PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE IDEA’S WAY OF BEING IN SCHOPENHAUER’S METAPHYSICS

Abstract

This paper offers some remarks on the ontological problem of the Schopenhauer’s theory of Ideas, i.e. their double and even “contradictory” character of being at once eternal, universal, and on the other hand individuated and determined as produced by the struggle of the Will against itself. Should the Ideas really have a metaphysical role, not a simple epistemic one? How can them be plural and why and what that really means? Should we take them as a third besides or between Will and Representation? For the sake of solving such problems it is not enough a reasoning on the knowledge of “Platonic Ideas” as an object. We must instead comprehend the role of Ideas under a peculiar meaning and a mere relative kind of eternity as well. This can be done initially by the means of a careful consideration on the second book of Schopenhauer’s main work, in which he brings out the Idea as a metaphysical entity for the first time. It would follow unexpected consequences concerning Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Nature and even his Ethics.