Governança Corporativa e Seus Determinantes: Influências Negativas do Ambiente Externo Sobre as Práticas de Governança Corporativa do Próximo Exercício
Resumo
Objetivo: O presente estudo objetivou analisar as chances da competitividade de mercado e o risco não sistemático determinarem os níveis de Governança Corporativa do próximo exercício.
Fundamento: Teoria da agência e governança corporativa, Competitividade de Mercado, risco não sistêmico e estudos correlatos.
Método: A metodologia possui abordagem quantitativa com regressão logística. A amostra é composta pelas empresas que constituíram o IBOVESPA no ano de 2016.
Resultados: O risco não sistêmico demonstrou ser um contraponto à governança. Assim, o ambiente de risco desfavorece a tomada de decisão a favor da adoção de práticas de governança. Já o grau de competitividade de mercado, por meio do índice Herfindahl, constatou o aumento nas chances de ocorrerem as práticas do novo mercado.
Contribuições: Este estudo tem o intuito de contribuir com a discussão referente às chances das práticas de governança corporativa ocorrer de acordo com os fatores externos, visto que as influências externas não necessariamente levam as empresas a adquirem determinado conjunto de práticas.
Downloads
Não há dados estatísticos.
Referências
Ahmed, A. S. (1994). Accounting earnings and future economic rents: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17(3), 377-400.
Almeida, J. E. F. (2010). Qualidade da informação Contábil em ambientes competitivos. Tese de Doutorado, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo.
Araújo, L. A. D. (2005). Risco e Competição Bancária no Brasil. Universidade Federal do Ceará. Dissertação de Mestrado, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia, Universidade Federal do Ceará. Fortaleza.
Assaf Neto, A. (2009). Mercado financeiro. (9 ed) São Paulo. Editora Ática.
Balakrishnan, K., & Cohen, D. (2011). Product market competition, financial accounting misreporting and corporate governance: evidence from accounting restatements. Working Paper, Stern School of Business, New York University.
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003). Corporate governance and control. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 1, 1-109.
BM&FBOVESPA (2017). Segmentos de listagem. Disponível: http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt_br/listagem/acoes/segmentos-de-listagem/sobre-segmentos-de-listagem/
Brennan, M. J., & Zhang, Y. (2016). Capital asset pricing with a stochastic horizon. SSRN.
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001). Financial accounting information and corporate governance. Journal of accounting and Economics, 32(1), 237-333.
Byun, H. S., Lee, J. H., & Park, K. S. (2014). Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Payout Policy.
Calomiris, C. W., & Carlson, M. (2016). Corporate governance and risk management at unprotected banks: National banks in the 1890s. Journal of Financial Economics, 119(3), 512-532.
Chhaochharia, V., Grinstein, Y., Grullon, G., & Michaely, R. (2016). Product market competition and internal governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Management Science, 63(5), 1405-1424.
Claessens, S., & Yurtoglu, B. B. (2013). Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey. Emerging markets review, 15, 1-33.
Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., & Rusticus, T. O. (2006). Does weak governance cause weak stock returns? An examination of firm operating performance and investors' expectations. The Journal of Finance, 61(2), 655-687.
Demsetz, H. (1973). Industry structure, market rivalry, and public policy. The Journal of Law and Economics, 16(1), 1-9.
Departamento de Justiça dos Estados Unidos da América (2010). Horizontal merger guidelines.
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004). Private benefits of control: An international comparison. The Journal of Finance, 59(2), 537-600.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of management review, 14(1), 57-74.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of financial economics, 33(1), 3-56.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2004). Profitability, growth, and average returns. SSRN.
Fávero, L. P., Belfiore, P., Silva, F. D., & Chan, B. L. (2009). Análise de dados: modelagem multivariada para tomada de decisões. Rio de Janeiro: Campus.
Ferreira, M. A., & Laux, P. A. (2007). Corporate governance, idiosyncratic risk, and information flow. The Journal of Finance, 62(2), 951-989.
Giroud, X., & Mueller, H. M. (2011). Corporate governance, product market competition, and equity prices. The Journal of Finance, 66(2), 563-600.
Gitman, L. J. (2010). Princípios da administração financeira. (12 ed) São Paulo. Pearson Prentice Hall.
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. The quarterly journal of economics, 118(1), 107-156.
Griffith, R. (2001). Product market competition, efficiency and agency costs: an empirical analysis (No. 01/12). IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS).
Hair Jr., J. F. ., Babin, B. ., Money, A. H. ., & Samouel, P. . (2005). Fundamentos de métodos de pesquisa em administração. Porto Alegre: Bookman.
Hou, K., & Robinson, D. T. (2006). Industry concentration and average stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1927-1956.
Jensen, M. C. (2003). A theory of the firm: governance, residual claims, and organizational forms. Harvard University Press.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.
Karuna, C. (2007). Industry product market competition and managerial incentives. Journal of accounting and economics, 43(2), 275-297.
Kim, K. H., & Kim, T. (2016). Capital asset pricing model: A time-varying volatility approach. Journal of Empirical Finance, 37, 268-281.
Kothari, S. P. (2001). Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of accounting and economics, 31(1), 105-231.
Lintner, J. (1965). The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risky investments in stock portfolios and capital budgets. The review of economics and statistics, 13-37.
Maksimovic, V., & Phillips, G. (2001). The market for corporate assets: Who engages in mergers and asset sales and are there efficiency gains?. The Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2019-2065.
Marciukaityte, D., & Park, J. C. (2009). Market competition and earnings management. SSRN.
Michelberger, K. J. (2016). Risk Aversion in the Board Room. An Analytical Approach on Corporate Governance of German Stock-Listed Companies. European Integration Studies, (10), 135-144.
Mossin, J. (1966). Equilibrium in a capital asset market. Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society, 768-783.
Nickell, S. J. (1996). Competition and corporate performance. Journal of political economy, 104(4), 724-746.
Oliveira, G. A. S. (2014). Indicadores de concorrência. Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica – CADE. Brasília.
Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem. The American Economic Review, 63(2), 134-139.
Rossi, F. (2016). Corporate Governance, Risk-Taking, and Firm Performance: Evidence from Italy. SSRN.
Rossi, M. (2016). The capital asset pricing model: a critical literature review. Global Business and Economics Review, 18(5), 604-617.
Ryu, D., Ryu, D., & Hwang, J. H. (2017). Corporate governance, product-market competition, and stock returns: evidence from the Korean market. Asian Business & Management, 16(1-2), 50-91.
Sadka, G. (2006). The economic consequences of accounting fraud in product markets: Theory and a case from the US telecommunications industry (WorldCom). American Law and Economics Review, 8(3), 439-475.
Schoar, A. (2002). Effects of corporate diversification on productivity. The Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2379-2403.
Sharpe, W. F. (1964). Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk. The journal of finance, 19(3), 425-442.
Shi, W., Connelly, B. L., & Hoskisson, R. E. (2017). External corporate governance and financial fraud: cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions. Strategic Management Journal, 38(6), 1268-1286.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The journal of finance, 52(2), 737-783.
Silva, C. L. (2017). Competitividade e estratégia empresarial: um estudo de caso da indústria automobilística brasileira na década de 1990. Revista da FAE, 4(1), 35-48.
Thompson Junior, A. A., & Formby, J. P. (1998). Microeconomia da firma: teoria e prática. PHB.
Almeida, J. E. F. (2010). Qualidade da informação Contábil em ambientes competitivos. Tese de Doutorado, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo.
Araújo, L. A. D. (2005). Risco e Competição Bancária no Brasil. Universidade Federal do Ceará. Dissertação de Mestrado, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia, Universidade Federal do Ceará. Fortaleza.
Assaf Neto, A. (2009). Mercado financeiro. (9 ed) São Paulo. Editora Ática.
Balakrishnan, K., & Cohen, D. (2011). Product market competition, financial accounting misreporting and corporate governance: evidence from accounting restatements. Working Paper, Stern School of Business, New York University.
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003). Corporate governance and control. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 1, 1-109.
BM&FBOVESPA (2017). Segmentos de listagem. Disponível: http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt_br/listagem/acoes/segmentos-de-listagem/sobre-segmentos-de-listagem/
Brennan, M. J., & Zhang, Y. (2016). Capital asset pricing with a stochastic horizon. SSRN.
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001). Financial accounting information and corporate governance. Journal of accounting and Economics, 32(1), 237-333.
Byun, H. S., Lee, J. H., & Park, K. S. (2014). Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Payout Policy.
Calomiris, C. W., & Carlson, M. (2016). Corporate governance and risk management at unprotected banks: National banks in the 1890s. Journal of Financial Economics, 119(3), 512-532.
Chhaochharia, V., Grinstein, Y., Grullon, G., & Michaely, R. (2016). Product market competition and internal governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Management Science, 63(5), 1405-1424.
Claessens, S., & Yurtoglu, B. B. (2013). Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey. Emerging markets review, 15, 1-33.
Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., & Rusticus, T. O. (2006). Does weak governance cause weak stock returns? An examination of firm operating performance and investors' expectations. The Journal of Finance, 61(2), 655-687.
Demsetz, H. (1973). Industry structure, market rivalry, and public policy. The Journal of Law and Economics, 16(1), 1-9.
Departamento de Justiça dos Estados Unidos da América (2010). Horizontal merger guidelines.
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004). Private benefits of control: An international comparison. The Journal of Finance, 59(2), 537-600.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of management review, 14(1), 57-74.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of financial economics, 33(1), 3-56.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2004). Profitability, growth, and average returns. SSRN.
Fávero, L. P., Belfiore, P., Silva, F. D., & Chan, B. L. (2009). Análise de dados: modelagem multivariada para tomada de decisões. Rio de Janeiro: Campus.
Ferreira, M. A., & Laux, P. A. (2007). Corporate governance, idiosyncratic risk, and information flow. The Journal of Finance, 62(2), 951-989.
Giroud, X., & Mueller, H. M. (2011). Corporate governance, product market competition, and equity prices. The Journal of Finance, 66(2), 563-600.
Gitman, L. J. (2010). Princípios da administração financeira. (12 ed) São Paulo. Pearson Prentice Hall.
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. The quarterly journal of economics, 118(1), 107-156.
Griffith, R. (2001). Product market competition, efficiency and agency costs: an empirical analysis (No. 01/12). IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS).
Hair Jr., J. F. ., Babin, B. ., Money, A. H. ., & Samouel, P. . (2005). Fundamentos de métodos de pesquisa em administração. Porto Alegre: Bookman.
Hou, K., & Robinson, D. T. (2006). Industry concentration and average stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1927-1956.
Jensen, M. C. (2003). A theory of the firm: governance, residual claims, and organizational forms. Harvard University Press.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.
Karuna, C. (2007). Industry product market competition and managerial incentives. Journal of accounting and economics, 43(2), 275-297.
Kim, K. H., & Kim, T. (2016). Capital asset pricing model: A time-varying volatility approach. Journal of Empirical Finance, 37, 268-281.
Kothari, S. P. (2001). Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of accounting and economics, 31(1), 105-231.
Lintner, J. (1965). The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risky investments in stock portfolios and capital budgets. The review of economics and statistics, 13-37.
Maksimovic, V., & Phillips, G. (2001). The market for corporate assets: Who engages in mergers and asset sales and are there efficiency gains?. The Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2019-2065.
Marciukaityte, D., & Park, J. C. (2009). Market competition and earnings management. SSRN.
Michelberger, K. J. (2016). Risk Aversion in the Board Room. An Analytical Approach on Corporate Governance of German Stock-Listed Companies. European Integration Studies, (10), 135-144.
Mossin, J. (1966). Equilibrium in a capital asset market. Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society, 768-783.
Nickell, S. J. (1996). Competition and corporate performance. Journal of political economy, 104(4), 724-746.
Oliveira, G. A. S. (2014). Indicadores de concorrência. Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica – CADE. Brasília.
Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem. The American Economic Review, 63(2), 134-139.
Rossi, F. (2016). Corporate Governance, Risk-Taking, and Firm Performance: Evidence from Italy. SSRN.
Rossi, M. (2016). The capital asset pricing model: a critical literature review. Global Business and Economics Review, 18(5), 604-617.
Ryu, D., Ryu, D., & Hwang, J. H. (2017). Corporate governance, product-market competition, and stock returns: evidence from the Korean market. Asian Business & Management, 16(1-2), 50-91.
Sadka, G. (2006). The economic consequences of accounting fraud in product markets: Theory and a case from the US telecommunications industry (WorldCom). American Law and Economics Review, 8(3), 439-475.
Schoar, A. (2002). Effects of corporate diversification on productivity. The Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2379-2403.
Sharpe, W. F. (1964). Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk. The journal of finance, 19(3), 425-442.
Shi, W., Connelly, B. L., & Hoskisson, R. E. (2017). External corporate governance and financial fraud: cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions. Strategic Management Journal, 38(6), 1268-1286.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The journal of finance, 52(2), 737-783.
Silva, C. L. (2017). Competitividade e estratégia empresarial: um estudo de caso da indústria automobilística brasileira na década de 1990. Revista da FAE, 4(1), 35-48.
Thompson Junior, A. A., & Formby, J. P. (1998). Microeconomia da firma: teoria e prática. PHB.
Downloads
Publicado
2021-12-30
Como Citar
Voltolini Gomes, A. R., & Ribeiro de Mello, G. . (2021). Governança Corporativa e Seus Determinantes: Influências Negativas do Ambiente Externo Sobre as Práticas de Governança Corporativa do Próximo Exercício. Revista Evidenciação Contábil &Amp; Finanças, 9(3), 123–141. Recuperado de https://periodicos.ufpb.br/ojs2/index.php/recfin/article/view/54671
Edição
Seção
Seção Nacional
Licença
Copyright (c) 2021 Revista Evidenciação Contábil & Finanças
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Autores que publicam na RECFin concordam com os seguintes termos:- Autores mantém os direitos autorais e concedem à revista o direito de primeira publicação, com o trabalho simultaneamente licenciado sob a Licença Creative Commons Attribution que permite o compartilhamento do trabalho com reconhecimento da autoria e publicação inicial nesta revista;
- Em virtude de aparecerem nesta revista de acesso público, os artigos são de uso gratuito, com atribuições próprias, em aplicações educacionais e não-comerciais;
- A revista permitirá o uso dos trabalhos publicados para fins não-comerciais, incluindo direito de enviar o trabalho para bases de dados de acesso público.
