Sobre los problemas de posesión y atribución para el saber cómo colectivo

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.69933

Keywords:

Saber como, Saber como grupal, Atribuciones de saber como, Estados colectivos, Intencionalidad no-proposicional

Abstract

En este ensayo, examino dos problemas que cualquier teoría del saber cómo y en particular una teoría del saber como grupal debe tratar: el problema de la posesión, que es la necesidad de explicar como un grupo puede estar en un estado de saber como hacer algo, y el problema de la atribución, que es la necesidad de dar cuenta de las condiciones en las que es admisible atribuir saber como a un grupo. Argumento que (a pesar de ciertas apariencias iniciales) estos problemas son independientes, lo que es especialmente importante en el contexto de teorías del saber cómo donde este no puede en general reducirse a actitudes proposicionales.

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Author Biography

Felipe Morales Carbonell, Universidad de Chile

Felipe Morales Carbonell did his PhD at KU Leuven, Belgium. He is currently a postdoctoral researcher at Universidad de Chile. He works on know-how, abilities, imagination, and modal epistemology.

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Additional Files

Published

2024-11-06

How to Cite

Morales Carbonell, F. (2024). Sobre los problemas de posesión y atribución para el saber cómo colectivo. Aufklärung, 11(Especial), p.87–102. https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.69933

Issue

Vol. 11 No. Especial (2024): Filosofia da Cognição & da Linguagem

Section

Articles

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