A diversidade do novo mecanicismo na ciência cognitiva: uma análise das propostas de Bechtel e Piccinini
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.69945Palavras-chave:
Novo Mecanicismo, Ciência Cognitiva Teórica, Filosofia da Ciência Cognitiva, Integração Científica Teórica, Filosofia da MenteResumo
Autores proeminentes do novo mecanicismo na ciência cognitiva propõem integrar e unificar o campo teoricamente por meio da articulação de uma teoria mecanicista da cognição humana. O trabalho de William Bechtel e de Gualtiero Piccinini são exemplos desta proposta. Contudo, um projeto de unificação ambicioso como esse encontra uma série de obstáculos na ciência cognitiva, tradicionalmente caracterizada por fragmentação, dispersividade e diversidade teórica. Neste trabalho, eu mostro as diferenças substanciais nas diferentes versões das propostas teóricas apresentadas nos textos de Bechtel e Piccinini. A partir desta análise, eu argumento que as propostas de unificação ou integração apresentadas por eles, baseadas na teoria mecanicista da cognição humana, são inadequadas, porque existe uma grande variedade de versões da teoria entre os seus próprios defensores mais influentes.
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