A teoria representacional da mente e a psicologia do senso-comum
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v8iesp.60021Keywords:
representações mentais, explicações psicológicas, behaviorismo, WittgensteinAbstract
O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar algumas vantagens das teorias representacional e computacional da mente quando comparadas a outras visões, especialmente o behaviorismo. A ideia é que as teorias representacionais e computacionais nos permitem conceber atitudes proposicionais (estados mentais, como crenças e desejos) de uma forma que preserva duas características essenciais que consideramos que elas têm nas explicações psicológicas do senso comum: avaliabilidade semântica e eficácia causal. O Behaviorismo reconcebe os estados mentais de uma forma que não preserva essas características essenciais. Ao fazer isso, o sucesso da psicologia do senso comum torna-se um mistério. Ilustro algumas das dificuldades que o behaviorismo enfrenta ao considerar e criticar a abordagem de Wittgenstein da compreensão linguística. O resultado é que as teorias representacionais e computacionais da mente fazem um trabalho melhor em defender a psicologia do senso comum e, portanto, devem ser preferidas em comparação com o behaviorismo.
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