The possibility of moral liability of the agent for unwanted results in the course of an intentional action: Study on intentional actions and conscious morally reckless actions within the scope of philosophy of mind

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v10i2.63313

Keywords:

Psychology, Philosophy of mind, Philosophy of language, intentionality

Abstract

In this work, I investigate some questions pertaining to intentional actions and consciously morally reckless actions, seeking to answer the question whether it is possible to morally hold the agent responsible morally for the unwanted results arising from his intentional actions. The first conclusion reached was that the result of an action that was not the object of the agent's intention is a mere consequence of the main action, however, the action that provoked it can be characterized as a consciously morally reckless action. The second conclusion is that, yes, the unwanted results arising from an intentional action are also the moral responsibility of the causative agent, therefore, it is reasonable to hold him responsible for this.

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Author Biography

Antonio Sanches Sólon Rudá, Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa

Ph.D. student (Ciências Criminais na Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Coimbra, Protugal, e MSc student (Teoria do Direito pela Fac. de Dir da Univ de Lisboa). Membro da Fundação Internacional de Ciências Penais. E-mail: antoniosolonruda@gmail.com

References

BLONDEL, Maurice. L’Action (1893). Essai d’une critique de la vie et d’une Science de la pratique. Presses Universitaires de France. Quadrige. 2007.

DAVIDSON, Donald., Essays on actions and events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.

FLOR, Geovano Prudencio. Responsabilidade Moral. Disponível em: https://bit.ly/3ypLrv1.

HEATHER, Nick e SEGAL, Gabriel. Understanding addiction: Donald Davidson and the problem of akrasia. Article in Addiction Research and Theory · October 2013. Disponível em https://bit.ly/3eP2D5h, consulta realizada em 16 de maio de 2021, às 17:00hs.

LECLERC, André. Uma introdução à filosofia da mente. Curitiba: Appris, 2018, p. 109.

MELE, Alfred R. e MOSER, Paul K. Intentional Action. Basil Blackwell, 1994.

SORRENTINO, Beatriz. O agente apagado: o papel do agente nas explicações de ações. Tese de doutorado. Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade de São Paulo. 2015. Disponível em https://bit.ly/3vTsbUS. Consulta realizada em 08 de maio de 2021.

Additional Files

Published

2023-10-31

How to Cite

Sólon Rudá, A. S. (2023). The possibility of moral liability of the agent for unwanted results in the course of an intentional action: Study on intentional actions and conscious morally reckless actions within the scope of philosophy of mind. Aufklärung, 10(2), p.177–186. https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v10i2.63313

Issue

Vol. 10 No. 2 (2023): May-August

Section

Articles

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