The value of testimonial-based beliefs in the face of AI-generated quasi-testimony

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.70023

Palavras-chave:

Trust, Testimony, AI, Epistemology, Social normativity

Resumo

The value of testimony as a source of knowledge has been a subject of epistemological debates. The "trust theory of testimony" suggests that human testimony is based on an affective relationship supported by social norms. However, the advent of generative artificial intelligence challenges our understanding of genuine testimony. The concept of "quasi-testimony" seeks to characterize utterances produced by non-human entities that mimic testimony but lack certain fundamental attributes. This article analyzes these issues in depth, exploring philosophical perspectives on testimony and the implications of conversational AI technologies on our epistemic practices.

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Biografia do Autor

Felipe Álvarez, Universidad Andrés Bello

Felipe Álvarez holds a Master’s in Philosophy from the Universidad de Chile. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at the University of Chile, while working as an adjunct assistant professor at the Universidad Andrés Bello. His areas of interest are contemporary epistemology and social ontology, with a focus on testimony and the Internet.

Ruth Espinosa, Universidad Andrés Bello

Ruth Espinosa holds a PhD in Philosophy from the University of Leipzig (Germany) and a Master’s in Philosophy with a specialization in epistemology from the University of Chile. Her research areas include modern and contemporary epistemology. She currently serves as the Head of the Department of Humanities and General Education at Universidad Andrés Bello (Chile).

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Arquivos adicionais

Publicado

2024-11-06

Como Citar

Álvarez, F., & Espinosa, R. (2024). The value of testimonial-based beliefs in the face of AI-generated quasi-testimony. Aufklärung: Journal of Philosophy, 11(Especial), p.25–38. https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.70023

Edição

v. 11 n. Especial (2024): Philosophy of Cognition & Language

Seção

Artigos

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