Constitution View Of The Person

Authors

  • Wellistony Carvalho Viana Universidade Federal do Piauí, UFPI

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.2016.22726

Keywords:

metaphysics of person, personal identity, Constitution View, Physicalism

Abstract

According to the Constitution View (CV), the person is not identical to his body or even to his psychological states. What makes a Person1 at t1 the same Person2 at t2 is his first-person perspective (FPP). The person would be then constituted by one body, but not identical to it. The present paper raises some criticisms of the Constitution View of L. R. Baker, which redirect to a non-physicalist form of putting the problem of personal identity, different from that of Baker.

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Author Biography

Wellistony Carvalho Viana, Universidade Federal do Piauí, UFPI

Wellistony C. Viana é doutor em filosofia pela Hochschule für Philosophie de Munique-Alemanha. É coordenador e professor do curso de filosofia do ICESPI (Instituto Católico de Estudos Superiores do Piauí) e membro do corpo docente do mestrado em ética e epistemologia da UFPI.

References

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Revista Aufklärung. v. 2, n. 1 (2015), Janeiro-Junho

Additional Files

Published

2015-02-09

How to Cite

Viana, W. C. (2015). Constitution View Of The Person. Aufklärung, 2(1), p.27–44. https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.2016.22726

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 1 (2015): Revista Aufklärung. v. 2, n. 1 (2015), Janeiro-Junho

Section

Articles

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