AUTONOMY AND HETERONOMY IN ETHICS AND RIGHT ACCORDING TO KANT

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7443/problemata.v15i1.68577

Keywords:

Freedom, Will, Choice, Duty, Virtue

Abstract

Kant distinguishes ethics from right since ethics demands that action happens objectively and subjectively determined by duty, while right demands only that action objectively happens according to duty, although it subjectively allows the subject to be pathologically moved by inclinations. Autonomy demands two things simultaneously: objectively, the duty must result from practical reason; but, subjectively, the motive of the action must be respected for duty. The juridical duty comes from external legislation, it fulfills the objective condition because it stems from the determination of the form of external relation between the choices by the will, but it does not have to fulfill the subjective condition, because it is indifferent regarding the motive for the choice to carry out the action, provided the action be externally in conformity with duty. Nevertheless, as the internal legislation also refers to juridical duty, it is possible to subjectively follow the juridical law out of respect but provided that the juridical duty be converted into an indirect ethical duty.

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References

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Published

2024-06-30

Issue

Vol. 15 No. 1 (2024)

Section

Papers

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