HUSSERL, MILLIKAN AND INTENTIONALISM

Abstract

In this article, I deal with the concept of intentionality. The theoretical proposal is to contrast the approaches of Husserl and Millikan, two authors who make use of this notion, despite presenting different philosophical proposals. In both cases, the concept of intentionality can be linked to their semantic theories, just as intentionality is associated with the notion of teleology. The conflict exposed here brings up questions referring to the classic debate between intensionalism and extensionalism, and, in the broader theoretical panorama, it deals with the reasonably recent attempt to naturalize phenomenology. Despite adopting opposing positions in the epistemic debate about the nature of meaning, we find in their semantic theories normative elements that are both intentional and teleological. Likewise, in both Husserl's phenomenology and Millikan's biosemantics, the conceptual elaboration of intentionality presupposes a theory of representation and the conceptual expansion of some terms used, to ensure the intersubjective character of meaning and signification.