Considerations concern the nature of perceptual experience
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v7i3.55680Keywords:
perceptual experience, hallucinatory experience, sense data theory, intentionalism, disjunctivismAbstract
On this paper I will present and I will discuss the sense data theory, the intentionalism and the disjunctivism on their pure versions, that is, according to which the nature of perceptual experiences is fundamentally a matter of sense data, intentional content and of the perceptual relation, respectively. For that, I will deal with some of the main arguments used to support these theories and of some criticism against them. Considering the problems that challenge them, it seems that none of them offer a satisfactory account to the nature of perceptual experiences.
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