[Authority and Defeatability of Judicial Precedent: An Analysis Based on Joseph Raz's Theory]

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v12i2.72347

Keywords:

precedents, authority, defeasibility, Joseph Raz, stare decisis

Abstract

This paper examines the authority of precedents in common law systems, focusing on the debate about their nature and how the doctrine of stare decisis binds judges to past decisions. Based on Joseph Raz's theory of authority, precedents are analyzed as protected reasons, which exclude dependent reasons from previous decisions in subsequent cases. Finally, the article discusses the defeasibility of precedents through processes of distinction and overruling, without violating stare decisis. The flexibility in applying precedents depends on the decision-making context, while their rigidity increases with the reinforcement of decisions.

Author Biography

  • Márcio Barcelos Corrêa, UFRJ

    Mestre em Direito pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Especialista em Direito Penal e Criminologia pelo Introcrim/Faculdade CERS.

References

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SCHAUER, Frederick. Is defeasibility an essential property of law? In: FERRER BELTRÁN, Jordi; RATTI, Giovanni Battisti. The logic of legal requirements: essays on defeasibility. Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 77-88. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661640.003.0005

SHECAIRA, Fábio Perin. Precedent and the source-norm distinction. In: EDICOTT, Timothy; KRISTJÁNSSON, Hafsteinn Dan; LEWIS, Sebastian. Philosophical foundations of precedent. Oxford University Press, 2023, p. 320-334.

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Published

19/08/2025

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Corrêa, M. B. (2025). [Authority and Defeatability of Judicial Precedent: An Analysis Based on Joseph Raz’s Theory]. Aufklärung, 12(2), p.183-198. https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v12i2.72347

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