[Authority and Defeatability of Judicial Precedent: An Analysis Based on Joseph Raz's Theory]
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v12i2.72347Keywords:
precedents, authority, defeasibility, Joseph Raz, stare decisisAbstract
This paper examines the authority of precedents in common law systems, focusing on the debate about their nature and how the doctrine of stare decisis binds judges to past decisions. Based on Joseph Raz's theory of authority, precedents are analyzed as protected reasons, which exclude dependent reasons from previous decisions in subsequent cases. Finally, the article discusses the defeasibility of precedents through processes of distinction and overruling, without violating stare decisis. The flexibility in applying precedents depends on the decision-making context, while their rigidity increases with the reinforcement of decisions.
Downloads
References
DUXBURY, Neil. The nature and authority of precedents. Oxford University Press, 2008.
CROSS, Rupert. The House of Lords and the doctrine of precedent. In: Law, morality and society: essays in honour of H. L. A. Hart. Oxford University Press, 1977.
EHRENBERG, Kenneth. Joseph Raz’s theory of authority. Philosophy Compass, v. 6, n. 12, 2011, p. 884-894.
HART, Herbert. L. A. O conceito de direito. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1994.
LAMOND, Grant. Do precedents create rules? Legal Theory, v. 11, 2005, p. 1-26.
LAMOND. Precedent. Philosophy Compass, v. 2, n. 5, 2007, p. 699-711.
LAMOND. The doctrine of precedent and the rule of recognition. In: EDICOTT, Timothy; KRISTJÁNSSON, Hafsteinn Dan; LEWIS, Sebastian. Philosophical foundations of precedent. Oxford University Press, 2023, p. 21-34.
LEGGATT, George A. M. Precedent in English law. Harris Society Annual Lecture, 26 abr. 2024. Disponível em: https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-leggatt-240426.pdf.
RAZ, Joseph. The authority of law. Oxford University Press, 1979.
RAZ, Joseph. Authority and justification. Philosophy & Public Affairs, v. 14, n.1, 1985, p. 03-29.
RAZ, Joseph. Practical reason and norms. Oxford University Press, 1999.
SCHAUER, Frederick. Precedent. Stanford Law Review, v. 39, n. 3, fev. 1987, p. 571-605.
SCHAUER, Frederick. On the supposed defeasibility of legal rules. Current Legal Problems, v. 51, n. 1, 1998, p. 223-240.
SCHAUER, Frederick. Is defeasibility an essential property of law? In: FERRER BELTRÁN, Jordi; RATTI, Giovanni Battisti. The logic of legal requirements: essays on defeasibility. Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 77-88.
SHECAIRA, Fábio Perin. Precedent and the source-norm distinction. In: EDICOTT, Timothy; KRISTJÁNSSON, Hafsteinn Dan; LEWIS, Sebastian. Philosophical foundations of precedent. Oxford University Press, 2023, p. 320-334.
SIMPSON, A. W. B. The ratio decidendi of a case and the doctrine of binding precedent. In: GUEST, A. G. Oxford essays on jurisprudence, 1ª ed., 1961.
UNITED STATES, Supreme Court of. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. Disponível em: <>.
Additional Files
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Journal general policy
1.This journal works under a Creative Commons License aplied to online journals. That icence can be read in the following link: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
2.Accordingly to this License, a)the journal declares that authors hold the copyright of their articles without restrictions, and they can archieve them as post-print elsewhere. b)the journal allow the author(s) to retain publishing rights without restrictions.
Metadata Policy for information describing items in the repository
1. Anyone may access the metadata free of charge at anytime.
2.The metadata may be re-used in any medium without prior permission, even commercial purposes provided the OAI Identifier or a link to the original metadata record are given, under the terms of a CC BY license refered for the Journal.
