SENTIMENTS AND UTILITY:

AN INVESTIGATION OF MORAL IN HUMEAN BASES

Authors

  • Matheus de Mesquita Silveira Universidade de Caxias do Sul - Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia;

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7443/problemata.v11i5.52093

Keywords:

Sentiments, Reason, Utility, Benevolence, Justice

Abstract

The article main purpose is to develop an argument concerning the central problem of Hume's practical philosophy. The initial approach consists in determine the influence that reason and sentiments have on how moral judgments are ordinarily made. It will be argued that the base of moral distinctions is found in sentiments, with reason having an instrumental role in the process. In order to explain which principle offers a north to sentiments and is the moral compass of individuals, the second point developed in this article converges to investigating moral sentiments and utility from the humean argument about the natural virtue of benevolence and the artificial virtue of justice. To answer these questions, the argument will be grounded essentially on the Investigations on the Principles of Morals, using the Treatise of Human Nature and Hume’s commentators when is necessary to reinforce or clarify a specific point.

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Author Biography

Matheus de Mesquita Silveira, Universidade de Caxias do Sul - Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia;

Professor do PPG Filosofia da Universidade de Caxias do Sul;

Pesquisador filiado ao International Wolf Center - Minnesota/EUA;

Doutor em Filosofia pela Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos - Período Sanduíche na City University of New York;

Mestre em Filosofia pela Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos - Período Sanduíche na Universidad de Buenos Aires;

Licenciatura e Bacharelado em Filosofia pela Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos;

References

AYER, A. J. 2003. Hume. São Paulo: Loyola.

BRITO, A. N. 2001. Hume e o empirismo na moral. Philósophos, Goiânia, v.6, n. 1 e 2, p.11-25.

HUME, D. 2000. Tratado da natureza humana: uma tentativa de introduzir o método experimental de raciocínio nos assuntos morais. Traduzido por Débora Danowski. São Paulo: Unesp.

________. 2004. Investigações sobre o entendimento humano e sobre os princípios da moral. Traduzido por José Oscar de Almeida Marques. São Paulo: Unesp.

________. 2004b. Ensaios morais, políticos e literários. Tradução de Luciano Trigo. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks.

QUIGLEY, C. 2006. Modern Mummies: the preservation of the human body in the twentieth century. Carolina do Norte: McFarland.

SCHNEEWIND, J. B. 2001. Hume e a virtude naturalizada. In: Schneewind, J. B. A invenção da autonomia: uma história da filosofia moral moderna. Traduzido por Magda França Lopes. São Leopoldo, Unisinos, p. 389-413.

SCHNALL, S.; HAIDT, J.; CLORE, G. L.; & JORDAN, A. H. 2008. Disgust as embodied moral judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, n. 34, pp. 1096–1109.

SILVA, A. L. O. & BRITO, A. N. 2007. Utilidade e simpatia: Hume contra o egoísmo cético. Controvérsia, v. 3, n. 1, p. 22-29.

STROUDT, B. 1977. Hume. London: Routledge.

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Published

2020-12-14

Issue

Vol. 11 No. 5 (2020)

Section

Papers

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