The El valor de las creencias testimoniales ante los quasi-testimonios producidos por IA generativa

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.70023

Keywords:

Confianza, Testimonio, AI, Epistemología, Normatividad social

Abstract

El valor del testimonio como fuente de conocimiento ha sido sujeto de debates epistemológicos. La “trust theory of testimony”, por ejemplo, sugiere que el testimonio humano se basa en una relación afectiva fundada en las normas sociales. Sin embargo, el surgimiento de la inteligencia artificial generativa desafía nuestro entendimiento del testimonio genuino. Así, el concepto de “quasi-testimonio” busca caracterizar las afirmaciones realizadas por entidades no-humanas que imitan el testimonio, pero que carecen de ciertos atributos fundamentales. Este artículo analiza ese problema en profundidad, explorando las perspectivas filosóficas en torno al testimonio y las implicaciones de las tecnologías de IA conversacionales en nuestras practicas epistémicas.

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Author Biographies

Felipe Álvarez, Universidad Andrés Bello

Felipe Álvarez holds a Master’s in Philosophy from the Universidad de Chile. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at the University of Chile, while working as an adjunct assistant professor at the Universidad Andrés Bello. His areas of interest are contemporary epistemology and social ontology, with a focus on testimony and the Internet.

Ruth Espinosa, Universidad Andrés Bello

Ruth Espinosa holds a PhD in Philosophy from the University of Leipzig (Germany) and a Master’s in Philosophy with a specialization in epistemology from the University of Chile. Her research areas include modern and contemporary epistemology. She currently serves as the Head of the Department of Humanities and General Education at Universidad Andrés Bello (Chile).

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Additional Files

Published

2024-11-06

How to Cite

Álvarez, F., & Espinosa, R. (2024). The El valor de las creencias testimoniales ante los quasi-testimonios producidos por IA generativa. Aufklärung, 11(Especial), p.25–38. https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.70023

Issue

Vol. 11 No. Especial (2024): Filosofia da Cognição & da Linguagem

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Articles

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