On the possession and attribution problems for collective know-how
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.69933Palavras-chave:
Know-how, Group know-how, Know-how attributions, Collective states, Non-propositional intentionalityResumo
In this paper, I examine two issues that any account of know-how, but particularly an account of group know-how, needs to deal with: the possession problem, which is the need to explain how a group can be in a state of knowing how to do something, and the attribution problem, which is the need to account for the conditions in which it is admissible to attribute know-how to a group. I argue that (despite some initial appearances) they are independent problems, which is specially important in the context of theories where know-how cannot in general be reduced to proposition-oriented attitudes.
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