The Gadamer-Habermas debate: an essay on the apparent dichotomy between tradition and autonomy in philosophical hermeneutics

Abstract

This article aims to discuss, under the dialectic method, the problem of interpretation, from the positions of Gadamer and Habermas, regarding the apparent dichotomy between tradition and autonomy in philosophical hermeneutics. With regard to Gadamerian philosophical theory, the interest is to understand what happens or supervene reason why factors linked to tradition, modus vivendi, as well as the historicity of the social context are taken into account. It is concluded, regarding Gadamer´s position, that the fundamental historicity of this act means that it is no longer possible to continue thinking the truth as something ready, that would simply have to be discovered. Instead, the truth happens, it takes place. As for Habermas, the insufficiency of understanding is identified, since the relevance would be in what to do with what is understood. The habermasian emphasis would be beyond what is done of tradition, in the ability to criticize, separating in it what is valid and what is no longer acceptable, so understanding cannot be everything. It is, instead, just a moment alongside criticism. As a result, from Paul Ricoeur, it was seen that the supposed dichotomy between tradition and autonomy is merely hypothetical and appears much more apparent than real or effective. The idea of thinking them together is more tangible and even productive. Separating them into different hermeneutic fields is dysfunctional, since they invariably end up complementing each other.