THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.7443/problemata.v2i2.10799"><i> <b>[doi: 10.7443/problemata.v2i2.10799]</b></i></a>

Authors

  • Luís Estevinha Rodrigues

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7443/problemata.v2i2.10799

Keywords:

Kant, epistemologia, verdade, conhecimento, mundo externo, epistemology, truth, knowledge, external world

Abstract

In this essay we look into the two complementary notions of truth which, as we construe the topic, support Kant’s epistemology. In so doing, we intend to find the necessary basis to hold that Kant’s overall account of truth, if in order, pushes the cognitive agent farther from the external world and its objects beyond what is desirable.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Published

2011-11-16

Issue

Section

Papers