Descriptive names and singular thoughts

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.69966

Keywords:

Singular thought, Mental files, Acquaintance, Cognition, Identification and tracking

Abstract

The aim of this text is to discuss a tension in the philosophy of language involving descriptive names. Descriptive names are those introduced or fixed in language through a definite description. The debate centers on whether the introduction of a name into discourse generates a new singular thought, i.e., a direct thought about an object that is not mediated by a definite description. Gareth Evans (1982) argues that descriptive names are incapable of producing singular thoughts, whereas David Kaplan (1989) contends that names introduced through a description do generate new singular thoughts. We will present two proposed solutions to this tension, those of Marga Reimer and Recanati. Both are considered attempts to reconcile the views of Evans and Kaplan. However, I will argue that these solutions are not truly reconciliatory. Lastly, I introduce a notion of singular thought inspired by Robin Jeshion (2010) and Imogen Dickie (2020), which establishes the focus of attention as the foundation for the formation of singular thoughts and explains how descriptive names can generate direct thoughts.

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Author Biography

Max da Costa, Universidade Federal do Paraná

Max William Alexandre da Costa é doutor em filosofia pela UFPR. Vem desenvolvendo há quase dez anos uma investigação sobre pensamentos singulares e cognição, como base para a compreensão da semântica de nomes próprios e outros aspectos da linguagem. Tem como principais interesses: semântica, teoria da referência, ciências cognitivas e computação. Gosta muito de animais, e de estudar na companhia deles.

References

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DICKIE, I. We are acquainted with ordinary things. In: JESHION, R. (Ed.) New essays on singular thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 213-245.

DICKIE, I. Fixing reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

DICKIE, I. Cognitive focus. In: GOODMAN, R.; GENONE, J.; KROLL, N. (Ed.) Singular thought and mental files. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. p. 223-250.

DONNELLAN, K. Reference and definite descriptions. Philosophical Review, v. 75, p. 281-330, 1968.

EVANS, G. The varieties of reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.

GOODMAN, R. Goodman, R. . On the supposed connection between proper names and singular thoughts. Synthese, v. 195, p. 197-223, 2016.

GOODMAN, R.; GENONE, J.; KROLL, N. (Ed.) Singular thought and mental files. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.

GOODMAN, R. Mental Filing. Noûs, v p. 204-226, 2022.

HURRY, D. A. Vindicating Evans: a defense of Evans' theory of singular thought. 2021.

Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia) – University of Western Ontario, Ontario, Canadá.

Disponível em: <https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/7655>.

JESHION, R. (Ed.) New essays on singular thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

JESHION, R. Singular thought: acquaintance, semantic instrumentalism, and cognitivism. In: JESHION, R. (Ed.) New essays on singular thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 105-141.

KAPLAN, D. Demonstratives: an essay on the semantics, logic, metaphysics, and epistemology of demonstratives and other indexicals. In: ALMOG, J.; WETTSTEIN, H.; PERRY, J. (Ed.) Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989a. p. 481-564.

KAPLAN, D. Afterthoughts. In: ALMOG, J.; WETTSTEIN, H.; PERRY, J. (Ed.) Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989b. p. 565-614.

KRIPKE, Naming and necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.

RECANATI, F. Mental files. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

RECANATI, F. Coreference de jure. In GOODMAN, R.; GENONE, J.; KROLL, N. (Ed.) Singular thought and mental files. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. p. 161-186.

REIMER, M. Descriptive names and singular thought. In: GOODMAN, R.; GENONE, J.; KROLL, N. (Ed.) Singular thought and mental files. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. p. 38-51.

Additional Files

Published

2024-11-06

How to Cite

da Costa, M. (2024). Descriptive names and singular thoughts. Aufklärung, 11(Especial), p.55–66. https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.69966

Issue

Vol. 11 No. Especial (2024): Filosofia da Cognição & da Linguagem

Section

Articles

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