RECOGNITION ETHIC REVISITED

Abstract

In this article, the idea of ethics of recognition is rethought in order to make possible a proposal: such an idea is an alternative to the ethical violence exercised by the moral discourses that are claimed to be absolute and universal, since these discourses trust and sustain themselves on the rationality of the subject considered free and autonomous. After briefly reviewing the concept of subject, elaborated mainly by Kant, the article analyzes Hegel's recognition and critique of Michel Foucault's notion of subject, but takes as its starting point the perspective of the American philosopher Judith Butler - strongly inspired in the ideas of Adriana Cavarero. For Butler, the question of the moral subject arises when we are called to say who we are, that is, to describe ourselves. Butler's originality is given to the extent that she recognizes that a discourse is never authentic and the subject remains opaque. Rather than being treated as a problem, it is from the apprehension of these epistemological limits that recognition is grounded. But for it to be better presented as an alternative to normative and violent discourses, Butler's ethics of recognition may perhaps be complemented by Foucault's idea of ethics as a critic.