THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.7443/problemata.v2i2.10799"><i> <b>[doi: 10.7443/problemata.v2i2.10799]</b></i></a>
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7443/problemata.v2i2.10799Keywords:
Kant, epistemologia, verdade, conhecimento, mundo externo, epistemology, truth, knowledge, external worldAbstract
In this essay we look into the two complementary notions of truth which, as we construe the topic, support Kant’s epistemology. In so doing, we intend to find the necessary basis to hold that Kant’s overall account of truth, if in order, pushes the cognitive agent farther from the external world and its objects beyond what is desirable.Downloads
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Published
2011-11-16
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