A diversidade do novo mecanicismo na ciência cognitiva: uma análise das propostas de Bechtel e Piccinini

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.69945

Palavras-chave:

Novo Mecanicismo, Ciência Cognitiva Teórica, Filosofia da Ciência Cognitiva, Integração Científica Teórica, Filosofia da Mente

Resumo

Autores proeminentes do novo mecanicismo na ciência cognitiva propõem integrar e unificar o campo teoricamente por meio da articulação de uma teoria mecanicista da cognição humana. O trabalho de William Bechtel e de Gualtiero Piccinini são exemplos desta proposta. Contudo, um projeto de unificação ambicioso como esse encontra uma série de obstáculos na ciência cognitiva, tradicionalmente caracterizada por fragmentação, dispersividade e diversidade teórica. Neste trabalho, eu mostro as diferenças substanciais nas diferentes versões das propostas teóricas apresentadas nos textos de Bechtel e Piccinini. A partir desta análise, eu argumento que as propostas de unificação ou integração apresentadas por eles, baseadas na teoria mecanicista da cognição humana, são inadequadas, porque existe uma grande variedade de versões da teoria entre os seus próprios defensores mais influentes.

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Biografia do Autor

Diego Leite, Universidade Federal de Alfenas

Diego Azevedo Leite possui Graduação (2011) e Mestrado (2014) em Psicologia pela Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF). Possui também Doutorado em Ciência Cognitiva (2018) pela Universidade de Trento (Itália), validado no Brasil pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG). Foi Doutorando Visitante no Instituto de Ciência Cognitiva (Institut für Kognitionswissenschaft - IKW) na Universidade de Osnabrück (Alemanha), por um período de seis meses (de 10/2015 a 03/2016). Atualmente, trabalha com Psicologia Cognitiva Educacional na Universidade Federal de Alfenas (UNIFAL-MG).

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Arquivos adicionais

Publicado

2024-11-06

Como Citar

Leite, D. (2024). A diversidade do novo mecanicismo na ciência cognitiva: uma análise das propostas de Bechtel e Piccinini. Aufklärung: Journal of Philosophy, 11(Especial), p.39–54. https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.69945