PORQUE REPRESENTAÇÕES SÃO UM PROBLEMA PARA REPRESENTACIONISTAS

Authors

  • Cícero Antônio Cavalcante Barroso UFC

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7443/22717

Keywords:

argumento da transparência da consciência, condição representacional, qualia, representação, representacionismo.

Abstract

Na filosofia da mente, filósofos de diferentes posições concordam que experiências são representações. Dentre esses filósofos, os representacionistas merecem especial destaque, pois defendem que esse caráter representacional da experiência é o que define a consciência. Para tanto, eles geralmente se fiam no argumento da transparência da consciência (cf. HARMAN 1990, DRETSKE 1995 e TYE 1995). Esse argumento, que foi introduzido por MOORE 1903, sustenta que não percebemos as propriedades das nossas experiências, antes percebemos as propriedades de objetos e eventos extramentais através das nossas experiências. O problema com essa visão é que ela parece incompatível com o que sabemos sobre como representações operam. Neste artigo, meu objetivo é expor esse problema.

 

[doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.7443/problemata.v6i2.22717]

 

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Published

2015-10-06

Issue

Vol. 6 No. 2 (2015)

Section

Papers

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