The diversity of new mechanism in cognitive science: an analysis of the proposals of Bechtel and Piccinini

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.69945

Keywords:

New Mechanism, Theoretical Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Theoretical Scientific Integration, Philosophy of Mind

Abstract

Prominent authors of new mechanism in cognitive science propose to integrate and unify the field theoretically through the articulation of a mechanistic theory of human cognition. The work of William Bechtel and Gualtiero Piccinini are examples of this proposal. However, an ambitious unification project like this encounters a series of obstacles in cognitive science, traditionally characterized by fragmentation, dispersiveness and theoretical diversity. In this work, I show the substantial differences in the different versions of the theoretical proposals presented on the works of Bechtel and Piccinini. Based on this analysis, I argue that the unification or integration proposals presented by them, based on the mechanistic theory of human cognition, are inadequate, because there is a wide variety of versions of the theory among its own most influential defenders.

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Author Biography

Diego Leite, Universidade Federal de Alfenas

Diego Azevedo Leite possui Graduação (2011) e Mestrado (2014) em Psicologia pela Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF). Possui também Doutorado em Ciência Cognitiva (2018) pela Universidade de Trento (Itália), validado no Brasil pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG). Foi Doutorando Visitante no Instituto de Ciência Cognitiva (Institut für Kognitionswissenschaft - IKW) na Universidade de Osnabrück (Alemanha), por um período de seis meses (de 10/2015 a 03/2016). Atualmente, trabalha com Psicologia Cognitiva Educacional na Universidade Federal de Alfenas (UNIFAL-MG).

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Additional Files

Published

2024-11-06

How to Cite

Leite, D. (2024). The diversity of new mechanism in cognitive science: an analysis of the proposals of Bechtel and Piccinini. Aufklärung, 11(Especial), p.39–54. https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.69945

Issue

Vol. 11 No. Especial (2024): Filosofia da Cognição & da Linguagem

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