CHARLES LARMORE:

THE QUESTION OF REASONABLE DISAGREE

Authors

  • Elnora Gondim UFPI

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7443/problemata.v11i5.52651

Keywords:

reasonable disagreement, pluralism, liberalism, intuitionism, contextualism

Abstract

The present text deals with Charles Larmore's theory, more precisely, of the relations between the conceptions of reasonable disagreement, pluralism and liberalism. Such a theory has as its characteristics rational intuitionism, contextualism and defends a realistic position of morality.

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Author Biography

Elnora Gondim, UFPI

doutorado/filosofia/PUCRS

References

Atzori, Claudia, La proposta liberal di Charles Larmore nel dibattito post rawlsiano. Https://www.cosmopolisonline.it/articolo.php?numero=XIII12016&id=9

Fanton, Marcos (2015), O princípio do respeito igual como a melhor resposta às experiências da modernidade: a filosofia política de Charles Larmore. São Paulo: Cadernos de Ética e Filosofia Política. Número 27.

Galston, William A. (1999), Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism: Three Sources of Liberal Theory. , 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 869, http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss3/9.

Larmore, C. (1987), Patterns of Moral Complexity . New York: Cambridge University Press.

Larmore, Charles. (1994), Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement, New York: Social Philosophy and Policy.

Larmore, C. (1996), Morals of Modernity. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Larmore, C. (1999), The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism, New York: Journal of Philosophy.

Nussbaum, Martha C. (2011), Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism, Philosophy & Public Affairs 39, no. 1.

Mason, Elinor. (2018), Value Pluralism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/value-pluralism/

Young, Shaun. (2012), Illusions of difference? Larmore’s political liberalism. New York: Journal of Philosophy, p. 102

Published

2020-12-13

Issue

Section

Papers