The change of topic objection in Herman Cappelen’s austerity framework of conceptual engineering
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.70029Keywords:
Conceptual engineering; Conceptual ethics; Change of topic; Verbal disputes., Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Change of topic, Verbal disputesAbstract
This paper examines the change of subject problem in conceptual engineering, focusing on Herman Cappelen's austere approach. We present two versions of the problem: the verbal disputes objection and the content instability objection. We analyze how Cappelen addresses these objections using the notions of "topic" and "topic similarity". We argue that while his response to the verbal disputes objection is satisfactory, his approach fails to adequately deal with the content instability objection. Specifically, Cappelen does not provide sufficient resources to identify the incompatible content that grounds substantive disagreements in cases involving revised terms. We conclude that Cappelen's austere approach, despite its contributions, leaves important questions unanswered about how to characterize legitimate disagreements in conceptual engineering contexts.
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