Can AI be trustworthy?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.69910Palavras-chave:
Artificial Intelligence, Distrust, Human replacement, Ethics of AI, ExplicabilityResumo
In this paper, I address why some people distrust of Artificial Intelligence, and how this discipline can be trustworthy. Specifically, I describe the origins of such distrust, make a prognosis of the current state of uncertainty it provokes, and offer a key for a trustworthy AI. In the first section, I deal with why machines have not been considered trustworthy, and, more importantly, with the core of distrust of AI: as I contend here, there has been a shift from an academic debate about AI minds, due to skepticism about other minds, to fears on day-to-day life, mainly due to concerns of human replacement. In the second section, I make a prognosis about the current state of distrust AI provokes. Finally, I offer a key for a trustworthy AI based on explicability. As I argue, explicability via experts who have been certified by institutions are facilitators of a trustworthy AI.
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