(EN) On Justification, Justice, and Legitimacy

Abstract

I consider three main questions. First, what is the relationship between the concepts of Justification, Justice, and Legitimacy? I approach these concepts from the similar, though divergent, theories as found first in John Rawls, and his theory of Political Liberalism, namely his Justice as Fairness and second in Jürgen Habermas, in his Between Facts and Norms, namely his theories of Communicative Action and Discourse Ethics. Second, what is the proper level of legitimation and justice? Which social institutions are best described as doing the legitimation, and to which does it apply? Third, I offer an argument explaining that legitimacy is not sufficient for a full theory of justice. If justice and legitimacy are divergent concepts, then the latter, as the weaker, singularly fails to deliver a stable social structure. To make this argument, I look at the space between Habermas and Rawls on the subject of Political Liberalism.