A Teoria Principal-Agente e a Delegação de Autoridade

Os mecanismos de controle dos EUA no impedimento de funcionamento do órgão de apelação da OMC

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22478/ufpb.2318-9452.2026v13n26.71393

Abstract

This article applies the principal-agent (PA) theory to States and International Organizations (IOs), with the aim of analyzing the advantages and disadvantages, as well as what motivates the delegation of authority from the former to the latter. Among the main institutions for mediating international interests, the World Trade Organization (WTO) stands out, which is important in strengthening and maintaining multilateral trade. The work therefore presents how the WTO works as an agent in promoting international trade, highlighting the relevance and agency of the Appellate Body in mediating disputes between the organization's member states. However, a threat to the autonomy of the WTO was observed in the face of the control mechanism exercised by the United States in the appointment of judges to compose the Appellate Body, making the body's performance impossible and giving room to question the adequate autonomy delegated to the OI , which highlights the interference of the United States as the main among the main.

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Published

2026-05-21

How to Cite

Oliveira Gomes, L. (2026). A Teoria Principal-Agente e a Delegação de Autoridade: Os mecanismos de controle dos EUA no impedimento de funcionamento do órgão de apelação da OMC. Journal of Scientific Initiation on International Relations, 13(26), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.22478/ufpb.2318-9452.2026v13n26.71393

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Artigos