EPISTEMOLOGIA DO TESTEMUNHO: O TESTEMUNHO COMO FONTE DE JUSTIFICAÇÃO

Authors

  • Ronaldo Miguel Silva Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul - PUCRS

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7443/19900

Keywords:

Epistemologia do testemunho, Justificação testemunhal, Reducionismo, Antirreducionismo, Monitoramento

Abstract

O testemunho ganha estatuto epistêmico justamente pela sua indispensabilidade. Uma tese amplamente difundida, reacendendo forte interesse entre a classe dos atuais epistemólogos, é a de que o testemunho é uma fonte de crenças penetrante e natural, no qual muitas das crenças nele fundamentadas constituem conhecimento e estão justificadas. Desse modo, face à relevância do estatuto epistêmico do testemunho, este artigo propõe, sob tríplice aspecto: i) mostrar a origem do cenário histórico a partir do qual permeiam os debates contemporâneos da epistemologia do testemunho; ii) apresentar as principais teses de discussões sob as quais versam as explicações sobre as condições em que a crença testemunhal pode ser qualificada como fonte básica de justificação; iii) propor um contraponto ao reducionismo, argumentando que o antirreducionismo é compatível com a concepção de monitoramento proposta por Elizabeth Fricker como condição para a justificação. Consequentemente, mediante a plausibilidade do argumento, pretende-se oferecer uma defesa a favor da tese antirreducionista.

 

[doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.7443/problemata.v5i2.19900]

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Author Biography

Ronaldo Miguel Silva, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul - PUCRS

Doutorando em Filosofia PUCRS

Filosofia Analítica / Epistemologia / Epistemologia Social.

Pesquisas: 1. O TESTEMUNHO COMO FONTE DE CONHECIMENTO

Pesquisas 2. O TESTEMUNHO COMO JUSTIFICAÇÃO DO CONHECIMENTO.

Missão de estudos na UNIVERSIDAD DE LA REPÚBLICA DE MONTEVIDEO - UDELAR.

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Published

2014-12-10

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