The theory of knowledge as critical social theory in Habermas

Abstract

By confronting himself with the reduction of theory of knowledge in a positive theoretical Science performed by August Comte’s positivism, Habermas is challenged to streamline his argumentations in terms of a readjustment of the theory of knowledge as a critical social theory. We want to reconstruct his argumentations in order to comprehend that the concept of interest of reason is the fundament to the formulation of his critical social theory, especially in what concerns to the connection between knowledge and interest as a methodological discovery that has the purpose of serving as a regulative paradigm. From this, we will develop the correlative idea of self-reflection from psychoanalysis, which intends to extract from positivism itself a therapeutic orientation. By walking in this argumentative way we intend to come to the theory of knowledge as a critical social theory, as proposed by Habermas.