THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS IN PETER SINGER'S ETHICS

Abstract

This article presents an analysis around the inquiry of the animal being in Peter Singer's philosophical thought, specifically, regarding its moral status. Our discussion implies approaching the theme through two matters: 1. What does the defense of an equality for animals in terms of moral actions and, consequently, a moral status consist of? 2. From an ethical point of view, what implications does this defense bring to our coexistence with other animals? As a theoretical basis for our discussion, we will address the contributions of the philosopher Peter Singer, especially those presented in his Practical Ethics (1979), in addition, we will also use other works by researchers who may contribute to our discussion. Peter Singer's perspective consists in extending the ethical principle of equal consideration of interests to protect the interests of sentient animals. The presence of sensitivity is configured as the moral criterion for interests to exist and, therefore, be taken into account, even if it is the minimum interest in avoiding suffering. This understanding allows us to assert that we, as human beings, have a moral obligation to impartially consider the interests of other animals at the expense of our lesser interests; otherwise, we will be assuming a speciesist posture, that is, aiming only the interests of our own species.