THE BEGINNING OF THE CONCEPT OF DOGMATISM IN KANT<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.7443/problemata.v2i2.10766"><i> <b>[doi: 10.7443/problemata.v2i2.10766]</b></i></a>

Authors

  • Claudio Sehnem

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7443/problemata.v2i2.10766

Keywords:

Dogmatismo, ceticismo, criticismo, lógica, matemática

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to analyze the beginning of the concept of dogmatism attributed by Kant to the Enlightenment, particularly that one that begins with Leibniz. The idea is that we can find many elements, already presented in the pre-critical period, that make Kant an original thinker even before the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason. Analyzing the comments made by Kant to Mendelssohn and Eberhard, it is revealed here a route of the kantian thought, that tries to follow closely the indications of the very Kant, in the sense that Kant himself mentions a shift not only in the history of pure reason, but also in his own thought, that is: there was a dogmatic period, another skeptical and finally the critical one. Based on this, it is possible to contest the current notion that there was this skeptical period in the kantian thought occasioned by the reading of Hume’s works.

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Published

2011-11-19

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Section

Papers