Coordination and Discrimination in an Intertemporal Model of the Labor Market

Authors

  • Ricardo Azevedo Araujo
  • Paulo R. A. Loureiro
  • Adolfo Sachsida

Abstract

This paper presents a model that combines the taste discrimination with managerial coordination in an intertemporal optimizing framework. In that way, the loss of efficiency yielded by the presence of discrimination is compensated for managerial abilities. We show that a possible outcome is that workers with different productivity earn the same wages, which indicates the existence of discrimination. Furthermore, we are able to show that the Solow condition does not hold. The article contains three sections. The first one is an introduction of the coordination and discrimination in an intertemporal job market model, while the second section includes a study of the basic model. Then the conclusions.

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Author Biography

Paulo R. A. Loureiro

 

Published

2009-12-20

How to Cite

Araujo, R. A., Loureiro, P. R. A., & Sachsida, A. (2009). Coordination and Discrimination in an Intertemporal Model of the Labor Market. Revista Da ABET, 8(2). Retrieved from https://periodicos.ufpb.br/ojs/index.php/abet/article/view/15271