with the “ideational turn” of public policy literature and discursive neoinstitutionalism, the authors propose the notion of cognitive capacity to understand the meaning disputes around public policies and as a state capacity dimension, operating as a link between relational and administrative dimensions.

In the second part of the book, we highlight the aim at the disputes of ideas and meanings in State-society interactions, and the treatment of the vocalization of demands and their inclusion in public policies as capacities forged in the interactive process over time, which condition the construction of institutional fit.

Essential reading for students of State-society interactions in the production of public policies, the work offers a promising analytical model and substantial empirical studies, raising the level of the debate and offering clues for overcoming reductionist and dichotomous models.

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