Argumentative-conceptuals analises about the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus of Ludwig Wittgenstein

Abstract

The work of Ludwig Wittgenstein called Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, at the same time that represents a great contribution to a change of conception concerning the language and it’s capacities to deal with the reality and a comprehension of the external world, brings within itself  a series of argumentative/conceptual problems as well, which seem that have got out of author’s control, revealing a polemic work with a strong presence in the debates about Philosophy Of Language and Ontology. The dogmatic aspect, compounding a work grounding on aphorisms, brings a reflection almost entirely subjective and internal to a new system peculiar to Wittgenstein, generating certainly many doubts about the power of it to establish a public consensus. Putting this aside, it is also convenient to notice that the author himself, when decides to deal with the definition of sensible concepts of the Philosophy, turns out entering in contradictions with his own words many times, revealing, maybe, why he had had abandoned these text’s ideas to assume a more pragmatical posture in his later works. We will see how and where some of these contradictions occur, making as well a dialog with another authors in order to have a more diverse comprehension of the terms treated.