SARTRE’S CRITIC OF HUSSERL’S TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

Abstract

The Transcendental Ego is traditionally understood as responsible for unifying the multiplicity of apparitions seized by the subject. Sartre realizes that Husserl’s phenomenology helps us understand that intentional consciousness would not require the unifying pole. However, Husserl himself would make a transcendental turn, requiring this Ego – which himself has reject so far. Sartre would notice that husserlian’s phenomenology would make this Ego dispensable, showing us that the answer for the question about how consciousness would unify himself through the multiplicity of apparitions was already given in Husserl’s phenomenology. We intent to show in this paper that the resource to an I as an unifying pole would not be just unnecessary, but would also be an obstacle to understand the real meaning of intentionality as phenomenology would conceive - keeping in mind that the multiplicity of appearances would be unificated both internally, by the temporality, and externally, by the object pole.